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Smt. Saraswati v. Tulsi Ram Seth Etc.

Delhi High Court
Sep 2, 1970
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Factual and Procedural Background

A suit was filed by the plaintiff-respondent seeking recovery of Rs. 14,722.61 and a mandatory injunction for possession under Section 66 of the Specific Relief Act. During the trial, Mr. Hans Raj Sawhney, a Senior Advocate representing the defendant, sought to examine certain witnesses. The plaintiff's counsel objected, contending that as a senior advocate, Mr. Sawhney was prohibited from 'acting' in court, which includes examining or cross-examining witnesses. The Subordinate Judge upheld this view by an order dated November 28, 1967, holding that examination and cross-examination of witnesses constituted 'acting,' thus barring a senior advocate from such activities. A revision petition against this order was filed and referred to a larger bench for determination of this important legal question.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a senior advocate, designated under the Advocates Act, 1961 and Supreme Court Rules, is debarred from examining or cross-examining witnesses on the ground that such activity amounts to 'acting' in court, which senior advocates are prohibited from doing.
  2. Whether the terms 'act' and 'pleading' as used in the Advocates Act, Bar Council Rules, Supreme Court Rules, and Code of Civil Procedure include or exclude examination and cross-examination of witnesses.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The words ‘act’ and ‘pleading’ have distinct meanings; ‘act’ should be restricted to filing appearances, pleadings, or applications, excluding examination of witnesses and audience rights, which fall under ‘pleading’.
  • Examination and cross-examination of witnesses are part of pleading and do not amount to ‘acting’ as prohibited for senior advocates.
  • Restrictions on senior advocates giving ‘advice on evidence’ relate to pre-trial stages and do not imply prohibition on examination of witnesses during trial.
  • Practical considerations indicate that if examination of witnesses were included within ‘acting,’ senior advocates would be unduly restricted from performing original work in trials, which is undesirable.
  • Previous authoritative case law supports the distinction that examination and cross-examination are not ‘acting’ but part of pleading.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The term ‘acting’ as used in the Advocates Act, Bar Council Rules, and Supreme Court Rules includes examination and cross-examination of witnesses.
  • Since senior advocates are prohibited from ‘acting’ in court, they cannot examine or cross-examine witnesses.
  • Rule (c) of Chapter 1 of Part VI of the Rules governing Advocates prohibits senior advocates from giving ‘advice on evidence,’ which is argued to imply prohibition on examination of witnesses.
  • Relied on case law such as The Governor-General in Council v. Bhagwan Sahai and Govind Narain v. Smt. Chhoti Devi, which held that examination and cross-examination constitute ‘acting’.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Harchand Ray Gobordon Das v. B.N Ry. Co., A.I.R 1916 Cal. 1811 Distinction between ‘act’ and right of audience; recognized agent has no right of audience under Order 3 Rule 1 CPC. Supported the view that ‘act’ does not include right of audience or pleading.
Eastern Tavoy Minerals Corporation, Ltd. ‘To plead’ is distinct from ‘act’ under Order 3 Rules 1 and 2 CPC; recognized agent has no right to audience. Reinforced distinction between ‘act’ and ‘pleading’.
Jivan Lal v. Ram Rattan, A.I.R 1936 Oudh 261 Recognized agent can appear and take necessary steps but cannot plead or argue. Supported the restricted meaning of ‘act’ excluding pleading and arguing.
Thayarammal v. Kuppuswami Naidu, A.I.R 1937 Mad. 937 Right to appear does not include right to plead; Order 3 Rules 1 and 2 CPC do not confer right to plead. Confirmed that ‘act’ is limited to procedural steps, not pleading.
Aswin Shambhuprasad Patel v. National Rayon Corporation Ltd, A.I.R 1955 Bom. 262 ‘Appearance, application or act’ does not include pleading; right of audience and examination of witnesses are part of pleading. Held examination and cross-examination are not ‘acting’ but part of pleading.
Panna Lal v. Deoji Dhanji, A.I.R 1955 M.B 109 ‘Act’ means taking procedural steps; recognized agent cannot examine or cross-examine witnesses. Supported distinction and held examination is part of pleading, not ‘acting’.
Samdukhan v. Madan Lal, A.I.R 1959 Raj. 35 Order 3 Rule 1 CPC excludes pleading and arguing from ‘acting’. Approved earlier cases and the restricted meaning of ‘act’.
The Governor-General in Council v. Bhagwan Sahai, A.I.R 1948 E.P 61 Pleading and acting are distinct; recognized agent can cross-examine witnesses as examination is ‘acting’. Relied upon by respondent; court found no detailed discussion on why examination is ‘acting’.
Govind Narain v. Smt. Chhoti Devi, A.I.R 1966 Raj. 170 Examination and cross-examination are ‘acting’ and not ‘pleading’; no pleader allowed to examine witnesses without Vakalatnama. Respondent relied on this; court found the reasoning based on practice, not statutory rule.
In re, Fuzzle Alt ‘Act’ means doing something as agent recognized by the court, such as filing documents. Approved the narrower meaning of ‘act’ as procedural steps.
Kali Kumar Roy v. Nobin Chunder Chuckerburty, I.L.R. 1881 Cal. 685 ‘To act’ means taking necessary litigation steps on behalf of a client in court. Supported limited scope of ‘acting’ to procedural acts.
Sawarmal v. Kurrjilal, A.I.R 1939 Rang. 1 Presentation or filing of appeal is ‘acting’; ministerial function recognized. Confirmed ‘acting’ includes filing and presentation but not trial conduct.
Nadella Satyanarayana v. Venkata Subbiah, A.I.R 1957 A.P. 172 Presentation of application without proper authority is irregularity; ‘acting’ includes applying in court. Reiterated ‘acting’ as procedural acts before trial stage.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined statutory provisions under the Advocates Act, 1961, Bar Council of India Rules, and Supreme Court Rules, noting that the restrictions on senior advocates pertain to filing appearances, pleadings, and applications, collectively termed as ‘acting’. The court analyzed the distinction between ‘act’ and ‘pleading’ as used in Order III of the Code of Civil Procedure and found consistent judicial interpretations limiting ‘act’ to procedural steps such as filing documents and appearances, while ‘pleading’ includes audience rights, addressing the court, and examination and cross-examination of witnesses.

Precedents were reviewed, including decisions from Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, and other High Courts, which predominantly held that examination and cross-examination are parts of pleading and not ‘acting’. The court found the contrary decisions relied upon by the respondent, which treated examination as ‘acting’, lacked sufficient statutory or rule-based foundation and were based on assumptions or practice rather than explicit legal provisions.

The court also considered the practical implications, observing that including examination of witnesses within ‘acting’ would unduly restrict senior advocates from performing essential trial functions, thus disadvantaging litigants and burdening the legal system. The court concluded that the prohibition on senior advocates ‘acting’ does not extend to examining or cross-examining witnesses, which falls within their right to plead and address the court.

Accordingly, the court set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge that barred the senior advocate from examining witnesses and held that senior advocates are competent to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Holding and Implications

The court held that a senior advocate is not prohibited from examining or cross-examining witnesses, as such activities do not constitute ‘acting’ within the meaning of the Advocates Act, Bar Council Rules, or Supreme Court Rules.

The direct effect is that senior advocates may participate fully in the trial process, including examination and cross-examination of witnesses. This decision clarifies the scope of restrictions on senior advocates, ensuring they are not unduly limited in their trial functions. No new precedent was set beyond the clarification of existing rules and their interpretation, and the matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

Show all summary ...

Rajindar Sachar, J.:— The question that requires determination in this petition is whether a senior advocate, designated under the Advocates Act, 1961 and Supreme Court Rules, is debarred from examining or cross-examining the witnesses as this would amount to ‘acting’ in a court on his part which admittedly a senior advocate is prohibited from doing. A suit has been filed by the plaintiff-respondent for the recovery of Rs. 14,722.61 and a mandatory injunction for possession under Section 66 of the Specific Relief Act. During the trial of the suit, Mr. Hans Raj Sawhney, a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court and the High Court appearing for the defendant, wanted to examine certain witnesses. This was objected to by Bawa Shivcharan Singh, Advocate, for the plaintiff on the ground that Mr. Sawhney being a senior advocate could not act. Accordingly, it was contented that as examination and cross-examination of witnesses come under the definition of the term ‘act’, Mr. Sawhney could not proceed with the examination or cross examination of the witness. This contention found favour with Shri P.L Singla, Subordinate Judge, who by his order dated November 28, 1967, held that examination and cross-examination of a witness is ‘acting’ and as a senior advocate is debarred from ‘acting’ he is consequently debarred from examining and cross-examining the witnesses.

2. A revision was filed against that order which come before me sitting singly. I felt that the point raised in the revision is important for the members of the bar and it was in the fitness of things that this matter be decided by a larger bench. I, therefore, referred this matter to my lord the Chief Justice for constituting a larger bench That it how the matter has come up before us for decision.

3. Sub-section (1) of section 16 of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides for two classes of advocates. Sub-section (2) of Section 16 provides that an advocate may, with his consent, be designated as senior advocate if the Supreme Court or a High Court is of opinion that by virtue of his ability, experience and standing at the Bar he is deserving of such distinction. Sub-section (3) of section 16 provides that senior advocate; shall, in the matter of their practice, be subject to such restrictions as the Ear Council of India may, in the interests of the legal profession, prescribe. Section 49 gives power to the Bar Council of India to make rule for discharging its functions under the Act. Part VI of the Bar Council of India Rules deals with the Rules governing advocates. Chapter I of this part deals with restrictions on senior advocates as contemplated under Section 16(3) of the Act. Restrictions under the Rules relevant for the purpose are as under:—

4. “Rules governing advocates:

Senior Advocates shall, in the matter of their practice of the profession of law mentioned in Section 30 of the Act, be subject to the following restrictions:—

(a) A senior advocate shall not file a vakalat or act in any Court, or Tribunal, or before any person or other authority mentioned in Section 30 of the Act.

Explanation—‘To Act’ means to file an appearance or any pleading or application in any Court, or Tribunal, or before any person or other authority mentioned in the said Section either in person or by his recognised agent or by an advocate or an attorney on his behalf”.

“(c) He shall not accept instructions to draft pleadings or affidavits, advice on evidence or to do any drafting work or an analogous kind in any Court, or Tribunal, or before any person or other authority mentioned in Section 30 of the Act or undertaking conveyancing work of any kind whatsoever. This restriction however shall not extend to settling any such matter as aforesaid in consultation with an advocate in Part II of the Common Roll.”

5. Similarly in exercise of its powers conferred by Article 145 of the Constitution of India the Supreme Court has framed the Rules known as the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 Order IV Rule 2(a) provides that the Chief Justice and the Judges may with the consent of the advocate designate an advocate as senior advocate if in their opinion by virtue of his ability, experience and standing at the Bar the said advocate is deserving of such distinction. Rule 2(b) of Order IV provides as under;—

6. “A senior advocate shall not—

(i) file a vakalatnama or act in any Court or tribunal in India.

(ii) appear without an advocate on record in the Court or without a junior in any other court or tribunal in India.

(iii) accept instructions to draw pleadings or affidavits, advice on evidence or do any drafting work of an analogous kind in any court or tribunal in India or undertake conveyancing work of any kind whatsoever but this prohibitton shall not extend to settling any such matter as aforesaid in consultation with a junior.

(iv) accept directly from a client any brief or instructions to appear in any court or tribunal in India.

Explanation:

In this Order—

(i) ‘acting’ means filing an appearance or any pleadings or applications in any court or tribunal in India, or any act (other than pleadingirequired or authorised by law to be done by a party in such court or tribunal either in person or by his recognised agent or by an advocate or attorney on his behalf.

(ii) ‘tribunal’ includes any authority or person legally authorised to take evidence and before whom advocates are, by or under any law for the time being in force, entitled to practise.

(iii) ‘junior’ means an advocate other than a senior advocate,”

7. It is not the case of the plaintiff-respondent that there is any specific bar under the Advocates Act, 1961, or the Bar Council of India Rules or the Supre ne Court Rules, 1966 restricting a senior advocate to examine or cross-examine the witnesses. The restriction is sought to be supported by the restrictions mentioned in the Rules namely that a senior advocate shall not act in any court. This argument is based on the contention that the restriction that a senior advocate shall not ‘act’ in any court means that he is not entitled to examine a witness as the examination of witness is covered by the word ‘act’. It is contended that the senior advocate is only entitled to plead which, according to Bawa Shivcharan Singh, the learned counsel, means that he can address the court. The short question, therefore, that falls for determination is whether the examination of witness is to be included in the word ‘act’ or ‘pleading’. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent that if the examination or cross-examination of witness is not covered by the word ‘act’ there would be no prohibition against the senior advocate to examine witness as the argument is based only on the hypothesis that the examination of witness is included in the word ‘act’.

8. The words ‘act’ and ‘pleading’ also occur in Rules 1, 4(1) and (5) of Order III of the Code of Civil Procedure and they read as under:—

Rule I

“Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, as the case may be, on his behalf:

Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person.

Rule 4(1)

No pleader shall act for any person in any Court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognized agent or by some other person duly authorized by or under a power-of-attorney to make such appointment.

Rule 4(5)

No pleader who has been engaged for the purpose of pleading only shall plead on behalf of any party, unless he has filed in Court a memorandum of appearance signed by himself and stating—

(a) the names of the parties to the suit,

(b) the name of the party for whom he appears, and

(c) the name of the person by whom he is authorized to appear:

Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall apply to any pleader engaged to plead on behalf of any party by any other pleader who has been duly appointed to act in Court on behalf of such party.”

9. It would be seen that clauses (1) & (5) of rule 4 of order iii of the code of civil procedure make a distinction between the words ‘act’ and ‘pleading’ as in the former case power-of-attorney is necessary whereas only a memorandum of appearance is necessary in the latter case.

10. Mr. Radhey Lal Aggarwal, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that there is a difference between the words ‘act’ and ‘pleading’ and that ‘act’ must be restricted to the acts other than examination of a witness and the right of audience, and the later are covered by the word ‘pleading’. The interpretation of the words ‘act’ and pleading’ has been the subject-matter of a number of decisions under Order III of the Code of Civil Procedure and it will be proper now to make a reference to them.

11. In Harchand Ray Gobordon Das v. B.N Ry. Co . A.I.R 1916 Cal. 1811. a Division Bench consisting of Jenkins C. J. and Chatterjee J. held that a recognised agent has no right of audience under Order 3 Rule 1 of C.P.C This authority clearly, therefore. recognizes that the word ‘act’ would not include the right of audience.

12. A similar matter came up for decision in a case reported as Eastern Tavoy Minerals Corporation, Ltd.2 where Buckland, J. followed an earlier Calcutta case and held as under:—

“To plead is not to make or do an appearance or an application or an act, and is not within Order 3 Rules 1 and 2. Therefore, a recognized agent as such has no right to audience”

13. This matter was also considered by a Division Bench in a case reported as Jivan Lal v. Ram Rattan . A.I.R 1936 Oudh. 261.. In this case it was held as under:—

“A recognised agent cannot be allowed to plead and argue. The words ‘any appearance, application or act’ mean no more than that he can appear, make applications and take such steps as may be necessary in the course of the litigation for the purposes of the case of his principal; he cannot plead or argue for his principal.”

14. Reference may also be made to a Full Bench decision in case Thayarammal v. Kuppuswami Naidu . A.I.R 1937 Mad. 937. In that case one of the questions that was to be answered by the Full Bench was whether an agent with a power of attorney to appear and conduct judicial proceeding has the right of audience in Court. The Full Bench referred to an earlier unreported Bench decision of the High Court wherein it had been held that a right to appear in Court for its principal given to a recognized agent by Order 3 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not include a right to plead. The Full Bench also relied on the earlier two Calcutta cases namely Harchand Ray Gobordon Dass and Eastern Tavoy Minerals Corporation, Ltd. and held that Order 3 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Proceedure does not give a recognized agent any right to plead in court on behalf of his principal in the appellate or original side of the High Court.

15. The matter also came up for hearing in Aswin Shambhuprasad Patel v. National Rayon Corporation Ltd . A.I.R 1955 Bom. 262., wherein Chagla C. J. referred with approval to the Calcutta cases and held as under:—

“The expression ‘appearance, application or act in or to any Court’ in 0.3 R. 1 Civil Procedure Code does not include pleading. The right of audience in Court, the right to address the Court, the right to examine and cross examine witnesses are all parts of pleading with which O. 3 does not deal at all. It deals with a restricted class of acts in connection with the litigation in Court and it is with regard to that restricted class of acts that O.3 permits recognized agents to be appointed.”

16. Chagla C. J. has specifically observed that the right of audience in Court, the right to address the Court and the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses are all parts of pleading with which Order 8 does not deal at all. This case is an authority for the proposition that examination and cross-examination of witnesses are not covered in the definition of the word ‘act’ but are rather covered by the word ‘pleading’.

17. The next case which elaborately dealt with the matter is Panna Lal v. Deoji Dhanji . A.I.R 1955 M.B 109, where after noticing the previous cases, Samvatsar J. held as follows:

“It is the privilege of a pleader to be allowed to plead and to claim an audience for the purpose and a recognised agent has no such right. The words ‘appearance. application or act’ in O. 3 R. 1 only mean appear, make application and take such of he; necessary steps as may be required to be taken up for the progress of the proceedings. A recognised agent cannot, therefore, be allowed to examine witnesses on behalf of his principal or to cross examine the witnesses of the other side.”

18. The next case referred to is Samdukhan v. Madan Lal . A.I.R 1959 Raj. 35. In this case also it was held that Order 3 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not include pleading or arguing and a recognized agent cannot be allowed to ‘plead’ and ‘argue’ under this rule. The Calcutta and Bombay cases discussed earlier were also referred to with approval.

19. Bawa Shivcharan Singh, learned counsel for the respondent relied greatly on the case reported as The Governor-General in Council v. Bhagwan Sahai . A.I.R 1948 E.P 61, where Teja Singh, J. after holding that ‘Pleading’ and ‘acting’ stand on different footings and held that ‘pleadings’ in the limited sense of arguing the matter is a special privilege of the pleader and the recognised agent did not have that privilege, but neverthless held that a recognised agent can cross examine the witnesses because the examination of witnesses is covered under the term ‘acting’, as this was merely taking action for the proper conduct of the case

20. The next case in which a similar view was taken is Govind Narain v. Smt. Chhoti Devi . A.I.R 1966 Raj. 170., where Jagat Narayan J., held as follows:—

“A recognized agent of a party is entitled to examine and cross-examining a witness is acting and cross examining a witness is acting and not ‘pleading’. To plead means to argue in support of a cause. In other words ‘pleading’ only mean addressing the Court. An examination of the language of section 119 of the code goes to show that the authors of the Code made a distinction between addressing the court and examining witnesses in Court. If it were the intention of the framers of the Code that no one except the party himself or his pleader should examine or cross-examine witnesses, this intention would have been expressed by the use of appropriate words. For literally speaking examining and cross-examining witnesses is ‘acting’ and not ‘pleading’. Under Order 3 Rule 4(5) a pleader can plead without riling a Vakalatnama But no pleader is allowed to examine or cross-examine witnesses unless he is filed his Vakalatnama, This is obviously because examination and cross examination of witnesses amounts to ‘acting’, and Order 3 Rule 4(1) lays down that no pleader shall act for any person in any court unless he has been appointed by such person by a document in writing, that is by a Vakalatnama.”

21. His lordship followed the observation of Teja Singh T. in The Governor-General in Council v. Bhagwan Sahai and dissented from the observations of Chagla C.J in Aswin Shambkuprasad Patel10 and the observations of Samvatsar J, in Pannalal's case

22. Though the words ‘Act’ and ‘pleading, have not been defined in the Code some of the cafes have not purported to give definition of the word ‘act’. In re, Fuzzle Alt11 the expression ‘act was defined by Phear J. as under:—

I think that the word ‘act’ there means the doing of something as the agent of the principal party, which shall be recognized or taken notice of by the Court as the act of that principal; such for instance as filing a document.”

23. In Kali Kumar Roy v. Nobin Chunder Chuckerburty . I. L. R. 1881 Cal. 685., White (concurring) observed as follows:—

“To act for a client in Court is to take on his behalf in the Court, or in the offices of the Court, the necessary steps that must be taken in the course of the litigation in order that his case may be properly laid before the Court.”

24. These two definitions of the expression of word ‘act’ were approved in a Division Bench case reported as Sawarmal v. Kurrjilal . A.I.R 1939 Rang. 1., wherein their lordships held that a plaint or memorandum of appeal which is drawn up-and signed by the pleader duly authorised under Order 3 Rule 4 there is nothing contrary to the provisions of the Rule if the said appeal was handed over by another pleader to whom that task has been delegated by the authorised pleader and the appeal filed was treated to have been properly filed. Their lordships held that this was a ministerial function. In this case, therefore, the presentation or an appeal was considered to be covered in the expression ‘act’.

25. Another case in which expression ‘acting’ was also considered is the Full Bench in Nadella Satyanarayana v. Venkata Subbiah . A.I.R 1957 A. P. 172.. In that case execution petition had been signed by the party as well as by the pleader but was presented by mother pleader who had no power of attorney at the time he presented the petition. The question that arose was whether the presentation of an application by a pleader to whom the authority in the prescribed manner under Rule 4 of Order 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not given is only an irregularity which could be cured at a subsequent stage The argument was based on the fact that as the pleader who presented the application did not have the power of attorney there was want of authority on the part of a pleader to ‘act’ within the meaning of Order 3 Rule 4 C P. C Their lordships after referring to the cases in the earlier Calcutta cases and Rangoon case mentioned above held that ‘applying’ is included in the word ‘acting’ and a pleader who files an application on behalf of a party ‘acts’ for him. This case also accepted the definition of the expression ‘act’.

26. All these cases which define the expression ‘act’ have so far carried it to mean presentation of application etc. but all at a stage prior to the start of the trial i e examination of the witnesses (of course it would still be ‘acting’ if an application is put in during or after the examination of witnesses. The substance is that examination of witnesses is treated as distinct from Thing an application etc. which is covered by the word ‘acting’).’ No case other than the case decided by Teja Singh, J The Governor-General in Council's case and Jagat Narayan, J. Govind Narain's case has been brought to our notice where the expression ‘acting’ has been held to include examination of the witnesses. In the case reported as The Governor-General in Council there is no discussion as to how the expression ‘act’ is deemed to include the examination of witnesses. In Govind Narain's case it has been observed in support of the finding that the expression ‘act’ includes examination of witnesses the fact that no pleader is allowed to examine or cross-examine the witnesses unless he files a Vakalatnama and, therefore, it should be assumed that examination of witnesses is covered by the expression ‘acting’. With great respect, no rule is pointed out which specifically requires the filing of a power of attorney by an advocate for the purpose of examination of witnesses. The fact that the practice may be that the advocate files power of attorney for examination of witnesses does not answer the question that we are to decide in the present reference. It may be that the power of attorney is filed on the assumption that examination of witnesses is covered by the expression ‘acting’ and, therefore as required by Order 3 Rule 4(1) C.P.C a power of attorney is necessary. It is, therefore, not, with respect, right in basing a decision on this practice which assumes that the expression’ acting covers the examination of witnesses

27. One of the reasons also mentioned in Govind Narain's case to hold that the expression ‘acting’ includes examination of witnesses is by reference to S. 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is suggested that S 119 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes a distinction between ‘addressing the Court’ and ‘examining witnesses’ and therefore it means that the expression ‘pleading’ does not cover both ‘arguing’ and examination of witnesses’. With respect, again this conclusion does not necessarily follow. Simply because the legislature has used the word ‘addressing the court’ and “examination of witnesses”, it is not determinative of the fact whether the word ‘pleading’ cover both the eventualities. In any case the controversy is about the expression ‘acting’ and whether it includes examination of witnessed If examination of witnesses is not covered by the word ‘acting’ it does not really matter whether the word ‘pleading’ should be restricted to ‘argument’ only or also to examination of witnesses’. Moreover it is to be seen that section 119 of the code is only confined to the High Court and obviously any reference to it would not be of any help in the matter before the subordinate Courts.

28. Bawa Shivcharan Singh in support of his contention that ‘acting includes examination of witnesses referred to Rule (c) of Chapter 1 of part VI of the Rules governing Advocates, which lays down the restirctions on senior advocates and pointed out that Rule (c) prohibits a senior advocate from giving ‘advice on evidence’. The submission of Bawa Shivcharan Singh was that as this Rule prohibited a senior advocate from ‘giving advice on evidence’ it necessarily suggested that he cannot examine witnesses as according to him this expression covers ‘the examination of witnesses’. He also submitted that the prohibition of giving ‘advice on evidence’ shows that the senior advocate was not to have anything to do with the trial and, therefore necessarily was debarred from examination of the witnesses. In our view this contention is without any merit. On the other hand the expression ‘advice on evidence’ is an expression which is used for a stage prior to the start of the trial. In all litigations after the pleadings have been settled and issues struck an interval is provided to determine what evidence should be laid at the trial. It is this work which is called ‘advice on evidence and which is not to be performed by a senior advocate. Odgers “Principles of pleading and practice” 14th Edition, deals with ‘Advice on Evidence’ in Chapter 19, page 256. It is stated therein:—

“As soon as disc very is completed or in urgent cases even sooner, the papers are laid before counsel for his advice on evidence. This should be done by both sides, even in cases apparently simple, otherwise the action may be lost for want of some certificate or other formal piece of proof.”

“Advising on evidence is perhapes. the most important piece of work which a junior barrister has to do, success at the trial so much depends on the care with which the case is got up beforehand; and the solicitor, who may have had but little experience in litigious work, will look to “counsel for advice on every necessary detail”

“It may be necessary to apply to postpone the trial, e.g, to secure the attendance of witnesses who are ill or absent abroad”

29. The ‘trial’ is treated separately from a stage prior to that which is called ‘advice on evidence’ as is clear from the treatment in this book which mentions the ‘trial’ in Chapter 20, page 169 separately

30. The specific prohibition on senior advocate in giving ‘advice on evidence’ in R. (c) of the Rules Governing Advocates rather brings out clearly the fact that examination of witnesses is not covered by the expression ‘acting’. This is so because if the word ‘acting’ was to cover the stage of examination of witnesses it would necessarily have covered the stage prior to that namely ‘advice on evidence’. In that case it would not have been necessary to place this restriction in Rule (c) when senior advocate had already been prohibited from acting by rule (a) of the rules Governing Advocates. It is quite obvious, therefore, that the Bar Council when placing a restriction on a senior advocate not to act in any court was not contemplating to place restriction on him at the trial stage namely the examination of the witnesses Similarly the explanation given in rule (a) of the rules and the explanation given in Rule 2(b) Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules also indicate that the restriction on a senior advocate to act is being restricted to the acts of filing, pleading or like applications and similar actions.

31. Even from the point of view of practical working it seems to us that if the expression ‘acting’ was to include the examination of witnesses it will virtually debar the senior advocates from all original work. It is not unusual for courts to hear arguments immediately on the counclusion of evidence and if it was to be held that senior advocates cannot examine witnesses they would obviously not be in a position to argue the matter if the arguments were to be heard immediately after the evidence of the witnesses was concluded We do not think that it was meant to place such serious restrictions on the rights of senior advocates. It should also be appreciated that examination of witnesses is really presenting and pleading the case of the parties though through the mouths of the witnesses. Arguments are only a summary and a condensed form of the case that has been pleaded already by evidence. To deprive a party of the benefit of a senior advocate when his real case is being put forward before the court would be to place the litigant public at a serious disadvantage and the law profession under a serious and un-necessary strain. As was indicated by Samvatsar J. in Panna Lal's case many complicated, legal and technical matters arise during the course of the evidence and if they were to be permitted to be done by persons other than advocates (as they would be if the examination of witnesses was included in the expression acting’ it will seriously interfere with the proper functioning of the courts which would be deprived of the assistance of the advocates at precisely the time it was required. In our view, the decision of Teja Singh J. and Jagat Narayan J. have taken too narrow a view of the expression ‘acting’ and, with) respect, do rot lay down the correct law. We think that the correct interpretation of the expression ‘acting’ is not including examination of the witnesses as held in the Panna Lal's case and Aswin Shambhuprasad ant others’ case is correct one. We, therefore, hold that the senior advocate is not prevented from examination and cross-examination of the witnesses as the same ate not covered in the expression ‘acting. In that view of the matter Mr. Sawhney who was a senior advocate was competent to examine and cross examine the witnesses and the decision of the Subordinate Judge who held to the contrary, therefore, cannot be upheld and is set aside.

32. The result is this revision petition is accepted and the matter is sent back to the trial court to proceed in accordance with law and in accordance with the observations made above. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the Subordinate judge on 23rd September, The civil revision is allowed with costs.

33. Petition allowed.