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M/S. Delhi Chemical And Pharmaceutical Works And Another v. Union Of India And Others

Delhi High Court
Feb 5, 1970
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent challenges the judgment dated 28 May 1969 of Mr. Justice T.V.R. Tatachari, which dismissed the appellants' writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The petition attacked the validity of notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of lands in village Kilokari, New Delhi (total 16 bighas and 12 biswas, fields Nos. 386/2 and 387/2).

Chronology (as stated in the opinion): a Section 4 notification dated 28 Nov 1958 (published 11 Dec 1958) initially covered the appellants' land. The appellants filed objections on 1 June 1959. The Administration informed them by letter of 19 July 1961 that the 1958 notification had been cancelled and that two new Section 4 notifications dated 3 June 1961 (published 6 July 1961) covered the area for the "planned development of Delhi." The appellants filed objections under Section 5-A on 3 Aug 1961. A Section 6 notification was published on 27 Oct 1961 declaring the land required to be taken.

After the Collector made an award the appellants applied on 22 Jan 1962 to the Collector that the notifications were discriminatory, illegal and void; a reference was made to the District Judge under Section 18. Prior to and alongside acquisition steps, the appellants had engaged with the Municipal Corporation (layout plan filed 23 Mar 1959; partial sanction for Plot No. 66 given 16 Dec 1959), litigation occurred (a suit and temporary injunction by the Building Society; settlement on 23 Mar 1961) and subsequent administrative communications led the appellants to file the writ petition on 6 Nov 1963. The single Judge dismissed the writ petition; this appeal followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (relating to the appellants' lands) were valid and not a colourable exercise of power.
  2. Whether the acquisition was for a "public purpose" within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act, given that lands were to be developed and ultimately allotted (partly) to a Co-operative House Building Society (respondent No. 6).
  3. Whether the payment of compensation came from public revenue (or public funds) so as to satisfy the requirements for a Section 6 declaration.
  4. Whether the Chief Commissioner (or the authority issuing the notification) was competent to issue the impugned notifications.
  5. Whether the appellants were unfairly denied the opportunity to lead evidence under Section 5-A of the Act before the Collector.
  6. Whether the exclusion of certain adjacent lands from acquisition amounted to improper discrimination (and whether the appellants' layout/service plans should be deemed sanctioned for purposes of that exclusion).
  7. Whether the acquisition was effectively being made under the Delhi Development Act rather than under the Land Acquisition Act (and if that affected validity).
  8. Whether a Section 6 notification that uses the words “it appears” is invalid unless it explicitly records the satisfaction of the appropriate Government.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The notifications and consequent proceedings were a colourable exercise of powers under Sections 4 and 6 — although described as for a public purpose, the land was in reality being acquired for the Building Society (respondent No. 6), which would pay the compensation.
  • The asserted "public purpose" was illusory because acquired land would be divided into smaller plots for residence of a few individual members of the Society, producing private benefit and private enrichment rather than public benefit.
  • The government scheme would generate revenue (premiums/lease money and periodic enhancements) and thus the acquisition was not truly at public expense (i.e., compensation would not come from public revenue).
  • The acquisition was for a company/ society and so could not constitute a public purpose unless the building or work also sub-served the public purpose of an industry or undertaking of that company (relying on R.L. Arora cases).
  • The Section 6 notification failed to state that the appropriate Government was satisfied such land was needed for a public purpose (because it used the phrase “it appears” rather than explicitly recording satisfaction).
  • The Collector should have allowed the appellants to produce evidence under Section 5-A to substantiate their objections (they assert denial of opportunity to lead evidence).
  • The exclusion of neighbouring plots amounted to discrimination; the appellants contended their layout/service plans should be deemed sanctioned before 13-11-1959 under Sections 312 & 313 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act and therefore they should have enjoyed the same exception as neighbours.
  • Alternatively, the acquisition was effectively under the Delhi Development Act rather than the Land Acquisition Act and that affected the legal character of the proceedings.

Respondent / Delhi Administration and Supporting Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The acquisition formed part of an overall governmental scheme titled “Large Scale Acquisition, Development and Disposal of Land in Delhi” designed to secure planned development of Delhi, address acute housing shortages, provide infrastructure and prevent speculative profiteering; it therefore pursued a public purpose.
  • Compensation for lands acquired in Delhi was being paid from a Government-sanctioned “Revolving Fund” (sanctioned by Government of India) and thus the acquisition was at public expense; there was no material to contradict the affidavit stating this.
  • The Chief Commissioner was empowered by the President to exercise the powers of the Central Government under the Act and hence was competent to issue the impugned notifications.
  • The alleged denial of the opportunity to adduce evidence before the Collector was an afterthought; no request to lead evidence was made before the Collector (as per affidavit of Shri K.L. Rathe).
  • The exclusion of certain contiguous lands from acquisition was policy-based: lands for which layout and service plans had been sanctioned before 13-11-1959 or which had already been built upon were excluded — a policy endorsed by the Supreme Court in Udai Ram Sharma — and thus the difference in treatment was not discriminatory in the present circumstances.
  • On the question whether the notification need explicitly state the appropriate Government's satisfaction, the Administration produced an affidavit stating that the appropriate Government had been fully satisfied after consideration; the Administration relied on precedent that the absence of explicit wording in the notification does not invalidate a Section 6 declaration.
  • The Administration maintained that the acquisition was made under the Land Acquisition Act and that references to the Delhi Development Act did not alter the validity of the acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shyam Behari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 427 Authority cited for the proposition that a Section 6 declaration requires that compensation be paid out of public revenue or funds controlled/managed by a local authority. The court held this authority to be irrelevant in the present case because the Administration produced an affidavit (Shri K.L. Rathe) stating compensation was paid from a Government-sanctioned “Revolving Fund”, and nothing contradicted that statement in the record.
Girdhari Lal Amritlal Shodan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1966 SC 1408 Same general rule as Shyam Behari regarding requirement that compensation come from public revenue for a valid Section 6 declaration. The court treated the precedent as not applicable on the facts because the Administration swore that compensation would be paid from the sanctioned Revolving Fund (public expense).
R.L. Arora v. State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 764 and R.L. Arora v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 1230 Principles limiting acquisition for companies: the work for which land is acquired must be directly useful to the public and the building/work must sub-serve the public purpose of the company’s industry or undertaking. The appellants relied on these cases. The court concluded the Arora authorities did not assist because the present acquisition was part of a comprehensive public scheme (planned development of Delhi) and not acquisition solely for a private company’s benefit.
Somawanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151 Interpretation of “public purpose” in Section 2(f) of the Act: inclusive definition; a purpose benefiting even a fraction of the community may qualify as public purpose. Also noted that satisfaction as to public purpose is for the State unless there is colourable exercise of power. The court relied on Somawanti to affirm that the planned development of Delhi is a public purpose and that, absent colourable exercise, it is for the appropriate government to be satisfied on that point.
N.N. Gamadia v. State of Maharashtra, Misc. Petn. No. 217 of 1962 (Bom) (unreported) An unreported Bombay High Court decision concerning acquisition for a house building society (relied upon by appellants). The court observed this case was distinguishable because that acquisition was not part of a general scheme for planned development; accordingly, it lent no assistance to the present case.
Ganga Bishnu Swaika v. Calcutta Pinjrapole Society, AIR 1968 SC 615 Principle that a Section 6 notification that uses the words “it appears” does not necessarily show a lack of satisfaction by the appropriate Government and that such a form does not automatically invalidate the notification. The court relied on this authority to hold that the wording of the impugned Section 6 notification did not invalidate it, especially given the Administration's affidavit that the appropriate Government was satisfied after consideration.
Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 1138 Recognition of a policy excluding lands whose layout and service plans had been approved before a specified date from certain acquisition notifications. The court used this authority to support the Administration's explanation that lands with sanctioned plans before 13-11-1959 were excluded by policy and that such exclusion did not amount to illegal discrimination in the present facts.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Smt. Kamla Bhandari, Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 138-D and 143-D of 1965, Dated 1-12-1969 (Delhi) Authority cited for the proposition that the exception to acquisition contemplated by the Administration requires a positive overt act of sanction; a lay-out plan merely “considered as passed” or deemed by inaction would not satisfy the exception. The court applied this reasoning to reject the appellants' argument that their plans were to be deemed sanctioned by virtue of inaction under sections of the Corporation Act; the Administration's policy required positive sanction before the specified date.
Nagrik Adhikar Samiti, Sara Pipal Thala Extension v. Delhi Administration, Civil Writ No. 42 of 1969 (Delhi) and Uttar Pradesh Samaj Co-op. House Building Society Ltd. v. Union of India, Civil Writ No. 846 of 1968 (Delhi) Instances of local Division Bench decisions expressing similar views about the State’s satisfaction as to public purpose and validity of acquisition policies. The court cited these Division Bench authorities to show consistency with the proposition that State satisfaction about public purpose is for the appropriate government unless colourable exercise of power is shown.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by addressing each contention advanced by the appellants and applying the material facts and law as follows (limited to what the opinion states):

  1. Colourable exercise / public purpose: The court accepted the Administration's evidence that the acquisition was part of a comprehensive, documented governmental scheme ("Large Scale Acquisition, Development and Disposal of Land in Delhi") designed to secure planned development, address acute housing shortages, control speculative dealings, and provide civic amenities. Given the scale, policy objectives and the Master Plan work, the court concluded the acquisition related to a legitimate public purpose and was not merely a transfer to a private society for private enrichment.
  2. Source of compensation / public expense: The court relied on the affidavit of Shri K.L. Rathe stating compensation was to be paid from a Government-sanctioned "Revolving Fund" (sanctioned by Government of India) and that land was being acquired at public expense. In the absence of any counter-affidavit, cases cited by appellants that required compensation from public revenue for a valid Section 6 declaration were held inapplicable on these facts.
  3. Competence of issuing authority: The court accepted the single Judge's conclusion that the Chief Commissioner was empowered by the President to exercise the powers of the Central Government under the Act and therefore competent to issue the impugned notifications.
  4. Opportunity to lead evidence under Section 5-A: The court accepted the Administration's account (Shri Rathe's affidavit) that no request to adduce evidence had been made before the Collector and treated the appellants' complaint as an afterthought; the single Judge's finding that the appellants had not taken steps to produce evidence was upheld.
  5. Discrimination in exclusion of adjacent lands: The court accepted the Administration’s policy-based explanation that lands for which layout/service plans had been sanctioned before 13-11-1959 or which had been built upon were excluded from the notification. The contiguous lands relied upon by appellants fell within that exception on the facts (plans sanctioned or built upon before the cut-off), whereas the appellants' plans and service plans had not been sanctioned before that date; thus the difference in treatment was not unlawful discrimination according to the court.
  6. Effect of deemed sanction under municipal law: The court analysed the appellants' reliance on deemed sanction under Sections 312 and 313 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act and rejected it. Citing Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Smt. Kamla Bhandari, the court held the Government's policy exception required a positive overt act of sanction; mere inaction of the Corporation's Standing Committee or a “deemed” sanction would not satisfy the policy exception.
  7. Form of Section 6 notification (“it appears” vs. explicit satisfaction): The court noted there is no prescribed statutory form for a Section 6 declaration and accepted the Administration’s affidavit that the appropriate Government was satisfied after consideration. Relying on precedent (Ganga Bishnu Swaika), the court held that the use of the words “it appears” in the notification did not render it invalid in the circumstances.
  8. Overlap with Delhi Development Act: The court observed that even if the Delhi Development Act had a similar purpose, that does not prevent the purpose from also being a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act. The court accepted that the acquisition in the present case was under the Land Acquisition Act and therefore the appellants’ argument that the acquisition was effectively under the Delhi Development Act was not relevant to invalidate the notifications.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The court affirmed the single Judge's dismissal of the appellants' writ petition and ordered costs (counsel’s fee Rs. 300/-).

Implications: The direct effect is that the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act challenged by the appellants were upheld as valid and the acquisition process continued to be lawful on the facts presented. The court treated the acquisition as forming part of a large-scale governmental urban development scheme and concluded that the various procedural and substantive objections raised by the appellants (colourable exercise, lack of public expense, discrimination, denial of opportunity to lead evidence, requirements of municipal sanction) were without basis on the record. The opinion does not assert that it establishes a novel legal principle beyond applying existing authorities and the Administration's factual case; therefore, no broader or new precedent is proclaimed beyond the court’s conclusions on the facts of this case.

Costs: Appeal dismissed with costs; counsel's fee fixed at Rs. 300/-. (As stated in the opinion.)

Show all summary ...

P.N khanna, J.:— This is an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the judgment dated May 28, 1969 of Mr. Justice T.V.R Tatachari, dismissing the appellants' writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of certain lands situated in village Kilokari, New Delhi.

2. Briefly stated, the appellants purchased the said land measuring 16 bighas and 12 biswas bearing fields Nos. 386/2 and 387/2 situated in village Kilokari, New Delhi, for constructing residential houses for themselves and the employees of the first appellant and its allied concerns. A notification dated November 28, 1958 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, herein called “the Act”, was published in Delhi Gazette dated December 11, 1958 to the effect that land including the appellants' land, was likely to be taken by the Government at the expense of a Co-operative Society, called the ‘New Friends Co-operative House Building Society Limited’, Delhi respondent No. 6, herein called the “Building Society”. On June 1, 1959, the appellants on learning about the said notification filed their objections. On July 19, 1961, the Deputy Housing Commissioner, Delhi Administration, informed the appellants by his letter of the said date that the notification covering their land had been cancelled, and that two other notifications dated 3rd June, 1961 under Section 4 of the Act had been simultaneously issued on the same date (published in the Gazette dated July 6, 1961) covering the area including the appellants' land, stating that the land was “likely to be required to be taken by Government at the public expense for a public purpose, namely for the planned development of Delhi”. A booklet published by Delhi Administration giving information about the Government's scheme of “Large Scale Acquisition and Disposal of Land for Urban Development in Delhi” was enclosed with the said letter.

3. On August 3, 1961, the appellants filed their objections under Section 5-A of the Act. On October 27, 1961, a notification under Section 6 of the Act was published declaring that the appellants' land along with some other lands were required to be taken by the Government at the public expense for a public purpose, namely, for the planned development of Delhi. On January 22, 1962, the appellants filed an application before the Land Acquisition Collector Delhi, that the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 were discriminatory, illegal and void. A reference was then made to the District Judge under Section 18 of the Act, after the Land Acquisition Collector had made his award.

4. In the meanwhile, the appellants, not knowing about the aforesaid notification dated November 28, 1958, had submitted on March 23, 1959 a layout plan for their land to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, respondent No. 5, herein called ‘the Corporation’ for its sanction. On May 26, 1959, the Corporation had suggested certain changes and then by its letter dated October 29, 1959, asked for correct documents of the appellants' ownership of their lands. On December 16, 1959 the appellants were informed by the Municipal, Commissioner that sanction under Section 336 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act had been accorded to them to erect a house on Plot No. 66 without affecting, however, the rights of the Government or Delhi Development Authority or any other person. Thereupon, the Building Society filed a suit in the court of the Sub-Judge, Delhi, for the issuance of & permanent injunction restraining the Corporation, the two appellants and some others from building or raising any construction over the land in question. A temporary injunction was granted by the Court. The Corporation thereupon, on revision, revoked the sanction given earlier for the building of the house in plot No. 66. On March 23, 1961, the Building Society and the appellants entered into a settlement, and the suit was dismissed. As Delhi Administration was not a party to the settlement, certain negotiations took place between the Deputy Housing Commissioner, the appellants and the Building Society and it was ultimately agreed that the Building Society would offer four plots to the appellants subject to the usual terms and conditions applicable to such allotments. The arrangement was duly approved by the Chief Commissioner, Delhi.

5. On August 16, 1963 the Deputy Housing Commissioner, Delhi Administration, wrote to the appellants that with reference to their representation regarding the partly built-up plot, the Delhi Administration had no objection from the point of view of acquisition to the completion of the construction and that the Corporation was being informed of the same. The Corporation, on this, revived its earlier sanction to the erection of the house on the said plot No. 66. The appellants, however, on reconsideration felt dissatisfied and filed the writ petition on November 6, 1963.

6. The learned single Judge, before whom the petition came up for hearing, while repelling the arguments of the appellants' learned counsel, held that it could not be said that the acquisition by the Chief Commissioner was a colourable exercise of power or that the purpose of the acquisition was a private purpose. The planned development of Delhi was held to be a public purpose which was being sought to be achieved also through the agency of Co-operative Societies, like respondent No. 6. He further held that this purpose did not cease to be a public purpose within the meaning of the Act merely because the Delhi Development Act had been enacted for similar purpose.

7. The appellants' grievance that they were not allowed to lead evidence before the Land Acquisition Collector was held to be an afterthought and without justification. The acquisition in the present case was held to be under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and not under the provisions of Delhi Development Act. References to Delhi Development Act, therefore, were not considered relevant.

8. He also held that the Chief Commissioner was empowered by the President to exercise the powers and discharge the functions of the Central Government under the provisions of the Act. He had the same powers as the Central Government. He was, therefore, the authority competent to issue the impugned notifications. Regarding the appellants' objection to the effect that the acquisition was discriminatory inasmuch as the adjacent lands belonging to Shri J.J Singh, M.S Chaturvedi and M.D Chaturvedi were not acquired, the learned single Judge held, that the same had to be exempted in accordance with a set policy under which the lands in respect of which the lay-out plans and service plans had been sanctioned by the Competent Authority prior to 13-11-59 or had been built upon were excluded from the purview of the said notifications and this did not involve any discrimination. Even the appellants got a concession in respect of the land, plot No. 66, which had been partially built upon.

9. Mr. R.L Aggarwal, the learned counsel for the appellants, advanced almost similar arguments before us and contended that the notifications and the proceedings in consequence thereof were a colourable exercise of the powers under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. He submitted that although it was stated that the lands were required for a public purpose, the same were in reality being acquired for the Building Society, respondent No. 6, who was to pay the whole amount of compensation. No public purpose was involved, according to the learned counsel, when the land was intended to be divided into smaller plots for the residence of a few individual members of the Society itself. No public purpose would be served when the members of the Society were to be so given plots of land after the appellants were deprived of the same and which the appellants had originally acquired for their own residence. The Government in fact, was devising this scheme for making more money by incorporating terms, in the respective lease deeds under which the lands would be given, on payment of premiums and lease money, which would be enhanced at the time of periodical revisions of the terms of the said lease deeds. The learned counsel submitted that in view of these circumstances it could not be said that the payment of compensation was to be made out of the public revenue or that the acquisition was made for a public purpose.

10. The contentions of the learned counsel that the payment of the compensation for the acquisition of the land in question was not to be made out of public revenue, but was to be made by the Building Society was not raised before the learned single Judge. The same therefore, could not be allowed to be urged at this stage. We, however, find that the contention is otherwise entirely erroneous and without any substance. The affidavit in reply sworn by Shri K.L Rathe, Secretary, Local Self-Government and Public Works Department, Delhi Administration states that the compensation for all lands acquired in Delhi is being paid out of a fund called the “Revolving Fund”, which had been sanctioned by the Government of India. It was further stated that the land was being acquired at public expense. There is no counter-affidavit or anything else to show that this was not correct in the present case. The reference by the learned counsel to the two judgments of the Supreme Court in Shyam Behari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 427 and Girdhari Lal Amritlal Shodan v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1966 SC 1408, where it was held that no declaration under Section 6 for acquisition of land for a public purpose could be made unless either the whole or part of the compensation for the property to be acquired comes out of public revenue or from funds controlled or managed by local authority, was, therefore, entirely irrelevant.

11. The learned counsel then submitted that this was a case in reality for the acquisition of land for the purpose of a company, viz. the Building Society, respondent No. 6, and as the acquisition of land was for the construction of houses for the individual members of the Building Society, it could not be said to be a public purpose. A few private individuals banded together, should not have the advantage of acquiring the land. The company for which the land could be acquired must be engaged or be intending to engage in some industry or work which may be for a public purpose and also the Building or work for which the land was to be acquired, must sub-serve the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company was engaged. Merely because the public would be able to visit the locality for the purpose of dealing with the persons residing in the houses constructed there it would not amount to public purpose. For these contentions, the learned counsel relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in the two Arora cases, R.L Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 764 and R.L Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 1230. In the first case, the Supreme Court observed: “What these provisions require is that the work should be directly useful to the public and the agreement shall contain a term how public shall have right to use the work directly themselves.” In the second case, the Supreme Court was considering the effect of Clause (aa) introduced in Section 40(1) of the Act and observed: “We are, therefore, of opinion that Clause (aa) does not permit acquisition of land for construction of some building or work for a company engaged or to be engaged in an industry or work, which is for a public purpose unless the building or work for which the land is acquired also sub-serves the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company is engaged.” The learned counsel contended that acquiring land from the appellants and handing it over to the Building Society, which is a company, therefore, cannot be protected as if would result in private enrichment and the public would not be gaining in any way. The acquisition, therefore, in the circumstances of the present case, was merely colourable exercise of the powers under the Act.

12. The arguments of Mr. Aggarwal lack merit as they completely ignore the over-all scheme of the Delhi Administration, of which the acquisition in question forms a small part. The process of the acquisition was entirely different from the process of disposal of the land; and was evolved as a part of a scheme of “Large Scale Acquisition, Development and Disposal of Land in Delhi” which was devised by the Administration in the peculiar circumstances which prevailed in Delhi.

13. According to the affidavit of Shri K.L Rathe, the population of Delhi urban area has quadrupled itself in the last two decades and has been increasing at a phenomenal rate. The sudden and heavy influx of displaced persons from West Pakistan into the city and suburbs of Delhi after partition of the country, the expansion of industrial and commercial activities and the setting up of the foreign embassies and missions, all contributed to an unprecedented growth of population in Delhi and its suburbs. From 7 lakhs in 1941, the population increased to 23.5 lakhs in 1961. This rapid expansion was not accompanied by an adequate programme of housing. The deficit in housing was of the order of about 66,000 dwelling units in 1951 which rose to 1,04,000 dwelling units in 1956 and to about 1,45,000 dwelling units as at present, without considering the large scale replacement needed in the case of structures which have outlived their lives or were in a deplorably obsolete and sub-standard conditions. In the absence of any control, haphazard growth of houses in different places took place and the services did not keep pace with such expansion. All the evils arising out of over-crowding, multiplying growing slums and lack of proper civic amenities manifested themselves in the social and economic life of Delhi. The acute problem of land and housing, if not adequately and effectually tackled, threatened to aggravate the crisis. On the one side, person whose main motive was making business profits by dealing in land, started acquiring available land. On the other hand, those citizens, who wished to construct houses for bona fide residential needs were not able to get sites at reasonable prices. This caused widespread disappointment and frustration. It became the duty of the Government to take up in hand the planned development of the town which became a vital necessity for the proper preservation of civic life in the capital. The Government, therefore took in hand a comprehensive plan for regulating the growth of the city and providing accommodation for the different classes of people who had to live and work in the city. Town planning was set up in the year 1955 and interim General Plan was prepared in 1956 and then started work on the bigger project of preparing a Master Plan. The Government decided that it was necessary to acquire 34,070 acres of land in and around the city and develop it properly. The necessary notification was, therefore, issued. The draft Master Plan giving the detailed rules and regulations in respect of the land use, and allied matters was published in July, 1960, but the general pattern of development and the need for acquisition of large areas for such development had been decided upon by the Government before the said notification of 13th November, 1959. In order to meet the requirements of the plan, another notification was issued for a further acquisition of about 16,000 acres in October, 1961. It was also considered that in order to exercise a better control over the land use, freehold tenure should be discouraged. In order to prevent speculative dealings, therefore, land was to be leased out to the purchasers subject to the conditions that the site would be built upon on an approved plan within two years and if the land and the buildings are sold a portion of the unearned increase in the value should be paid to the Government. Normally, no resale would be allowed for the period of ten years, except in exceptional circumstances. These conditions were devised in order to avoid private enrichment and speculative dealings in property and to ensure accommodation for the bona fide requirements of the citizens.

14. Till now, the total area of land of which possession has been or is shortly likely to be taken up would be 21,000 acres. Six residential and eight industrial schemes have been sanctioned at an estimated cost of Rs. 11 lakhs and the work has been taken in hand in these cases. Further schemes are under examination and detailed work in connection with the scheme is being done. The planned development scheme makes liberal provisions for roadways, open spaces in front of houses, parks, schools, play grounds, recreation centres, green landscapes, nurseries, hospitals and other community facilities.

15. After the process of acquisition is complete the process of disposal is undertaken. Under the scheme of “Large Scale Acquisition, Development and Disposal of Land in Delhi”, the acquired land is allotted to individuals and co-operative societies on lease-hold basis in pursuance of a policy duly adopted by the Government and decided upon after keeping in view the interests of the public at large. This resettlement of the land enables the Government to exercise control not only on the immediate and present use of the land, but also secures its future use in accordance with the land use prescribed in the Master Plan. The ‘Planned Development of Delhi’, which is thus essential in the interests of public cannot be ensured, if any developed land is left in the hands of private individuals. It is not the case of acquiring land from one person and transferring it to another. The land has to be given to individuals or societies in accordance with the plan. The resettlement of land on prescribed terms and conditions by Delhi Administration, is wholly a separate branch of its activities, the considerations governing which are several and varied, based on a well thought out and evolved scheme for the planned development of the city. This scheme, according to the affidavit, is being worked out and has to be carried out by the Government on a no profit and no loss basis. It has been denied that the Administration acquired plots to be resold on lease-hold basis for earning profits for the Government.

16. It will, thus, be observed that it is not a case of acquiring land for a company or individuals. The acquisition has been made in the present case as a part of a general scheme for the planned development of Delhi which, as is shown above, is essential for the maintenance and preservation of the welfare of the public at large. This public benefit cannot be conferred by one stroke on the entire community as a unit. It has to be conferred on individual members or sections of the public. The allotment of a certain piece of land to a society for the purpose of development and the construction of houses for its members i.e for the benefit of its few individual members cannot be tom out of its context and has to be viewed in its larger perspective, as being a part of a larger scheme, which is meant to confer a benefit on the entire public at large. Even if the benefit is enjoyed by a section of the community, it would not cease to be a public purpose.

17. The definition of the expression ‘public purpose’ as given in Section 2(f) of the Act, is an inclusive definition and not compendious one. The Supreme Court in the case of Somawanti v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151, considered the implication of this expression. Broadly speaking, the expression ‘public purpose’ in their Lordships' view, includes a purpose in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of the individuals is directly concerned. On page 164 of the report, it has been observed that the expression public purpose has been used in the Act in its generic sense of including any purpose in which even a fraction of a community may be interested or by which it may be benefited. The purpose of planned development of Delhi, is, therefore, clearly a public purpose within the meaning of the Act. The learned counsel for the appellants also cited an unreported judgment of the Bombay High Court in N.N Gamadia v. State of Maharashtra, Misc. Petn. No. 217 of 1962 (Bom) decided by Modi, J., on 6-12-1965. All the cases relied upon by the the learned counsel for the appellants, including the said unreported Bombay case, are cases where the acquisition of land was made for the purpose of a company. In the Bombay case, the acquisition which was sought to be made for a house building Society, was not part of a general scheme for the planned development of the town, which would be for the benefit of the community at large, as in the present case. In any case, this aspect of the matter, viz. the planned development of the city was not considered at all in these cases. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, lend no assistance to decide the present case.

18. It may also be mentioned here that unless there is a colourable exercise of power, which as discussed above, is not the case in the present case it is for the State Government, as was observed by the Supreme Court in the said Somawanti's case, AIR 1963 SC 151 to be satisfied about, whether the purpose for which land is needed is a public purpose or not. The above view was also expressed in the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Mr. Justice Hardyal Hardy and Mr. Justice T.V.R Tatachari, in Nagrik Adhikar Samiti, Sara Pipal Thala Extension v. Delhi Administration, Civil Writ No. 42 of 1969, D/- 26-11-1969 (Delhi) and of another Bench consisting of one officer Mr. Justice H.R Khanna as he then was, and Mr. Justice T.V.R Tatachari in Uttar Pradesh Samaj Co-op. House Building Society Ltd. v. Union of India, Civil Writ No. 846 of 1968, D/- 15-4-1969 (Delhi).

19. The learned counsel for the appellant next contended that the notification is invalid as according to Section 6 of the Act the declaration can be made only “when the appropriate Government is satisfied that any particular land is needed for a public purpose.” The notification in the present case reads: “Whereas it appears to the Chief Commissioner, Delhi, that land is required to be taken by the Government at public expense for a public purpose ……………” According to the learned counsel the satisfaction of the appropriate Government was not mentioned in the notification. Unless, therefore, the Government was stated to be satisfied, the notification could not be held to be valid. We, however, find that in the affidavit of Shri K.L Rathe, Secretary, Local Self-Government and Public Works Department, Delhi Administration, it has been specifically stated that “after careful consideration of the report and facts and circumstances of the case, the appropriate Government was fully satisfied that the land was genuinely needed for the public purpose mentioned in the notification and it was, therefore, that the declaration under Section 6 was issued.” In view of this, the objection of the learned counsel has no basis. No statutory form has been prescribed for a declaration to be made under Section 6 of the Act. As was observed by the Supreme Court in Ganga Bishnu Swaika v. Calcutta Pinjrapole Society, AIR 1968 SC 615, the mere fact that the notification issued under Section 6 does not show the Government's satisfaction assuming that the words “it appears” used in the notification do not mean satisfaction, could not render the notification Invalid or not in conformity with section 6. The contention of the learned counsel, therefore is without any merit.

20. Mr. Aggarwal, learned counsel for the appellant, then contended that under Section 5-A of the Act the Collector should have given opportunity to the appellants to adduce evidence to substantiate their objections. This aspect of the matter was dealt with by the learned single Judge before whom the case was argued in the first instance. Shri Rathe in his affidavit has stated on oath that no prayer was made at any time before the Land Acquisition Collector for being allowed to lead evidence. As the learned single Judge has observed, the petitioners do not appear to have taken any step at any stage for producing any evidence. The grievance of the appellant is merely an afterthought. This contention of the learned counsel, therefore, is without any basis.

21. The learned counsel, then submitted that the acquisition in question is discriminatory inasmuch as the lands belonging to Shri J.J Singh, Shri Khanna, Shri M.S Chaturvedi and Shri M.D Chaturvedi, have not been acquired even though they are continuous to the appellants' land. We, however, find from the affidavit of Shri Rathe that according to the policy of the Government land in respect of which layout plans and service plans had been approved, by the competent authority before 13-11-1959, the date on which the preliminary notification in respect of 34,070 acres of land was issued, were excluded from the purview of the notification. Such policy was approved by the Supreme Court in Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 1138. There was a policy behind the exclusion. In his affidavit, Shri Rathe stated that in the case of the appellants, the lay-out plans and service plans had not been approved before that date. The said lands, therefore, could not be left out of the impugned notifications. The Land of Shri J.J Singh, had been constructed upon before 13-11-59 and was, therefore, not included in the notification. Similar was the case with the land of Shri Khanna, who also constructed a building before the said date. Same was the position with respect to the lands of Shri M.S Chaturvedi and M.D Chaturvedi. In fact, it was pointed put by Shri Rathe in his affidavit that the lands on plot No. 66 belonging to the appellants, which was claimed to have been built upon partially was also excluded from the purview of the said notifications. The objection of the learned counsel, therefore, was not well founded.

22. The learned counsel then submitted that the lay-out plans in this case should be deemed to have been sanctioned before 13-11-1959 in view of Sections 312 and 313 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. The lay-out plans were also submitted by the appellants to the Corporation on March 23, 1959. Under the direction of the Corporation revised plan was submitted on November 8, 1959. Service plans were submitted on November 8, 1959. The Corporation did not accord its sanction to the said plans within 60 days as required by Section 313 nor did it intimate that the sanction had been refused. The said lay-out plans according to the learned counsel were, therefore, deemed to have been sanctioned according to that section, as the restrictions upon utilisation of land imposed by the said section could not be enforced by the Corporation by reason of the inaction of its Standing Committee within the prescribed period. The requirement of the Government policy was, therefore, fully complied with and the case of the appellant was “at par” with the cases of Shri J.J Singh, Khanna, M.D Chaturvedi and M.S Chaturvedi, urges the learned counsel.

23. The advantages of the exception mentioned in the notification incorporating the Government's policy would have been available to the appellants, if not only the lay-out plans, but also the service plans had been sanctioned before 13-11-1959. Further, the sanction, required by the Government policy, was not intended to be a “deemed” sanction. It contemplated a positive overt act of granting sanction.

24. In the words of Mr. Justice Andley, who spoke for the Bench of this Court consisting of Mr. Justice Hardy and himself, in Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Smt. Kamla Bhandari, Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 138-D and 143-D of 1965, D/- 1-12-1969 (Delhi). “This exception contemplates a positive overt act of sanction and, in our view, a lay-out plan which could have been “considered as passed” would not be covered. Even if the restriction upon utilisation of the land imposed by Section 313 of the Corporation Act cannot be enforced by the Corporation authorities by reason of the inaction of its Standing Committee within the period specified in sub-section (3) and sub-section (5) of Section 313 of the Corporation Act, it would not follow that the Chief Commissioner, acting in exercise of powers under the Land Acquisition Act, could not decide that exception (c) would apply only to such lands in respect of which there are positive overt acts of sanction by the competent authorities before the specified date.”

25. It is, thus, manifest that in this case, the mere inaction of the Standing Committee of the Corporation to sanction or disallow the lay-out plans did not help the appellants, and the service plans had not even been submitted before the prescribed date. This would therefore, not be a case where according to the policy of the Administration, the lay-out plan and service plan had not been passed before 13-11-1959. The appellants, therefore, were not entitled to the benefits, which, as a matter of policy of the Administration, were given to those whose lay-out plans and service plans had been sanctioned before 13-11-59. There was, thus, no discrimination as was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants.

26. Mr. Aggarwal then contended that the Delhi Development Act, 1957 was an enactment which was passed to provide for the development of Delhi according to plan and for matters ancillary thereto. The acquisition although stated to have been made under the Land Acquisition Act was in fact made under the Delhi Development Act. The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act merely provided the procedure by which the land could be acquired under Section 15 of the Delhi Development Act, 1957. It is not necessary to examine this argument and its effect any further, as the acquisition in the present case, as contended by Shri S.S Chadha, learned counsel for the Union of India, was not under the Development Act, but under the Land Acquisition Act.

27. As was held by the learned single Judge, the mere fact that it is also the purpose for which the Delhi Development Act was enacted, does not mean that it ceased to be a public purpose within the meaning of Land Acquisition Act. The two enactments are separate and independent. In the present case, the acquisition being not under the Delhi Development Act, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant has no relevance.

28. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 300/-.

29. Appeal dismissed.