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Union Of India Petitioner v. Smt. Bishan Devi & Others S

Delhi High Court
Oct 12, 1969
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (H.R. Khanna, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Shrimati Bishan Devi and her husband Buta Ram, displaced persons from Gujranwala (Pakistan), submitted separate claims for properties left in Pakistan. Bishan Devi's claim was verified on March 7, 1951 for Rs. 24,000 and later enhanced on revision to Rs. 29,784. Buta Ram's claim was verified for Rs. 31,900. A property in Ramesh Nagar, New Delhi (built by the government) was put to auction on November 27, 1955; Bishan Devi was the highest bidder (Rs. 15,400), her bid was accepted and she received provisional possession.

Administrative steps followed: Bishan Devi was asked for registration numbers and later for a surrender certificate for a quarter occupied by her husband; failure to comply led to notices and, eventually, an order dated February 7, 1958 cancelling the auction-sale in her favour and forfeiting her 10% deposit. Her appeal was dismissed on August 28, 1958 and an application under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act was dismissed on June 15, 1959.

On December 27, 1958 the Chief Settlement Commissioner issued a memorandum providing that in pending cases where the claim value was Rs. 1,00,000 or less, claims need not be clubbed on the ground that an inquiry into a benami transaction had not been completed. After that memorandum, Bishan Devi's appeal against clubbing was allowed by Shri S.R. Anand by order dated March 20, 1959, holding her claim could not be clubbed with her husband's and she was to be paid on her verified claim alone.

Subsequently, in March 1967 the Regional Settlement Commissioner directed resale of the disputed property; the property was auctioned on March 9, 1967 and purchased by Subash Chander for Rs. 24,050. Bishan Devi's Section 33 application against the resale was dismissed on March 14, 1967 by Shri H.R. Nair. She filed a writ petition under Article 226; the learned Single Judge allowed it, quashed the March 14, 1967 order and the March 9, 1967 auction-sale, and directed transfer of the property to Bishan Devi. The Union of India, Chief Settlement Commissioner and Regional Settlement Commissioner appealed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the resale of the property (auction of March 9, 1967) was lawful in the face of the earlier order dated March 20, 1959 by Shri S.R. Anand, which held that Bishan Devi's claim could not be clubbed with her husband's.
  2. Whether an oral (personal) hearing is required to be given to a petitioner before the Central Government, or an authority delegated with its powers, dismisses an application under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act.
  3. Whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner's memorandum dated December 27, 1958 had the force of law such that reliance on it could justify clubbing of claims or annulment of Shri Anand's order (the court did not decide this issue but the question was raised).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Union of India, Chief Settlement Commissioner, Regional Settlement Commissioner)

  • No detailed account of the appellants' specific legal arguments is recorded in the opinion beyond the fact that they sought to overturn the Single Judge's decision and defended the resale/administrative actions of the settlement authorities.

Respondent — Shrimati Bishan Devi

  • No detailed transcript of Bishan Devi's arguments is recorded in the opinion; the record shows she sought quashing of the March 14, 1967 order, annulment of the resale and transfer of the property in her favour, and relied upon the order dated March 20, 1959 of Shri S.R. Anand.

Respondent / Purchaser — Subash Chander (represented by Mr. Nijhawan)

  • Argued that the Chief Settlement Commissioner's memorandum dated December 27, 1958 constituted administrative instructions and did not have the force of law (i.e., it could not be relied upon to invalidate the resale). The court did not decide the legal force of the memorandum because it based its decision on Shri Anand's order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ranjit Singh v. The Union of India and others Principle that Section 33 is different from Section 24 and that a representation to the Central Government under Section 33 is not necessarily a revision petition governed by Rule 105; oral hearing is not required where the Government decides not to interfere, but if the Government proposes to reverse a prior decision prejudicial to a person a hearing should be given. The court accepted the principle in Ranjit Singh and applied it to hold that it is not incumbent on the Central Government to give an oral hearing in every case under Section 33; only when the Government proposes to interfere with an impugned order is an oral hearing necessary.
Hira Lal Kher v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi (Full Bench) Held that, for a revision under Section 24 of the Act, it is only after hearing the petitioner or his pleader that a revision petition can be dismissed (i.e., an oral hearing requirement for Section 24 revisions as applied via Rule 105). The court distinguished Hira Lal Kher as relating to Section 24 (power of revision) and not to Section 33 (residuary powers of Central Government); the court therefore did not extend the Full Bench rule to Section 33 matters.
Dewan Jhangi Ram v. Union of India Authority cited for the view that a petitioner should be heard before the Central Government acts under Section 33 in certain circumstances (noted as a view expressed by D.K. Mahajan, J.). The court noted Dewan Jhangi Ram but treated it as distinguishable: in that case a prior order in favour of a person had been reversed by the Central Government without hearing him, and the court recognized that before reversing a previous decision prejudicially affecting a person a hearing should be afforded.
Sobha Ram Sethi v. Union of India and others Followed the dictum that a personal hearing is not necessary in every case under Section 33; cited as authority consistent with Ranjit Singh. Used as supporting authority for the proposition that oral hearing is not invariably required under Section 33 when the Central Government dismisses an application for non-interference.
Darshan Kumar v. Union of India and others Followed the dictum in Ranjit Singh regarding Section 33 and oral hearings (cited alongside Sobha Ram Sethi). Relied upon as one of the authorities following Ranjit Singh to support the court's conclusion about the non-compulsory nature of oral hearings under Section 33 in certain circumstances.
Hazara Singh another v. Union of India and others Cited as an authority following the Ranjit Singh approach to Section 33 and hearings. Accepted as further supporting authority for the court's conclusion on the circumstances in which oral hearing is required under Section 33.
Local Government Board v. Arlidge (House of Lords) Authority for the proposition that absence of oral hearing does not per se offend principles of natural justice; what matters is whether adequate opportunities were given to the party. Referred to by the court to illustrate that oral hearings are not an absolute requirement in quasi-judicial proceedings and to support the view that lack of oral hearing does not automatically violate natural justice.
Board of High School and Intermediary J.P. Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta Their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred approvingly to Local Government Board v. Arlidge. Referred to as an approving citation of Arlidge to bolster the proposition that oral hearing is not always required and that what matters is that the opportunities actually given were adequate.
Messrs Serajuddin Company v. Union of India and others Held that although proceedings are quasi-judicial, it was not imperative for the Central Government to give an oral hearing to the petitioner in that context. Used as an example consistent with the court's conclusion that oral hearing is not invariably required where the Central Government deals with applications under rules or residuary powers.
Board of Education v. Rice Cited as part of the standard of review on procedural requirements (referenced in the Arlidge discussion). Referenced indirectly through the Arlidge decision to explain the proper standard for procedural fairness (i.e., not automatically equating administrative procedure to court procedure).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main strands of reasoning: first, on the legality of the resale in the light of Shri S.R. Anand's order (20 March 1959); and second, on whether a personal hearing under Section 33 was required in the circumstances.

  1. Effect of Shri S.R. Anand's order of 20 March 1959:

    The court observed that after the Regional Settlement Commissioner had ordered clubbing of the claims (16 September 1957) and the subsequent cancellation of the auction (7 February 1958) and dismissal of Bishan Devi's appeal (28 August 1958), the Chief Settlement Commissioner issued the December 27, 1958 memorandum. Following that memorandum, Bishan Devi's appeal against clubbing was allowed by Shri Anand (20 March 1959), holding that her claim could not be clubbed with her husband's and she was entitled to be paid compensation for her verified claim alone. That order was not set aside in any proceeding and therefore "holds the field."

    The court reasoned that any order for resale necessarily assumed that Bishan Devi's and her husband's claims could validly be clubbed and that the combined compensation fell short of her bid. Given Shri Anand's order that clubbing was not permissible, that foundational assumption for resale could not be made. Therefore the resale (auction of March 9, 1967) was illegal in the face of Shri Anand's order. The court explicitly relied on the binding effect of the Shri Anand order and did not decide whether the December 27, 1958 memorandum had the force of law.

  2. Requirement of oral (personal) hearing under Section 33:

    The court examined the statutory scheme: Section 24 deals with revision petitions (with specific grounds and procedural protections), while Section 33 confers residuary powers on the Central Government ("The Central Government may at any time call for the record... and may pass such order... as is not inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder."). Rule 105 of the Rules incorporates, so far as applicable, the procedure in Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure for appeals and revisions; a proviso added on July 20, 1963 permits dismissal of certain revisions without oral hearing.

    The court agreed with the principle laid down in Ranjit Singh that Section 33 is different in character from Section 24: a representation under Section 33 is not necessarily a revision petition governed by Rule 105. The court held that if the Central Government finds no force in an application under Section 33 and decides not to interfere, it is not incumbent upon it to hear the petitioner orally. However, before the Central Government reverses a previous decision and thereby prejudicially affects a person, that person should be given an opportunity to be heard. The court therefore concluded that an oral hearing is required only when the Government proposes to interfere with the impugned order; absence of oral hearing is not in every case a breach of natural justice.

    In reaching this view the court relied on Ranjit Singh and related authorities (including Dewan Jhangi Ram, Sobha Ram Sethi, Darshan Kumar, Hazara Singh) and on common-law authority (Local Government Board v. Arlidge) approving the proposition that oral hearing is not an invariably necessary concomitant of quasi-judicial proceedings; the court noted that the House of Lords decision was approved by the Supreme Court in Board of High School and Intermediary J.P. Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta and was consistent with other Indian authorities.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED. The court declined to interfere with the Single Judge's acceptance of Bishan Devi's writ petition and concluded that the resale (auction of March 9, 1967) was illegal in view of the March 20, 1959 order of Shri S.R. Anand.

Immediate consequences for the parties

  • The amount paid by Subash Chander (purchaser at the March 9, 1967 auction) must be refunded to him forthwith.
  • The parties shall bear their own costs.
  • The court based its decision on the Shri Anand order and did not decide whether the Chief Settlement Commissioner's memorandum of December 27, 1958 had the force of law; it noted that if the appellants believed the Shri Anand order to be legally infirm they should have assailed it in appropriate proceedings.

Broader implications

The court articulated and applied the principle that Section 33 (residuary powers of the Central Government) does not automatically attract the same oral hearing requirements as Section 24 (power of revision) — i.e., oral hearing under Section 33 is not universally required and becomes necessary where the Government proposes deliberately to reverse a prior decision that would prejudicially affect a person. The court left open the question whether the December 27, 1958 memorandum itself had the force of law and did not set aside or overrule existing precedents beyond applying the authorities cited to the facts at hand.

This summary is prepared strictly on the basis of the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add, infer, or assume facts or legal conclusions beyond those expressly stated in the text.

Show all summary ...

H.R Khanna, C.J:— This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent by Union of India, Chief Settlement Commissioner and Regional Settlement Commissioner, is directed against the judgement of learned Single Judge whereby he accepted the writ petition filed by Shrimati Bishan Devi respondent, quashed the order dated March 14, 1967 of Joint Chief Settlement Commissioner and the auction-sale, in respect of the property in dispute, held on March 9, 1967. Order was also made that Shrimati Bishan Devi was entitled to the transfer of the property in dispute in her favour.

Brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that Shrimati Bishan Devi and her husband Buta Ram were displaced persons from Gujranwala in Pakistan. Bisharn Devi and Buta Ram made separate claims for properties left in Pakistan. The claim of Bishan Devi was verified on March 7, 1951 for Rs. 24,000/-. On revision the amount was enhanced on June 18, 1951 to Rs. 29,784/-. The claim of Buta Ram was verified for an amount of Rs. 31,900/-. The property in dispute, situate in Ramesh Nagar, New Delhi, had been built by the government. It was put to auction on November 27, 1955, under the orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Bishan Devi gave the highest bid of Rs. 15,400/-. Her bid was accepted and on December 17, 1955 she was told to give the registration numbers of her claim application and of any of her relatives or associate. Bishan Devi gave the registration number of her claim which had been verified for Rs. 29,784/-. She also along with that associated the claim of her husband which had been verified for Rs. 31,900/-. The total compensation due on the two verified claims calculated as separate units, according to Bishan Devi, came to Rs. 17,654/-. She moved the Chief Settlement Commissioner for the finalization of her case. On July 16, 1957 the Settlement Officer issued a notice to Bishan Devi asking her to produce surrender certificate in respect of a quarter occupied by her husband in Purana Qila. She was told that unless she did so the sale of the property in her favour would be cancelled and the amount of 10% deposited by her would be forfeited. Bishan Devi was also given provisional possession of the property in dispute. Bishan Devi filed objections to the demand of surrender certificate. On September 16, 1957, Regional Settlement Commissioner passed on order clubbing the claims of Bishan Devi and her husband. It was observed that the property held by Bishan Devi in Pakistan had not been shown to have been purchased by her out of her Stridhana. On December 10, 1957, Bishan Devi was asked to pay Rs. 3,060/- being the extra amount payable by her towards the sale price by reason of the clubbing together of the claims of Bishan Devi and Buta Ram. Bishan Devi did not pay that amount. On February 7, 1958 an order was made cancelling the auction-sale in favour of Bishan Devi and forfeiting the 10% deposit made by her. On February 28, 1958 Bishan Devi was asked to hand over vacant possession of the property in dispute. Bishan Devi filed an appeal against the orders dated February 7, 1958 and February 28, 1958, but her appeal was dismissed by Shri Gajendra Singh, Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner, on August 28, 1958. Bishan Devi filed an application under Section 33 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the order of Shri Gajendra Singh, but the same was dismissed on June 15, 1959.
During the pendency of Bishan Devi's application under Section 33 of the Act, the Chief Settlement Commissioner issued a memorandum on December 27, 1958. Paragraphs 1 and 4 of that memorandum, with which we are only concerned, read as under :—
“In supersession of the instructions contained in this office letter noted in the margin on the above subject, it has been decided that cases kept pending on the ground that inquiries were to be made whether or not the property which is the subject of the claim and which is shown in the name of a particular claimant was not purchased benami, the claimant may be paid on the basis of the claim assessment order as it stands, if the value of the claim is Rs. 1,00,000/- or less. This means that where any claim is valued at one lakh or less, it will not be clubbed on the ground that the inquiry whether or not it is a benami transaction has not been done.
4. These instructions will be effective from the date of the issue, and past cases will not be re-opened.”
After the issue of the above memorandum, Bishan Devi filed an appeal against the order directing the clubbing of her claim with that of her husband. This appeal was accepted by Shri S.R Anand, Assistant Settlement Commissioner, as per order dated March 20, 1959. It was held that the claim of Bishan Devi could not be clubbed together with that of her husband and that she be paid compensation for the claim verified in her favour without clubbing the same with that of her husband. After the above order had been made by Shri Anand, Buta Ram, husband of Bishan Devi, surrendered possession of the house in his occupation in Purana Qila. He also filed an application that in view of the order of Shri Anand the case might be reopened and property be tranferred to Bishan Devi. Buta Ram was thereupon informed that the case and been sent to another official for doing the needful. Buta Ram died on January 9, 1965.
In March, 1967, it is stated, the Regional Settlement Commissioner directed that the property in dispute be sold by public auction on March 9, 1967. Bishan Devi filed an application under Section 33 of the Act against the proposed resale of the property. During the pendency of the revision the property in dispute was sold by auction on March 9, 1967 and was purchased by Subash Chander respondent for Rs. 24,050/-. Application under Section 33 of the Act filed by Bishan Devi was dismissed on March 14, 1967 by Shri H.R Nair, Joint Chief Settlement Commissioner with delegated powers of the Central Government. Bishan Devi thereupon filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order dated March 14, 1967. Prayer was also made that the property in dispute be not sold by public auction as the property was in the meantime sold and purchased by Subash Chand, he too was impleaded as a party under order dated December 6, 1967, of Andley, J.
The learned Single Judge in allowing the writ petition held that the order dated February 7, 1958, cancelling the auction-sale in favour of Bishan Devi, as well as the order dated August 28, 1959 made by Shri Gajendra Singh stood superseded by the order dated March 20, 1959 of Shri Anand. The order dated March 14, 1967, made by the Joint Chief Settlement Commissioner, was held to be not in conformity with law, as, in the opinion of the learned Single Judge, the Joint Chief Settlement Commissioner had not applied his mind to all the various grounds especially that relating to the order of Shri Anand. View was also expressed by the learned Single Judge that a personal hearing should have been given to Bishan Devi or her counsel before the dismissal of her application under Section 33 of the Act by Shri Nair, although it was observed that it was not necessary to base the decision on that ground. The resale of the property in favour of Subash Chander was held to be illegal.
We have heard Mr. Kapur on behalf of the appellants, Mr. Bhawani Lal on behalf of Bishan Devi respondent and Mr. Nijhawan on behalf of Subash Chander, and are of the view that no case has been made for interfering with the decision of the learned Single Judge in accepting the petition of Bishan Devi. It would appear from the resume of facts given above that subsequent to the order dated September 16, 1957 of the Regional Settlement Commissioner by which the claims of Bishan Devi and her husband were clubbed together as also subsequent to the order dated February 7, 1958 by which the auction sale in favour of Bishan Devi was cancelled and the order dated August 28, 1958 of Shri Gajendra Singh, Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner by which Bishan Devi's appeal was dismissed, the Chief Settlement Commissioner issued a memorandum dated December 27, 1958. According to that memorandum, in pending cases relating claims of Rs. 1,00,000/- or less the claimant might be paid compensation on the basis of claim asessment order and the claim need not be clubbed on the ground that the inquiry, whether or not it is a benami transaction, has not been done. After the issue of the above memorandum, Bishan Devi whose application under Section 33 of the Act, against the order of Shri Gajendra Singh was pending, filed an appeal against the order directing the clubbing of her claim with that of her husband. This appeal was accepted by Shri Anand as per order dated March 20, 1959 and it was held that her claim could not be clubbed together with that of her husband and that she was entitled to be paid compensation for the claim verified in her favour without such clubbing. The above order of Shri Anand was not set aside in any proceeding and holds the field. In the face of the order of Shri Anand, no order could be made for the resale of the property in dispute because such a resale could only be ordered on the assumption that the claims of Bishan Devi and her husband could be validly clubbed together and the compensation payable on account of those claims as clubbed together fell short of the amount of bid made by Bishan Devi. Such an assumption could obviously be not made in view of the order passed by Shri Anand.
Argument has been advanced by Mr. Nijahwan that the memorandum dated December 27, 1958, constituted administrative instructions and could not have the force of law. It is not necessary, in our opinion, to go into this question as we are of the view that the order for resale of the property in dispute was illegal because of the order of Shri Anand. As we base our decision upon the order of Shri Anand alone, there is no need to deal with the question whether the said memorandum had the force of law. If it was the case of the appellants that the order of Shri Anand was not in conformity with law and he was in error in relying upon that memorandum, the proper course was to assail it in appropriate proceedings. As things stand, we find that the order of Shri Anand holds the field as remarked earlier. In the face of that order the property in dispute could not be ordered to be resold.
The learned Single Judge, though he did not base his decision on that ground, has also expressed the view that it is necessary that the petitioner should be given a personal hearing before his application under Section 33 of the Act is rejected by the Central Government or the authority delegated with the powers of the Central Government under that Section. A Division Bench authority of Falshaw and Tek Chand, JJ. in case Ranjit Singh v. The Union of India and others(1), was cited before the learned Single Judge but he expressed his disagreement with the dictum laid down in that case. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we, with due deference, are of the opinion that the principle laid down by the learned Judges in the case of Ranjit Singh v. The Union of India others(1) is correct. Section 24 of the Act deals with revision petitions which may be filed under the Act and the grounds on which such revisions can be entertained. Section 33 deals with the residuary powers and reads as under :—
“Certain residuary powers of Central Government.
“The Central Government may at any time call for the record of any proceeding under this Act and may pass such order in relation thereto as in its opinion the circumstances of the case require and as is not inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in this Act or the rules made thereunder.”
According to Rule 105 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, except as otherwise provided in the Act or in the Rules, the procedure laid down in Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to the hearing and disposal of appeals and revisions under the Act. A proviso was added to the above Rule as per notification published on July 20, 1963, that in the case of a revision under sub-section (4) of section 24 of the Act, it shall not be necessary to give an oral hearing if, after sending for the record, if necessary, and considering the petition for revision, the Central Government thinks fit to dismiss the revision. Before the above proviso was added a Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Hira Lal Kher v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, New Delhi, (2), held that it is only after hearing the the petitioner or his pleader that a revision petition can be dismissed. The Full Bench case related to a revision under Section 24 of the Act and not to a matter under Section 33 which deals, as stated above, with the residuary powers of the Central Government. If an application is made to the Central Government under Section 33 of the Act and it finds no force in the application, it is, in our opinion, not incumbent upon the Government to hear the petitioner orally. It is only when the Central Government decides to interfere with the impugned order that a duty is cast upon it to hear the other party because not to do so would offend against the principles of natural justice. We find ourselves in this respect in agreement with the following observations in the case of Ranjit Singh v. The Union of India and others(1),
“It is, however, quite clear that the provisions of section 33 are very different from those of section 24 which is headed ‘Power of revision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner’. This clearly means that any petition filed under that section must be treated as a regular revision petition. On the other hand section 33 is headed ‘Certain residuary powers of Central Government’ Some of the words of the two sections are undoubtedly similar but I do not regard any representation made to the Central Government with a view to causing it to exercise its residary powers under section 33 as a revision petition or governed by rule 105. Our attention was drawn to a decision of D.K Mahajan, J. in Dewan Jhangi Ram v. Union of India(3), in which the view has been expressed that the petitioner should be heard before a decision is made by the Central Government under section 33, but in that case it appears that the person who moved this Court under Article 226 was one against whom some previous order in his favour had been reversed by the Central Government purporting to act under Section 33 without giving him any opportunity to be heard : I would certainly agree that although the words which occur in sub-section (3) of section 24 of the Act— ‘No order which prejudicially affects any person shall be passed under this section without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard’ do not occur in section 33, they embody a principle which should be applied by the Central Government when acting under section 33 and that before any previous decision is reversed under this section the person likely to be prejudicially affected by it should be given an opportunity to be heard. This, however, does not mean that any person who chooses to make a request to the Central Government for the purpose of reversing some earlier decision must necessarily be given a personal hearing before the decision of the Government not to interfere is communicated to him. The dictum laid down above was followed in Sobha Ram Sethi v. Union of India and others(4), Darshan Kumar v. Union of India and others(5), decided on September 1, 1967, and Hazara Singh another v. Union of India and others (6), decided on February 3, 1968”
It may be observed that the absence of oral hearing does not per se offend against the principles of natural justice and that oral hearing is not a necessary concomitant of all quasi-judicial proceedings. It would always depend upon the circumstances of each ease whether oral hearing should be granted or not. Dealing with the question of oral hearing, Viscount Haldane L.C observed in a case, decided by the House of Lords, Local Government Board v. Arlidge(7) :
“What appears to me to have been the fallacy of the judgment of the majority in the Court of Appeal is that it begs the question at the beginning by setting up the test of the procedure of a Court of justice, instead of the other standard which was laid down for such cases in Board of Education v. Rice(8), I do not think the Board was bound to hear the respondent orally, provided it gave him the opportunities he actually had.”
The above case was referred to with approval by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Board of High School and Intermediary J.P Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta(9). In the case of Messrs Serajuddin Company v. Union of India and others(10), while dealing with an application under rules 54 and 55 of the mineral concession rules, it was held that though the proceedings were of a quasi-judicial nature, it was not imperative for the Central Government to give an oral hearing to the petitioner.
In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. The amount paid by Subash Chander should be refunded to him forthwith. The parties, in the circumstances of the case, shall bear their own costs.
A.N.K Appeal dismissed.