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Digambar Prasad Petitioner v. S.L Dhani Etc. S
Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Digambar Prasad, proprietor of Musaddi Mal Brothers (the petitioner), occupied shop Municipal No. 1791, Dariba Kalan, Delhi, as tenant of respondents 2 and 3 (Shrimati Devi Jain and Shrimati Gun Wanti Devi Jain). Respondents 2 and 3 filed a petition on 28 October 1964 under the Delhi Rent Control Act for eviction on the ground of rent arrears alleged to be Rs. 1,180 up to 30 September 1964 (rent at Rs. 46 per mensem) and alleged unauthorized subletting.
The petitioner denied arrears and subletting and sought fixation of standard rent. On 9 May 1965 the Additional Controller under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act directed the petitioner to pay or deposit the arrears and pay future rent at Rs. 46 per mensem during the proceedings. The petitioner appealed and the Rent Control Tribunal dismissed the appeal by order dated 31 January 1966. The petitioner did not comply with the Section 15(1) order; his defence was struck off under Section 15(7) on 30 March 1966. The Additional Controller thereafter found that subletting was not proved but that the petitioner was liable to be evicted for non-payment; the standard rent was fixed at Rs. 20 per mensem from 28 October 1964 (order dated 26 November 1966).
Because the shop was in a slum area, respondents 2 and 3 on February 1967 applied under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 for permission to execute the eviction order, alleging the petitioner was a man of means and in arrears (said arrears alleged to have accumulated). The Competent Authority granted permission by order dated 11 December 1967, observing among other things that the respondents had not been paying rent regularly and that the respondents (sic — meaning the petitioner/occupant) were not entitled to protection under the Slum Areas Act.
On 5 January 1968 the petitioner filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking quashing of the Competent Authority's order of 11 December 1967. The petition was admitted and directed to be heard by a Division Bench; the Division Bench referred the matter to a Full Bench for determination of the proper approach under Section 19(4) of the Slum Areas Act (as amended).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in deciding an application under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (as amended by Act No. 43 of 1964), the Competent Authority is required to take into account the tenant's status and means to obtain alternative accommodation as a primary consideration (particularly under Section 19(4)(a)).
- Whether the Competent Authority's failure to consider the tenant's means/availability of alternative accommodation rendered its order legally unsustainable such that the High Court should quash that order in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
- Whether the petitioner, given his admitted arrears of rent and failure to comply with earlier orders (including the striking off of his defence), is nevertheless entitled, in equity and in the exercise of judicial discretion, to have the Competent Authority's order quashed.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Sawhney)
- The primary requirement in an application under Section 19 is the status of the tenant and his means to obtain alternative accommodation; the Competent Authority must consider whether alternative accommodation within the tenant's means would be available (Section 19(4)(a)).
- Section 19(4)(a) and (b) are the only factors the Competent Authority must consider where no other factors have been prescribed under clause (c); the assessment must be made from the tenant's point of view rather than the landlord's.
- Reference was made to the decision in Jyoti Pershad v. Union Territory of Delhi, where the Court emphasized the Act's orientation to protect tenants lacking alternative accommodation.
Respondents' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Yogeshwar Dayal)
- The conduct of the tenant in refusing to pay arrears is a relevant factor the Competent Authority may and should take into account when deciding permission under Section 19; to ignore it would allow a tenant to remain in occupation without payment of rent.
- The separate remedy of a rent recovery suit may be ineffective if the tenant lacks attachable property, making non-payment a practical problem for landlords.
- Reliance was placed on statutory provisions (reference to sub-section (2) of Section 20B of the Act) and on authority in support: Shrimati Parvati Devi v. Tibbia College Board, Delhi and another, and Chander Bhan v. Chattar Singh and another, where courts considered a tenant's conduct and inability to claim protection under Section 19 in circumstances of non-payment or where the tenancy was conditional/temporary.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jyoti Pershad v. Union Territory of Delhi | Shows the Slum Areas Act (as originally enacted) is oriented to protect tenants who have no alternative accommodation; the Act looks at the problem from tenants' point of view and contemplates eviction only where accommodation cannot be provided or is unfit. | The court recorded the petitioner's reliance on Jyoti Pershad to support the contention that Section 19(4) must be applied with primary regard to the tenant's need for alternative accommodation; the decision informed the debate over statutory purpose though the Full Bench did not grant relief on the merits. |
| Shrimati Parvati Devi v. Tibbia College Board, Delhi and another | Authority for the proposition that mere poverty and inability to find alternative accommodation cannot by itself prevent eviction; such circumstances do not necessarily bar execution when tenancy is conditional or temporary. | Respondents relied on this case to show that inability to find alternative accommodation does not automatically entitle a tenant to protection under Section 19; the Court noted this authority in evaluating the relevance of tenant conduct. |
| Chander Bhan v. Chattar Singh and another | Holds that a tenant's refusal to pay rent is a relevant and germane factor for the Competent Authority to consider under Section 19 when granting or refusing permission. | The court cited a passage from this case to support respondents' argument that default in payment should be taken into account; the Full Bench accepted tenant's conduct as a determinative factor in exercising discretion. |
| Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. II, Third Edition (authoritative treatise) | Principle that certiorari is discretionary: it will be granted where the inferior court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and where the applicant's conduct does not disentitle him to relief; the remedy is not of course. | The court quoted Halsbury to explain the discretionary nature of certiorari and to support the proposition that a petitioner with unclean hands or conduct disentitling him to relief should not obtain relief as a matter of course. |
| A.M. Allison & H.P. Brigg v. B.L. Sen & Others | Reinforces that writs of certiorari are discretionary and the Court may refuse relief where there is no failure of justice; concurrent findings of fact may justify refusal to interfere. | The court relied on this authority to justify declining to quash the Competent Authority's order in the exercise of its discretion, given the factual background of arrears and prior procedural events against the petitioner. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench proceeded in two related strands: (A) the legal question of the matters the Competent Authority must take into account under Section 19(4) of the Slum Areas Act; and (B) the exercise of judicial discretion under Article 226 in the specific circumstances of this petitioner.
1. On Section 19(4): The Division Bench had earlier observed that the Competent Authority erred in treating the tenant's status as irrelevant. The Full Bench recorded the competing positions: the petitioner contended that clauses (a) and (b) of Section 19(4) (availability of alternative accommodation within the tenant's means; and whether eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance) are the primary and controlling considerations, and that the assessment must be tenant-focused (relying on Jyoti Pershad). The respondents contended that the tenant's conduct—particularly refusal to pay rent—is a relevant factor which the Competent Authority may take into account (relying on Chander Bhan and Parvati Devi).
2. On the exercise of judicial discretion: The Full Bench emphasized that the remedy of writ of certiorari is discretionary and not of right. The court recited authorities (Halsbury; A.M. Allison & H.P. Brigg) explaining that a litigant's conduct may disentitle him to equitable relief. The Bench examined the specific facts: the petitioner had been ordered under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act to pay or deposit arrears and future rent, had not complied, had his defence struck off under Section 15(7), and an eviction order had been made; he also failed to pay arrears during the Section 19 proceedings. The Bench treated these facts as relevant to equitable relief under Article 226.
3. Conclusion of analysis: Although the Competent Authority was found by the Division Bench to have overlooked the relevance of Section 19(4)(a), the Full Bench concluded that intervention by writ would be inappropriate in the exercise of the Court's discretion because of the petitioner's conduct (persistent non-payment of rent despite orders and opportunity). The court held that the petitioner came to court with unclean hands and that equitable considerations justified refusing the discretionary relief sought even if there were procedural infirmities in the Competent Authority's treatment of factors under Section 19(4).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition under Article 226 was dismissed.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The petitioner’s application to quash the Competent Authority's order dated 11 December 1967 failed; the petition was dismissed (the court ordered dismissal without costs).
- The Court exercised its discretion to refuse certiorari on equitable grounds, principally the petitioner's admitted and unremedied arrears of rent and the striking off of his defence in the prior eviction proceedings.
Broader implications:
The opinion applies established principles governing the discretionary nature of writ relief (certiorari) and underscores that a tenant's non-payment of rent and related conduct are relevant to equitable relief under Article 226 and to the Competent Authority's exercise of discretion under Section 19. The opinion does not set out a novel legal rule; it resolves the petition on the facts and the exercise of discretion rather than by establishing a new precedent beyond the authorities discussed.
Source: Summary prepared exclusively from the provided legal opinion of H.R. Khanna, C.J., as contained in the supplied text.
H.R Khanna, C.J:— This writ petition has been referred to Full Bench in pursuance of the order of Dua, C.J (as he then was) and Rangarajan, J. in the following circumstances.
Digambar Prasad, proprietor of Musaddi Mal Brothers, is occupying the shop in dispute bearing Municipal No. 1791, situate in Dariba Kalan, Delhi, as a tenant of Shrimati Devi Jain and Shrimati Gun Wanti Devi Jain respondents 2 and 3. The petitioner is carrying on jeweller's business in the shop. On October 28, 1964 respondents 2 and 3 filed a petition under the Delhi Rent Control Act for the eviction of the petitioner from the shop on the ground that for the period till September 30, 1964, Rs. 1,180 were due from the petitioner on account of arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 46 per mensem and that he had refused to pay the said amount in spite of a registered notice. The petitioner was also alleged to have sublet a portion of the shop without the consent of respondents 2 and 3.
The application of the respondents was resisted by the petitioner. He denied the allegation that arrears of rent were due from him and that he had sublet any part of the shop. The petitioner also prayed for fixation of the standard rent. On May 9, 1965 the Additional Controller passed an order under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act and directed the petitioner to pay or deposit the arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 46 per mensem within one month from the date of the order and to continue paying or depositing the future rent month by month at the same rate, during the pendency of the eviction proceedings. The petitioner went up in appeal against that order but his appeal was dismissed by the Rent Control Tribunal as per order dated January 31, 1966. The petitioner failed to comply with the order made under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act by paying or depositing the arrears within the prescribed period. The defence of the petitioner was thereupon struck off by the Additional Controller under Section 15(7) of the above Act on March 30, 1966. The Additional Controller thereafter went into the question of the liability of the petitioner to be evicted and the standard rent of the shop in dispute. As per order dated November 26, 1966 the Additional Controller held that respondents 2 and 3 had failed to prove that the petitioner had sublet any part of the shop. The petitioner, was however, held to be liable to be evicted as he had admittedly not made any payment or deposited the arrears of rent in compliance with the order passed under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The standard rent of the shop was fixed to be Rs. 20 per mensem with effect from the date of application, i.e, October 28, 1964.
As the shop in dispute was situated in a slum area, in February 1967 respondents 2 and 3 filed an application under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 (No. 96 of 1956) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for permission to execute the order of the Additional Controller dated November 26, 1966. It was stated in the application that the petitioner was a man of means and was living in his own house situate near Mori Gate, Delhi. Part of the house was stated to have been let out by the petitioner. It was also stated that previously the competent authority under the Act had granted permission to the respondents to execute an earlier order for the eviction of the petitioner. The petitioner was further stated to have not paid rent for 57 months except for a sum of Rs. 200.
The above application was resisted by the petitioner and he denied the allegations of respondents 2 and 3. The petitioner stated that he was a poor man and his income from business was about Rs. 200 per mensem which was hardly sufficient to maintain him and the members of his family. The petitioner, however, admitted that he was living in his ancestral house and that a portion of that house was in possession of some old tenants. According to the petitioner he was not able to arrange for alternative accommodation because of his poverty. The Competent Authority appointed under the Act granted the permission sought by respondents 2 and 3 as per order dated December 11, 1967. In the course of the order, while granting the permission, the Competent Authority observed :
“In the eviction order itself there is a mention of arrears of Rs. 1,180. According to the petitioners, the arrears have now accumulated to Rs. 3,100. It has been argued by the petitioners that the respondents have paid only Rs. 20 (Rs. 200) on account of rent since the Ist April, 1962, and that the eviction order, for whose execution the permission is being sought, is the 3rd against the respondents. Under these circumstances, I do not think that a deposit of Rs. 740 by the respondents meets the entire claim of the petitioners. Since the respondents have not been paying rent regularly in spite of the eviction orders, I am of the view that they are not entitled to any protection under Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 and the question of status of the respondents is not relevant to the present petition.
In view of the above, permission asked for is hereby granted.”
On January 5, 1968 the petitioner filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issuance of a writ for quashing the order dated December 11, 1967 made by Shri S.L Dhani, Competent Authority, respondent No. 1.
The petition was admitted on January 8, 1968 and it was directed to be heard by Division Bench. At the time of the hearing of the petition it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the primary requirement to be gone into in an application under Section 19 of the Act was the status of the tenant and his means to get an alternative accommodation. If this criteria, it was submitted, was not kept in view, the order of the Competent Authority should be considered to be patently wrong. The above contention was controverted on behalf of the respondents. It was further submitted that the relief in a writ petition being discretionary, it would be unjust to give protection to the petitioner under Section 19 of the Act. The learned Judges constituting the Division Bench referred to the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 19 of the Act and observed that the question whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available if he were evicted, could not be considered to be irrelevant as had been assumed by the Competent Authority. The Competent Authority in this view of the matter was held to have not acted in accordance with Section 19(4)(a) of the Act. Question, however, arose, in the opinion of the learned Judges, whether in view of the fact that the petitioner was admittedly in arrears of rent, this Court in exercise of its discretion should decline to interfere with the impugned order or whether the Court should direct the Competent Authority to come to a decision after taking into account the factors mentioned in Section 19(4)(a) of the Act. It was considered proper that the matter should be decided by a larger Bench. The case, in the circumstances, has been placed before the Full Bench.
The Act came into force on February 8, 1957. It was amended by Amendment Act No. 43 of 1964. The amending Act came into force on February 28, 1965. Section 19 of the Act reads as under :—
“19. Proceedings for eviction of tenants not to be taken without permission of the competent authority :—
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority :—
(a) institute, after the commencement of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Amendment Act, 1964, any suit or proceeding for obtaining any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in a slum area; or
(b) where any decree or order is obtained in any suit or proceeding instituted before such commencement for the eviction of a tenant from any building or land in such area, execute such decree or order.
(2) Every person desiring to obtain the permission referred to in sub-section (1) shall make an application in writing to the competent authority in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed.
(3) On receipt of such application, the competent authority, after giving an opportunity to the parties of being heard and after making such summary inquiry into the circumstances of the case as it thinks fit, shall by order in writing, either grant or refuse to grant such permission.
(4) In granting or refusing to grant the permission under sub-section (3), the competent authority shall take into account the following factors, namely :—
(a) whether alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him if he were evicted;
(b) whether the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas;
(c) such other factors, if any, as may be prescribed.
(6) Where the competent authority refuses to grant the permission, it shall record a brief statement of the reasons for such refusal and furnish a copy thereof to the applicant.”
Sub-section (4) of section 19 was inserted by Act No. 43 of 1964. Some other alterations were also made in the Section but we are not concerned with them in the present case. Mr. Sawhney on behalf of the petitioner has argued that the only factors, which have to be taken into account by the Competent Authority while granting or refusing to grant the permission under Section 19 of the Act, are those specified in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (4) of that Section. So far as clause (c) of that Section is concerned, it is the common case of the parties that no other factors have been prescribed under that clause. According to Mr. Sawhney, if the case is not covered by clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (4) and it is not shown to the satisfaction of the Competent Authority that an alternative accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available if he were evicted or that the eviction is in the interest of improvement and clearance of the slum areas, the application under Section 19 should be dismissed irrespective of the fact whether the tenant commits default in paying the arrears of rent. The matter, while deciding an application under Section 19, has according to Mr. Sawhney, to be looked at from the angle of the tenant and not that of the landlord. Reference in this connection is made to (1) the decision of Jyoti Pershad v. Union Territory of Delhi(1) wherein the constitutional validity of Section 19 of the Act, as it stood before the amendment made by act no. 43 of 1964, was upheld. Ayyangar, J., speaking for the Court in that case, observed :
“The Act, no doubt, looks at the problem not from the point of view of the landlord, his needs, the money he has sunk in the house and the possible profit that he might make if the house were either let to other tenants or was reconstructed and let out, but rather from the point of view of the tenants who have no alternative accommodation and who would be stranded in the open if an order for eviction were passed. The act itself contemplates eviction in cases where on the ground of the house being unfit for human habitation it has to be demolished either singly under Section 7 or as one of a block of buildings under Chapter IV. So long therefore as a building can, without great detriment to health or safety, permit accommodation, the policy of the enactment would seem to suggest that the slum dweller should not be evicted unless alternative accommodation could be obtained for him.”
As against the above, Mr. Yogeshwar Dayal on behalf of respondents 2 and 3 has argued that the conduct of the tenant in refusing to pay the arrears of rent is a relevant factor which can be taken into account by the Competent Authority in deciding an application under Section 19 of the Act. To ignore that factor would have the effect of allowing a tenant to remain in occupation of the rented premises without payment of rent. The remedy of a separate suit for recovery of rent, it is pointed out, may prove to be illusory and ineffective in case the tenant is not in possession of any attachable property. Reference has been made by Mr. Yogeshwar Dayal to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 20B of the Act which deals with the liability to pay rent of a tenant other than one who is placed in possession of a building in pursuance of a direction issued under sub-section (4) of Section 20A of the Act. Reliance has also been placed by Mr. Yogeshwar Dayal on two cases, Shrimati Parvati Devi v. Tibbia College Board, Delhi and another,(2) and Chander Bhan v. Chattar Singh and another(3). In Parvati's case the appellant was taken as a temporary employee by the respondent and given a quarter on condition that it should be vacated when the appellant ceases to be an employee. The appellant refused to vacate the quarter on termination of her services. The respondent took proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act for the eviction of the appellant. In that case an order for the eviction of the appellant was made and she was given one year to vacate the quarter. The respondent thereafter moved an application under Section 19 of the Act for obtaining permission to evict the appellant. The permission was granted. The appellant then filed a writ petition to quash the order granting the permission. The writ petition was dismissed. On appeal the learned Judges of the Division Bench, S.B Capoor and S.K Kapur, JJ. held that the mere fact that the appellant was poor and could not find alternative accommodation could not stand in the way of the respondent from getting the eviction order. In the case of Chander Bhan, Dua, C.J (as he then was), while dealing with an application under Section 19 of the Act, observed :
“To restrain execution of the order of eviction against him would virtually amount to conferring on him a right to remain in possession without paying any rent and the owner will have to go on instituting successive proceedings for rent every month, the decrees in which may or may not be fully executed. This factor would thus seem to be quite relevant and germane for being taken into account in granting or refusing permission under section 19.”
It is not necessary to express any opinion on the merits of the above contentions advanced on behalf of the parties because we are of the view that this Court should not, as urged on behalf of respondents 2 and 3, interfere with the impugned order in the exercise of its discretion. As would appear from the resume of facts given above, the petitioner, who owed arrears of rent failed, to deposit or pay the same in spite of an order having been made under Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The defence of the petitioner in eviction proceedings was consequently struck off. An eviction order was thereafter made against the petitioner because of his failure to pay the rent. Even in the course of the proceedings under Section 19 of the Act the petitioner failed to pay the arrears of rent and permission to execute the ejectment order was granted against him. In our opinion, the above conduct of the petitioner disentitles him to obtain the relief sought by him in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner in the present case seeks a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Competent Authority. The grant of such a writ is in the discretion of the Court and the petitioner is not entitled to it as a matter of course. Such a discretion has to be exercised judicially to further the cause of justice and not arbitrarily and capriciously or in a manner which results in manifest injustice. The Court would be justified in declining to exercise such a discretion in the petitioner's favour where he does not come to the Court with clean hands or his conduct otherwise is such that it would be inequitable and unjust to grant him the relief. The payment of rent is an essential requisite of the occupation of premises by the tenant. A tenant normally cannot insist upon occupation of a premises without payment of rent. The Court in any event would be loath to exercise its discretion in favour of a tenant who in spite of opportunity offered to him fails to pay the arrears of rent. Any other approach would have the effect of putting a premium on the default committed by a tenant.
We may in this context refer to the observations on the subject of writ of certiorari on page 140 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume II, Third Edition, which read as under :—
“Although the order is not of course it will though discretionary nevertheless be granted ex debito justitiae, to quash proceedings which the Court has power to quash, where it is shown that the court below has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, if the application is made by an aggrieved party and not merely by one of the public and if the conduct of the party applying has not been such as to disentitle him to relief;”
In the case of A.M Allison & H.P Brigg v. B.L Sen & Others, (4), Bhagwati, J., speaking for the Court, observed :
“Proceedings by way of certiorari are ‘not of course’. (Vide Halsbury's Laws of England’, Hailsham Edition, Volume 9, paras 1480 and 1481, pages 877-878). The High Court of Assam had the power to refuse the writs if it was satisfied that there was no failure of justice, and in these appeals which are directed against the orders of the High Court in applications under Article 226, we could refuse to interfere unless we are satisfied that the justice of the case requires it. But we are not so satisfied. We are of opinion that, having regard to the merits which have been concurrently found in favour of the respondents both by the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar, and the High Court, we should decline to interfere.”
The writ petition consequently fails and is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without costs.
SKB Petition dismissed.
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