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Gautam Electric Motors Petitioner v. Firm Shanti Lal And Bros.
Legal Opinion Summary — V.S. Deshpande, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges an order of Hardy, J. admitting a petition presented by the respondent-creditor under Section 433(e) read with clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 for the winding up of the appellant (a company) and directing that the petition be advertised in newspapers.
The parties are commercial concerns that dealt with each other in two distinct transactions:
- In the first transaction the appellant-company purchased Super Enamelled wire from the respondent-creditor. After paying the major portion of the price, the company admitted that some balance was payable: the company stated the balance as Rs. 22,087.27 while the creditor claimed Rs. 27,484.21. The admitted balance (referred to in the order and in argument) is also recorded at Rs. 22,087.07 in parts of the opinion.
- In a separate transaction the company gave about 30 tonnes of copper bars to the respondent-creditor for fabrication into copper wire; the creditor deposited about three lakhs rupees as security with the company. The creditor filed a suit in this Court claiming Rs. 5 lakhs in relation to that second transaction; the company defends that suit and says it is owed about Rs. 24,000 by the creditor arising from that matter.
The creditor alleged that the company was financially insolvent. Hardy, J.'s order admitting the winding-up petition was, however, based solely on the company's failure to pay the admitted debt of (variously recorded) Rs. 22,087.07 within three weeks of a statutory notice served under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 434. The appeal was argued on whether that order was justified.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its debt on the ground that it neglected to pay the admitted debt of Rs. 22,087.07 to the creditor within the meaning of Section 434(1)(a) read with Section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956.
- Whether a dispute between the parties arising from a separate and distinct transaction (not the transaction which gave rise to the statutory demand) can amount to a reasonable excuse for non-payment of an admitted debt for the purposes of Section 434(1)(a).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The company does not deny obligation in respect of the amount stated in the first transaction (the admitted debt) but contends it has a reasonable excuse for not paying because of litigation and a separate dispute with the creditor arising from the second transaction.
- The company contends that it is not financially insolvent and that the amount demanded should not be paid pending resolution of the other dispute, because on balance the company may have a net advantage if the separate dispute is resolved in its favour.
- The company implies that the creditor's petition is intended to place pressure on the company rather than to obtain genuine winding-up in the interests of all creditors.
Respondent-Creditor's Arguments
- The creditor sought a winding-up petition on the ground that the company neglected to pay an admitted debt after a statutory demand under Section 434(1)(a), thus invoking the conclusive presumption in Section 433 that the company is unable to pay its debts.
- The creditor also alleged that the company was financially insolvent, and relied upon the company's failure to pay the amount demanded within the statutory time as justifying admission of the winding-up petition.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| In re: London Paris Banking Corporation (1874–75) 19 Equity cases 444 | Explains that the word “neglected” in the relevant provision is not simply “omitted” but means “omitted to pay without reasonable excuse”. | Used to state the foundational meaning of “neglected”: non-payment after demand will not amount to neglect if there is a reasonable excuse. |
| Amalgamanted Commercial Traders PTE Ltd. v. Krishnaswami | Discussed in context of bona fide disputes about debt existence or payment. | Referenced as one of the decided cases that consider bona fide disputes in the context of statutory demands. |
| Hari Nagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. M.W. Pradan | Where there was no bona fide dispute, the Supreme Court upheld admission of petition and advertisement. | Placed to show that absence of bona fide dispute can support admission of winding-up petition. |
| Re: Douglas (Griggs) Engineering Limited (1962) All E.R. 498 (1963) Ch. 19 | Held that a company's disputed claim in separate proceedings does not necessarily displace the petitioning creditor's prima facie right to a winding-up order where the debt is undisputed and a judgment exists. | Noted by the Court but held not to be conclusive; the decision acknowledged the court's discretion and particular facts (no assets for execution) influenced the outcome in that case. |
| The Company v. Sir Rameswar Singh | Illustrates that cross-suits between parties, when taken together, may show that little or nothing is due to the petitioner and that there may be a bona fide dispute warranting refusal to wind up until litigation is resolved. | Used as an example where mutual claims led the court to treat the petition as not properly grounds for winding-up pending resolution of related litigation. |
| Thakur Gobind Singh v. The Merchant Mohani Flour Mills Ltd. (14 CC 184) | Shows that even where sums are due to petitioning creditors, a company may have reasonable cause for refusing payment (under earlier Companies Act provisions) and the court is not statutorily obliged to wind up a company. | Applied to support the proposition that refusal to pay in certain circumstances is not "neglect" within the statutory meaning, and that depositing amounts in court can demonstrate bona fides. |
| Re: Federal Chemicals Works Limited | Holds that where a company has admitted demands but also has other claims against the creditors, it may have a reasonable excuse for non-payment. | Relied upon to support the view that separate claims against creditors can constitute a reasonable excuse for non-payment of admitted demands. |
| Palmer's Company Precedents, 17th Ed., part II, p. 27 (treatise) | States the proposition that omission to comply with a statutory demand is not “neglect” if there is reasonable cause; a bona fide dispute is a reasonable cause. | Adopted as a correct statement of the law summarizing the principle that reasonable cause (including bona fide dispute) negates “neglect”. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The opinion proceeds from the basic legal proposition that “neglected” in Section 434(1)(a) means omission to pay without reasonable excuse. The court reasoned that if the company has a justified reason for not paying an admitted debt then it cannot be said to have “neglected” to pay and the conclusive presumption of inability to pay under Section 433(1)(a) should not be raised.
The opinion identifies the usual justifications for non-payment in response to a statutory demand: non-admission of the debt or a bona fide dispute as to liability. Many decided cases address what constitutes a bona fide dispute. However, the present case differs because the company does not dispute its obligation to pay the amount claimed in the first transaction and it does not assert a set-off arising from that same transaction. Instead the company's justification is that a separate dispute concerning a different transaction (the second transaction) exists between the parties and that, taken together with that separate claim, the company may stand to gain on balance.
The court considered authority (including Douglas (Griggs) and other cases) and concluded that although a dispute not directly connected to the debt demanded is not in every case a conclusive answer to a winding-up petition, such disputes may, in particular circumstances, amount to a reasonable excuse for non-payment. The court emphasized that these decisions show the existence of a judicial discretion: even where a prima facie right to a winding-up order exists, the court may refuse to make an order if facts warrant exercising that discretion in favour of the company.
Applying these principles to the present facts, the court noted: (a) both parties are commercial concerns; (b) nothing in the record shows the appellant-company to be commercially insolvent; (c) a separate suit between the parties is pending; and (d) the petition appears motivated to bring pressure on the company rather than to obtain an honest winding-up for the benefit of all creditors. On these bases the court found the company's refusal to pay to be a reasonable step in the circumstances rather than neglect invoking Section 433 conclusively.
Balancing the interests of both parties and exercising the court's discretion under Section 433 (which uses the permissive term “may”), the court fashioned a conditional and protective remedy: secure the creditor’s claim while avoiding an immediate order for winding-up and allowing the inter se litigation to reach disposal.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appeal was allowed in part: the court ordered that the winding-up petition shall be stayed provided the appellant-company, within 15 days, furnishes a bank guarantee to the respondent-creditor to the satisfaction of the Registrar for payment of a sum not exceeding Rs. 25,000 together with interest at 6% per annum from the date of presentation of the winding-up petition until its disposal. The stay will continue until the disposal of Suit No. 361 of 1968 (Shanti Lal & Bros. v. Gautam Electric Motors Pvt. Ltd.). The appeal was allowed to that extent, but without any order as to costs. If the company fails to give the required security the appeal will stand dismissed with costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the respondent-creditor's claim is to be secured by way of a bank guarantee not exceeding Rs. 25,000 with interest, and the winding-up proceedings are stayed pending disposal of the specified suit; if the company does not provide the security the earlier order admitting the petition will be restored (appeal dismissed with costs).
- The court exercised its discretion to avoid forcing the company into liquidation where a reasonable excuse for non-payment (a separate bona fide dispute and pending litigation) exists and where the petition appears to be motivated by pressure rather than an honest desire to wind up for the creditors' benefit.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general rule; rather it applies established principles and precedents to the facts and exercises discretionary relief. The decision therefore determines the dispute between these parties on these facts and does not state that a novel precedent is being created.
Order: Appeal allowed in part under the terms set out above; no order as to costs on the allowance; failure to provide security results in dismissal of the appeal with costs.
A.N.K. Order accordingly.
V.S Deshpande., J.:— This appeal is directed against the order of Hardy, J. admitting the petition of the respondent-creditor against the appellant-company under Section 433(e) read with clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956 for the winding up of the appellant-company and directing this to be advertised in the newspapers.
Both the parties are commercial concerns having dealings with each other. By one transaction the appallant-company had purchased some Super Enamelled wire from the respondent-creditor. After paying the major portion of the price for the same, the appellant-company has to pay to the respondent-creditor the remainder of the price which according to the company is Rs. 22,087.27 and according to the respondent-creditor Rs. 27,484.21. By another separate transaction, the company had given about 30 tonnes of copper bars to the respondent-creditor to be fabricated into copper wire. The creditor deposited about three lakhs rupees as security with the company. The creditor has filed a suit in this Court against the company for the recovery of Rs. 5 lakhs in the second transaction, which is defended by the company. The defence of the company is that nothing is due to the creditor from the company and on the other hand Rs. 24,000/- are due to the company from the creditor.
The creditor had also alleged that the company was financially insolvent, but the order of Hardy J. is based solely on the failure of the company to pay the admitted debt of Rs. 22,087.07 within three weeks in response to the notice given by the creditor to the company under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 434 of the Companies Act and the appeal was argued on both the sides solely on the question whether this order was justified or not.
The sole question for consideration, therefore, is whether the company shall be deemed to be unable to pay its bebt on the ground that it neglected to pay the admitted debt of Rs. 22,087.07 to the creditor within the meaning of section 434(1)(a) read with Section 433(a) of the Companies Act, 1956.
The law is well settled that the word “neglected” used in section 434(1)(a) is not necessarily equivalent to “omitted.” It really means omitted to pay without reasonable excuse”. (Sir Georage Jessal, M.R in the leading case of In re : London Paris Banking Corporation. Therefore, if the company is justified in not paying the debt, though admitted, it would not be said to have neglected to pay the same and, therefore, the conclusive presumption that it is unable to pay its debt shall not be raised against it under section 433(1)(a). On the other hand, the mere fact that the company is not proved to be insolvent or even financially insolvant is no reason why it sould not be deemed to be unable to pay its debts if it has failed to pay the debt without justification after the statutory demand. We have, therefore, only to consider whether the justification offered by the company in the present case is such that the company cannot be said to have neglected to pay the debt in response to the statutory demand.
The usual justification of a company for non-payment of debt in response to a statutory demand is that the company does not admit the debt or that there is a bona fide dispute as to whether the debt is payable or not by the company to the creditor. Most of the decided cases on this point, therefore, discuss what is a bona fide dispute as to the existence or as to the payment of the debt between the company and the creditor. In re : London Paris Banking Corporation (1874-75) 19 Equity cases, 444 (1) and the Amalgamanted Commercial Traders PTE Ltd. v. Krishnaswami. Where there was no bona fide dispute as to the debt, however, the Supreme Court upheld the order admitting the petition and directing the advertisement in newspapers in Hari Nagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. M.W Pradan(3).
None of these decisions are applicable to the present case, inasmush as the company does not dispute that it is obliged to pay the creditor as price of the goods at any rate a sum of Rs. 22,087.07. It also does not say that it has any set off or counter claim against the creditor in the first transaction in which it has to pay this amount to the creditor. What it says is that in the second transaction, which on its own admission is completely different from the transaction, a dispute is going on between the parties. Can it be said that a dispute between the parties, which is not a part of the transaction out of which the demand of the petitioning-creditor has arisen can never be a reasonable excuse for non-payment of the petitioning-creditors' debt which in itself is admitted. In partial support of this extreme position we have come across the decision of a single learned Judge in re: Douglas (Griggs) Engineering Limited (1962) All E.R 498-(1963) Ch. 19. The petitioning creditor's debt in that case was based on a judgment obtained by him against the company and for that reason the debt was undisputed. The company however, resisted the petition on the ground that in a third party proceeding the company was claiming a much larger sum against the petitioning creditor. Pennycuick, J. observed as follows:-
“It seems to me that the matters raised by the company do not afford a sufficent answer to the petition. It would have been open to the company to apply in the action brought by the petitioning creditor for leave to defend by raising a set-off, but the company did not elect to do so. In the event the petitioning creditor has obtained judgment and possesses all the remedies of a judgment creditor. In particular the petitioning creditor is entitled to present a petition for winding-up the company based on that judgment, and prime facie is entitled to a winding-up order against the company based on that judgment. It seems to me that this prima facie right of the petitioning creditor to a winding-up order is not displaced merely by showing that the company has a disputed claim against petitioning creditor which is the subject of litigation in the other proceedings.”
The above statement of law has been adopted by Pennington at page 633 of the second edition of his “Company Law”. We may, however, point out that the decision in the above mentioned case was also influenced by the fact that the company's solicitors had informed the petitioning creditor's solicitors that there were no assets of the company on which execution could be levied either at their own office or at the company's place of business. The learned Judge, therefore, observed as follows :—
“In so far as the court has a discretion on the foregoing facts whether or not a winding-up order should be made, there appear to be no facts which would warrant exercising that discretion in favour of the company.”
It is clear, therefore, that the mere fact that the dispute between the parties was not connected with the debt, which form the foundation of the winding-up petition, was not conclusive. The Court still had a dscretion to refuse the prayer for winding-up, though in this particular case such facts were absent. We can, however, easily think of cases in which the company may have a reasonable excuse for non-payment of a debt, though consisting of a dispute between the parties not directly connected with the debt, the payment of which is demanded by the petitioning creditor under Section 434(1)(a) of the Companies Act. The Company v. Sir Rameswar Singh, was one such case. The claim of the petitioning creditor was the subject matter of his suit against the company, while the claim of the company against him was the subject matter of another suit by the company against the petitioning creditor. If an account of both these opposing claims were to be taken, hardly any money would be found due to the petitioner from the company. Greaves, J. in the first Court held that he could not say that the petition for winding-up was not brought bona fide but Sanderson C.J and Woodroffe, J. in the appeal held that there was a bona fide dispute between the parties and that the proper course for the petitioning creditor was to file a suit for the recovery of the amount due to him. Such suit had been filed by him, but its hearing was postponed until after the hearing of that an order for winding-up the company ought to be made on the petition until the litigation involved in the two above mentioned suits had been disposed of.
Even a clearer case is Thakur Gobind Singh v. The Merchant Mohani Flour Mills Ltd. (6) 14 CC 184, the petitioning creditors were ex-directors of the company to whom certain sums were undoubtedly due from the Company. The company, however, resisted the winding-up petition on the ground that certain other sums were due to the company from the Directors. Din Mohammad, J. (with whom Mehar Chand Mahajan, J. agreed) pointed out that under Section 162 of the Companies Act, 1913 (corresponding to section 433(e) of the Companies Act, 1956), it is obvious that even if a company is declared to be unable to pay its debts, no statutory obligation is laid on the Court to wind it up. The “neglect” contemplated in Section 163(1)(i) of the Companies Act, 1913 (corresponding to Section 434(a) of the Companies Act, 1956) is not established. The learned Judge posed the following question and answered it as follows :—
“Suppose, a person has a fixed deposit with a bank and has also stood surety for a debtor, who later turns out to be impecunious, to the extent which goes far beyond the deposit. If in the face of this situation, the bank refuses to pay the amount of the fixed deposit unless the debt due to the bank is first discharged, will it not be repugnant to common sense to hold that the bank by virtue of its refusal brings itself within the ambit of this definition. The Legislature could not be so neglectful as not to contemplate such cases while enancting this provision. It is the fundamental cannon of the interpretation of statutes to avoid all such constructions as at once looked absurd, unreasonable or ridiculous and the construction suggested by the appellants' counsel appears to me to be of this description. As I look at the matter, the Directors would have rendered themselves liable to the share-holders if they had thrown the Inspector's report over-board and readily yielded to the appellants' demand. In my opinion, therefore, there has been no neglect in this case as contemplated by Section 163(1)(i).”
Another reason why the learned Judges refused to grant the prayer for winding up was that the company actually deposited the amounts claimed by the petitioning creditors in Court to prove its bona fides. Even a more recent decision is in re : Federal Chemicals Works Limited. In that case also the demands made by the creditors were admitted, but the company had other claims against each of the creditors. The company's claims could not be said to arise out of some transaction out of which the creditor's demand has arisen. It was held that the company had a reasonable excuse for not paying up the creditor's claim.
On a consideration of the above decisions, the following statement of law in Palmer's Company Precedents, 17th Ed. part II, page 27, appears to be correct :—
“The mere omission of a company to comply with a notice requiring payment of a debt, served pursuant to the above para (a), is not “neglect” within the meaning of that paragraph if there is reasonable cause for the omission, and the fact that the debt in question is bona fide disputed is a reasonable cause”.
While the reasonable cause or excuse for non-payment of the debt is the genus, the bone fide dispute regarding the creditor's demand itself is only a species of the same genus. A dispute of the company with the creditors regarding another claim by the company against the creditor, though not connected with the creditor's demand, may constitute another species of the same genus.
This legal position would be supportable also on general principle. If a creditor were to file a suit against the company and the claim in the suit were admitted by the company, the company could resist the suit only by pleading a set-off or counter-claim in the same suit. If the company had a separate claim against the creditor, normally the creditor's suit against the company could not be resisted or stayed unless some legal provision for defence or stay of the same is found such as one under Section 10 of Code of Civil Procedure, Section 34, Arbitration Act, or otherwise. The same analogy, however, cannot be applied to a winding up petition presented by the creditor against the company. For, the nature of such a winding-up petition and the consequences of the order of winding-up are quite different from the nature of a suit and the result of a decree passed upon the same. It would not be possible, therefore, to apply the same test to both these proceedings. A separate dispute between the company and the creditor may not perhaps be a good answer to a suit by creditor against the company, but it may be a reasonable excuse for the non-payment of an admitted debt to the creditor by the company, with the result that a Court may refuse to hold that the company was deemed to be unable to pay its debt to such a creditor within the meaning of Section 434(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 1956.
In the present case, both the parties are commercial concerns. There is nothing to show that the appellant-company is commercially insolvent. The sole question is whether it has a reasonable excuse for the non-payment of the admitted debt of the creditor. In view of the other litigation pending between the parties in this Court, the company is not acting unreasonably in thinking that the amount due to the creditor should not be paid inasmuch as the company would stand to gain something on balance from the creditor if the other dispute between the parties is decided. The object of the present winding-up petition is clearly, therefore, to bring pressure on the company to pay up. The petition is not genuinely motivated to obtain a winding up of the company in the interests of all the creditors. In such a case, the Court has clearly a discretion under Section 433 of the Companies Act, which says that a company “may” be wound up by the Court if the Company is unable to pay its debts and even if the company is deemed to be unable to pay its debts under section 433(1)(a). We are of the view that the ends of justice in the present case would be served if on the one hand the claim of the creditor against the company is secured and on the other hand the company is not forced to go into liquidation. We, therefore, order that if the appellant-company gives a bank guarantee within 15 days to the respondent-creditor to the satisfaction of the Registar of this Court for the payment of a sum not exceeding Rs. 25,000/- with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the presentation of the winding-up petition till its disposal, the winding-up petition shall be stayed till the disposal of suit No. 361 of 1968 (Shanti Lal & Bros. v. Gautam Electric Motors Pvt. Ltd.) pending in this Court for the expeditious disposal of which due steps will be taken both by the parties and this Court. To this extent the appeal is allowed, but without any order as to costs. If, however, the appellant-company fails to give such security, the appeal would stand dismissed with costs.
A.N.K Order accordingly.
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