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Banarsi Lal v. Smt. Neelam And Others

Delhi High Court
Apr 28, 1969
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Two criminal revisions (Criminal Revision Nos. 413 and 414 of 1968) were placed before the High Court pursuant to orders of a learned Additional Sessions Judge dated 1-8-1968. In Criminal Revision No. 413 of 1968 the Additional Sessions Judge recommended quashing search warrants issued under Section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr PC) by Shri Gorakh Ram, Sub‑Divisional Magistrate, for the recovery of a child from Smt. Neelam (the child's mother) at the instance of Shri Banarsi Lal (the child's father). In Criminal Revision No. 414 of 1968 the Additional Sessions Judge recommended setting aside an order made by the same Sub‑Divisional Magistrate on 12-2-1968 which had (a) issued summons against certain respondents and (b) directed that a notice under Sections 107/112 Cr PC be sent with the summons. The Additional Sessions Judge considered the order unsustainable because, in his view, an order under Section 112 Cr PC was a condition precedent to proceeding under Section 107 Cr PC and no such order existed in the case.

In addition, the record contained a petition by Shri Banarsi Lal alleging contempt of Court by Smt. Neelam and by her two counsels (Shri M.L. Nagpal and Miss Usha Mehra) based on paragraphs 4 and 5 of the grounds of revision filed before the Additional Sessions Judge. The order forwarded these matters to the High Court for final disposal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the search warrants issued under Section 100 Cr PC for the recovery of a minor child from the mother (Smt. Neelam) were sustainable in law or should be quashed.
  2. Whether the order of the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate dated 12-2-1968 — issuing summons and directing that notice under Sections 107/112 Cr PC be sent — was legally sustainable when no prior order under Section 112 Cr PC had been made.
  3. Whether the language used in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the grounds of revision constituted contempt of Court such that the contemnor (and her counsel) should be punished or, alternatively, be prevented from being heard until purging the contempt.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments (on behalf of Shri Banarsi Lal — advanced by Shri P.N. Lekhi)

  • Challenged competency of the revisions under Sections 435 and 439 Cr PC (citing Panna Lal Lahoti v. State of Hyderabad) and argued that the High Court's revisional powers were not attracted in this case.
  • With respect to Criminal Revision No. 413, argued that the Magistrate had reason to believe that the mother's custody of the child amounted to confinement constituting an offence under Section 100 Cr PC and therefore was empowered to issue search warrants.
  • Submitted that the father (Shri Banarsi Lal) was entitled to custody of the child and, relying on Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, contended that the father's position as natural guardian prevents the mother from having exclusive custody that could amount to wrongful confinement.
  • Argued that the mother's custody might amount to kidnapping under Section 361 IPC and invoked the permissive presumption in Illustration (e) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  • Relied on the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 (Section 7(1)(c)) to contend that wrongful denial of access could constitute an offence under that Act.
  • Contended that non‑compliance with Section 112 Cr PC (in Criminal Revision No. 414) was at most an irregularity; in the absence of shown prejudice, the impugned order should not be disturbed on revision, relying on Sections 529, 530 and 537 Cr PC and cases such as Abasu Begum v. Umda Khanum and Raghunath Singh v. State.
  • Pressed the High Court not to hear the contemnor on merits unless she purged the alleged contempt.

Petitioner's / Applicant's Arguments (Smt. Neelam and her counsel Shri M.L. Nagpal & Miss Usha Mehra)

  • Smt. Neelam tendered an unconditional and unequivocal apology and explained that the Magistrate had passed the impugned order directing search warrants for her infant son without notice to her and had declined to allow her to inspect the record; she maintained that she sought only to quash the order, not to cast a slur on the Magistrate's Court.
  • The two Advocates also tendered an apology and, in their replies before the Additional Sessions Judge, pleaded that the contempt proceedings had been initiated to deter and embarrass them in the discharge of their professional duties and to coerce Smt. Neelam into dropping her litigation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Panna Lal Lahoti v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 Hyd 129 Authority that Sections 435 and 439 Cr PC authorise High Court interference even in pending criminal cases for illegality of procedure or harassment; power to interfere with interlocutory orders if proceedings are seriously irregular. The Court said it could not hold the present revisions incompetent on this authority and treated the revisional jurisdiction as available (subject to its sparing exercise).
Smt. Ram Piari v. Sohan Lal, 1968 Delhi LT 148 Cited by respondent to distinguish concerning the scope/effect of Section 100 Cr PC (counsel's submission was that the scope/effect of Section 100 was not considered in that case). The Court found the attempted distinction illusory and did not accept it as a basis to sustain the impugned order under Section 100.
Vasudevan v. R. Viswaiakshmi, AIR 1959 Ker 403 Recognises father's right as natural guardian under Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and that a father cannot be removed unless Court is satisfied he is unable to continue as guardian. The Court noted the principle but observed this decision does not support treating a mother's custody of a child under five years as an offence under Section 100 Cr PC.
John Carapiet Galstaun v. Syed Mahammad Hussain Choudhury, AIR 1932 Cal 627 Invoked in argument in relation to presumptions under the Evidence Act / to support characterisation of conduct. The Court held this decision (and the companion decision Sohagbati v. Sourendra Mohan Singh) to be wholly inapplicable to the present case.
Sohagbati v. Sourendra Mohan Singh, AIR 1918 Pat 415 (44 Ind Cas 661) Invoked in support of a presumption argument under Section 114 Illustration (e) of the Evidence Act. Found wholly inapplicable to the facts of this case by the Court.
Empress v. Pran Krishna Surma, (1882) ILR 8 Cal 969 Case dealing with offences arising out of removal of minors from custody of lawful guardians. The Court considered it unnecessary to refer to this case because it rejected the contention that the mother's custody amounted to an offence in the present facts.
Mohammad Hussain v. Emperor, AIR 1925 All 295 Case dealing with offences arising out of removal of minors from custody of lawful guardians. The Court did not find it necessary to rely on this decision in the present matter.
Abasu Begum v. Umda Khanum, (1882) ILR 8 Cal 724 Relied upon by respondent-counsel to support the proposition that non‑compliance with a provision (here Section 112 Cr PC) may be treated as a mere irregularity. Cited to the Court, but the Court reviewed binding authority (Balraj Madhok) and did not accept non‑compliance as a reason to sustain the impugned order in the present circumstances.
Raghunath Singh v. State, AIR 1953 Pat 1 Also relied on by respondent to argue non‑compliance with Section 112 is merely an irregularity. Cited by counsel; the Court nonetheless treated the Additional Sessions Judge's finding seriously and, applying binding authority, quashed the impugned order.
Balraj Madhok v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Delhi 31 Held that without an order under Section 112 Cr PC, Magistrates had no competence to deal with the petitions (interpreting the scheme of Chapter VIII Cr PC). The Court regarded this decision as binding, treated it as authoritative on the requirement of Section 112, and followed it in quashing the Magistrate's order in Criminal Revision No. 414.
Shravan Kumar Gupta v. Superintendent District Jail, AIR 1957 All 189 Passages from this Division Bench decision were quoted with approval in Balraj Madhok concerning Chapter VIII Cr PC. The Court noted that Balraj Madhok quoted this decision with approval and treated the line of authority as binding in the present context.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in stages: first addressing the contempt application, and then dealing with the merits of each revision.

Contempt application

- The two paragraphs in the grounds of revision complained of were reproduced and identified as strong criticisms of the learned Magistrate's conduct. The Additional Sessions Judge had disapproved of the language and recommended action against the Advocates; he forwarded the record because he felt himself not competent to finally dispose of the matter.

- The Court observed that the offending memorandum appeared to have been professionally drafted. The signatures of the party (Smt. Neelam) did not, on the facts, convert the matter into actionable contempt by her: she was apparently not aware of technicalities and had relied on her Advocates. The Court therefore discharged the rule against Smt. Neelam.

- The Court emphasised the high threshold for criminal contempt: it is to be used sparingly, with scrupulous care and only where administration of justice is imperilled. Mere forceful advocacy or use of strong language in appellate or revisional pleadings is not contempt unless it imputes unjudicial motives without reasonable basis or is accompanied by malice or deliberate obstruction of justice.

- The Court declined to proceed with committal or punishment; the Advocates and Smt. Neelam had tendered unconditional apologies and the Court expressed reluctance to use summary contempt powers against professional advocates when there is no malice or deliberate attempt to impair administration of justice.

Merits — Criminal Revision No. 413 (search warrants under Section 100 Cr PC)

- The Court examined Section 100 Cr PC and emphasised that the statutory core is the expression "reason to believe." That phrase requires the Magistrate to form a judicial belief after considering the available material and not to act superficially or arbitrarily.

- The respondent's argument was that the father, as natural guardian under Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, was entitled to custody and that the mother's withholding of the child constituted an offence (including possible kidnapping under Section 361 IPC). The respondent also sought to invoke presumptions under Section 114 Illustration (e) Evidence Act and other authorities.

- The Court rejected these contentions in the present factual matrix. It observed that Section 6's proviso gives ordinary custody of a child under five years to the mother and therefore the mother's custody of a child under five could not easily be characterised as confinement amounting to an offence under Section 100 Cr PC.

- The Court further held that the facts on record did not show that the mother's custody remotely suggested an offence of kidnapping under Section 361 IPC. Several cases relied upon by counsel were held inapplicable or not supportive of the argument that the magistrate had "reason to believe."

- Concluding this part, the Court agreed with the Additional Sessions Judge that the Magistrate's order issuing search warrants was difficult to sustain on the existing record and was therefore quashed.

Merits — Criminal Revision No. 414 (order under Sections 107/112 Cr PC)

- The principal objection to the Additional Sessions Judge's recommendation was that non‑compliance with Section 112 Cr PC was a mere irregularity and, absent shown prejudice, should not invalidate the Magistrate's action at this interlocutory stage.

- The Court considered the binding decision in Balraj Madhok v. Union of India (AIR 1967 Delhi 31) which held that without an order under Section 112 Cr PC, Magistrates had no competence to deal with the petitions in question. The Court treated that decision as binding and influential; Balraj Madhok also quoted with approval passages from Shravan Kumar Gupta.

- The Court observed that while irregularity might sometimes be treated lightly, directory statutory provisions are nonetheless intended to be obeyed and courts should not encourage pre‑emptive violations while proceedings are in preliminary stages.

- Applying this reasoning, the Court agreed with the Additional Sessions Judge and quashed the impugned order of the Magistrate issuing summons and directing notice under Sections 107/112 Cr PC. The Court clarified that the order should not be construed to contain any expression of opinion on the merits of the underlying family dispute.

General observations

- The Court criticised the manner in which the learned Magistrate handled both matters, finding the approach superficial and lacking in the care a magistrate should exercise in extraordinary family disputes. The Court expressed concern that such handling neither enhances the prestige of Magistrate's Courts nor inspires litigant confidence.

- The Court urged the parties to attempt an amicable settlement in the best interests of their child and observed that the summary power to punish for contempt must be exercised with wisdom and restraint.

Holding and Implications

Holding: REVISIONS ALLOWED

Direct effects on the parties (as explicitly stated in the opinion):

  • The High Court quashed the order of the Sub‑Divisional Magistrate issuing search warrants under Section 100 Cr PC for the recovery of the child from Smt. Neelam (Criminal Revision No. 413 of 1968).
  • The High Court quashed the Magistrate's order dated 12-2-1968 issuing summons and directing that a notice under Sections 107/112 Cr PC be sent (Criminal Revision No. 414 of 1968).
  • The rule for contempt against Smt. Neelam was discharged; the two Advocates and Smt. Neelam had tendered unconditional apologies and the Court declined to take further punitive action against them.
  • The Court admonished the learned Magistrate for a superficial approach in handling the matters and urged the parties to seek an amicable resolution for the sake of their child.

Broader implications (as reflected in the opinion):

  • The Court applied existing precedents (notably Balraj Madhok) concerning the requirement of a Section 112 order before proceeding under Chapter VIII Cr PC and emphasised the need for Magistrates to apply a genuine judicial mind when acting under Section 100 Cr PC ("reason to believe").
  • The opinion emphasises the limited and sparing use of contempt powers and delineates the boundary between forceful advocacy and actionable contempt; however, the Court did not purport to lay down a new rule of law beyond applying existing principles and precedents.

End of summary — prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. These two revisions (Criminal Revisions Nos. 413 and 414 of 1968) have been placed before me pursuant to two orders made by a learned Additional Sessions Judge on 1-8-1968. In Criminal Revision No. 413 of 1968, it is recommended by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the search warrants issued under Section 100 of the Cr PC by Shri Gorakh Ram, Sub-Divisional Magistrate, for the recovery of the child from Smt. Neelam, the child's mother, at the instance of Shri Banarsi Lal, the child's father, is unsustainable in law and should be quashed.

2. In Criminal Revision No. 414 of 1968, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has recommended that the order made by the same learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate on 12-2-1968 to the following effect.

“Perused the papers of the file and heard the learned counsel for the complainant. I am satisfied that there exists an apprehension of breach of peace from the respondents Narinder Nath Kohli, Smt. Neelam, Smt. Lila Kohli and Smt. Bhagwati Kohli. Issue summons for their appearance on 27-2-68. The notice u/section 107/112 Cr PC be also sent along with the summons.” is unsustainable in law and deserves to be set aside. According to the learned Additional Sessions Judge, there being no legal order under Section 112 of the Cr PC in the instant case, which was a condition precedent for proceeding under Section 107 of the Cr PC, the order issuing the notice is unsustainable.

3. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has also forwarded a petition moved by Shri Banarsi Lal against Smt. Neelam and her two counsel, Shri M.L Nagpal and Miss Usha Mehra for contempt of Court on the ground that in the grounds of revision filed before the learned Additional Sessions Judge from the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, paragraphs 4 and 5 thereof are couched in language which amounts to contempt of Court. I would first dispose of the application for contempt of Court because on behalf of the respondent Shri Banarsi Lal, his learned counsel Shri P.N Lekhi has raised a preliminary point to the effect that the petitioner Smt. Neelam, being in contempt, this Court should not hear her on the merits of the revision till she purges herself of the contempt. It may be pointed out that in the application for contempt of Court, presented on behalf of Shri Banarsi Lal in the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge in April, 1968, action was sought not only against Smt. Neelam, but also against her two Advocates who had signed the application for revision. In this Court also, up to the date of the final hearing, the allegations of contempt of Court against the two Advocates were not dropped. It was only when the two Advocates were actually present in Court that during the course of arguments the learned counsel stated that he did not want to press his application for contempt of Court against the two Advocates.

4. It is noteworthy that when the revision application was presented in the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the office did not find anything objectionable with the grounds of revision and the revision was duly entertained without any objection. The two paragraphs in the grounds of revision, which formed the basis of the application for contempt of Court, read as under:—

“4. That the whole conduct of the learned Magistrate previously in issuing search warrants for the recovery and production of a minor child from the mother and the present proceedings smacks of the partisanship to the utter disregard of the judicial considerations of the case.

5. That these proceedings are a result of evident misuse of the process of the Criminal Court and are in contraventions to the provisions of the law as laid down in Chapter VIII of the Cri PC motivated to harass and coerce the petitioner to come to terms with the respondent who claims to be a Community and Caste fellow of the learned Magistrate.”

5. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has, in his order, strongly disapproved the conduct of the two learned Advocates in drafting these grounds of revision and has observed that they should not have been swayed by emotions of their client and that they should have declined to append their signatures to what is described as personal attack on the learned Magistrate's Court. On consideration of the explanation of the learned Advocates, the learned Additional Sessions Judge felt that a mere admonition would serve the cause of justice, but as he did not consider himself competent to finally dispose of this matter, the record has been forwarded to this Court.

6. The respondent's learned counsel Shri Lekhi, has, as observed earlier, dropped the matter with reference to the learned Advocates, but he has addressed very lengthy arguments against Smt. Neelam. The two Advocates as well as Smt. Neelam have tendered an unqualified apology. Smt Neelam has, while tendering unconditional and unequivocal apology, explained that the learned Magistrate had, without notice to her, passed the impugned order directing search warrants for her only infant son, just a few months old, on the assumption that her custody of her own child amounted to wrongful confinement and this action of the learned Magistrate had perturbed her very much. The learned Magistrate, according to her explanation, had even declined to allow her to inspect the record after she had come to know of the impugned order. She has emphasised that she merely wanted to have the impugned order quashed, without intending to cast any slur on the learned Magistrate's Court In their replies in the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the Advocates and Smt. Neelam had inter alia, pleaded that the contempt proceedings had been initiated to deter and embarrass the Advocates in the discharge of their professional duty and to make Smt. Neelam drop her pending litigation.

7. Shri Banarsi Lal (respondent in this Court), I should like to clarify, cannot claim a right either to pursue or to drop the charge of contempt of Court and he must be deemed to have discharged his duty—if he thought it was his duty— when he brought the relevant facts to the notice of the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and thereafter of this Court. It was then for the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge or for this Court to take whatever action was considered appropriate for safeguarding the dignity of the learned Magistrate's Court Shri Banarsi Lal could not claim a right to press the matter as if it was his personal litigation. I have, however, heard the learned counsel for Shri Banarsi Lal at length because, according to his submission, he was entitled to insist that this Court should not hear the counsel for Smt. Neelam in support of the recommendation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge because she is in contempt. In regard to this submission as well, I must point out that the object of revisional jurisdiction is to confer upon the High Court a kind of supervisory power in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception and misapplication of law, irregularity of procedure and similar infirmities and that this power, which is discretionary in nature, is exercisable in the larger interest of justice. No party can thus insist, as a general rule, that his opponent should not be heard by this Court. But this apart, the present matter being concerned with the allegation of contempt of Court the relevant facts having been brought to the notice of this Court, the party doing so can scarcely have a further locus standi to claim a right to address this Court as to how the alleged contemner should be dealt with. It is of course open to this Court to ask for assistance from such party, if willing to assist. I must, however, not be understood to negative or dwarf the broad general rule, which is subject to exceptions, that a party in contempt may not be heard until he has purged his contempt. Speaking for my part, I would accept as just the general rule not to hear a party in contempt only when the alleged contempt has the tendency of impeding the course of justice and when there is no other effective way of enforcing obedience.

8. Now, the alleged contempt of Court in the case in hand, consists of the use of objectionable language in the memorandum of the grounds of revision presented in the Court of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The memorandum was presumably drafted by the professional lawyers. The mere fact that the memorandum also bears the signatures of the party, who is apparently ignorant of the technicalities of the law of contempt and who may well have felt safe in signing the memorandum drafted and signed by his Advocates, does not seem to me, on the facts and circumstances of this case, to constitute actionable contempt by the petitioner. I would, therefore, discharge the rule against her. I, however, must not be understood to imply that ignorance of law is a defence or to lay down a general rule that a private party is immune from liability for contempt of Court merely because his lawyer has drafted the offending pleading. I consider it appropriate to point out once again that committal for contempt of Court is a weapon to be used sparingly and it is intended to be used with scrupulous care with reference to the interests of the administration of justice only, must not be allowed to be used by the litigants as a lever for putting pressure on their opponents. That is a misuse of this power and the Courts have a duty to be vigilant in guarding against it. It is unnecessary to add that a deliberate or reckless Contempt of Court, which is actionable, would not go unnoticed. I have emphasised this caution because it is not infrequently that this aspect is not given the importance it deserves.

9. Adverting to the recommendation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge for taking action against the two learned Advocates, I should like to point out that forceful advocacy and even use of strong language in criticising on appeal or revision the impugned decisions of subordinate Courts is no contempt, but forceful advocacy and use of strong language does not mean that an Advocate can scandalise the Court or impute to it unjudicial motives for which there is no reasonable basis on the circumstances of the case It is undeniable that no judiciary can function with the requisite efficiency in a set up like ours unless there is strong, efficient, conscientious and independent Bar and a weak, inefficient and unconscientious Bar is a somewhat ineffective corrective to an erring Court. The practice of law is not a business which is open to all those who desire to engage in it. It is a personal right and privilege of an Advocate to represent his client, and claim audience, in Court in order to plead for him. An advocate's is an exalted and a learned profession in which privilege and duty coincide: the professional lawyer's privilege being also his duty and his duty being also his privilege. This indeed is essential if the quality of justice in our country is to be of the expected high order as contemplated by our Constitution.

10. An Advocate in our set-up practices not only law, but also the science of the correct use of language. The words are indeed his tools with which he works. His is accordingly a word-bound profession. The language he uses must, therefore, be precise, dignified, respectful and persuasive, free from injudicious annoyance or offence. Being entrusted with the duty and privilege of securing for his client justice according to law an Advocate is entitled to appropriate freedom and scope in criticising the impugned judgments and orders and in addressing arguments and making submissions on behalf of his client Oral arguments by an Advocate, from their very nature, are relatively speaking, accorded greater latitude than written memorandum of appeal or revision. But this privilege, which is also his duty, does not extend to imputing extraneous unsjudicial motives to the subordinate Courts which cannot be substantiated or held to be reasonably justified on the record. If, however, they can be so substantiated, then I am unable to accede that such a submission or pleading would amount to actionable contempt of Court. Being an officer of the Court, it seems to be an Advocate's duty to uphold the dignity and prestige of the Courts in which he practices as also of the Courts, the orders of which it is his professional privilege and duty to criticise, consistently with his loyalty to his client's cause, which he is engaged to plead in accordance with law. The administration of justice cannot be impaired by clothing the professional Advocate with the freedom to fairly and temperately criticise in good faith the impugned judgments and orders.

11. When the judicial impartiality and prestige of Courts has solid foundations in their traditional judicious objectivity and efficiency, as illustrated by their day-to-day functioning in the public gaze, the mere strong language in criticising their orders, cannot mar their image. Such Courts should not be hyper-sensitive in this matter. Examined according to this test, I am disinclined to hold that the paragraphs reproduced above consitute any actionable contempt of Court on the part of the Advocates. A fortiori there can be no actionable contempt by the petitioner. It was of course possible for the Advocates concerned to use more sober and restrained, though equally effective and persuasive, language, but then that is a question more of propriety than of contempt of Court. In this connection, it would not be right for this Court to be completely unmindful of the progressively decreasing standard of the teaching of English language in our country. I do not consider it proper to say anything more on this subject on this occasion except to emphasise once again that the summary power of punishing for contempt has to be used sparingly and only in serious cases. This Court must of necessity possess this power in the larger interest of sustaining the authority and impartiality of our judicial process, but its usefulness depends on the wisdom and restraint with which it is exercised. To use it against professional lawyers, when there is no malice and no attempt to impair or obstruct the administration of justice, but when they seem to have genuinely exercised their professional right of criticism (may be in somewhat ill-advised language) in seeking justice for their clients, is to use it for a purpose for which it does not seem to have been intended. On the view that I have taken, it is unnecessary to discuss the various decisions cited by Shri Lekhi in support of the submission that Smt. Neelam should not be heard by this Court because she has committed contempt of Court.

12. Coming now to the merits of the recommendations of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Shri Lekhi vehemently opposed it. To begin with, the learned counsel has urged that Setions 435 and 439 of the Cr PC, are not attracted in this case. He has cited Panna Lal Lahoti v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1954 Hyd 129, but I am unable to hold on the authority of this decision that the present revisions are incompetent. According to this decision, Sections 435 and 439 of the Cr PC authorise interference by the High Court even in a pending criminal case on the ground of illegality of procedure or harassment of the accused by an unjustified application of illegal procedure though of course such power has to be exercised sparingly and in cases of exceptional character. The power to interfere with an interlocutory order made by the lower Court also, according to this decision, vests in the Court of revision provided it finds that the impugned proceedings are seriously irregular. The power of the High Court in revision under Section 439 of the Cr PC has been held not to be exhaustive in the reported judgment.

13. Dealing with Crl. Revision No. 413 of 1968, Shri Lekhi, the learned counsel for the respondent, has read Section 100 of the Cr PC and has pointed out that if the learned Magistrate below had reason to believe that any person was confined under such circumstances that the confinement amounted to an offence then he was empowered to issue a search warrant and the person, if found, had to be immediately taken before the Magistrate who was enjoined to make such order as seemed proper. In order to persuade this Court to hold that the Magistrate must be deemed to have satisfied himself that the confinement amounted to an offence, he has very strongly argued that Shri Banarsi Lal, his client, was entitled to the custody of his child and that Shrimati Neelam, though the natural mother of the child, was committing an offence in not handing over the child to her husband. In regard to Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, he has submitted that it is only the custody of a minor under five years of age which Is given to the mother. The father, according to the learned counsel, remains a natural guardian of his minor child and as such he cannot be held disentitled to the custody of his minor children, even though under five years of age.

14. The argument seems to me to be wholly unacceptable. Section 6 undoubtedly provides that the natural guardian of a Hindu minor boy and an unmarried girl is the father and after him the mother. This guardianship is in respect of minor's person as well as in respect of his property. But the proviso added to this rule relates to the custody of a minor who has not completed the age of five years and this custody is ordinarily to be with the mother. In view of this explicit provision, I find it extremely difficult to hold that a mother's custody of her child under five years of age can be held to constitute a confinement amounting to an offence within the contemplation of Section 100 of the Cr PC. Shri Lekhi has tried to distinguish the decision of this Court in Smt. Ram Piari v. Sohan Lal, 1968 Delhi LT 148 on the ground that the scope and effect of Section 100 of the Cr PC was not considered in that case. The distinction sought to be made by the learned counsel is, in my view, illusory.

15. My attention has been drawn by Shri Lekhi to Vasudevan v. R. Viswaiaksmi, AIR 1959 Ker 403 according to which the right of the father to be the natural guardian of a Hindu minor is recognised in Section 6(a) of Hindu Minority and Guardinaship Act and he cannot be removed from his guardianship unless the Court is satisfied that he is unable to continue to be the guardian. This decision does not lay down that a mother's custody of her child under five years of age constitutes an offence within the contemplation of Section 100 of the Cr PC

16. The submission that the mother's custody in the present case amounts to an offence of kidnapping as contemplated by Section 361, I.P.C is still more difficult to uphold or even to appreciate. Reference to illustration (e) to Section 114, Indian Evidence Act is clearly inappropriate on the facts and circumstances of this case. When the order of the learned Magistrate is assailed on revision, then this Court has to go into the question on the material on the record and the permissive presumption under Section 114 illustration (e), Indian Evidence Act, can by no means be conclusive in favour of the legality of the order. The decisions in John Carapiet Galstaun v. Syed Mahammad Hussain Choudhury, 36 CWN 242 : (AIR 1932 Cal 627) and Sohagbati v. Sourendra Mohan Singh, 44 Ind Cas 661 : (AIR 1918 Pat 415) are wholly inapplicable to the present case.

17. The argument that the petitioner who is the natural mother of the infant child, is normally not at home because she is working for her livelihood and, therefore, her custody of the child is not for the latter's benefit, has merely to be stated to be rejected in this case. During the course of arguments, the respondent's learned counsel, in his enthusiasm, also made certain oblique improper suggestions about the private life of Smt. Neelam which are wholly unsubstantiated from the record. It is difficult for this Court to appreciate such suggestions in the way in which they are made and it is of course not possible to take notice of them.

18. The argument that an offence of kidnapping against Smt. Neelam, as contemplated by Section 361, I.P.C has been made out, has to be merely stated to be rejected. The natural mother's custody of her child under five years of; age, on the facts and circumstances of this case, can by no stretch be considered to suggest an offence under this section. It is, therefore, unnecessary to refer to the decisions in Empress v. Pran Krishna Surma, (1882) ILR 8 Cal 969 and Mohammad Hussain v. Emperor, AIR 1925 All 295 (1) and other cases dealing with the offences arising out of removal of minors from the custody of their lawful guardians.

19. As a last resort, Shri Lekhi concentrated on the Untouchability (Offences) Act No. 22 of 1955 and submitted that an offence under Section 7(1)(c) of this Act, must be considered to have been committed by Smt. Neelam when she is not permitting Shri Banarsi Lal to have access to his infant child. On this ground, the order issuing search warrants is sought to be justified. The section relied upon, so far as relevant, reads as under:

“7. Punishment for other offences arising out of ‘untouchability’.

(1) Whoever—

(c) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations “or otherwise, incites or encourages any person or class of persons or the public generally to practise ‘untouchability’ in any form whatsoever;

20. It is extremely difficult for me to hold that the custody of Smt. Neelam of her own infant child amounts to an offence under this provision of law and that, for this reason, the learned Magistrate must be deemed to have reason to believe that the confinement amounts to an offence as contemplated by Section 100 of the Cr PC

21. Section 100 of the Cr PC is of course a provision of emergency, but this by itself does not mean that the Magistrate acting under this Section is to issue warrants of search automatically without applying his judicial mind to the allegations contained in the application and to the other material which may be available to him. The expression “reason to believe,” which is the real core of this Section, implies a belief in judicial mind arrived at after considering all the available material with a sense of responsibility and effort of mind, without ignoring, so far as possible, the other side of the controversy. This is a judicial duty and its performance rules out a superficial and arbitrary approach. The Magistrate must have reasonable grounds to believe that the confinement in question is such that it amounts to an offence. In my opinion, the impugned order of the learned Magistrate is difficult to sustain on the existing record and I am inclined to agree with the learned Additional Sessions Judge and quash the order issuing the search warrants.

22. Turning now to Criminal Revision No. 414 of 1968, the main ground on which Shri Lekhi has opposed the recommendation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is that non-compliance with Section 112 of the Cr PC is only an irregularity and, therefore, in the absence of prejudice to the persons proceeded against, caused as a result thereof, there can be no cogent ground for interference on revision with the order of the learned Magistrate. In support of this submission, he has referred me to Sections 529, 530 and 537 of the Cr PC. The infirmity found by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in the order of the learned Magistrate, according to the counsel, is a mere irregularity and no prejudice has been shown to the present petitioner: the impugned order is thus immune from attack. He has principally relied on Abasu Begum v. Umda Khanum, (1882) ILR 8 Cal 724 and Raghunath Singh v. State, AIR 1953 Pat 1. Passing reference has also been made to other decisions cited by him before the learned Additional Sessions Judge.

23. In this Court, in Balraj Madhok v. Union of India, AIR 1967 Delhi 31, Hegde C.J, after considering the scheme of Chapter VIII of Cri PC, observed thus:—

“I am in entire agreement with Shri C.B Aggarwala in his contention that without an order under section 112 of the code, the Magistrates had no competence to deal with the petitioners.”

24. The learned C.J thereafter quoted with approval some passages from the judgment of a Division Bench prepared by Bhargava, J. in Shravan Kumar Gupta v. Superintendent District Jail, AIR 1957 All 189. The infirmity in the case of Balraj Madhok, AIR 1967 Delhi 31 led this Court to hold the impugned detentions to be illegal and the detenus in the nine writ petitions were ordered to be released. That decision is binding on me. It is true the plea of irregularity was not raised and, therefore, not discussed in that case apparently because the counsel for the State did not consider the infirmity to be a mere irregularity.

25. However, assuming, without holding that non-compliance with Section 112 of the Cr PC in the present case is only an irregularity, I am inclined, as at present advised, to hold that the question of failure of justice due to irregularity of procedure, as a general rule, assumes importance only if the challenge is raised after the conclusion of the proceeding when the final result of the case is known and it can scarcely be considered to possess cogency while the case is in its preliminary stages. Courts are clearly disinclined to approve or encourage in advance violations of statutory provisions merely because they may be considered to be directory, for it is to be remembered that even the directory provisions of law are intended by the Parliament to be obeyed and the Courts cannot just ignore them. I have, therefore, no hesitation in agreeing with the recommendations of Shri Dev Raj Khanna, Additional Sessions Judge, and so agreeing, I quash the impugned order of the learned Magistrate. The present order is, however, not to be construed to contain any expression of opinion on the merits.

26. Before finally closing, I cannot help expressing this Court's concern and surprise at the manner in which both the cases have been dealt with by the learned Magistrate's Court This was an unfortunate case, arising, it appears, out of some misunderstanding between the husband and the wife when there is also an offspring from their marriage. Misunderstandings, for some reason, seem to have reached a very high pitch. The learned Magistrate, who was duty-bound, in the discharge of his judicial functions, to put his mind in all cases coming before him, should have realised, after reading the contents of these applications, that these two cases were of an extraordinary nature requiring a deeper probe and more serious thought than seems to have been devoted to these cases. The Court record has created an impression in this Court that the learned Magistrate has dealt with these cases in a manner which is highly superficial and is far from complimentary to him.

27. Instances like the present neither enhance the prestige of the Courts of Magistrates nor do they inspire confidence in the minds of the litigants. Without pursuing the matter further, as observed earlier, I accept the recommendations of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and quash the two impugned orders. It is, however, hoped that an earnest effort would be made both by the husband and the wife to see that their differences are settled in a peaceful way because they are both educated young people having respectable status in society, and if for no other reason, at least for the sake of their only offspring they would be well advised to try to adjust their differences.

28. They have both to realise that each one of them has not only rights but also obligations towards the other and they both owe to their child heavy duty, for the discharge of which they must put up with the normal jars and shocks of ordinary married life. In case of absolute impossibility of reconciliation which this Court hopes is not the case being highly educated persons of respectable status, they should sit down and amicably come to an agreed arrangement in a rational way in the best interests of all the three parties and not resort to acts of violence or to criminal Courts.

29. GDR/D.V.CRevisions allowed.