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Shri Munshi Lal v. Thakur Prem Chand

Delhi High Court
Jul 31, 1969
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — V.S. Deshpande, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant-landlord filed an eviction petition under proviso (a) to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, alleging non-payment of contractual rent of Rs. 35 per month and that a notice of demand for arrears had been given. The respondent-tenant disputed the contractual rate, contending that the rent was Rs. 30 per month, and sought fixation of the standard rent. Because the rent rate was disputed, the Rent Controller fixed an interim rent at Rs. 30 per month under section 15(3) and ordered the tenant to deposit both the arrears (on which the eviction petition was based) and future rent at that rate by the 15th of each month until the standard rent was fixed.

The tenant paid the arrears as ordered but defaulted twice in paying the future interim rent. The Rent Controller ultimately fixed the standard rent at Rs. 30 per month, refused to strike off the tenant's defence under section 15(7), but held that, because the tenant had not complied with the Controller's order for deposit of interim rent, the tenant was not entitled to the protection of section 14(2) and was liable to be evicted under proviso (a) to section 14(1).

On appeal, the Rent Control Tribunal agreed that the standard rent was Rs. 30 but took the view that because the tenant had paid the arrears (the basis of the eviction petition) as ordered under section 15(3), the tenant could not be evicted under proviso (a) to section 14(1) despite delays in payment of future interim rent; the Tribunal therefore dismissed the eviction petition. The present appeal to the court concerns whether default in payment of future interim rent disentitles the tenant to the benefit of section 14(2).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether default in payment of future interim rent fixed by the Rent Controller under section 15(3) of the Act disentitles the tenant to the benefit of section 14(2) of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Landlord)

  • Alleged that the tenant failed to pay contractual rent of Rs. 35 per month and served a valid notice of demand for arrears under proviso (a) to section 14(1).
  • Sought eviction on the ground of non-payment of arrears which existed prior to filing of the eviction petition.
  • Did not press any attack on the fixation of the standard rent at Rs. 30 before this court (conceded the standard rent fixed by lower courts).

Respondent (Tenant)

  • Contended that the true contractual rent was Rs. 30 per month (not Rs. 35) and asked for fixation of standard rent at that rate.
  • Argued (before this court, but raised earlier to the Rent Controller) that the notice of demand was invalid because it demanded rent at Rs. 35.35 per month whereas the contractual rent was Rs. 30; that objection was negatived by the Rent Controller and not challenged before the Tribunal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Caltex (India) Limited v. Bhagwan Devi (CA 2347 of 1966; Supreme Court, 26 Sept 1968) The right to renewal of a lease is a privilege and, if a tenant wishes to claim the privilege, it must be done strictly within the prescribed time. Applied analogously: the statutory benefit under section 14(2) is a privilege that must be claimed by strict compliance with the time and payment requirements of section 15; therefore the tenant must pay interim rent in time to obtain section 14(2) protection.
Raja Ram Mahadev Paranjype and Others v. Aba Maruti Mali and others (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 753) Described in the opinion as "instructive" (no specific rule elaborated in the text). Referred to as additional support for the view that statutory privileges must be strictly observed in the context of the case's statutory construction.
Darshan Devi v. Vidya Nath Misra (1969 D.L.T. 405) Decision cited in support of the court's construction of section 14(2) (the specific rule as applied in that case is not spelled out in detail in the provided opinion). Relied upon by the court as supportive authority for the conclusion that the tenant must fully comply with section 15(3) to obtain the benefit of section 14(2).
Chitra Kumar Tiwari v. Gangaram (1966 JLJ 1028) Decision cited as authority supporting the court's statutory construction (exact principle not detailed in the opinion text). Used to support the court's conclusion that the statutory benefit under section 14(2) requires full compliance with section 15(3); cited alongside other authorities.
Rampiyari v. Ramautar (A.I.R. 1968 M.P. 87) One of two Madhya Pradesh decisions said to be based on statutory provisions in pari materia with section 14(2) (opinion does not elaborate its precise rule). Relied upon as corroborative precedent supporting the court's construction that payment required by section 15 includes future rent and must be complied with in full.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered the text and purpose of section 14(2) and section 15 (specifically section 15(3) read with section 15(1)) of the Act. The analysis proceeds along the following lines, reflecting the court's step-by-step legal reasoning as contained in the opinion:

  1. Nature of the interim-rent regime: Section 15(3), read with section 15(1), empowers the Rent Controller to fix an interim rent and to order that the arrears (the basis of the eviction petition) and the rent that becomes due thereafter be paid by the tenant to the landlord by the 15th of each month until standard rent is fixed. Thus the order under section 15(3) deals with both past arrears and future interim rent.
  2. Textual construction of section 14(2): Section 14(2) becomes applicable only if the tenant "makes payment or deposit as required by section 15." The court reads "section 15" as the section in its entirety; accordingly, compliance must be with the order under section 15(3) as a whole, not merely payment of the arrears that gave rise to the cause of action.
  3. Cause of action is not erased by subsequent payment: The court rejects the notion that payment of arrears after filing the eviction petition wipes out the cause of action existing at the time of filing. The cause of action that had arisen in the landlord's favour persists unless the tenant obtains the special statutory benefit conferred by section 14(2) through full compliance with section 15(3).
  4. Consequence of partial compliance: Non-compliance with any part of the order under section 15(3) (for example, failing to pay future interim rent on time) disentitles the tenant from the special protection of section 14(2). When that protection is denied, the landlord may obtain eviction on the original ground (non-payment of arrears) because that cause of action remains available.
  5. No discretion to extend time under section 15(3): The court holds that section 15(3) read with section 15(1) does not give the Rent Controller discretion to extend the time for payment; compliance by the 15th of each month is mandatory. Because section 14(2) confers a special statutory benefit, it must be strictly construed and strictly complied with.
  6. Authority and analogy: The court relies on precedent, most notably Caltex (India) Ltd v. Bhagwan Devi, to underline that statutory privileges must be claimed strictly; other cited cases were described as supportive or instructive. The court expressly states that its conclusion is its own reasoning but that it is supported by the listed authorities.
  7. Res judicata point on notice of demand: The tenant's contention that the demand notice was invalid because it demanded Rs. 35.35 instead of Rs. 30 was negatived by the Rent Controller; the tenant did not challenge that finding before the Tribunal, making the finding res judicata. Accordingly, the tenant could not raise that objection before this court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the benefit of section 14(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is available to a tenant only when the tenant has made the payment or deposit of rent as required by section 15(3) read with section 15(1), and that such payment includes both the arrears and the rent becoming due subsequently. Because the tenant defaulted in payment of the future interim rent fixed under section 15(3), the tenant was disentitled to the protection of section 14(2).

Result: The appeal was partly allowed; the respondent-tenant was ordered to be evicted at the instance of the appellant-landlord, and the standard rent of Rs. 30 per month fixed by the lower courts was confirmed. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Implications: The immediate consequence is the eviction of the tenant and confirmation of the standard rent at Rs. 30. The court's decision clarifies the statutory construction of section 14(2) in relation to section 15(3) and section 15(1): the tenant must fully comply with the controller's order (including timely payment of future interim rent) to obtain the statutory protection; partial or late compliance will not suffice. The opinion relies on existing authorities for this construction and presents the court's own reasoning; the decision applies that construction to the facts before it to determine entitlement to section 14(2) relief.

Signed: V.S. Deshpande, J. — order accordingly.

Show all summary ...

V.S Deshpande, J.:— This is a landlord's second appeal against the decision of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing his application for the eviction of the respondent tenant and reversing the order of the Rent Controller who had ordered the eviction of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent under proviso (a) to section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, (hereinafter called the Act).

The landlord filed a petition for eviction of the tenant on the ground that the tenant had failed to pay the contractual rent of Rs. 35/- per month and that a notice of demand for the arrears of the rent had been given as required by proviso (a) to section 14(1) of the Act.
The tenant defended the petition on the ground that the contractual rent was only Rs. 30/- per month. He also prayed for the fixation of the standard rent.
As the rate of the rent was disputed by the parties, the Rent Controller fixed the interim rent at Rs. 30/- per month under section 15(3) and ordered the tenant to deposit the arrears of the rent as also the future rent at that rate. The tenant paid the arrears of the rent as ordered by the Rent Controller but delayed the payment of future rent twice and thus defaulted in the payment of future rent. The Controller ultimately fixed the standard rent at Rs. 30/- per month. He declined to strike off the defence of the tenant under section 15(7) of the Act but held that the tenant had not complied with his order for the deposit of the interim rent and, therefore, the tenant was not entitled to the protection of section 14(2) of the Act. He, therefore, held that the tenant was liable to be evicted under proviso (a) to section 14(1) of the Act.
The Rent Control Tribunal was of the view that the tenant having paid the arrears of the rent on which the eviction petition was based as ordered by the Rent Controller under section 15(3), the tenant could not be evicted under proviso (a) to section 14(1) of the Act even though the tenant did not comply with the order of the Rent Controller strictly inasmuch as he failed to pay the future interim rent in time. He confirmed the Rent Controller's finding that the standard rent should be Rs. 30/- per month, but dismissed the eviction petition of the landlord on the ground that the arrears of the rent on which the eviction petition was based had been paid by the tenant in time as per the order of the Rent Controller under section 15(3) of the Act.
The sole question that arises for decision by me is, whether the default in the payment of future interim rent fixed by the Rent Controller under section 15(3) of the Act disentitles the tenant to the benefit of section 14(2) of the Act.
It is true that the eviction petition was originally based on a cause of action arising prior to the filing of the said petition, namely, the non-payment of arrears of the rent by the tenant and a notice of demand made by the landlord within the meaning of proviso (a) to section 14(1) of the Act. This is in accordance with the principle that a cause of action must arise in favour of a party before such a party can come to a Court of law to seek relief. Section 15(3) read with S. 15(1) of the Act gives power to the Rent Controller to fix an interim rent and to order that the amount of arrears of the rent on the basis of which the eviction petition was brought as also the rent becoming due thereafter shall be paid by the tenant to the landlord by the 15th of each month till the standard rent is fixed by the Rent Controller. The significance of the provisions contained in section 15(3) is two fold: on the one hand, it deals equitably with the landlord by ensuring that the tenant does not take an undue advantage of the litigation by refraining from paying rent to the landlord. On the other hand, the compliance by the tenant with this order of the Rent Controller gives him the statutory benefit of section 14(2 which says that:—
“No order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall he made on the ground specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1), if the tenant makes payment or deposit as required by section 15.”
The crux of this case is the correct construction of sub-section (2) of section 14 which is reproduced above. At first sight, it may be thought that the payment or deposit required by section 15 would mean the payment or deposit of only those arrears of the rent the non-payment of which provided a cause of action to the landlord to file the eviction petition. This argument may receive some support by the fact that it is only the recovery of possession on the grounds specified in clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 which is barred by the said, payment or deposit. This argument seems to have appealed to the learned Rent Control Tribunal.
On fuller consideration, however, this argument, though at first plausible, would be found to be untenable. Firstly, it is to be noted that sub-section (2) of section 14 becomes applicable only if the tenant makes the payment or deposit as required by section 15. By section 15, we must understand section 15 as a whole. If the legislature had intended that only that portion of the order of the Rent Controller as related to the deposits of the arrears of rent need to be complied with by the tenant to get the benefit of sub-section (2) of section 14, then the legislature would have said so. The legislature was aware that section 15(3) empowered the Rent Controller to fix and order the payment of interim rent not only in respect of the arrears but also in respect of the rent which became payable subsequently. A plain reading of the language of sub-section (2) of section 14, therefore, requires the tenant to comply with the order of the Rent Controller passed under section 15(3) as a whole and not only in respect of the arrears of rent.
Secondly, it is a fallacy to think that the payment of the arrears of the rent by the tenant wipes out the cause of action on which the eviction petition was based. The same principle which requires that a cause of action must precede the filing of the eviction petition also requires that the cause of action which has once arisen cannot be wiped out by the payment of rent by the tenant subsequently, particularly when such payment has been made after the filing of the eviction petition and that too in compliance with the order of the Rent Controller under section 15(3) of the Act. There is, therefore, no principle which can be invoked to support the argument that the payment of the arrears of the rent by the tenant under section 15(3) of the Act wipes out the cause of action under sec. 14(1)(a) and disentitles the landlord to evict the tenant thereafter. The correct principle is, on the other hand, that the tenant is allowed by section 14(2) a special statutory benefit of defeating the landlord's petition for eviction by fully complying with the provisions of section 15(3). The non-compliance with the privisions of section 15(3) disentitles the tenant from the benefit of section 14(2). Such non-compliance may consist in defaulting to pay the rent for a period which is subsequent to the period for the arrears of which the cause of action for the eviction petition was provided by proviso (a) to section 14(1). When the benefit of section 14(2) is thus denied to the tenant, the relief of eviction is granted to the landlord not because the tenant has failed to pay the future rent as ordered by the Controller under section 15(3) but because the original cause of action which had arisen in favour of the landlord under proviso (a) to section 14(1) is still available to him. The only way to deprive the landlord of the said cause of action was for the tenant to comply fully with the order under section 15(3) so as to get the benefit of section 14(2). The eviction of the tenant is still being made on the ground that the tenant had originally not paid the arrears of the rent which were demanded by the landlord under proviso (a) to section 14(1) before the eviction petition was filed. If the legal situation is understood in this way, the fallacy underlying the argument which appealed to the learned Rent Control Tribunal would become obvious.
Thirdly, section 15(3) which is to be read with section 15(1) does not give the Controller any discretion to extend in favour of the tenant the time to pay the rent. On the contrary, the rent has to be paid by the 15th of each month as stated in section 15(1). The failure of the tenant to pay the rent by the 15th of a month constitutes non-compliance with the order made by the Rent Controller under section 15(3) read with section 15(1). section 14(2) of the Act gives a special statutory benefit to the tenant. Therefore, it is to be strictly constructed. Its provisions have to be regarded as mandatory and any failure to comply with it read with section 15(3) in this case would disentitle the tenant to its benefit. In Caltex (India) Limited, v. Bhagwan Devi, CA 2347 of 1966 decided by the supreme Court on the 26th September 1968, it was held that the right to the renewal of the lease given to a tenant was a privilege and if the tenant wished to claim the privilege he must do so strictly within the time limited for the purpose. Applying this observation to our case, the tenant must pay the rent in time as provided for by section 15 if he wishes to get the benefit of section 14(2). The decision of the Supreme Court in Raja Ram Mahadev Paranjype and Others v. Aba Maruti Mali and others (A.I.R 1962 S.C 753) would also be found instructive in this connection. The result is that it cannot be said that the tenant has made payment or deposit as required by section 15 within the meaning of section 14(2). section 14(2) also does not provide that the Court may regard a payment or deposit of rent as made under section 15 even though the tenant may be late in making such payment or deposit and thereby contravenes the provisions of section 15(3) read with section 15(1). For the above reasons I find that the correct construction of section 14(2) of the Act is that its benefit is available to the tenant only when the tenant has made the payment or deposit of the rent as required by section 15(3) read with section 15(1) and that such rent includes not only the arrears of the rent but also the rent becoming due subsequently. Though the above reasons are my own, I am supported in the above conclusion by the following decisions, namely, Darshan Devi v. Vidya Nath Misra (1969 D.L.T 405), Chitra Kumar Tiwari v. Gangaram (1966 JLJ 1028) and Rampiyari v. Ramautar (A.I.R 1968 M.P 87)—these two Madhya Pradesh decisions being based on statutory provisions which are in pari materia with section 14(2) of the Act.
The learned counsel for the appellant did not press his attack on the fixation of the standard rent by the learned lower courts but conceded on the other hand that the standard rent fixed at Rs. 30 per month is correct.
The learned counsel for the respondent wanted to argue that the notice of demand given by the landlord to the tenant under proviso (a) to section 14(1) was invalid inasmuch as the rent demanded therein was at the rate of Rs. 35.35 per month while the true contractual rent was only Rs. 30 per month. This objection of the tenant was negatived by the Rent Controller. But the tenant in his appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal did not challenge this finding of the Rent Controller. The finding has, therefore, become res judicata between the parties. In the landlord's appeal before me the tenant cannot raise this point now firstly because the point was not urged before the Rent Control Tribunal when the tenant had the opportunity and the duty to do so and secondly because it is not a pure question of law but a mixed question of fact and law. I could not, therefore, allow the tenant to raise it.
This appeal is, therefore, partly allowed and it is ordered that the respondent-tenant be evicted from the premises at the instance of the appellant-landlord while the standard rent of Rs. 30 as fixed by the learned lower courts is confirmed. In view of the divided success, the parties are ordered to bear their own costs.
S.K.B Order accordingly