- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Union Of India v. Angrup Thakur .
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Letters Patent Appeal concerning Land Acquisition)
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a Letters Patent Appeal from an order of a Single Judge dismissing a writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The writ petition challenged compulsory acquisition proceedings in respect of land measuring about 84 bighas and 11 biswas belonging to the writ petitioners (Shri Angrup Thakur and others). A notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued in January 1965 and a notification under section 6 was issued in October 1965. Both notifications were authored by the Governor of Punjab. The section 4 notification stated that land was likely to be required for construction of buildings and research work on vegetables; the section 6 notification declared the land needed for construction of buildings and research at the Indian Agricultural Research Institute, Vegetable Breeding Sub-station Katrain (Kulu Valley).
The writ petitioners filed objections under section 5-A of the Act and alleged (1) that they were never called by the Collector nor did they appear in connection with the hearing of those objections, and (2) that the land was for the purposes of an Institute owned and managed by the Government of India so that the Central Government (and not the Punjab Government) was the appropriate government under section 3(ee) and that the notifications were therefore unauthorised.
The Single Judge examined the record and concluded that a notice fixing 12 April 1965 for hearing objections under section 5-A had been sent to and received by the writ petitioners, who appeared before the Collector on that date and made a joint signed statement reiterating their objections but without asking for an opportunity to lead evidence or to address further arguments. The Single Judge held that the petitioners had been heard. However, on the second point (appropriateness of the Punjab Government), the Single Judge accepted the writ petitioners' contention and quashed the notification under section 6 with costs.
On appeal, the Union of India applied under Order 41, Rule 27, Civil P.C., to place on record a 20 February 1957 Ministry of Home Affairs notification (F. 26 (5)/67.J. II, S.R.O. No. 645) by which the President, exercising Article 258, entrusted to the Government of Punjab (with consent) the functions of the Central Government under the Land Acquisition Act in relation to acquisitions for Union purposes in Punjab. If admissible, that notification would answer the challenge that the Punjab Government was not the appropriate Government.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the notifications issued under section 4 and section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (1894) were valid where the acquisition purportedly concerned an institute run by the Government of India — i.e., whether the Punjab Government was the appropriate Government for issuing notifications under the Act.
- Whether the writ petitioners were afforded a hearing in relation to their objections under section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act.
- Whether the appellate court (in a Letters Patent Appeal) may admit additional documentary evidence on appeal under Order 41, Rule 27, Civil P.C., in particular the 20 February 1957 Ministry of Home Affairs notification delegating Central Government functions to the Punjab Government.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Union of India)
- Applied under Order 41, Rule 27, Civil P.C. to place on record a Ministry of Home Affairs notification dated 20 February 1957 (S.R.O. No. 645) which, by exercise of Article 258, entrusted to the Government of Punjab the functions of the Central Government under the Land Acquisition Act in relation to acquisitions for Union purposes in Punjab.
- The appellant submitted that if this notification were considered, it would be a complete answer to the writ petitioners' challenge that the Punjab Government was not the appropriate Government.
Respondents / Writ Petitioners (represented by Shri Sachar)
- Contended that the writ petitioners had not been called by the Collector nor appeared in connection with the hearing of their objections under section 5-A.
- Argued that because the relevant Institute was owned, managed and run by the Government of India, the acquisition was for Union purposes and the Central Government (not the Punjab Government) was the appropriate Government under section 3(ee) — so the notifications were unauthorised and void.
- Objected to the late production of the 1957 notification on appeal, arguing that Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C. is inapplicable to Letters Patent Appeals and relied on several decisions (cited in the opinion) to support exclusion of the notification from the appellate record.
- Also relied on decisions and executive instructions to argue that failure to give notice to the department concerned during the Collector's proceedings rendered those proceedings without jurisdiction or invalid.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in the opinion) | Application by the Court (how the court treated or used it) |
|---|---|---|
| Parsotim Thakur v. Lal Mohar Thakur (A.I.R. 1931 P.C. 143; also cited as 1966 Cur. L. J. 290) | Principle on admission of additional evidence on appeal: additional evidence may be required "to enable the Court to pronounce judgment" or "for any other substantial cause", and normally when an inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent on the evidence as it stands. | The Court cited and relied on the statement (including Privy Council observations) to frame the limits of its discretion to admit additional evidence; it applied the principle but concluded that the 1957 notification constituted a delegation instrument that warranted admission in the interest of justice. |
| K. Venkatarmakiah v. Seetharam Reddy (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1526) | Authority for allowing additional evidence where the appellate court requires evidence to pronounce judgment or for "any other substantial cause". | The Court relied on this decision to justify admitting the additional document under Order 41, Rule 27(1)(b) in the present case as a matter of justice and completeness of record. |
| Javantilal Amratlal v. F.N. Rana (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 648) | Observation that not every executive order has force of law, but a general executive order that confers powers exercisable under a statute (thus modifying or adding to the statute) may have the force of law. | The Court cited this paragraph to reject the submission that mere executive instructions of the Financial Commissioner in Punjab had the sanctity to invalidate acquisition proceedings; the Court held those instructions were not equivalent to statutory rules and did not automatically nullify proceedings if not followed. |
| Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 193) | Cited by respondents in support of excluding the 1957 notification under Order 41, Rule 27 (specific principle from the case not detailed in the opinion). | The Court noted this authority was relied upon by respondents but did not find the respondents' objection easy to sustain; the Court admitted the notification despite these citations. |
| Indrachand v. Bhagwanas (A.I.R. 1952 Nag. 248) | Cited by respondents as authority to oppose admission of the notification (specific principle not detailed in the opinion). | The Court recorded that this decision was relied upon but did not treat it as decisive; it admitted the notification. |
| Venku Reddi v. Pichi Reddi (A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 250) | Cited by respondents to support exclusion of additional evidence (specific principle not detailed in the opinion). | The Court noted the citation but proceeded to admit the notification; the respondents did not otherwise show why Rule 27 should not apply. |
| The Municipal Committee v. The State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1869 Kerala 843) | Relied upon by respondents (Shri Sachar) for certain observations (paragraph 36) bearing on notice requirements (as referenced by counsel). | The Court found the observations relied upon to be of little relevance on the facts or law applicable to the present case and did not accept it as supporting respondents' position. |
| Lonappan v. Sub-Collector (Bench decision of Kerala High Court — no formal citation in the opinion) | Bench decision relied upon by respondents to argue proceedings before Collector were without jurisdiction because no notice had been given to the department concerned. | The Court distinguished that case on its facts (and on the presence of statutory rules in the Kerala instance); it held that executive instructions in Punjab were not statutory and their non-observance did not invalidate the acquisition proceedings in the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a step-by-step fashion to address the three principal issues: admissibility of the 1957 notification on appeal; the appropriateness of the Punjab Government as the acquiring authority; and whether the petitioners had been heard under section 5-A.
-
Applicability of Order 41, Rule 27 to Letters Patent Appeals:
The Court examined the wording of Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C., which generally bars production of additional evidence on appeal but allows it where (a) the trial court wrongly refused evidence; (b) the appellate court requires a document or witness to pronounce judgment; or (c) for any other substantial cause. The Court held that the provision is couched in sufficiently wide language to include appeals from orders made on applications under Article 226 (i.e., Letters Patent Appeals). The respondents' bald assertion that Rule 27 does not apply to such appeals was not shown to be correct.
-
Whether the 1957 notification should be admitted:
The Court applied authorities (including K. Venkatarmakiah and Parsotim Thakur) on the scope of Rule 27 and the circumstances in which appellate courts may allow additional evidence. It noted that the present application did not seek to adduce ordinary evidence (witness statements or private documents requiring rebuttal) but sought to place on record an executive instrument — a notification by which the President, under Article 258, had entrusted to the Punjab Government the Central Government's functions under the Land Acquisition Act for Union purposes in Punjab. The Court treated such a delegation instrument as being on a different footing from ordinary evidence.
Because (a) respondents did not claim they would lead evidence in rebuttal or question the relevancy of the notification, and (b) admission of the notification was necessary in the interest of justice to resolve a central issue (the identity of the appropriate government), the Court exercised its discretion under Rule 27(1)(b) to admit the notification. The Court, however, criticized the appellant for the belated production and imposed costs (Rs. 100) on the appellant for this reason.
-
Effect of the 1957 notification on the appropriateness-of-government issue:
Once the 1957 notification was placed on record, the Court held it “clinches” the point — i.e., it established that the functions of the Central Government under the Land Acquisition Act, in relation to acquisition for Union purposes in Punjab, had been entrusted to the Punjab Government. Consequently, the Court reversed the Single Judge's decision that had quashed the section 6 notification on the ground that Punjab was not the appropriate Government.
-
Whether the petitioners were heard under section 5-A:
The Court agreed with the Single Judge's factual conclusion: the writ petitioners were given notice fixing 12 April 1965, they appeared before the Collector on that date and made a joint signed statement reiterating their objections and asking the Collector to await the result of a representation to the Minister; they did not ask for an opportunity to lead evidence or to address further arguments. The Court found nothing in the material before it to contradict the Single Judge's findings. Accordingly, the Court held that the petitioners had been heard.
-
On executive instructions and notice to the department concerned:
The respondents sought to rely on certain executive instructions of the Financial Commissioner in Punjab to argue that failure to give notice to the department or local body on whose application the section 4 notification was issued would invalidate the Collector's proceedings. The Single Judge (and the appellate Court) distinguished a Kerala case where a statutory rule framed under section 55 of the Act existed; in contrast, the Punjab instructions were only executive and lacked statutory sanction. Therefore their non-observance did not nullify the acquisition proceedings. The Court also noted that the petitioners themselves could have asked the Collector to issue the departmental notice but did not do so.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the writ petition. The Court reversed the Single Judge's decision on the point that the Punjab Government was not the appropriate Government and held that, in view of the 20 February 1957 notification (Ministry of Home Affairs, S.R.O. No. 645), the functions of the Central Government under the Land Acquisition Act in relation to acquisitions for Union purposes in Punjab had been entrusted to the Punjab Government.
As to costs, the Court imposed a nominal cost of Rs. 100 on the appellant (Union of India) for the belated production of the additional evidence; otherwise there was no order as to costs, and the writ petition was dismissed.
Implications: The direct effect is that the writ petitioners' challenge to the acquisition (on the ground that Punjab was not the appropriate Government) fails and the Single Judge's order quashing the section 6 notification is reversed. The opinion does not state or claim that it establishes any broader novel precedent beyond the resolution of the specific questions on admissibility of the 1957 notification and the factual findings about hearing; no wider rule or binding new principle was announced beyond the Court's application of existing rules (Order 41, Rule 27 and related authorities) to the facts of this case.
Note: This summary is strictly confined to the content of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond the opinion's text.
I.D Dua, C.J:— This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing a petition under Articles 226, and 227 of the Constitution questioning the proceedings for the-compulsory acquisition of the land measuring about 84 bighas and 11 biswas belonging to the writ petitionors Shri Angrup Thakur and others respondents in the present appeal. Notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (here, after called the Act) was issued in January, 1965 and under section 6, in October, 1965. According to the notification under section 4, it appeared “to the Governor of Punjab that land was likely to be required to be taken by Government at the the public expense for a public purpose, namely, for the construction of building and doing research work on vegetables” and in the notification under section 6, the Governor of Punjab was stated to be satisfied that the land in question was “needed by the Government at public expenses for a public purpose, namely for the construction of buildings and doing research work on vegetables at Indian Agricultural Research Institute, Vegetable Breeding Sub-station Katrain (Kulu Valley)” and it was declared that the land in question was required for the above purposes. As is apparent, the Governor of Punjab was the author of both these notifications.
2. Objections under section 5-A of the Act to the notification under section 4 were presented by the writ petitioners and according to their averments in the writ petition, they were never called by the Collector, nor did they ever appear before him in connection with the hearing of those objections. The other objection pressed before the learned Single Judge was that the Indian Agricultural Research Institute Vegetable Breeding Sub-Station Katrain was owned and managed and run by the Government of India, with the result that the acquisition of land for the purposes of the said Institute must be the purposes of the Union and that under section 3(ee) of the Act. the Central Government was the appropriate Government for the purposes of the notifications under sections 4 and 6 of the Act. The Punjab Govenment was according to this averment, not the appropriate Government and the two notifications were, therefore, unauthorised and a nullity. The learned Single Judge, after considering the unsatisfactory nature of the return, thought it necessary to go into the record which was made available by the learned counsel for the respondents and on perusual of those records he came to the conclusion that a notice fixing 12th April 1965 for bearing the objections under section 5-A had been sent to and received by the writ petitioners who appeared before the Collector on that date and made a joint statement signed by them. In that statement, they reiterated their objections filed by them under section 5-A and also required the Collector to await the result of their representation made against the acquisition to the Minister concernad. But they did not ask for any opportunity to lead evidence or to address further arguments. On this states of the record, the learned Single Judge held that the peritioners had been heard. Certain executive instructions relied upon by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners were held not to amount to legally binding directions. the non-observance of which could have the effect of nullifying the order on the objections under section 5-A.
3. On the second point that the Punjab Government was not the appropriate Government for the notification under section 6 of the Act, the writ petitioners submission was accepted and the notification under section 6 was quashed with costs.
4. On appeal, the learned counsel for the Union of India has applied under order 41, Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for being permitted to place on the record a copy of the Notification Mo. F. 26 (5)/67.J. II, dated 20th February 1957 (S.R.O No. 645) which reads as under:—
“In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (i) of Art, 258 of the Constitution of India, the President here-by:—
(1) Entrusts to the Government of Punjab with the consent of that Government the functions of the Central Government under the land Acquisition Act 1894 (1 of 1894) in relation to the Acquisition of Land for the purposes of the Union in the State of Punjab, subject to the condition that notwithstanding this entrustment, the Central Government may itself exercise the said functions should it deem fit to do so in any case; and
(2) Directs that the word ‘Punjab’ shall be omitted from the notification of the Govt of India in the Ministry of Home Affairs No SRO 1074 dated the 14th May, 1955.”
5. This notification, if admissible for this Court to consider, is a complete answer to the second challenge levelled by the writ petitioners to the validity of the acquisition in question.
6. Shri Sachar, the learned counsel for the respondents in this appeal, has very strongly argued that there is no cogent ground for permitting this notification to be placed on the record on appeal and has added that Order 41, Rule 27, Civil P.C is inapplicable to Letters Patent Appeals. He has sought support for excluding this notification under O. 41, Rule 27 from the following decisions:—
Parsotim Thakur v. Lal Mohar Thakur . A.I.R 1931 P C. 143., Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh . A I.R 1951 S.C 193. Indrachand v. Bhagwanas . A.I.R 1952. Nag. 248., Venku Reddi v. Pichi Reddi . A.I.R 1958 A P. 250..
7. The objection raised by the respondents is, in our opinion, not easy to sustain. Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C, may now be read:—
“R. 27. (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if—
(a) The Court from whose decree that appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or
(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined.
(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an appllate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission”
8. This provision is couched in language which is wide enough to include within its fold an appeal from an order of a learned Single Judge made on an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. And then, except for the bald assertion, it has rot been shown why this provision should not apply to the present appeal.
9. The next question to be considered is whether it is a fit case in which this notification should be admitted in evidence on appeal. As observed in K. Venkatarmakiah v. Seetharam Reddy . A. I.R 1963 S.C 1526.,
“* * * * the appellate Court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence ‘to enable it to pronounce judgment’ but also for ‘any other substantial cause’. There may well be cases where even though the court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the State of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment, it still consider that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it may pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. such a case will be one tor allowing additional evidence for any other substantial cause’ under Rule 27 (1)(b) of the Code
10. It is easy to see that such requirement of the Court to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause is not likely to arise ordinarily unless some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent on an examination of the evidence That is why in Parsolim Thakur v. Lal Mohar Thakur . 1966 Cur. L. J. 290, the Privy Council while discussing whether additional evidence can be admitted observed:
‘It may be required to enable the Court to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, but in either case it must be the Court that requires it. This is the plain grammatical reading of the sub-clause. The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applied to adduce fresh evidence, but ‘when on examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent.’
As the Privy Counsel proceeded to point out:
It may well be that the defect may be pointed out by a party, or that a party may move ‘the Court to supply the defect, but the requirement must be the requirement of the Court upon its appreciation of the evidence as it stands.”
11. But in the case in hand, the appellant does not seek the production of evidence in the form of statements of witnesses or public or private documents which may require rebuttal. What is on the other hand sought to be produced on behalf of the appellant is an instrument whereby the President of India has, with the consent of the Government of Punjab, entrusted to the latter the functions of the Central Government under the Land Acquisition Act, in relation to the acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union in the State of Punjab. A document of this type, which purports to operate as a delegation of the executive functions of the Union to the Government of the State of Punjab, in our opinion, stands on a somewhat different footing from the evidence normally to be led by the parties in the form of private documents and the statements of witnesses. It may be printed out at this stage that the respondents do not claim to lead any evidence in rebuttal nor have they attempted to question the relevancy of this notification. In the interest of justice; therefore, in the case in hand’, this Court would be defeating the cause of justice if it declined to look at the Ministry of Home Affairs' notification reproduced above. We must point out that no other legal infirmity has been brought to our notice which would stand in the way of this Court in taking into account the contents of this notification. We, however, do feel that the appellant has not exhibited the diligence expected from a responsible body like the Union of India having all the facilities of the best legal advice, with the result that it must be burdened with costs for this belated production of the notification which we fix at Rs. 100/-.
12. This notification seems to us to clinch the point on which the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition, and indeed the learned counsel for the respondants has said nothing on the merits on this point. The decision of the learned Single Judge on this point must, therefore, be reversed. Shri Sachar has, as a last resort, attempted to re-agitate the objection unsuccessfully raised by him before the learned Single Judge and has with his usual eloquence submitted that his clients had not been given hearing in support of the objections filed by them under section 5-A of the Act. It is obvious that the learned counsel is, for this purpose, relying on order 41, Rule 22, Civil P. C, which would not be available to him if his earlier contention of excluding the applicability of Rule 27 of this Order to Letters Patent Appeals had prevailed, for if Rule 27 is inapplicable, there would be no cogent ground for applying Rule 22 of the same Order. Shri Sachar has in support of his submission drawn our attention to Annexure ‘A-2’, which embodies the objections raised by his clients under section 5-A of the Act to the notification issued under section 4 by the Governor of Punjab relating to the acquisition of the land in question and has then referred us to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the writ petition and the replies thereto. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel when he submits that the respondents before us (the writ petitioners) had not been given a hearing on their objections under section 5 A. As observed by the learned Single Judge the writ petitioners appeared before the Collector on 12th April. 1965 and made a joint statement which was also signed by them, in which they had requested the Collector to await the result of their representation made against the proposed acquisition to the Minister concerned. They do not seem to have asked for any opportunity to lead evidence or to address further arguments. The learned counsel has not been able to point out anything on the material before us which would suggest that the observations of the learned Single Judge are contrary to the record or in any way incorrect. Reference by Shri Sachar to a Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in The Municipil Committee v. The State of Punjab . A.I.R 1869 Kerala 843., is of little avail to the learned counsel because the observations in paragraph 36 of that judgment, on which reliance has been placed, do not seem to have any relevancy to the case before us either on its facts or on the law applicable. Shri Sachar has, however, repeated his submission on the authority of a Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Lonappan v. Sub-Collector that the proceedings before the learned Collector wire without jurisdiction because no notice had been given to the department concerned. In this connection, he has drawn our attention to certain instructions said to have been issued by the Financial Commissioner in the State of Punjab, according to which when the Collector receives as objection, he has to fix a date for hearing the same and to give notice of the date to the objector and to the officer of the department or the local body on whose application the notification under section 4 of the Act had been issued. The learned Single Judge, has in the impugned order observed that in the Kerala case, a statutory rule had been framed by the Government under section 55 of the Land Acquisition Act. whereas the instructions issued by the Financial Commissioner in the State of Punjab being merely executive instructions, had no such sanation behind them, with the result that failure to give notice to the department concerned could not have the effect of invalidating or nullifying the acquisition proceedings The learned Single Judge has also observed that the writ petitioners could, in any event, themselves have requested the Collector to issue notice to the department concerned and having not done so, they could not make a grievance of this omission in writ proceedings at such late stage. Precious little has been said before us to differ from the view taken by the learned Single Judge. We, however, do not express any considered opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the view taken in the Kerala case. Suffice it to say that in the case in hand, no manifest injustice on the ground of failure to give notice to the officer of the department concerned has been shown to have been suffered by the writ petitioners. Our attention has also been drawn on behalf of the respondents to Javantilal Amratlal v. F.N Rana . A.I.R 1964 S.C 648. and particular emphasis has been laid on paragraph 16 of the judgment in which at p. 659, it is observed that:—
“This is not so say that every order issued by an executive authority has the force of law. If the order is purely administrative or is not issued in exercise of any statutory authority, it may not have the force of law. But where a general order is issued even by an executive authority which confers power exercisable under a statute, and which thereby in substance modifies or adds to the statute, such conferment of powers must be regarded as having the force of law.”
13. These observations, in our opinion, do not support Shri Sachar's submission that in the present case, the general executive instructions issued by the Financial Commissioner in the State of Punjab have such sanctity that failure to give notice to the department concerned must necessarily, and as a matter of law, invalidate the order of acquisition.
14. In view of the notification under Article 258 of the Constitution reproduced earlier, we are constrained to allow this appeal, which we hereby do, but with no order as to costs. Ofcourse, the costs imposed on the appellant in connection with the admission of additional evidence will have to be paid to the respondents. The final result, therefore is that the writ petition is dismissed with no costs.
15. H L.S
16. Petition dismissed.
Alert