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Wearwell Cycle Co. (India) Limited Petitioner v. Wearwell Industries & Another S
Judgment Summary — V.S. Deshpande, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges the order of the Additional District Judge, Delhi dated 16 May 1967 refusing a temporary injunction sought by the plaintiff-appellant. The plaintiff (Wearwell Cycle Company (India) Limited) instituted Suit No. 3 of 1966 on 26 October 1966 seeking to restrain the defendants from using the trade mark and trading style “Wearwell”.
Key factual points set out in the opinion (as pleaded by the plaintiff and accepted in part by the Court) are:
- The promoters of the plaintiff entered into an agreement with the English Wearwell Cycle Company permitting the Indian company to use proprietary marks in India. The Indian company was registered on 14-11-1951 and obtained a licence to manufacture cycles on 14-1-1953.
- Production began by the end of 1954. Up to the filing of the suit in 1966 the plaintiff had sold cycles amounting to roughly Rs. 3 crores and spent about Rs. 4 lakhs on advertising; the word “Wearwell” and a monogram were affixed to its cycles.
- Defendant No. 2 (Ashok) began selling cycles under the name “Wearwell” and the monogram from about 25 July 1966 (sales-tax registration indicates dealer activity from that date). The plaintiff became aware in September 1966 and filed suit the following month.
- The Additional District Judge dismissed the plaintiff’s application for temporary injunction on 16 May 1967, but directed the defendants to maintain accounts of sales and furnish security to compensate the plaintiff if it succeeded. The plaintiff appealed from that order under Order 43, C.P.C.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff had made out a strong prima facie case for grant of temporary injunction restraining the defendants from using the trade mark and trading name “Wearwell”.
- Whether the plaintiff, by exclusive user of the mark for about 12 years and by sales and advertising, had acquired a proprietary right in the trade mark sufficient to sustain an action for passing off.
- Whether the defendants' use of the word “Wearwell” and a similar monogram was likely to deceive or cause confusion among the public (the causation of passing off and likelihood of deception).
- Whether the balance of convenience and the preservation of the status quo favoured the plaintiff or the defendants pending final adjudication.
- Whether the plaintiff’s failure to secure formal registration of the trade mark was fatal to its claim for injunctive relief based on passing off.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff had used the trade mark “Wearwell” (and monogram) exclusively on cycles manufactured by it since 1954, including substantial sales (circa Rs. 3 crores) and advertising expenditure (circa Rs. 4 lakhs), giving rise to reputation and goodwill.
- The defendants started trading under the style “Wearwell Industries” and began assembling and selling cycles under the mark only about three months before filing of the suit, causing irreparable injury and constituting the tort of passing off.
- Pending final decision, a temporary injunction was necessary to prevent deception of the public and to preserve the plaintiff’s established goodwill.
Defendants' Arguments
- The defendants denied that “Wearwell” was ever the proprietary mark of the plaintiff and asserted their entitlement to use that name.
- The defendants contended that rights under the agreement with the English company were transferred to them and that the promoters (notably Shri K.C. Aggarwal) were entitled to use the trade name.
- They argued the plaintiff lacked reputation (or was in poor financial position) and that the balance of convenience favoured defendants because a temporary injunction would destroy their business.
- They maintained that they had been carrying on business under the name “Wearwell Industries” for about three years (a contention accepted in their pleadings) and therefore should be allowed to continue using the mark.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Powell v. Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Company (1896) 2 Ch. 54 | The plaintiff may rely on a common law right to prevent passing off even where no registered trade-mark is relied upon; injunction is available to prevent goods being passed off as those of the plaintiff. | The Court invoked the principle that infringement need not be of a registered mark; the plaintiff may rely on user and goodwill to restrain likely confusion. |
| Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Company v. Powell (1897) A.C. 710 (House of Lords) | Affirmation of the Court of Appeal’s approach that a common-law action lies to prevent passing off notwithstanding registration issues. | The House of Lords' affirmation reinforced the Court’s reliance on common-law passing off doctrine for unregistered but well-known marks. |
| Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Loog, 8 App. Cas. 29 | Historical authority indicating fraud on the public is foundational to right to damages at common law; contextual authority for passing-off principles. | Referenced to show the historical development that fraudulent intent is not necessarily required in equity for relief; supports treating likely deception as sufficient. |
| Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Cr. 338 | Authority indicating that intentional deceit was not essential to warrant an injunction in passing-off matters. | Used to support the proposition that a plaintiff need not prove deliberate fraud — a practice calculated to deceive suffices. |
| Reddaway v. Banham (1896) A.C. 199 | Holds that substantial continuous user (here 12 years) can be sufficient for acquisition of exclusive right to use a name, even where the words are descriptive and used by others. | The Court analogised the plaintiff’s 12-year exclusive use and concluded that such user strongly supports a proprietary claim in the mark. |
| Draper v. Twist (1939) 3 All ER 513 | Supports the proposition that damage is presumed from market presence of deceptive goods; plaintiff entitled to damages without proof of actual damage. | Invoked to show that the law presumes adverse effect from deceptive goods in the market; proof of actual damage is not required for relief. |
| Kaviraj Pandit Durgdatt Sharma v. Navratna Pharmaceutical Laboratory, AIR 1965 SC 1980 | Establishes that passing off is a common law remedy distinct from infringement of a registered trade-mark. | The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to emphasise that the plaintiff's unregistered but long-standing use gives rise to a distinct common-law remedy. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a step-by-step analysis addressing the reasons given by the Additional District Judge for refusing the temporary injunction, and applied established passing-off principles to the facts as pleaded.
- On the nature of the “invention” or origin of the trade-mark (Addressing Reason No. 1 of the Additional District Judge): the Court rejected any inference that because the trade-mark was not invented in India (it had English ancestry) this weakened the Indian company's entitlement. The Court emphasised that the English company's established reputation enhanced the value of the mark for the Indian company and that the plaintiff benefited from this association; the foreign origin was not a disqualification but supported the plaintiff’s claim to goodwill more readily.
- On proprietorship of the mark (Addressing Reason No. 2): the Court contrasted the plaintiff’s uninterrupted exclusive use of the mark over approximately 12 years (sales ~Rs. 3 crores; advertising ~Rs. 4 lakhs) with the defendants' asserted short period of use (about three months before suit). The Court found no serious controversy on proprietorship — the weight of continuous long use supported the plaintiff’s claim and undermined the defendants’ competing claim.
- On preservation of the status quo (Addressing Reason No. 3): the Court held that the plaintiff sought to preserve, not create, the status quo that existed for 12 years up to July 1966 when defendants began using the mark. Granting a temporary injunction would maintain that status quo.
- On balance of convenience (Addressing Reason No. 4): the Court found the plaintiff’s position to be far stronger on the evidence of prior use and reputation. The balance of convenience could not favour the defendants when they were recent usurpers of a mark long associated with the plaintiff. The Court rejected the suggestion that an injunction would destroy the defendants’ business, noting the defendants could adopt an alternative trade name and establish their own reputation.
- On the absence of registered trade-mark (Addressing Reason No. 5): the Court held that lack of registration was not determinative. The plaintiff’s claim was founded on long user and goodwill, not registration, and common-law passing-off principles apply regardless of registration (supported by statutory savings in the Trade & Merchandise Marks context and precedent such as the cited Supreme Court decision).
- On likelihood of deception: the Court examined the similarity of the monograms and the prominence of the word “Wearwell” and concluded that the defendants' use was likely to mislead the ordinary and unwary customer into believing the defendants' cycles were the plaintiff's well-known product. The Court noted a prior order (Andley, J., 29-5-1967) already prohibiting use of the monogram by the defendants, and found the small metal plate displayed by defendants insufficient to distinguish their goods in the eyes of typical consumers.
- Synthesis: applying the common-law principles from the precedents cited (that registration is not a prerequisite to relief, that deception need not be shown to actual purchasers, and that substantial prior user can create proprietary rights), the Court concluded that the plaintiff had established a prima facie case, that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff, and that preservation of the long-standing position required interim relief.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed. The order of the Additional District Judge dated 16 May 1967 is set aside and, pending the decision of the suit, the defendant-respondents are prohibited from using the word “Wearwell” in the name of their business and as a mark on cycles made and sold by them. No order as to costs of the appeal was made.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the defendants are temporarily restrained from using the trade name and mark "Wearwell" on their cycles; the plaintiff's request for preservation of its position in the market pending final adjudication was granted.
- The decision applies established common-law passing-off principles (as discussed in the opinion) to permit interim relief where a plaintiff demonstrates substantial prior use, goodwill and a likelihood of public deception by a recent usurper.
- The opinion does not purport to create or proclaim a new legal principle; it applies existing authorities to the facts. The judgment does not state any broader declaratory pronouncement beyond the immediate injunction and the legal reasoning used to support it.
End of summary. This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text.
V.S Deshpande, J.:— This is an appeal against the order of the Additional District Judge, Delhi dated 16th May, 1967 refusing the grant of temporary injunction to the plaintiff-appellant. The application for temporary injunction by the plaintiff before the Additional District Judge, though made under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 C.P.C, was actually covered by Order 39, Rule 2 alone inasmuch as the suit by the plaintiff was for restraining the defendants from committing “other injury of any kind” within the meaning of Rule 2(1). The injury complained of was the harm caused to the plaintiff by the sale of deceptive goods by the defendants. The order of the learned Additional District Judge was apparently, therefore, passed under Order 39, Rule 2 CPC and not under Section 151 C.P.C It was, therefore, appealable under Order 43, CPC.
Briefly, the facts leading to the filing of this appeal against the order dated 16th May, 1967 passed by the Additional District Judge, dismissing the appellants' application for temporary injunction are as follows :
Shri K.C Aggarwal, the father of defendant No. 2 and certain other persons decided to promote a company to manufacture “Wearwell” Cycles. These cycles used to be manufactured by an English Company called the Wearwell Cycle Company Limited in England. Shri Aggarwal, therefore, went to England and entered into an agreement with the English Company. Shri Aggarwal acted for Janki Das and Sons of Jullundur, India, and the agreement was entered into by him for the benefit of the Indian Company which was to be formed under the name of “Wearwell Cycle Company (India) Limited”. The English Company permitted by this agreement the Indian Company to use any of its proprietary marks in India. The Indian Company was registered under the Indian Companies Act on 14-11-1951. It obtained the licence to manufacture cycles under the Registration and Licencing of Industrial Undertaking Rules, 1952 on 14-1-1953. The Indian company went into production by the end of 1954 and produced and sold cycles worth Rs. 3 crores or so by the time the suit came to be filed in 1966. The Indian Company had spent about Rs. 4 lakhs to advertise its cycles. The word “Wearwell” and monogram containing the said word were displaced on all the cycles made and sold by the Indian Company.
The agreement entered into with the English Company contemplated that the Indian Company would enter into an agreement with the English Company after the Indian Company was registered incorporating the terms of the said agreement into the new agreement between the two companies. This, however, does not seem to have been done. By the end of 1965 Shri K.C Aggarwal was removed from the Directorship of the Indian Company. Defendant No. 2, Ashok, is his son born probably on 25-4-1947. He took his B.Com degree in 1966 and started the business of selling cycles from the 25th July, 1966 as would appear from the licence as a dealer obtained by him from the Sales Tax Authorities. He also used the name “Wearwell” and the monogram containing that word on the cycles sold by him. The plaintiff Company came to know of this in September, 1966 and immediately filed the Suit No. 3 of 1966 on 26-10-1966. The plaintiff averred that from the end of 1954, it has been manufacturing cycles under the trade mark “Wearwell” in four different models, viz.; Popular Wearwell, Super delux Wearwell, Delux Wearwell and Super Jet Wearwell. Since February, 1966, however, the plaintiff has been concentrating on the manufacture of their famous model Deluxe Wearwell. Its production till the filing of the suit was approximately worth Rs. 3 crores as per the statement showing the yearly figures of sale attached. It has spent about Rs. 4 lakhs on advertising the trade mark “Wearwell” as per statement attached. The trade mark “Wearwell” is the key portion of the plaintiff's trading style “Wearwell Cycle Company (India) Limited”. It denotes the cycles manufactured by the plaintiff alone in India. It is associated by the members of the public with the plaintiff only. The plaintiff-company has applied for registration of this trade mark which application is pending. Even prior to the registration of the trade mark, the plaintiff has acquired reputation and good-will in this trade mark. The defendents have started trading under the style of “Wearwell Industries” at Ludhiana and started assembling and selling cycles under the trade mark “Wearwell”. The trading of the defendants started only about 3 months prior to the filing of the suit. It is causing irrepairable loss and injury to the plaintiff for which pecuniary compensation would not be an adequate relief. The action of the defendants amounts to the tort of passing off. Pending the decision of the suit for permanent injunction, therefore, the plaintiff prayed for a temporary injunction restraining the defendants from using the trade mark “Wearwell”.
The defendants did not deny that the plaintiff started a factory for assembling of cycles in the year 1955. They, however, denied that the trade mark “Wearwell” was ever the proprietary mark of the plaintiff. They stated that the plaintiff-company has been assembling the cycles and wrongfully using the name “Wearwell” sometimes. The defendants have been carrying on business under the name of “Wearwell Industries” for the last about three years in manufacturing, assembling and selling cycles under the trade mark “Deluxe Wearwell”. The defendants are entitled to use the trade mark “Wearwell”. The agreement with the English Company was entered into by Shri K.C Aggarwal, who was entitled to use the trade name “Wearwell”. The rights under the agreement with the English Company were transferred to the defendants. The balance of Convenience is in favour of the defendants in as much as the business of the defendants would be totally stopped, if temporary injunction is granted against them. The plaintiff has no reputation and is in a bad way financially. It is not, therefore, entitled to permanent injunction against the defendant and hence no temporary injunction should be granted in its favour.
The learned Additional District Judge refused to pass an order of temporary injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff-appellant and instead directed the defendants to maintain accounts of sales made by them and to furnish security to compensate the plaintiff-company in the event of the success of the suit. The learned Additional District Judge was of the view that a strong prima facie case was not made out by the plaintiff for the grant of temporary injunction in view of the following reasons :
(1) A serious controversy exists as to whether or not the invention claimed by the plaintiff is a new one or a new manufacture or whether or not it involves any new skill;
(2) The defendant disputes the plaintiff's ownership of the trade mark;
(3) A temporary injunction cannot be granted to establish a new state of things different from the state which existed on the date on which the suit was instituted;
(4) The balance of convenience is not in favour of the plaintiff as—the grant of temporary injunction would destroy the defendant's business altogether, while the position would be different if the plaintiff is able to prove his right to the disputed trade mark; and
(5) The plaintiff has not been able to get the trade-mark registered in its name yet.
I am afraid, I am unable to agree with the reasoning of the learned Additional District Judge. It is not clear what is implied in reason No. 1 given by him. It is true that the trade-mark “Wearwell” is not invented by the plaintiff. Apparently, the invention was made by the English Company, which has been manufacturing Wearwell Cycles for many years past. The good-will and reputation of the English Company in respect of this trade mark was so great that the promoters of the plaintiff-company including Shri K.C Aggarwal, father of defendant No. 2, thought it worthwhile to take the trouble and spend money of sending Shri Aggarwal to England to enter into an agreement with the English Company under which the Indian Company would be entitled to use the trade-name “Wearwell”. Both the parties are, therefore, committed to the position that the trade-mark “Wearwell” was the property of the English Company, which was valuable enough to be sought after by the proposed Indian Company. If the Indian Company had itself invented the name “Wearwell”, it may have perhaps required a longer period to establish its good-will and reputation in respect of it. But the good-will and the reputation of the trade-mark in respect of the cycles manufactured by the Indian Company already existed. Prior to the gradual stoppage of imports by the Government of India after attainment of independence, Wearwell cycles used to be imported in India and were known for a certain quality attached to them. The reputation among the Indian buyers must have been good enough to persuade the promoters of the Indian Company to acquire the said trade-mark from the English Company. By such acquisition the Indian Company would get the benefit of the established reputation of the cycles sold under this trade-mark. A shorter period of time would, therefore, be required for the Indian Company to acquire the reputation and good-will in respect of this trade-mark. Far from being a disqualification, therefore, the fact that the Indian Company itself did not invent this trade-mark but decided to use it in view of its agreement with the English Company puts the claim of the Indian Company to the use of the trade-mark on a better footing. As the trademark was already well known, a comparatively short period of its association with the cycles made by the Indian Company would be sufficient to give the Indian Company the goodwill in the use of the trade-mark.
The agreement entered into with the English Company was expressly made for the benefit of the proposed Indian Company. This is conclusively proved not only by the agreement itself, but also by the fact that Shri K.C Aggarwal, the predecessor in-title of the defendant, was himself a Director of the plaintiff-company which used—the trade-mark “Wearwell” in pursuance of the agreement entered into with the English Company. It is true that the agreement contemplated a fresh agreement between the Indian Company and the English Company after the incorporation of the Indian Company. Legally speaking, therefore, the Indian Company cannot base its claim to the trade-mark “Wearwell” on the agreement entered into by its promoters with the English Company. This does not mean however, that Shri K.C Aggarwal can personally claim any benefit under the agreement with the English Company. From the date of entering into agreement with the English Company to his removal from the Directorship of the Indian Company, Shri K.C Aggarwal, predecessor in-title of the defendant-respondents, has himself been a party to the use of this trade-mark for the exclusive benefit of the Indian Company. The Indian Company has based its claim to the exclusive use of this trade-mark not on the agreement entered into with the English Company, but on the fact that for 12 years prior to the filing of the suit it has been exclusively using this trade-mark for cycles made by it. On the contrary, the business of the defendants dated apparently from July, 1966, i.e, hardly three months before the filing of the suit by the plaintiff. In view of the age of defendant No. 2 and the date of his Sales Tax Registration Certificate, one can safely proceed on the assumption that the use of the trade-mark by the defendants commenced only from July, 1966. One cannot, therefore, agree with the learned Additional District Judge that there is any serious controversy as to the proprietorship of this trademark as between the two parties. On the side of the plaintiff-company is the 12 years use of the trade-mark resulting in the sale of cycles worth Rs. 3 crores and expenditure on advertisement of about Rs. 4 lakhs. As against this the defendant-respondents can claim the use of the trade-mark for just three months before the suit. The defendant-respondent cannot, therefore, claim any comparison with the plaintiff-company in this respect at all. Reason No. 2 given by the learned Additional District Judge is also, not, therefore, valid.
The plaintiff-company is wanting the temporary injunction to preserve the status quo as it existed for 12 years ending July, 1966. It is only in July, 1966 that the defendants started disturbing the status quo by using the trade-mark, which was used exclusively by the plaintiff till then. It cannot be said, therefore, that the plaintiff wanted the temporary injunction to create a new state of things.
The question of balance of convenience can arise only when at least prima facie the two parties are on the same level and their rights are about equal. As already stated above, the plaintiff was the user of this trade-mark being for 12 years and the plaintiff having made cycles under this trade-mark to the tune of Rs. 3 crores and having spent on the advertising of this trade-mark an amount of about Rs. 4 lakhs, the plaintiff-company's position is infinitely superior to that of the defendant-respondents, who began the use of the trade-mark just three months before the suit and who have not dared to state how much they have earned by selling the cycles in this period of three months and how much they have spent on advertisement during those three months. It is not the law that any one can start using the trade-mark exclusively associated with another for a long time and then tell the Court not to grant temporary injunction to the establish user because this would be inconvenient to the new user, who may be called a usurper.
The fact that the plaintiff has not so far succeeded in getting the trade-mark registered in its name is not relevant in as much as the suit of the plaintiff is based on the user of the trade-mark by the plaintiff for 12 years prior to the suit and is not based on the registration of the trade-mark. The plaintiff avers that the defendants have committed the tort of passing off. They do not aver that the defendant-respondents have infringed any trade-mark registered in the plaintiff's favour. In Powell v. Birmingham Vinegar Grewery Company, (1896) 2 Ch. 54, (1) the plaintiff-Company had manufactured a sauce under the name “Yorkshire Relish” for 34 years. The registration of these words as a trade-mark in 1884 was later set aside in 1894 in a decision genuineness of which was upheld by the House of Lords, in (1894) A.C 8. The Court of appeal observed as follows :—
“The plaintiff in this case does not complain of the infringement of any registered trade-mark. He relies exclusively on his common law right to prevent other people from making and selling goods which can be and are passed off and mistaken for goods made by him under the name “Yorkshire Relish”…
Before there was any legislation on the subject of trade-marks it was well settled that when any one adopted a mark so closely resembling the trade-mark of the plaintiff as to be likely to be mistaken for it, the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction to restrain the use of such mark. Fraud on the public to the detriment of the plaintiff was the foundation of the right to damages at common law: per Lord Blackburn in Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Loog 8 App. Cas. 29(2); but as long as 1833 it was decided in Millington v. Fox, 3 My. & Cr. 338,(3), that intentional deceit was not essential to warrant the court in granting an injunction. The Court will interfere to protect a plaintiff if ordinary or unwary purchasers are likely to be misled and to mistake the defendant's goods for the plaintiffs” (per Lindley, L.J).
The House of Lords sub-nom Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Company v. Powel, (1897) A.C 710,(4), unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
What the plaintiff has to prove to succeed in getting temporary (and later a permanent) injunction is that he has acquired the exclusive right by usage of the trade-mark “Wearwell” for the sale of cycles made by it. As observed in Salmond on Torts, 12th Edition, at page 662, regarding the basis of passing off action :
“The Court have wavered between two conceptions of a passing-off action—as a remedy for the invasion of a quasi-proprietary right in a trade name or trade mark, as a remedy, analogous to the action on the case for deceit, for invasion of the personal right not to be injured by fraudulent competition. It has recently been said that “the true basis of the action is that the passing off… injuries the right of property in the plaintiff, that right of property being his right to the goodwill of his business.” In general the violation of a right to property is actionable, even though it is innocent and though no damage has been proved. At common law it was necessary to prove an actual fraudulent intention, but a different view was taken in equity, and since the Judicature Act it has been generally accepted that it is not necessary in an action for passing off to prove fraud—that is to say, an intent to deceive. It is sufficient in all cases to prove that the practice complained of is calculated (that is to say, likely) to deceive”.
The first question, therefore, is whether the exclusive use of this trade-mark by the plaintiff for 12 years resulting in the sale of cycles worth Rs. 3 crores and advertising expenditure of Rs. 4 lakhs is sufficient to associate this trade-mark so closely with the cycles made by the plaintiff as to become the part of the good-will of the plaintiff's business. It is only then that a proprietary right to the trade-mark can be claimed by the plaintiff. Taking into account the fact that industrialisation has spread in our country comparatively recently and that too after independence, the above mentioned period and volume of business should be regarded as sufficient for the proof of the plaintiff's claim. In Reddaway v. Banham, (1896) A.C 199, (5), Reddaway had been making a belting, which he called Camel Hair Belting for about 12 years before Banham began to use the same name for the Camel Hair Belting, which he also started to make. As the words “Camel Hair Belting” were merely descriptive words which may be as truly applied to the belting made by Raddaway as to the belting made by Banham or any one else, a strong burden of proof rested on Reddaway to show that he had acquired the exclusive right to the use of those words. The 12 years' user was held sufficient for the acquisition of such a right by the House of Lords. In the case before us, the word “Wearwell” is not a descriptive word, and, therefore, is more easily capable of being appropriated.
Section 27(2) of the Trade & Merchandise Mark, 1958 expressly states that nothing in the said Act shall affect rights of action against any person for passing off goods, as the goods of another person or the remedies in respect thereof. In Kaviraj Pandit Durgdatt Sharma v. Navratna Pharmaceutical Laboratory, AIR 1965 SC 1980, (6) the Supreme Court also pointed out that an action of passing off is a common law remedy distinct from an action for infringement of a registered trade-mark. The common law remedy was in substance an action for deceit, i.e a passing off by a person of his own goods as those of another. No fraudulent intention on the part of defendant-respondents is to be proved. All that is to be proved by the plaintiff is that the use of the word “Wearwell” by the defendant in selling their own cycles was likely to deceive purchasers into thinking that these cycles are made by the same person who have hitherto been using the trade-mark “Wearwell”. Nor is it necessary for the plaintiff to prove that actual damage was caused to him by the imitation of his goods by the defendants. The law assumes that the presence in the market of a quantity of deceptive goods will have an adverse effect upon the plaintiffs business. The plaintiff is, therefore, without proof of damage entitled to damages (Draper v. Twist, (1939) 3 All England Reports 513 (7), and the Editorial note below the head note of the case. It is not even necessary that the purchaser should know that the plaintiff-company is the maker of the “Wearwell” cycles or that their factory is situated in Faridabad. Even actual deception is not to be proved. The likelihood of customers being deceived is sufficient. Moreover it is not necessary to prove that there was any actual likelihood of deception of immediate purchasers. The manufacturer must not release upon the market products which are calculated to deceive the ultimate consuming public even though the retailer who is the immediate purchaser from the manufacturer is not misled. Lastly, the test for determining is whether deception was probably the first impression likely to be produced on the casual and unwary customer and it is no answer that an observant person making a careful examination would not be misled.
The last observation brings us to the question whether the use of the word “Wearwell” by the defendants results in the likelihood of deception of the ultimate purchasers. The monogram used by the defendants was so similar to the monogram used by the plaintiff that it was difficult to distinguish one from the other. Andley, J., in this Court has, therefore, already passed an order on 29-5-1967 prohibiting the defendant-respondents from using this monogram which is exclusively associated with the plaintiff's cycles. The word “Wearwell” with its English ancestry invokes an image of certain quality in the minds of the intending purchaser. By 12 years' user and sale of cycles under the said name in large numbers, the plaintiff-company has acquired the right to the benefit of the use of this trade-mark. The defendants cannot, now, so late in the day, be allowed to use the same name. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondents showed me a small metal plate which is affixed to their cycles to show that they are made under a licence from the English Company. The question is whether this is sufficient to distinguish the defendant-respondents' cycles from the plaintiff's cycles when both are using the trade name “Wearwell”. Firstly, the metal plate is too small and may not be observed by most of the purchasers. Secondly, it does not distinguish the defendant's cycles from the plaintiffs cycles inasmuch as the original reason why the plaintiff company started making cycles under the trade-name “Wearwell” is the same, viz. the agreement of the English Company with the promotors of the Indian Company. The Indian Company can, therefore, say with more justification than the defendants that the cycles are made by it in view of the agreement by its promotors with the English Company. Lastly, the defendants do not have any licence from the English Company, for the use of this trade name. On the whole, therefore, there is nothing to show that the trading style of the defendant-respondents as used on the cycles made by them is sufficiently distinct from the one used by the plaintiff to avoid confusion in the minds of the customers. On the contrary, the customer usually knows the word “Wearwell” as it is that word alone which is associated with a particular make of cycles. The customers do not know whether the manufacture of such cycles is under a licence from the English Company or whether these cycles are manufactured in Faridabad (where the factory of the plaintiff is situated) or in Ludhiana (where the business of the defendants is carried on). So long, therefore, as the defendants are allowed to use the word “Wearwell” on their cycles, the ordinary customer would think that they are the Wearwell cycles known to the public under that trade name. It must be held, therefore, that the use of the word “Wearwell” by the defendants is likely to mislead the public into thinking that the defendants' cycles are the same Wearwell cycles which have been known to the public by that name from 1954 to 1966. As the imitation of this trade mark by the defendants is very recent, there is absolutely no reason why the defendants should be allowed to continue its use. The defendants have to establish their own reputation independently of the reputation of the plaintiff. They can, therefore, use any other trade name, which will not be an invasion of the proprietary rights of the plaintiff or of any other maker of cycles. The defendants must try to become known on their own. No prejudice would, therefore, be caused to the defendants if they are prohibited from using the word “Wearwell” on their cycles. It is for them to use some other word or label, which will, in course of time, become known to the public as their exclusive trade-mark. Since they have no right to use the word “Wearwell” it cannot be said that the prohibition of its use by them would result in the destruction of their business. Their business does not rest on the use of this trade name. Nor is there any question of balance of convenience between the parties. For the right to use the trade name is in the plaintiff alone and it cannot be said, therefore, that any inconvenience can be caused to the defendants by their being prohibited from using the name.
For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed. The order of the learned Additional District Judge is set aside and pending the decision of the suit the defendant-respondents are prohibited from using the word “Wearwell” in the name of their business and as a mark on the cycles made and sold by them. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs of this appeal.
A.N.K Order accordingly.
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