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Indian Wood Products Co. Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi And Others

Delhi High Court
Feb 1, 1968
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 220‑D & 221‑D of 1962

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a manufacturing company with a factory at Izatnagar (Uttar Pradesh) that produced goods (described as "Katha", "Cutch", etc.). Contracts for sale to buyers in several places (including Delhi) were entered into through the petitioner's offices (notably the Delhi office) and the head office at Calcutta instructed the Izatnagar factory to despatch goods f.o.r. Izatnagar to customers' places of business. When goods were ready they were appropriated by the factory to the relevant contracts and despatched by rail. Railway receipts were taken in the petitioner's name as consignor and "self" as consignee; these receipts were forwarded to the petitioner's territorial offices (e.g., Delhi office), which prepared bills, collected payments, endorsed railway receipts and delivered them to purchasers while the goods were in transit.

For the assessment period 1‑7‑1957 to 31‑3‑1958 the petitioner submitted returns and paid sales tax in Uttar Pradesh (to Sales Tax Officer, Bareilly) for its sales including those to Delhi. The Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi, nonetheless assessed the petitioner to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act for the same Delhi transactions and raised a demand of Rs. 14,870.08p. The petitioner challenged the New Delhi assessment by filing these writ petitions (220‑D and 221‑D of 1962), seeking quashing of the New Delhi order without first pursuing the statutory appellate remedies. The Court confined its attention primarily to Civil Writ No. 220‑D of 1962, the facts of which were agreed to govern the other petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the place where the sale is "effected" for inter‑State sales of unascertained goods under Section 4(2)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act depends on the location of the goods at the time of their appropriation to the contract (and, if so, how to determine that place).
  2. Whether the Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi, had jurisdiction to assess and demand tax when the petitioner had already paid the tax for those transactions in Uttar Pradesh.
  3. Whether the Sales Tax Officer's order was lawful when it did not make a clear finding as to the place of appropriation (i.e., whether appropriation occurred in Uttar Pradesh or Delhi), a factual determination material to jurisdiction and the correct taxing State.
  4. Whether the writ petition should be dismissed for failure to pursue alternative remedies available under the Act (i.e., whether this Court should decline writ relief because statutory appeals/remedies were not exhausted).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that the sales should be deemed to have been effected inside Uttar Pradesh because the goods were within Uttar Pradesh at the time of appropriation to the contracts (relying on Section 4(2)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act).
  • The petitioner submitted returns and paid the full sales tax demand in Uttar Pradesh; under Section 9 the tax is payable only once and cannot be collected again by another State (here, Delhi).
  • The petitioner asserted that the goods were appropriated to the contracts in Uttar Pradesh (the factory at Izatnagar had "unconditionally appropriated" the goods to the contracts, and railway receipts were taken in the petitioner's name and forwarded to territorial offices which completed sale formalities while goods were in transit).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents accepted that the sales were inter‑State in character (Section 3) but argued that "delivery f.o.r Izatnagar" simply meant the purchasers bore the freight; it did not establish appropriation in Uttar Pradesh.
  • They denied unconditional appropriation in Uttar Pradesh, asserting that appropriation occurred in Delhi when the petitioner's Delhi office endorsed railway receipts in favour of purchasers against payment and prepared bills in Delhi.
  • The respondents contended that because the appropriate State entitled to tax was Delhi, Uttar Pradesh could not validly collect the tax for those transactions and that New Delhi Sales Tax Officer therefore had jurisdiction to assess.
  • On jurisdictional procedure they argued the writ petition should be dismissed because alternative statutory remedies (appeal/review) under the Act were not pursued by the petitioner before approaching the Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., Bombay v. S.R. Sarkar, (1960) 11 STC 655 The Supreme Court held (as quoted in the opinion) that:
  • A transaction of sale is subject to tax on completion of the sale; a mere contract is not a sale under Section 2(g).
  • Section 3(a) and Section 3(b) must be read so that they are mutually exclusive; Clause (b) covers sales effected by transfer of documents of title during movement from one State to another.
  • Only a sale effected by transfer of documents of title during movement (between the termini defined in Explanation 1) falls within Clause (b).
  • Section 4(2) assists in locating the place where a sale is effected (not merely defining "outside sales").
The Court relied on the Tata Iron principles to interpret Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act, to explain the meaning and scope of Clause (b) of Section 3, and to frame the inquiry as to the place where the sale was effected (particularly for inter‑State sales by transfer of documents during movement). The opinion accepts the Tata Iron exposition as authoritative guidance for this statutory interpretation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court set out the statutory scheme (quoting Sections 2, 3, 4 and 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act) and accepted for the purpose of decision the Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi's finding that the transactions were inter‑State sales within Clause (b) of Section 3 (i.e., effected by transfer of documents of title during movement from Uttar Pradesh to Delhi).

Given that finding, the Court explained the following analytical steps, based strictly on the opinion:

  1. Identify the appropriate State for levy: For inter‑State sales falling within Clause (b) of Section 3, the place where the sale is effected determines the appropriate State (by reference to Explanation to Section 2(a) and Section 4(2)).
  2. Determine which subsection of Section 4 applies: The goods in question were admitted to be unascertained; consequently Section 4(2)(b) applies — the place of sale depends on the location of the goods at the time of their appropriation to the contract of sale.
  3. Interpret "appropriation": The Court analysed the term "appropriation" and concluded (from the text of the statute and context) that Section 4(2)(b) does not require the kind of "unconditional appropriation" described in the Sale of Goods Act (Section 23). The Court observed that "appropriation" under Section 4(2)(b) denotes the setting apart of goods as specific goods to be delivered under the contract and need not be linked to the passing of property.
  4. Apply that interpretation to the record: The Court noted that the Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi, although finding the sales to be inter‑State under Section 3(b), did not make a clear finding on where the appropriation occurred — i.e., whether the goods had been appropriated in Uttar Pradesh or in Delhi.
  5. Conclude on jurisdictional sufficiency: The Court held that without a definite finding as to the place of appropriation (a fact material to determining the place of sale and hence the appropriate taxing State), the Sales Tax Officer could not properly assume jurisdiction to levy or collect the sales tax.
  6. Address the plea of alternative remedy: The respondents argued that writ jurisdiction should not be invoked because of available alternate statutory remedies. The Court acknowledged the usual reluctance to exercise writ jurisdiction where alternative remedies exist, but held that the existence of alternate remedies did not oust the Court's jurisdiction. Given the circumstances (notably that the petitioner had already paid tax in Uttar Pradesh and that there was no firm finding as to appropriation), the Court declined to dismiss the petition on that ground.

The Court therefore based its decision not on re‑evaluating the facts as such but on the legal deficiency in the Sales Tax Officer's order — the absence of a clear, determinative finding on the place of appropriation required to establish jurisdiction to tax.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions are allowed and the orders of the Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi, are quashed. The parties are to bear their own costs. It is, however, open to the Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi, to make a fresh order if that course is permissible in law.

Implications (direct and as stated in the opinion):

  • Direct effect on the parties: The New Delhi assessment and demand (Rs. 14,870.08p) are quashed; the petitioner, who had already paid the tax in Uttar Pradesh, will not be burdened (by this order) with a second levy absent a lawful fresh determination.
  • Jurisdictional principle applied: An assessing officer must make a clear factual finding about the place of appropriation (where that fact determines the place where sale is effected) before assuming jurisdiction to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act.
  • Alternate remedies: The Court exercised writ jurisdiction despite available statutory remedies because of the particular circumstances — notably the prior payment of tax and the absence of a firm finding on a material issue affecting jurisdiction. The opinion does not assert that this outcome establishes a broad rule against seeking statutory remedies; it relies on the case circumstances.
  • Precedential impact: The opinion applies statutory interpretation and established authority (as cited, e.g., Tata Iron) to the facts; the Court did not purport to lay down new law beyond the application of those principles to the procedural and factual deficiencies in the New Delhi order.

Outcome recorded in the judgment: "Petitions allowed." (Order quashing New Delhi Sales Tax Officer's assessment; liberty to make a fresh order if permitted by law.)

Show all summary ...

1. This judgment will dispose of Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 220-D of 1962 and 221-D of 1962. I am confining myself to the facts of Civil Writ No. 220-D of 1962 as the learned counsel agree that the decision in this case will govern the other matter. The petitioner-company alleges in the petition that it manufactures “Katha”, “Cutch”, etc., in its factory at Izatnagar within the State of Uttar Pradesh; that under the contracts made with parties in Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Delhi, tor sale the goods are delivered f.o.r Izatnagar and are despatched from Izatnagar to customer's place of business; that instructions are sent by the petitioner's head office in Calcutta to its factory at Izatnagar to despatch the goods in terms of the agreements for sale. When the goods are ready, they are “Unconditionally appropriated” by the petitioner's factory to the respective contracts and are thereafter despatched by rail direct to the customer's place of business; that the relative Railway Receipts are taken in the name of the petitioner as Consignor and “self” as consignee. The railway receipts are sent to the respective offices of the petitioner in the territories from where the orders emanate. Such offices of the petitioner prepara bills, collect payments and endorse the railway receipts and deliver them to the customers when the goods are in the course of movement; that during the assessment period 1957–58 (i.e 1-7-1957 to 31-3-1958) the petitioner through its Delhi office entered into agreements with customers for sale to them of its products manufactured at its factory at Izatnagar in the State of Uttar Pradesh; that the agreements in all those cases provided for delivery f.o.r Izatnagar and also contained instructions for despatch of the goods to customer's place of business at Delhi; that instructions were then issued by the petitioner's head office in Calcutta to its factory at Izatnagar to despatch the goods to the customer's place of business at Delhi; that when the goods were made ready, the factory at Izatnagar “unconditionally appropriated” the same to the contracts and despatched them by rail to Delhi; that the goods were booked in the name of the petitioner as the consignor and “self” as consignee, and that the railway receipts were then sent to the petitioner's Delhi office which prepared bills, collected payments and endorsed the railway receipts in favour of the purchasers and delivered the receipts to them, while the goods were in the course of the movement.

2. It is not in dispute that the sales in question to various parties in Delhi were sales in the course of inter-State trade and commerce within Section 3 of the Central Sales Tax Act. In the counter affidavit the respondents admit that the relevant sale agreements were entered into by the petitioner at Delhi through its Delhi office for supply of goods manufactured at Petitioner's factory at Izatnagar. The respondents, however, maintain that delivery f.o.r Izatnagar simply meant that freight from Izatnagar to Delhi was to be borne by the purchasers. The respondents deny that there was any “unconditional appropriation” of goods to the contract in Uttar Pradesh and say that “they were appropriated to contracts only when railway receipts representing title to them were endorsed by the petitioner's office at Delhi in favour of the purchasers against payments made by the latter at Delhi to the petitioner. The bills for the goods were also prepared at Delhi”. The petitioner submitted returns to the Sales Tax Officer, Bareilly in the State of Uttar Pradesh under the Central Sales Tax Act tor all its sales throughout India including Delhi Sales and the said Sales Tax Officer Bareilly assessed the petitioner to tax also with respect to transactions of sale made to parties in Delhi and the petitioner paid the entire tax demand for the said period to the Sales Tax Authorities in Uttar Pradesh.

3. It is admitted by the respondents in their counter-affidavit that the petitioner has paid the entire tax due on the transactions in question in Uttar Pradesh but the respondents claim that the appropriate State entitled to levy and collect tax being Delhi, the State of Uttar Pradesh could not collect tax on the transactions in question. In paragraph 8 of the petition it is stated, inter alia, that the goods were “appropriated to the contracts” for sale in Uttar Pradesh. The respondents in their counter affidavit assert that the goods were, in fact, “appropriated” to the contracts in Delhi. Although the petitioners have paid the entire sales tax demand with respect to the transaction in question in Uttar Pradesh, still by order dated 28th March, 1962, the Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi, assessed the petitioner to sales tax under the Central Sales Tax Act with respect to the same transactions and raised a demand for Rupees 14,870-08 P.

4. Before the Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi, the petitioner raised the same very contentions as have been raised in this petition, and mentioned hereinbefore. One of the contentions raised by the petitioner may be reproduced from the order of the Sales Tax officer. That was—

“The assessees have contended that the Central Sales Tax is to be deposited in the State where the sales took place and Section 4 of the Central Sales Tax Act determines the place of sale; that according to the aforesaid Section their sales should be deemed to have taken place inside U.P and outside other States because the goods were within U.P at the time of appropriation under a contract of sale effected with their purchasers who give their assent to their appropriation by virtue of their accepting the goods; that Section 3(b) contemplates cases of sale after first sale while Sec. 4(2)(b) takes into account those sales where the goods were appropriated to a contract; that their sales were governed by Section 3(a) and the tax was payable in U.P”

5. It is apparent, therefore, that one of the contentions raised before the Sales Tax Authority Delhi was that the goods had been “appropriated” to contract in Uttar Pradesh. The Sales Tax Officer held:—

“I have carefully considered the arguments of the assessees. The Supreme Court in the above cited case held that a transaction of sale is subject to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 on the completion of the sale and the mere contract of sale is not a sale within the definition under Section 2(g). In the judgment the Court had given directions that the Officer had to ascertain before he could order payment of tax under the Act that on the materials he was satisfied (a) that the goods at the time of transfer of documents of title were in movement from the State of U.P to the State of West Bengal and (b) that the place where the sale was effected was under Sec. 4(2) within the State of West Bengal. It has been admitted that the goods at the time of transfer of documents to the title were in movement from the State of U.P to the Union territory of Delhi. Farther from the course of transactions viz., entering into agreements with the customers at Delhi, forwarding the agreements to the Head Office at Calcutta for execution, sending the goods consigned to self and effecting transfer of documents against payments at Delhi, it is quite manifest that the place of sale was Delhi.

In view of the above, I hold that the transactions were in the nature of inter-State sales contemplated by Clause (b) of Section 3 as being effected by transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movements from one State to another at Delhi and are accordingly assessable to Delhi Central Sales Tax”.

6. From the above, it clearly appears that the Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi, took the view that the transactions were in the nature of inter-State sales as contemplated by Clause (b) of Section 3, having been effected when the goods were in movement from Uttar Pradesh to Delhi. He, however, gave no clear finding as to whether the goods were or were not appropriated” to the contract in Uttar Pradesh. Aggrieved by the order of the Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi, the petitioner filed the present writ petition, praying for the quashing of the same without taking recourse to the alternative remedy by way of appeal etc., provided in the Act and one of the objections taken on behalf of the respondents is that failure to take recourse to such remedies is fatal to the petition. It is necessary to read the relevant provisions of the Act then in force:—

“Section 2. In this Act unless the context otherwise requires—

(a) “appropriate State” means—

(i) in relation to a dealer who has one or more places of business situated in the same State, that State;

(ii) in relation to a dealer who has one or more places of business situate in different States, every such State with respect to the place or places of business situate within its territory;

Explanation — “Place of business” means:

(i) in the case of a sale of goods in the course of inter-State trade or commerce falling within Clause (a) of Section 3, the place from which the goods have been moved by reason of such sale;

(ii) in the case of such sale falling within Clause (b) of Section 3, the place where the sale is effected”.

“Section 3. A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce if the sale or purchase—

(a) occasions the movement of goods from one State to another; or

(b) is effected by a transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement from one State to another.

Explanation 1. Where the goods are delivered to a carrier or other bailee for transmission, the movement of the goods shall, for the purposes of Clause (b), be deemed to commence at the time of such delivery and terminate at the time when delivery is taken from such carrier or bailee.

Explanation 2. Where the movement of goods commences and terminates in the same State it shall not be deemed to be a movement of goods from one State to another by reason ???rely of the fact that in the course of such ???vement the goods pass through the territory any other State”.

“Section 4. (1) Subject to the provisions contained in section 3, when a sale or purchase of goods is determined in accordance with subsection (2) to take place inside a State, such sale or purchases shall be deemed to have taken place outside all other States.

(2) A sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to take place inside a State if the goods are within the State—

(a) in the case of specific or ascertained goods, at the time of the contract of sale is made; and

(b) in the case of unascertained or future goods, at the time of their appropriation to the contract of sale by the seller or by the buyer, whether assent of the other party is prior or subsequent to such appropriation.

Explanation - Where there is a single contract of sale or purchase of goods situated at ???nore places than one, the provisions of this sub-section shall apply as if there were separate contracts in respect of the goods at each such sale”

“Section 9. (1) The tax payable by any dealer under this Act shall be levied and collected in the appropriate State by the Government of India, in the manner provided in sub-section (2)

(2) The authorities for the time being empowered to assess, collect and enforce payment of any tax under the general sales tax law of the appropriate State shall, on behalf of the Government of India and subject to any rules made under this Act, assess, collect and enforce payment of any tax payable by a dealer under this Act in the same manner as the tax on the sale or purchase of goods under the general sales tax law of the State is assessed, paid or collected; and for this purpose they may exercise all or any of the powers they have under the general sales tax law of the State; and the provisions of such law, including provisions relating to returns, appeals, reviews, revisions, references, penalties, and compounding or offences shall apply accordingly.

(3) The proceeds (reduced by the cost of collection) in any financial year of any tax levied and collected under this Act in any State on behalf of the Government of India, shall, except insofar as those proceeds represent proceeds attributable to Union territories, be assigned to that State and shall be retained by it; and the proceeds attributable to Union territories shall form part of the Consolidated Fund of India”

7. Mr. Ashok Sen, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that under Section 9, the tax was payable only once, though it had to be collected by the Government of India, “in the appropriate State” and having paid the tax in Uttar Pradesh. Delhi could not on proper interpretation of the Act lew and/or collect it over again. These very provisions came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd., Bombay v. S.R Sarkar, (1960) 11 STC 655, Majority of their Lordships said—

“Sale is defined in Section 2(g) as meaning any transfer of property in goods by one person to another tor cash or for deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration and includes a transfer of goods on the hire-purchase or other system of payment by instalments, but does not include a mortgage or hypothecation of or a charge or pledge on goods. By Sec 3. a sale or purchase of goods is deemed to take place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce if the sale or purchase (a) occasions the movement of goods from one State to another, or (b) is effected by transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement from one State to another. A transaction of sale is subject to tax under the Central Sales Tax Act on the completion of the sale, and a mete contract of sale is not a sale within the definition of sale in Section 2(g). A sale being by the definition, transfer of property, becomes taxable under Section 3(a) if the movement of goods from one State to another is under a covenant or incident of the contract of sale, and the property in the goods passes to the purchaser otherwise than by transfer of documents of title when the goods are in movement from one State to another. In respect of an interstate sale, the tax is leviable only once and that indicates that the two clauses of section 3 are mutually exclusive. A sale taxable as falling within Clause (a) of Section 3, will be excluded from the purview of Clause (b) of Section 3; otherwise certain sales may be liable to tax under both the clauses and two States may in respect of a single sale, claim to levy the tax contrary to the plain intendment of Sections 8 and 9 of the Act

The sale contemplated by Clause (b) is one which is effected by transfer of documents of title to the goods during their movement from one State to another. Where the property in the goods has passed before the movement has commenced, the sale will evidently not fall within clause (b); nor will the sale in which the property in the floods passes after the movement from one State to another has ceased to be covered by the clause. Accordingly a sale effected by transfer of documents of title after the commencement of movement and before its conclusion as defined by the two termini set out in Explanation (I) and no other sale will be regarded as an inter-State sale under Section 3(b).

The view of the Supreme Court, therefore, was that within Clause (b) of Section 3 are included sales in which the property in goods passes during the movement of the goods from one State to another by transfer of documents of title thereto. It was further held that—

“We are unable to hold that any weight can be attached to the argument that if it was the object of the Legislature by enacting sub-section (2) of Section 4 to explain the expression, “where the sale is effected” as used in Clause (ii) of the Explanation to Section 2(a), the Legislature would have expressly stated so. Nor are we able to agree with the contention that Section 4 only seeks to define “outside sales” and is not intended to locate the place where a sale is effected The argument that by the application of Section 4. sub-section (2), in cases where the goods sold are unascertained or future goods, there will be difficulty in ascertaining the place where the sale is effected, has also no force”.

8. For the purposes of this decision. I will assume that the finding of the Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi, “that the transactions were interstate sales, as contemplated by Clause (b) of Section 3” is correct. If that be so, the appropriate State would be the State in which the sale is effected. That is the effect of Explanation 2 to Section 2(a). There was no controversy at the bar that the goods in question were unascertained and consequently, the place where “sale is effected” will have to be determined under Section 4(2)(b). Under the said Section 4(2)(b) the place of sale depends upon the location of the goods at the time of their appropriation to the contract of sale. It may be pointed out that Section 4(2)(b) does not require an unconditional appropriation as required by Section 23 of the Sale of Goods Act The question, therefore, arises whether under Section 4(2)(b) the location of sale depends on mere appropriation of goods to the contract of unconditional appropriation thereof. The term “appropriation” may be used in the sense that the goods are identified by the agreement of the parties as the goods about which they are contracting, so that the contract can never apply to any other goods. In other words, the goods are so far appropriated that the seller would, by delivering any other goods, break the contract though the goods still remain the seller's property. The term “appropriation” has not been defined and in the primary sense “to appropriate” is to set apart a thing with common consent as the property of a buyer and where a person is entitled to goods which form part of a larger quantity and are not earmarked and afterwards, the rest and set apart for him, they are said to be appropriated. In the other sense, it may mean a final appropriation of the goods to the contract so as to pass the property therein to the buyer. Consequently, when goods are selected with the common consent of the parties there may be appropriation of the goods to the contract even though the property has not passed. The scheme of the Sales Tax Act goes to show that the Parliament left out of account the element of passing of property as of any relevance in determining the situs of sale and the question of appropriation of goods has to be decided irrespective of the passing of property.

9. In other words, the appropriation referred to in Section 4(2)(b) connotes the setting apart of goods as specific goods to be delivered under the contract of sale and not an appropriation linked with passing of property. The term ‘unconditional appropriation existed in the Sale of Goods Act years before the enactment of the Central Sales Tax Act, and if the Parliament intended to convey the same idea, the Parliament would not have omitted the word “unconditionally” in Section 4(2)(b).

10. In the petition as well as in the counter-affidavit emphasis has been mainly laid on “unconditional appropriation” of the goods to contract in Uttar Pradesh, but from the contentions of the assessee raised before the Sale Tax Officer. New Delhi, which have bee quoted above, it does appear that the petitioner had argued that the goods were appropriated to the contract in Uttar Pradesh. The findings given by the Sales Tax Officer. New Delhi, are quite consistent with “appropriation of goods” in Uttar Pradesh. He has given no clear finding that the goods were appropriated to the contract as distinguished from “unconditionally appropriated” in Delhi. Without that finding the Sales Tax Officer could not assume jurisdiction to levy or collect the sales tax. Mr. Kirpal, the learned counsel for the respondents, contended that these intricate questions of fact should not be determined in the exercise of writ jurisdiction and the petition should be dismissed on the short ground of the petitioners' failure to avail themselves of the alternate remedies.

11. I am not going into or interfering with any finding of fact as my decision is based on the failure of the Sales Tax Officer to give a finding about fee place of appropriation of goods. So far as the alternate remedy is concerned, it does not affect the jurisdiction of this Court, though normally, the Courts would be reluctant to interfere in the writ jurisdiction when alternate remedies are available.

12. Having regard, however, to the circumstances of this case, namely,

(a) the petitioner has already paid the tax due on these transactions in Uttar Pradesh and without a firm finding, it would be unjust to burden the petitioner with the levy a second time; and

(b) the Sales Tax Officer had no jurisdiction to assess the petitioner to tax without giving a finding as to the place where sale was effected, on proper application of law,

13. I am not inclined to dismiss this petition on the ground of the existence of alternate remedy.

14. In these circumstances, these petitions are allowed and the orders of the Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi, quashed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. It will, however, be open to the Sales Tax Officer, New Delhi, to make fresh order if that course be permissible in law.

15. GGM/D.V.CPetitions allowed.