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Roop Narain Goela And Others Petitioners v. Smt. Krishna Devi Bagadia
Factual and Procedural Background
Krishna Devi Bagadia, the landlord, filed a petition for eviction against the appellants, who were in possession of a house. The eviction was sought under section 14(1)(b) and (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, on the grounds that the tenant Roop Narain Goela had sublet or otherwise parted with possession of the premises without the landlord's written consent and had built another house elsewhere. The Additional Rent Controller allowed the eviction petition on February 22, 1968. The appellants appealed to the Rent Control Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal in limine on March 11, 1968. The appellants then filed a second appeal in this Court, focusing solely on whether a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary to terminate the tenancy before eviction proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary to terminate a statutory tenancy before initiating eviction proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
- Whether the tenant Roop Narain Goela was a statutory tenant requiring no such notice for eviction.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants contended that two factors defeated the status of the tenancy as statutory: (1) the landlord had been regularly accepting rent after the tenancy allegedly ended on June 20, 1958; and (2) the landlord never informed the tenant that his tenancy was statutory.
- They argued that for monthly tenancies, a new tenancy arises upon expiry of each month and thus a notice under the Transfer of Property Act should be given before eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act.
- They relied on precedents such as Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai and Manujendra Dutt v. Purnedu Prosad Roy Chowdhury and others to support the necessity of such notice.
Respondent's (Landlord's) Arguments
- The landlord asserted that no notice was required because the tenancy was statutory, having originally been for 11 months and ended by efflux of time on June 20, 1958.
- It was alleged that the tenant was a statutory tenant entitled to protection under the Rent Control Act, and the appellants did not deny this in their written statement.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das and others | Acceptance of rent from a statutory tenant after expiry of contractual tenancy does not create a new tenancy requiring notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. | The Court relied on this precedent to hold that Roop Narain Goela was a statutory tenant and no fresh tenancy was created by rent acceptance. |
| Kai Khushroo v. Bai Jerbai | Tenants under Rent Restriction Acts enjoy statutory immunity from eviction even after lease expiry; acceptance of rent does not create new tenancy. | Approved by the Supreme Court and applied to confirm that rent acceptance does not amount to a new tenancy. |
| Pooran Chand v. Motilal and others | Where tenancy expires by efflux of time, no statutory notice under Transfer of Property Act is required. | Supported the Court's conclusion that no notice under section 106 was necessary before eviction. |
| Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai | Interpretation of section 12(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act regarding tenancy termination and notice. | Referenced by appellants but the Court did not express opinion on its applicability to Delhi Rent Control Act. |
| Manujendra Dutt v. Purnedu Prosad Roy Chowdhury and others | Interpretation of Calcutta Thika Tenancy Acts concerning tenancy termination and notice. | Referenced by appellants but the Court refrained from expressing opinion on its relevance to the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the nature of the tenancy, finding that Roop Narain Goela was a statutory tenant whose original contractual tenancy had expired by efflux of time. It applied the principle from Ganga Dutt Murarka that acceptance of rent from a statutory tenant after expiry of the original lease does not create a new contractual tenancy. The Court rejected the appellants' argument that continued rent payments or lack of landlord's intimation destroyed the statutory tenancy status. It further held that statutory protection under the Rent Control Act means no notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is required to terminate the tenancy before eviction proceedings. The Court declined to disturb the factual findings of the Rent Control Tribunal and Additional Rent Controller that the tenant was statutory. Arguments concerning monthly tenancy and reliance on other jurisdictional precedents were deemed unnecessary to decide given the statutory tenancy status.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed.
The Court upheld the eviction order without requiring a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, confirming that statutory tenants under the Delhi Rent Control Act do not need such notice for termination. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs. No new precedent was established beyond affirming settled law concerning statutory tenancy and notice requirements in eviction proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act.
S.K Kapur, J.:— Krishna Devi Bagadia, the landlord of the House in question, filed a petition for eviction against the appellants. Eviction was claimed under section 14(1)(b) and (h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and by order dated February 22, 1968, the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, allowed the petition on the grounds that tenant Roop Narain Goela had sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the premises in dispute in favour of Mangey Ram and Parkash Chand, appellants No. 2 and 3 respectively, without the written consent of the landlord and that tenant Roop Narain Goela had built a residential house in Greater Kailash, New Delhi. The appellants filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi, which was dismissed on March 11, 1968, in limine. From the order of the Tribunal it appears that the only question raised by the appellants was about the necessity of a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy before taking proceedings for eviction under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The appellants have filed the present second appeal in this Court against the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated March 11, 1968, and their learned counsel confined his arguments only to the point whether or not notice under section 106 was necessary.
Both the Rent Control Tribunal and the Additional Rent Controller recorded a finding that the first appellant (tenant) being a statutory tenant no notice terminating the tenancy was necessary. In paragraph 18(b) of the petition it has been alleged by the landlord that “no notice is required. The tenancy was initially for a period of 11 months, which came to end on the expiry of the said period on 20th June, 1958. The respondent No. 1 is a statutory tenant. There is no specific denial of this assertion in the written-statement. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that two important factors were completely destructive of the tenancy being a statutory one—
(1) Although the tenancy is alleged to have come to end on the 20th June, 1958, yet the landlord had been regularly accepting rent; and
(2) the landlord had never intimated the tenant that his tenancy was a statutory one.
In Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das and others, (1) it was held that where a contractual tenancy to which the rent control legislation applies has come to an end by efflux of time or by determination by notice to quit and the tenant continues in possession of the premises, acceptance of rent from the tenant by the landlord after the expiration or determination of the contractual tenancy will not afford ground for holding that the landlord has assented to a new contractual tenancy. The following observations of B.K Mukherjea, J., (as His Lordship then was) in Kai Khushroo v. Bai Jerbai, (2) approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ganga Dutt's case :
“…in cases of tenancies relating to dwelling houses to which the Rent Restriction Acts apply, the tenant may enjoy a statutory immunity from eviction even after the lease has expired. The landlord cannot eject him except on specified grounds mentioned in the Acts themselves. In such circumstances, acceptance “of rent by the landlord from a statutory tenant whose lease has already expired could not be regarded as evidence of a new agreement of tenancy and it would not be open to such a tenant to urge, by way of defence, in a suit for ejectment brought against him under the provisions of Rent Restriction Act that by acceptance of rent a fresh tenancy was created which had to be determined by a fresh notice to quit.”
It, therefore, stands finally settled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that mere acceptance of rent from a statutory tenant is not sufficient to show that a fresh tenancy was created. There is nothing more in this case beyond the payment of rent. As a matter of fact, the tenant did not in his statement even allege that a new tenancy had, after the expiry of the original tenancy, come into being. Mere continuance in possession for a long period under a statutory protection, the second factor relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants also does not have the effect of creating a fresh tenancy. It must, in the circumstances, be held that Roop Narain Goela was only a statutory tenant.
The matter may be looked at from another point of view. The Additional Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal have recorded a finding of fact that Roop Narain Goela was only a statutory tenant. It is not open to us to disturb that finding in an appeal under section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
That takes me to the next question as to whether a notice terminating the tenancy was required. In Ganga Dutt's case it was observed—
“The tenancy of the appellant was determined by efflux of time and subsequent occupation by him was not in pursuance of any contract express or implied, but was by virtue of the protection given by the successive statutes. This occupation did not confer any rights upon the appellant and was not required to be determined by a notice prescribed by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.”
Again, in Pooran Chand v. Motilal and others, (3) it was held that where the term of tenancy had expired by efflux of time no question of statutory notice could arise. On the facts of this case it must, in the result, be held that no notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy was required. The learned counsel for the appellants said that in case of the monthly tenancies if a tenant continues in occupation a new tenancy springs upon the expiry of every month and the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act being supplementary to the Transfer of Property Act, a notice ought to have been given terminating the tenancy before proceeding for eviction. In view of the answer recorded by me herein-before that Roop Narain Goela was a statutory tenant, this question does not survive and need not be answered. I may just mention that in support of the argument that a notice terminating the tenancy was necessary, the learned counsel for the appellants had relied on Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed v. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai , (4) in which decision section 12(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act (57 of 1947) fell for consideration, and Manujendra Dutt v. Purnedu Prosad Roy Chowdhury and others, (5) in which the statutes under consideration were the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act (2 of 1949) and the Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Amendment) Act (6 of 1953). I need not, however, express any opinion as to whether or not those decisions govern the interpretation of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed but, in the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.
Inder Dev Dua, C.J—I agree
A.N.K Appeal dismissed.
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