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A.N Seth v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Patiala
Structured Summary of the Opinion (A.N. Seth — Income-Tax Reference)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal (Delhi Bench 'B') referred two questions of law to this Court under section 66(1) of the Income-Tax Act, 1922. The reference arose from assessment years 1949–50 and 1950–51 (previous years ending March 31, 1949 and March 31, 1950) in respect of the assessee, A.N. Seth.
Brief factual matrix as stated in the opinion:
- From 1938 the assessee and his father-in-law formed a partnership (M/s. Sonepat Electric Supply) and obtained leases and an electricity licence to operate in Sonepat. A limited company (M/s. Sonepat Light, Power and General Mills Limited) was floated in 1940 and the firm transferred and re-transferred assets to and from that company between 1941 and 1944 in relation to licensing permissions.
- Negotiations for purchase of municipal land commenced about March 1941. The assessee purchased, in his own name, land measuring 48 bighas and 5 biswas from the municipality on September 13, 1946 for Rs. 3,015. He surveyed, prepared and obtained municipal approval for a lay-out plan (approved June 23, 1948), parceled the land into plots, developed the area and sold plots.
- During the relevant previous years, the assessee sold plots to about 88 parties for aggregate consideration of Rs. 60,292; about Rs. 16,150 of sales was to the company.
- The Income-Tax Officer treated surplus profit from those sales as taxable business income (computing surplus profits and assessing them). The Appellate Assistant Commissioner reversed that view, treating the amounts as capital accretions because he found the purchase was made as a capital asset and initial intention to resell for profit was absent.
- The Revenue appealed to the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, which, by majority (Judicial Member and Accountant Member disagreed on initial intention but agreed sales were for profit at time of sale), allowed the Revenue appeals and held the profits taxable as income from an adventure in the nature of trade.
- The assessee moved the Tribunal to refer two questions of law to this Court; the Tribunal consolidated and made the present reference.
Legal Issues Presented
- Was the profit arising from the sale of lands liable to Income-Tax on the ground that the transactions in the lands were in the nature of business transactions?
- Was the order of the Tribunal vitiated because the Members did not refer their difference of opinion (as to the intention at the time of purchase) to a third Member?
Arguments of the Parties
Assessee's Arguments
- The assessee contended before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the surplus amounts realized from sale of plots were accretions to capital (capital gains) and not taxable as business income or income from other sources.
- The assessee asserted that the purchase was made as a capital investment and that any subsequent motive to sell was not relevant to convert the transaction into trade for taxing purposes (as accepted by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner).
Revenue / Income-Tax Authorities' Position
- The Income-Tax Officer treated the surplus profits from the sales as taxable income from trade (an adventure in the nature of trade) and assessed the amounts accordingly.
- The Revenue appealed against the Appellate Assistant Commissioner’s deletions; before the Tribunal the Revenue succeeded on the basis that the assessee’s conduct (development and organized sale of plots) showed dealings in the nature of trade and the profits were taxable.
Tribunal Members' Views (as recited in the opinion)
- Judicial Member: Held that even at the time of purchase the assessee's intention was to re-sell the land at a profit.
- Accountant Member: Held that at the time of purchase the intention was not to re-sell for profit (initial intention was to exploit land for the electrical undertaking and expansion), but that subsequent conduct established that the assessee became a trader and sold for profit.
- Both Members agreed on the ultimate conclusion that, at the time of sale, the assessee's intention was to earn profit and that the gains were taxable as revenue income.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| G. Venkataswami Naidu & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax [1959] 35 I.T.R. 594 S.C. (cited) | Principle that the initial intention to resell is not solely decisive; the entire conduct from acquisition to sale must be considered and no single abstract rule governs all cases. | The Court relied on this authority to reject the Appellate Assistant Commissioner’s reliance on initial intention alone and to consider the assessee’s whole conduct (including subsequent steps to develop and sell) when characterising the transactions as an adventure in the nature of trade. |
| Khan Bahadur Ahmad Alladin and Sons v. Commissioner of Income-Tax [1968] 68 I.T.R. 573 S.C. (cited) | Statement that whether a transaction is an adventure in the nature of trade depends on the total impression and effect of all relevant factors and circumstances; no abstract formula applies universally. | The Court invoked this authority to support the approach of assessing the "collective effect of all relevant factors" rather than applying a single test (such as only initial intention) to decide whether the sales constituted trade operations. |
| Janki Ram Bahadur Ram v. Commissioner of Income-Tax [1965] 57 I.T.R. 21 S.C. (cited) | Observation that no single fact has decisive significance; the character of a transaction depends on the collective effect of all relevant materials and some facts may have dominant significance in context. | The Court used this authority to emphasise that a holistic evaluation of facts is required, reinforcing the view that subsequent conduct (development, layout, organized sale) could convert an investment into an adventure in the nature of trade. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by applying the principles established by the cited Supreme Court authorities emphasizing that:
- Characterisation of a transaction as an adventure in the nature of trade cannot rest solely on one abstract test (for example initial intention at purchase); the whole conduct from acquisition to sale must be assessed.
- Decisions must depend on the collective effect and total impression of all relevant factors and circumstances in each case.
Applying those principles to the present facts, the Court reviewed the chronology and conduct recited in the record:
- From 1938 onwards the partnership operated an electricity undertaking, obtained leases and built a power house to support that undertaking.
- After flotation of the limited company (1940–1941) the firm repeatedly arranged transfers of its assets to the company and sought to transfer additional land; the timing of leases and transfers suggested an idea of transferring assets to the company.
- Negotiations to purchase municipal land began about March 1941, but the actual purchase in the assessee's own name occurred on September 13, 1946. After purchase, the assessee surveyed, prepared and obtained approval for a layout plan (approved June 23, 1948), parceled the land into plots, developed it and sold plots to many purchasers (about 88) making substantial profits; only a relatively small portion was sold to the company.
- The Court treated this sequence — long-standing negotiations, immediate post-purchase steps to survey and lay out, municipal approval of the lay-out, parceling, development and organized sales to numerous buyers — as evidencing a scheme and design to deal in the land for profit, and an organised effort indicative of dealing as a dealer or trader.
On that basis the Court concluded that, notwithstanding any arguable initial intention to hold, the subsequent conduct converted the transactions into an adventure in the nature of trade and thus the profits were properly taxable as revenue income.
On the second question (whether the Tribunal order was vitiated because the two Members differed as to the assessee's initial intention but did not refer the matter to a third Member), the Court analysed section 5A(7) of the Income-Tax Act, 1922. It interpreted that provision to require reference only where Members are equally divided on the conclusion of a point, not merely where they differ in reasoning. Because both Tribunal Members agreed on the ultimate conclusion (that profits should be taxed as arising from an adventure in the nature of trade), there was no requirement to refer their differing reasoning to a third Member; the omission did not vitiate the Tribunal’s orders.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
- Answer to Question 1: In the affirmative and against the assessee — the profits arising from the sale of plots were liable to Income-Tax as profits from an adventure in the nature of trade.
- Answer to Question 2: In the negative and against the assessee — the Tribunal's orders were not vitiated by the Members' differing reasons because they agreed on the conclusion and no reference to a third Member was required under section 5A(7).
Implications:
- The direct consequence is that the surplus profits realized by the assessee from the sale of the plots are taxable as revenue income (profits from an adventure in the nature of trade) rather than being treated as mere capital accretions.
- The omission to refer differing reasons (where there was agreement on the final conclusion) did not invalidate the Tribunal's decision; thus, the Tribunal's orders in the appeals stand.
- The Court made no order as to costs in the reference.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general principle beyond applying existing Supreme Court authorities: it applies established tests (consider whole conduct, collective effect of facts) to the facts of this case.
End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion.
Tatachari, J.:— In this reference, the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench ‘B’, has referred two questions of law, namely:
“1. Was the profit arising from the sale of lands liable to Income-Tax on the ground that the transactions in the lands were in the nature of business transactions?
2. Was the order of the Tribunal vitiated because the Members did not refer their difference of opinion (as to the intention at the time of purchase) to a third Member?”
2. The facts which have given rise to the aforesaid two questions of law may be set out briefly. The assessee, A.N Seth, is an individual, and the assessment years are 1949–50 and 1950–51, and the corresponding previous years are the years ending with March 31, 1949, and March 31, 1950. Prior to the partition of India, the assessee was a resident of Lahore. In the year 1938, the assessee along with his father-in-law, Shri A.N Mehra, formed a partnership under the name and style of M/s. Sonepat Electric Supply, hereafter referred to as “the firm”. The firm obtained an electric licence from the Government of Punjab to generate electricity and supply it to Sonepat town. For that purpose, the firm obtained a piece of land measuring 20 bighas and 15 biswas on lease from the Sonepat Municipality on April 9, 1938, for a term of 18 years, on a rent of Rs. 100 per annum. The firm constructed a power house on a portion of the leased land and installed electrical equipment for generating electricity. On January 18, 1940, a limited company under the name and style of M/s. Sonepat Light, Power and General Mills Limited, hereafter referred to as “the company”, was floated, and the assessee became its managing director. On October 24, 1940, the firm took on lease another piece of land measuring 27 bighas, 10 biswas, which was adjacent to the previous piece of land from the Sonepat Municipality for a term of 18 years and on a rent of Rs. 50 per annum. On January 19, 1941, the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies granted a certificate of commencement of business to the company. On January 30, 1941, the firm transferred the entire electric undertaking including the machinery and equipment together with all other assets to the company. After the said transfer, the firm sought for permission to transfer the electric licence also to the company, but the Government of Punjab refused to grant the permission. Thereupon, the entire assets were retransferred by the company to the firm some time in 1943, but with retrospective effect from April 30, 1942, which was apparently the date on which the permission was refused by the Government of Punjab. It appears that after further negotiations, the Government of Punjab ultimately granted the permission for the transfer of the licence, and, therefore, on March 22, 1944, the assets of the electricity undertaking were transferred again by the firm to the company. It may be stated here that some time in 1942, the company expanded its activities, and an oil mill, a ginning factory and an ice factory began to function as part of the business activities of the limited company.
3. In 1945, Shri A.N Mehra, the father-in-law of the assessee, left the partnership, and thus the assessee became the sole proprietor of the business of the firm. On September 13, 1946, the entire land, measuring 48 bighas and 5 biswas, was sold by the municipality to the assessee for a sum of Rs. 3,015. According to the assessee, though the sale deed was executed on September, 13, 1946, the negotiations for the purchase were going on for a long time commencing from March, 1941. After the said purchase, the assessee got the land surveyed, got prepared the lay-out plan, and parcelled out the land into plots. The lay-out plan, which was got prepared by the assessee, was approved by the municipality on June 23, 1948. The assessee developed the area and sold the land in plots. In the relevant previous years, with which the present reference is concerned, viz., the years ended March 31, 1949, and March 31, 1950, the assessee sold such plots to about 88 parties and the sale consideration received by him totalled Rs. 60,292. A portion of the said area was sold to the company for a consideration of about Rs. 16,150.
4. The Income-Tax Officer worked out the surplus profit realised by the assessee in the sale transactions during the aforesaid two years as Rs. 25,600 and Rs. 34,692. Out of these amounts, he deducted Rs. 1,000 in each of the two years as cost of land and certain operation schemes, levelling, etc. the balance amounts were treated by the Income-Tax Officer as surplus profit, and assessed to Income-Tax
5. The assessee preferred two appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-Tax against the two assessment orders, and contended that the surplus amounts realised by him in the sale transactions were only accretions to the capital, and could not be taxed as income from business or other sources. By his common order, dated November 25, 1958, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case that the crucial fact which must be established in order to tax the excess in both the years was whether the purchase of the land was made with an intention to re-sell, and that the facts and circumstances in the case proved that the intention of the assessee at the time of purchase was merely to purchase the land as a capital asset and there could not be any intention to re-sell the same at that time, that even if the assessee had started developing the land for purposes of sale, the said subsequent motive in selling the land was not of any consequence, and that, therefore, the amounts were only a capital gain. In that view, he accepted the contention of the assessee and deleted the said amounts from the taxable income of the assessee.
6. Against the said common order, two appeals were preferred by the Income-Tax authorities to the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench ‘B’. The Tribunal consisted of one Judicial Member and one Accountant Member. The learned Judicial Member took the view that even at the time of purchase, the intention of the assessee was to sell the land at profit. On the other hand, the Accountant Member took the view that the intention of the assessee at the time of purchasing the land was not to sell it at a profit, but the intention was only to exploit the land for the promotion of the activity of electrical undertaking and the subsequent expansion of the same. But, both the Members agreed that the intention of the assessee at the time of the sale of the plots was to sell the land with a view to earn profits, and that, in the circumstances, the gains were liable to be taxed as revenue income. In the result, the Tribunal allowed the appeals, set aside the common order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and upheld the decision of the Income-Tax Officer that the profits arising from the sale of the plots were liable to Income-Tax.
7. Thereupon, the assessee moved the Tribunal by two reference applications to refer to this court the two questions which have already been set out above under section 66(1) of the Income-Tax Act, 1922. As the questions of law were common to the two reference applications, the Tribunal consolidated them and made this single reference?
8. The first question for consideration is as to whether the sales of the plots of lands by the assessee were in the nature of trade or business, and the surplus profit realised by him is liable to Income-Tax. As stated above, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner considered that the crucial fact which must be established in order to tax the surplus profit was whether the purchase of the land was made by the assessee with an intention to re-sell for profit, and on the facts and circumstances of the case, he came to the conclusion that the assessee did not have that initial intention, and any subsequent motive to sell the land for profit was not of any consequence, and that, therefore, the amounts in question were only a capital gain not liable to Income-Tax. The said view was obviously incorrect, as it is now well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court that the matter does not rest merely on the initial intention of the assessee at the time of the purchase, but his entire conduct from the moment of acquisition to the moment of the sale has to be taken into consideration. In G. Venkataswami Naidu & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax [1959] 35 I.T.R 594, 607, [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R 646., the Supreme Court observed regarding the question as to whether a transaction is in the nature of trade or business, as follows:
“This question has been the subject-matter of several judicial decisions; and in dealing with it all the judges appear to be agreed that no principle can be evolved which would govern the decision of all cases in which the character of the impugned transaction falls to be considered.”
9. Similarly, in Khan Bahadur Ahmad Alladin and Sons v. Commissioner of Income-Tax [1968] 68 I.T.R 573 S.C., the Supreme Court observed as follows:
“The answer to the question whether a transaction is an adventure in the nature of trade does not depend upon the application of any abstract rule, principle or formula, but must necessarily depend in each case on the total impression and effect of all the relevant factors and circumstances proved therein and which determine the character of the transaction.”
10. In Janki Ram Bahadur Ram v. Commissioner of Income-Tax [1965] 57 I.T.R 21, 25 S.C., the Supreme Court observed as follows:
“No useful purpose would be served by entering upon a detailed analysis and review of the observations made (in various decisions) in the light of the relevant facts, for no single fact has decisive significance, and the question whether a transaction is an adventure in the nature of trade must depend upon the collective effect of all the relevant materials brought on the record. But general criteria indicating that certain facts have dominant significance in the context of other facts have been adopted in the decided cases.”
11. As regards the initial intention of the assessee at the time of the purchase and his subsequent motive for selling the land at a profit, the Supreme Court in G. Venkatyswami Naidu & Co. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax [1959] 35 I.T.R 594 S.C. observed at page 610 as follows:
“It is often said that a transaction of purchase followed by re-sale can either be an investment or an adventure in the nature of trade. There is no middle course and no half way house. This statement may be broadly true; and so some judicial decisions apply the test of the initial intention to re-sell in distinguishing adventures in the nature of trade from transactions of investment. Even in the application of this test, distinction will have to be made between initial intention to re-sell at a profit which is present but not dominant or sole; in other words, cases do often arise where the purchaser may be willing and may intend to sell the property purchased at profit, but he would also intend and be willing to hold and enjoy it if a really high price is not offered. The intention to re-sell may in such cases be coupled with the intention to hold the property. Cases may, however, arise where the purchase has been made solely and exclusively with the intention to resell at a profit and the purchaser has no intention of holding the property for himself or otherwise enjoying or using it. The presence of such an intention is no doubt a relevant factor and unless it is offset by the presence of other factors it would raise a strong presumption that the transaction is an adventure in the nature of trade. Even so, the presumption is not conclusive; and it is conceivable that, on considering all the facts and circumstances in the case, the court may, despite the said initial intention, be inclined to hold that the transaction was not an adventure in the nature of trade. We thus come back to the same position and that is that the decision about the character of a transaction in the context cannot be based solely on the application of any abstract rule, principle or test and must in every case depend upon all the relevant facts and circumstances.”
12. We shall, therefore, consider the facts and circumstances in the present case, keeping in view the above-mentioned principles laid down by the Supreme Court. The assessee, along with his father-in-law, Shri A.N Mehra, formed the partnership firm in 1938, and obtained an electric licence from the Government of Punjab to generate electricity and supply it to Sonepat Town. On April 9, 1938, the firm obtained a piece of land measuring 20 bighas and 15 biswas on lease from the Sonepat Municipality and constructed a power house on a portion of the leased land and installed electrical equipment for generating electricity. The obtaining of the piece of land on lease was obviously for the purpose of supporting the electrical undertaking. Then, on January 18, 1940, a limited company was floated, and the assessee became its managing director. On January 19, 1940, the firm took on lease another piece of land measuring 27 bighas, 10 biswas. On January 19, 1941, the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies granted the necessary certificate for the commencement of the business of the limited company. Within a few days thereafter, on January 30, 1941, the firm transferred the entire electrical undertaking including the machinery and equipment together with all other assets to the limited company. The firm also sought for permission to transfer the electric licence also to the limited company, but the Government of Punjab refused to grant the permission. Thereupon, the entire assets were re-transferred by the company to the firm with effect from April 30, 1941. The short time within which the above transactions took place do lead to the inference that the firm, some time after the floatation of the limited company, formed the idea of transferring its assets to the limited company, and with that in view obtained the additional land of 27 bighas and 10 biswas with the intention of transferring that land also in favour of the limited company. This is further probabilised by the transactions which took place subsequently. After the refusal by the Government of Punjab to permit the transfer of the licence, the assessee appears to have continued the negotiations with the Government of Punjab, and succeeded in getting the said permission. As soon as the permission was granted, the assets of the electricity undertaking were again transferred by the firm to the limited company on March 22, 1944. In 1945, Shri A.N Mehra, the father-in-law of the assessee, left the partnership, and the assessee became the sole proprietor of the business of the firm. Then, on September 13, 1946, the entire land, measuring 48 bighas and 5 biswas, was purchased by the assessee in his own name from the municipality for a sum of Rs. 3,015. According to the assessee, the negotiations for the purchase were going on for a long time commencing from March, 1941. After the said purchase, the assessee got the land surveyed, got the lay-out plan prepared and got the same approved by the municipality, parcelled out the land into plots, developed the area and sold the said plots.
13. Thus, the various transactions mentioned above do suggest that at least from 1940, the firm was anxious to transfer its assets to the limited company and obtain the additional land on lease with the intention of transferring the said land also to the limited company, and not to hold the same itself. Negotiations for the purchase of the land from the municipality were started even in March, 1941, and after the purchase of the land in 1946, nothing appears to have been done on the land by the assessee. On the other hand, as already stated above, the assessee was taking steps to sell the land in plots. Out of the entire land, he sold only a small extent to the limited company for about Rs. 16,150, while he sold a larger portion to about 88 parties, making a large profit. The said conduct of the assessee does show that his intention in purchasing the land in his own name was not to hold the same for himself, but to re-sell the same for a profit. On a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that there was a scheme and a design on the part of the assessee in making the purchase and the sales, and the organised effort of the assessee to purchase the land and sell the same for profit indicates that he dealt with the land as a dealer or a trader, and that it was an adventure in the nature of trade. Our answer, therefore, to the first question referred to us is in the affirmative and against the assessee. The second question for consideration is as to whether the order of the Tribunal was vitiated, as the Members thereof did not refer their difference of opinion (as to the intention at the time of purchase) to a third Member. Section 5A(7) of the Income-Tax Act, 1922, provides as follows:
“(7) If the Members of a Bench differ in opinion on any point, the point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority, if there is a majority; but if the Members are equally divided, they shall state the point or points on which they differ, and the case shall be referred by the President of the Tribunal for hearing oh such point or points by one or more of the other members of the Tribunal, and such point or points shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the Members of the Tribunal who have heard the case, including those who first heard it.”
14. Under this provision, if the Members of a Bench of the Appellate Tribunal are equally divided on any point or points, the said point or points have to be referred to one or more of the other Members of the Tribunal for his or their opinion. A reading of the sub-section shows that it contemplates a difference amongst the Members on the conclusion on a point, and not a difference in the reasoning or reasons for arriving at the conclusion. Therefore, if the Members agree on the conclusion on a point, but differ in the reasoning or reasons for arriving at the conclusion, the provision in the sub-section does not apply, and the question of any reference to one or more of the other Members does not arise. In the present case, the point for determination was as to whether the profits arising from the sale or sales of the plots should be subjected to Income-Tax as profits arising from an adventure in the nature of trade. In arriving at a conclusion on the said point, the Judicial Member took the view that both at the time of the purchase and at the time of the sale, the assessee's intention was to re-sell the land for a profit, while the Accountant Member took the view that the intention of the assessee at the time of the purchase was not to re-sell the land for a profit, but that the subsequent conduct of the assessee showed that he had since become a trader. The Accountant Member accordingly agreed with the conclusion of the Judicial Member that the profits arising from the sale should be subjected to Income-Tax as profits arising from an adventure in the nature of trade. In other words, the Members disagreed in the reasoning adopted by them in arriving at a conclusion on the point for determination in the appeal, but agreed with each other on the conclusion on the point. As they were agreed about the final conclusion on the point for determination in the appeal, viz., that the profits made by the assessee should be subjected to Income-Tax, they did not make any reference to a third Member. As already explained above, in dealing with the first question, a decision regarding the initial intention of the assessee at the time of the purchase is not by itself decisive or conclusive. Even if the initial intention was to purchase the property as an investment and not to re-sell for profit, the assessee may change his mind and deal with the property subsequently as a trader, and enter into transactions which are in the nature of trade. Thus, a decision by a third Member on the question as to the initial intention at the time of the purchase was not necessary, as on a consideration of the subsequent conduct of the assessee, the two Members were agreed that he dealt with the property as a trader, and that the profits arising from the sales effected by him should be subjected to Income-Tax, and that the appeals before them should be allowed. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the omission by the Members of the Tribunal to refer their difference of opinion on the question as to the intention of the assessee at the time of purchase to a third Member, did not vitiate their final orders in the appeals before them. We accordingly answer the second question referred to us in the negative and against the assessee.
15. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs in this reference.
Kapur, J.:— I agree.
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