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Delhi Administration v. Parkash Chand And Others
Judgment Summary — H.R. Khanna, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The principal question reported by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, was whether an offence under sections 3 and 4 of the Delhi Public Gambling Act, 1955 (the Act) is cognizable.
Brief facts given in the opinion: On 20 December 1965 S.I. Har Kesh, acting on trustworthy information, obtained a warrant under Section 5 of the Act from the Superintendent of Police to search the house of Parkash Chand, which was alleged to be used as a common gaming-house. The sub-inspector raided the premises, seized cash and gambling articles and arrested persons present. The accused were produced before a Magistrate on 21 December 1965 and released on bail. A police report (State through S.I. Har Kesh) was forwarded to the trial Court by the Prosecuting Inspector on 27 January 1966.
At the trial Court hearing, objections were raised on two grounds: (1) that the matter was a non-cognizable summons case and, because S.I. Har Kesh (the complainant) was not present, the respondents were entitled to acquittal; and (2) that there was no proper complaint, as the document had not been addressed to any Court. The trial Magistrate condoned the absence of S.I. Har Kesh but held that there was no proper complaint and dismissed the matter.
The State sought revision before the Court of Sessions. The Additional Sessions Judge held that the offence was cognizable and that the report was a police report; he recommended quashing the trial Magistrate's order and directing trial according to law. The present judgment accepts that recommendation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an offence under sections 3 and 4 of the Delhi Public Gambling Act, 1955 is a cognizable offence.
- Whether the trial Magistrate erred in treating the police report as a complaint and dismissing the case on that ground instead of taking cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Arguments of the Parties
State's Position
- Mr. Anand appeared for the State. The State pursued the revision in which the Additional Sessions Judge had already held that the offence under the Act is cognizable and that the document before the trial Court was a police report (i.e., a report in writing by a police officer).
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents objected that the matter was a non-cognizable summons case and that because S.I. Har Kesh (the complainant) was not present, they were entitled to acquittal.
- The respondents also contended that there was no proper complaint because the document had not been addressed to any Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Queen-Empress v. Deodhar Singh, I.L.R. 27 Cal. 144 (Division Bench: Rampini & Paratt JJ.) | The proposition that where a statute vests power to arrest without warrant in a particular class of police officer (e.g., District Superintendent of Police), that is sufficient to satisfy the definition of "cognizable offence" in Section 4(1)(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. | The Court relied on and quoted this decision to support the conclusion that the limitation of arrest-power to a particular class of police officers does not prevent the offence from being cognizable. |
| Emperor v. Abasbhai Abdul Hussain, I.L.R. 60 Bom. 344 (Division Bench: Marten & Madgavkar JJ.) | Applied the same principle as the Calcutta Division Bench in the context of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act. | The Court noted that this Bombay Division Bench decision followed the Calcutta view and treated offences under a local gambling statute as cognizable when arrest without warrant was vested in a specified class of police officer. |
| Public Prosecutor v. A.V. Ramiah, A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 392 (Division Bench) | Held that an offence under section 12 of the Madras Gaming Act was not cognizable because the power of arrest was limited to arresting a person whom the police officer viewed as committing the offence (i.e., not an unrestricted power to arrest without warrant). | The Court distinguished Ramiah on the facts because the Delhi Public Gambling Act (section 5) does not confine arrest-power to persons whom the police officer sees committing the offence; therefore Ramiah is not applicable to the Delhi Act situation. |
| Miyabhai Pirbhai v. The State (decided by Raju J.) | The opinion, as referenced, held that offences under sections 4 and 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act were not cognizable. | The Court observed that this decision took a view different from the earlier Division Bench decisions (Calcutta and Bombay) and stated there was no sufficient ground to depart from the earlier Division Bench view. No further detail of the Miyabhai Pirbhai reasoning is provided in the opinion. |
| In re Naoarmal Jaitkiram Agarwale | This opinion mentions the case but does not state the rule or principle from it. |
The provided opinion references the case name only; no explanation of its application or holding is given in the text. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's reasoning proceeds in discrete steps based strictly on the materials and authorities cited in the opinion:
-
Statutory framework under the Delhi Public Gambling Act:
- Section 3 penalizes owning, keeping or having charge of a gaming-house (punishment up to six months and fine up to Rs. 1,000).
- Section 4 penalizes being found in a gaming-house for the purpose of gaming (punishment up to three months and fine up to Rs. 500).
- Section 5 authorizes the District Magistrate, an officer with full powers of a Magistrate of the first class, or the Superintendent of Police, upon credible information and after such enquiry as he thinks necessary, to enter and search premises, take into custody persons found there, and seize gaming instruments, money and other articles. The opinion reproduces the relevant provisions of Section 5 to show that a Superintendent of Police can arrest without a warrant.
-
Interpretation of "cognizable offence" in the Code:
- Section 4(1)(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines cognizable offence as an offence for which a police officer may, in accordance with the Second Schedule or under any law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant.
- The Court reasons that the Delhi Public Gambling Act is "a law for the time being in force" and that Section 5 vests arrest-without-warrant power in the Superintendent of Police. Therefore, by virtue of Section 4(1)(f) of the Code, offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the Delhi Act fall within the definition of cognizable offences.
- The Court emphasizes that the phrase "a police-officer" in the Code does not require that every class or rank of police officer must have the power; it is sufficient that the law vests the power in a police officer of a specified (though high) rank, here the Superintendent of Police.
-
Precedent support and distinctions:
- The Court relies on the Calcutta Division Bench decision in Queen-Empress v. Deodhar Singh, which reached the same conclusion where a statute limited arrest power to the District Superintendent of Police. The Court also notes follow-up in a Bombay Division Bench decision (Emperor v. Abasbhai) which adopted the same reasoning.
- The Court distinguishes Public Prosecutor v. A.V. Ramiah (Madras) on the ground that the Madras statute limited arrest to persons whom the police-officer viewed as committing the offence; that limitation made the arrest-power not of an unrestricted nature and led the Madras Division Bench to hold the offence non-cognizable. The Delhi Act has no such limiting language in Section 5, so Ramiah is distinguishable.
- The Court notes that a single-judge decision (Miyabhai Pirbhai) took a contrary view in the Bombay context but regards the earlier Division Bench authorities as controlling and finds no sufficient ground to depart from them.
-
Procedural consequence regarding the police report:
- Because the offence is cognizable, the trial Magistrate ought to have taken cognizance of the offence upon the report in writing made by S.I. Har Kesh under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- The trial Court erred in treating the police report as a "complaint." The opinion notes that the definition of "complaint" in Section 4(1)(h) of the Code expressly excludes a report of a police officer. Thus, the document before the trial Court was a police report and not a private complaint.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The recommendation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is accepted. The trial Magistrate's order dismissing the complaint is set aside and the trial Magistrate is directed to try the case according to law.
Implications:
- The Court holds that offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the Delhi Public Gambling Act, 1955 are cognizable offences because Section 5 of that Act vests power to arrest without warrant in a Superintendent of Police, which satisfies the definition in Section 4(1)(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
- Procedurally, because the matter arose from a police report, the trial Magistrate should have taken cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code rather than treating the document as a complaint; the trial Magistrate's dismissal on the ground that there was "no proper complaint" was therefore erroneous.
- The decision directly affects the parties by restoring the prosecution and directing that the case be disposed of according to law. The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader rule beyond its statutory and precedential analysis; it relies on and follows existing Division Bench authority rather than creating a new departure.
Recommendation accepted; order of the trial Magistrate set aside and case remitted for trial according to law.
H.R Khanna, J.:— This case has been reported, by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, with the recommendation that the order of the trial Magistrate dismissing the complaint be quashed and the main question which arises for determination is whether an offence under sections 3 and 4 of the Delhi Public Gambling Act 1955 (Act No. IX of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is a cognizable offence.
2. The brief facts of the case are that a police report entitled State through S.I Har Kesh of Special Staff, Old Police Lines, Delhi, against Parkash Chand and nine others, was forwarded to the trial Court by the Prosecuting Inspectors on 27th January, 1966.
3. According to the allegations made in the report S.I Har Kesh, on receipt of trustworthy information that the house of Parkash Chand respondent was being used as a common gaming-house, obtained a warrant from the Superintendent of Police under Section 5 of the Act entitling him to search the same and arrest the persons found there. In pursuance of that warrant the sub-inspector raided the house of Parkash Chand on 20th December 1965 and found some cashand articles used for the purpose of gambling. The sub-inspector took those articles into possession and arrested the persons present there. The endorsement on the report shows that on 21st December 1965 when the accused were produced before Magistrate they were ordered to be released on bail. The report ultimately was forwarded, as stated above to, the trial Magistrate by the Prosecuting Inspector on 27 th January 1966. When the case came up for hearing, an objection was raised on behalf of the accused-respondents that as it was a non-cognizable summons case and S.I Har Kesh complainant was not present, the respondents were entitled to acquittal. Another objection was taken on the ground that there was no proper complaint. The trial Court condoned the absence of S.I Har Kesh. It was, however, held that there was no proper complaint as it had not been addressed to any Court.
4. The State then went up in revision to the court of Session, The learned Additional Sessions Judge held that the offence complained of was a cognizable offence and in any case the report made by S.I Har Kesh was a police report. It was also observed that even if the report was treated as a complaint, there was no defect in it. Recommendation was, accordingly, made that the order of the trial Magistrate dismissing the complaint be quashed and she be directed to try the case according to law.
5. I have heard Mr. Anand on behalf of the State and Mr. Mehta on behalf of the respondents and am of the view that the recommondation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge should be accepted. Section 3 of the Act provides the penalty for owning or keeping or having charge of a gaming house, and according to that section the person guilty of such an offence shall be liable to imprisonment for a term which, may extend to six months and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to Rs. 1,000. Section 4 of the Act provides penalty for being found in gaming-house for the purpose of gaming. The punishment prescribed for the offence is imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months and fine which may extend to Rs. 500/-. Section 5 of the Act has a material bearing and reads as under:—
“If the District Magistrate or any other officer invested with the full powers of a Magistrate of the first class, or the Superintendent of Police, upon credible information, and after such enquiry as he may think necessary, has reason to believe that any house, room, tent, enclosure, space, vehicle, vessel or place, is used as a common gaming-house
he may either himself enter, or by his warrant authorise any officer of police, not below the rank of a Sub-Inspector, to enter with such assistance as may be found necessary, by night or day, and by force, if necessary, any such house, room, tent, enclosure, space, vehicle, vessel or place,
and may either himself take into custody, or authorise such officer to take into custody, all persons whom he or such officer fieds therein whether or not then actually gaming.
and may seize or authorise such officer to seize all instruments of gaming, and all moneys and securities for money and articles of value, reasonably suspected to have been used or intended to be used for the purpose of gaming which are found therein
and may search or authorise such officer to search all parts of the house, room, tent, enclosure, space, vehicle, vessel or place which he or such officer shall have so entered when he or such officer has reason to believe that any instruments of gaming are concealed therein, and also the persons of those whom he or such officer so takes into custody.
and may seize or authorise such officer to seize and take possession of all instruments of gaming found upon such search.”
6. Perusal of the above section goes to show that though an officer below the rank of a Superintendent of Police needs a warrant or authority to take into custody persons found in a place believed to be used as a gaming house, a Superintendent of Police can do so without a warrant. Question consequently arises as to whether a case under the Act would cease to be a cognizable case because the power of arrest without a warrant is vested in a police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. In this respect I find that Section 4(1)(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines a cognizable offence to mean an offence for, and cognizable case to mean case “in which a police-officer, within or without the presidency-towns, may, in accordance with the second sched ule or under any law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant.” According to the second schedule of the Code the police can arrest without warrant in offences under law other than the penal Code if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for three years or upwards. Delhi Public Gambling Act is a “law for the time being in force” and as under that law the Superintendent of Police can arrest without a warrant the offence under that law would, in my opinion, be a cognizable offence. The words “a police-officer” in the definition of cognizable offence do not mean any and every police officer and it is quite enough if the power to arrest without a warrant is vested in a police-officer of the high rank of a Superintendent of Police. I am fortified in this conclusion by the following observations of a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court (Rampini and Paratt JJ.) in Queen-Empress v. Deodhar Singh . I.L.R 27 Cal. 144.:—
“Now, under the Gambling Act, it is not every Police Officer who can arrest without a warrant. It is only the District Superintendent of Police who can arrest or by warrant direct the arrest of persons gambling in a house. The District Superintendent being a Police Officer who may, under a law for the time being in force, viz., the Gambling Act, arrest without warrant, we think that the requirements of clause (1)(f) of the above sections are satisfied, and that the offence in question is, therefore, a “cognizable offence”. We cannot accept the comtention that the words in that clause “a Police Officer mean, any and every Police Officer. It is sufficient if the Legislature has limited the power of arrest to any particular class of Police Officers.”
7. The above observations were followed by a Division Bench of Bombay High Court (Marten and Madgavkar JJ.) in Emperor v. Abasbhai Abdul Hussain . I.L.R 60 Bom. 344., a case under the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act. In re Naoarmal Jaitkiram Agarwale,3
8. I may state that in Public Prosecutor v. A.V Ramiah . A.I.R 1958 A. P. 392, a Division Bench consisting of K. Subba Rao C.J (as he then was) and Basi Reddy J., held that an offence under section 12 of the Madras Gaming Act was not a cognizable offence as it gave only a limited power of arrest to a police-officer. The learned Judges in arriving at this conclusion were influenced by the language of section 13 of that act according to which a police-officer could arrest without warrant any person committing in his view any offence made punishable by the Art. As the power of arrest was found to be limited to the arrest of a person committing an offence in the view of the police-officer and not otherwise It was held that the power was not of an unrestricted nature and the offence was not cognizable. There is, however, no such limitation imposed on the power of arrest given to a police-officer under section 5 of the Delhi Public Gambling Act because there is no provision in that Act that only the person committing an offence under the Act, in the view of the Superintendent of Police, can be arrested by, him. I would, therefore, hold that the facts of Ramiah's case are distinguishable. Another case to which my attention has been invited is that of Miyabhai Pirbhai v. The State,5 decided by Raju J. It was held that an offence under sections” 4 and 5 of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act was not a cognizable offence. Perusal of this authority no doubt shows that the learned Judge took a view different from that taken in the earlier Calcutta and Bombay Division Bench cases, but, in my opinion, there was no sufficient ground for departing from the view taken in those Division Bench cases.
9. As the offence was a cognizable offence the trial Magistrate should have taken congizance of the offence upon the report in writing made by S.I Har Kesh under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The report gave the material facts and the trial Court in my opinion, was in error in treating it as a complaint. The definition of the words “complaint” as given in section 4(1)(h) of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly excludes the report of a police-officer.
10. I would, therefore, accept the recommendation of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, set aside the order of the trial Magistrate dismissing the complaint and direct that the case be disposed of according to law.
11. Recommendation accepted.
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