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Smt. Shakuntla Petitions v. Sh. Hira Nand Sharma & Ors.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner filed a suit for permanent injunction claiming tenancy in a portion of House No. 543, Guru Ram Dass Nagar, Delhi. The petitioner alleged that her husband owned several plots, including plot No. 543, which he bequeathed by will to his brother, Gulab Singh. Gulab Singh sold the property to the first defendant, Hira Nand Sharma. The petitioner claimed to have been a tenant in a room on plot No. 546 and had given up that room to take tenancy in plot No. 543 at a monthly rent of Rs. 5/-. After the sale, the defendants allegedly pressured her to vacate and attempted forcible eviction.
The defendants contended that they had provisional possession under an agreement to sell from Gulab Singh, and the petitioner was not involved at that time. They asserted that the petitioner had been residing in plot No. 543 but had been paid Rs. 9,400/- by Gulab Singh to vacate and subsequently moved to plot No. 546. After possession under the agreement to sell, she was allowed temporary residence in a newly built room but later claimed tenancy.
The trial court granted the injunction as prayed, but the Senior Sub-Judge on appeal vacated it, stating no prima facie case was established and questioned the authenticity of certain documents, including a certificate by Gulab Singh. The petitioner then filed a revision petition before this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellate court erred in vacating the temporary injunction granted by the trial court.
- Whether this Court has jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to interfere with the appellate court’s refusal to grant injunction.
- Whether the petitioner’s possession and claimed tenancy entitle her to protection against forcible eviction without due process of law.
- How Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, applies to the rights of parties under an agreement to sell and possession.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Arguments
- The injunction was vacated without sufficient grounds.
- The petitioner is a tenant entitled to protection from forcible eviction.
- The Court has jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure because the lower appellate court refused to exercise jurisdiction by denying the injunction.
Respondents’ Arguments
- This Court lacks jurisdiction to interfere in the revision petition.
- The petitioner is only a licensee, not a tenant, and therefore has no enforceable right in the property.
- The petitioner had previously applied to the Rent Controller under Section 45 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, but relief was refused as the landlord-tenant relationship was not admitted.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure | Jurisdiction of the revisional court to interfere when lower appellate court refuses to exercise jurisdiction by denying injunction. | The Court held it had jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the appellate court’s refusal to confirm the injunction. |
| Section 45 of the Delhi Rent Control Act | Determination of landlord-tenant relationship and relief under Rent Control Act. | The respondents relied on the refusal of relief under this section to argue the petitioner had no tenancy rights. |
| Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 | Protection of possession under an agreement to sell. | The Court noted that possession under an agreement to sell does not automatically entitle the holder to evict others without due process and that the section’s application must be considered. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court recognized two conflicting narratives: the petitioner’s claim of tenancy and continuous possession supported by a certificate from Gulab Singh, and the defendants’ claim that the petitioner had been paid off and had vacated the property before they acquired possession under an agreement to sell. The Court found it peculiar that the petitioner would leave the property and then re-occupy it, but also noted that the defendants were not yet registered transferees, holding only possession under an agreement to sell.
The Court emphasized the fundamental legal principle that possession should be prima facie protected and that a person in possession cannot be dispossessed without due process of law. Even a trespasser is afforded protection to maintain the status quo in doubtful cases. The petitioner’s possession of part of the house was a strong factor in her favor at this stage.
The Court highlighted that the correctness of the refusal to grant injunction by the appellate court needed examination, as the lower court’s refusal amounted to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction. The Court concluded that while the petitioner may not have a right to a permanent injunction, she cannot be evicted without due process. The peculiar facts and legal questions, including the application of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, required trial and evidence.
Holding and Implications
The Court allowed the revision petition and restored the temporary injunction granted by the trial court, but limited the injunction to protection against dispossession except by due process of law.
The direct consequence is that the petitioner cannot be forcibly evicted without legal procedure, preserving the status quo pending trial. The Court noted that the respondents had filed a suit for mandatory injunction to recover possession, representing due process. Each party was directed to bear their own costs. No new precedent was established; the decision focused on safeguarding possession and procedural fairness in this particular case.
D.K Kapur, J.:— In a suit for permanent injunction based on a claim that she was a tenant in a portion of House No. 543, Guru Ram Dass Nagar, Delhi, the petitioner had claimed a temporary injunction. According to the case in the plaint, her husband was an owner of several plots including plot No. 543 which he had left by a will to his brother Gulab Singh. Gulab Singh sold this property to Hira Nand Sharma, the first defendant. In this plaint, she claimed that she was a tenant in a room situated on Plot No. 546, Guru Ram Dass Nagar, which she gave up to take a room in Plot No. 543 as a tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 5/-. After the sale to the defendants, it was claimed that the defendants had started putting pressure on her to vacate the premises and, the defendants were trying to forcibly make her vacate the premises. The defendants case on the other hand was that they had got provisional possession from Gulab Singh under an agreement to sell and the plaintiff was nowhere in the picture at that time. The claim was that the plaintiff bad previously been residing in plot No. 543, but she had been given a sum of Rs. 9,400/- by Gulab Singh to quit the property and thereafter she went to plot No. 546. After the possession was taken under the agreement to sell, she (the plaintiff) was allowed to reside for a short time in a newly built room, but thereafter she claimed that she was a tenant.
2. The trial court granted an injunction as prayed for, but on appeal the Senior Sub-Judge has vacated the injunction on the footing that no prima facie case had been established by the plaintiff. The Court also referred to certain documents on record including a certificate issued by Gulab Singh in favour of the plaintiff as being capable of later manufactured. The plaintiff has now moved this Court in revision.
3. According to the petitioner's case in this revision, the injunction has been vacated for insufficient grounds. On the other hand, the respondents claim that this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere in revision. And furthermore, the plaintiff has no case being only a kind of licencee in the premises. In a case of this type, the question is, should an injunction have been refused to the petitioner? The refusal of the lower appellate Court to confirm the injunction is really a refusal to exercise jurisdiction. So, this Court has certainly jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure because the lower appellate Court has refused to exercise jurisdiction by refusing the injunction. The question whether the injunction has been rightly or wrongly refused has now to be examined by me.
4. There are two sides of the story before this Court. The story of the plaintiff and the story of the defendants. According to the plaintiff, she is a tenant, and she is residing in a room and has the certificate of Gulab Singh. Even according to the defendants, she was previously a tenant in this property but had been paid off and had left the property and gone into plot No. 546. The defendants also referred to the fact that the plaintiff had previously applied to the Rent Controller under Section 45 of the Delhi Rent Control Act for certain reliefs, but the same had been refused on the ground that the relationship of landlord and tenant was not admitted. It was, therefore, claimed that the petitioner had no right in the property.
5. On the other hand, it does appear peculiar that the petitioner should have been in occupation of this property and should then have left and after that the defendants should have purchased the property under an agreement to sell and yet the plaintiff should have re-appeared in the same property. It may be that on an examination of the evidence, it is found that the plaintiff had never left the property and was in occupation of the same throughout or, it may be that she has an independent right in the propery or it may be that she is a licencee of the defendants. The case cannot be decided at this stage in the manner in which the Senior Sub-Judge has dealt with it.
6. The legal position in such matters should be very clear. If there is one principle of law which stands out in our jurisprudence, it is that possession should prima facie be protected. Once a person is in possession, he is not to be dispossessed otherwise than by legal means. This is part of the rule of law. To some extent, even a trespasser or wrong door is protected. In a doubtful case, it is better to maintain the status quo. Admittedly, the petitioner is in occupation of part of the house, so she has possession of that room. How she got there and why she got there are questions which the Court will determine on evidence. Prima facie, this factor of possession is a very strong factor in favour of the petitioner. The explanation offered by the defendants that she had got into possession for a few days on the asking of a neighbour, may be a plausible one. But, it is extremely strange that she should have got back in the same property where she was previously living. Then, there is the peculiar circumstance that the defendant is not yet a registered transferee of the property. There is only an agreement to sell coupled with possession. What was that possession? How and to what extent was this possession given? These are again questions which have to be tried. Then there is the next question as to whether a person who has got an agreement to sell and has got part possession or full possession—does he have the right to evict any one, can he get possession after he loses it? This depends on the manner in which Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is applied. To my mind, no doubt, the petitioner has no right to get a permanent injunction to prevent her eviction for all times to come, but she cannot be evicted or removed without due process of law. If she is not protected, it means that the Court has denied the petitioner any possible chance of getting any justice.
7. In these circumstances, I am compelled to accept the revision and restore the temporary injunction granted by the trial court. But the injunction is only to the extent that she will not be dispossessed except by operation of law and no further. I am informed by counsel for the respondents that a suit has been filed by way of mandatory injunction to get back the occupation of the room from the petitioner. Such a suit is an example pf due process of law. Parties to bear their own costs.
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