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Bismilla Jan v. Jain Tractors & Auto Spare
Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The landlord (petitioner) applied to the Competent Authority under S.19 of the Slum Act on 23.5.1970 seeking permission to institute eviction proceedings against the respondent, a firm carrying on business of auto spare parts in tenanted premises situated in the tyre market. The petitioner alleged that the respondent's registered office at 1470, Rang Mahal could serve as alternate accommodation. The Competent Authority refused permission, holding that the respondent did not have sufficient means and that the alleged alternate accommodation was unsuitable; that order was upheld on appeal by the Financial Commissioner. The petitioner (an elderly lady, as described in the opinion) then moved the High Court under constitutional jurisdiction (Articles 226 and 227).
Procedural milestones and evidence noted in the opinion include:
- Application to Competent Authority under S.19 dated 23.5.1970.
- Inspection report of the alleged alternate accommodation (1470, Rang Mahal) dated 6.10.1971 describing it as dingy, dusty, poorly ventilated and resembling a godown.
- Reference to income-tax assessment returns for 1967-68 and 1969-70 and to balance-sheets filed by the respondent company; affidavit of the respondent's managing director dated 1.9.1971.
- Financial Commissioner's order of 17.3.1971 is referred to in the reasoning.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Competent Authority correctly applied S.19(4) of the Slum Act in deciding (a) the availability of alternate accommodation and (b) the financial status of the tenant for the purpose of granting permission to sue for eviction.
- Whether the premises at 1470, Rang Mahal—alleged to be the respondent's registered office and located about 50 yards from the disputed premises—constituted suitable alternate accommodation.
- Whether the standard for assessing the financial status of a tenant under the Slum Act is the same when the tenant is a juristic person (a company) as when the tenant is an individual, and if not, how the standard should differ.
- Whether the Financial Commissioner erred in affirming the Competent Authority's decision, particularly in light of concessions and evidentiary findings recorded during appellate proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner alleged that the respondent possessed alternate accommodation: registered office premises at 1470, Rang Mahal, located approximately 50 yards from the disputed premises.
- The petitioner contended that income-tax authorities had not accepted certain balance-sheets (an order dated 23.3.1971 was relied upon) and therefore the balance-sheets filed by the respondent for subsequent years could not be relied upon to show the respondent's financial weakness.
- Implicit in the petitioner's position was the claim that the respondent had sufficient means (or at least that the evidence did not conclusively show inability) to obtain alternate accommodation and therefore permission to sue for eviction should be granted.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent (through affidavit and evidence) asserted that the firm did not have sufficient means to acquire alternate accommodation equal to the disputed premises; the managing director stated specifically (para 14 of affidavit dated 1.9.1971) that the firm would not be able to acquire equivalent accommodation in the same or any other commercial area for any amount of rent due to extra costs such as "pagri money".
- The respondent relied on balance-sheets and other company accounts to demonstrate limited available income, and the Competent Authority treated those documents as probative of the firm's financial position.
The opinion does not provide a detailed point-by-point transcript of submissions beyond the items summarized above; it does, however, record key contentions and concessions made in the officers' proceedings.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds from a statement of the object of the Slum Act and the statutory factors in S.19(4). The opinion reiterates that the Competent Authority must consider two principal factors under S.19(4): (a) availability of alternate accommodation within the tenant's means and (b) the financial status of the tenant to determine whether eviction would likely lead to the creation of further slums.
The court outlines the evidentiary framework the Competent Authority must follow: a landlord seeking permission under S.19 must allege, to the best of his knowledge, the tenant's income and adduce whatever evidence is available; once this is done, the tenant must produce positive evidence regarding his income, which is within his special knowledge.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court reviews the Competent Authority's particular findings:
- The Competent Authority inspected the alleged alternate accommodation (1470, Rang Mahal) and described it as unfit for use as business premises (dingy, dusty, foul-smelling, lacking ventilation and resembling a godown), and noted it was located in a lane without other tyre shops and about 50 yards from the disputed premises.
- On financial status, the Competent Authority discounted income-tax returns where assessments had not been passed and relied instead on the company's balance-sheets, concluding (after calculations noted in the record) that the firm had a monthly income of about Rs. 1,202 and therefore could not obtain alternative premises within their means without creating slums.
- The Financial Commissioner reviewed objections raised by the petitioner's counsel concerning alleged technical flaws in the balance-sheet presentation (clubbing of loans and advances) but found that, after scrutiny and confrontation with records, the counsel conceded those objections and accepted the balance-sheets as supported by the accounts on record. The Commissioner thus rejected the petitioner's technical challenges to the balance-sheets and sustained the Competent Authority's financial conclusion.
The court then identifies two principal legal errors in the concurrent findings:
- Suitability of alternate accommodation: The Competent Authority erred in holding that the registered office, though only 50 yards away, was unsuitable solely because it was not identical in amenities or located in a lane of tyre dealers, or because it was dingy. The court emphasized that suitability does not require exact similarity of amenities or convenience; an alternate need not match the original premises in all respects.
- Standards for juristic persons: Neither the Competent Authority nor the Financial Commissioner considered whether the standard for assessing financial status under S.19(4) should differ when the tenant is a juristic person (a company) as opposed to an individual. The court reasoned that, for a juristic person, an assessment of status must take into account the corporate form and the financial resources available to persons who control or own the company. If persons with substantial means own the company or control other concerns, eviction of the company does not necessarily result in creation of slums because those individuals can support or house the commercial activity outside the slum. Thus, applying the same narrow yardstick as for an impoverished individual tenant risks giving undue protection to companies that are corporate entities controlled by relatively wealthy individuals.
The court concluded that both authorities failed to apply their minds to the question of the appropriate standard for a juristic tenant and that the Competent Authority had misapplied the suitability test with respect to the registered office at 1470, Rang Mahal. For these reasons, the High Court exercised its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to correct the error.
Holding and Implications
Petition allowed.
Implications and direct effects stated in the opinion:
- The High Court allowed the petition, overturning the prior outcome in which the Competent Authority had refused permission to sue for eviction and the Financial Commissioner had upheld that refusal.
- The court directed attention to two practical consequences for decision-makers under the Slum Act: (a) suitability of alternate accommodation need not mean identical amenities or exact similarity to the disputed premises, and (b) when the tenant is a juristic person, authorities must apply different and appropriate standards in assessing financial status and the likelihood of creation of slums on eviction.
The opinion does not purport to establish a detailed precedent beyond the application of these principles in the present case; it primarily resolves the petition by allowing it and by clarifying that authorities must consider the distinct status of juristic persons when applying S.19(4).
(1) COMP. Authority held that Respdt. was not earning much and declined permission. Order was upheld in appeal by Fin. Comm. Petitioned moved High Court. After detailing above facts, judgment proceeds] (2) The object of the Slum Act is the orderly elimination of slums with interim protection for the slum dwellers until they are moved into better dwelling. The Comp. Auth. are given sufficient discretion under the Slum Act to ascertain whether the tenant, who has accommodation in the slum area, is likely to create further slums, if evicted. While exercising this discretion, however the Comp. Auth. can take into account only the factors mentioned in S. 19(4) of the Slum Act. It is well settled that the two factors which have to be taken into consideration are : (a) the availability of alternate accommodation & (b) the financial status of the tenant in order to find out whether he would be in a position to get alternate accommodation in case he was evicted or whether he was likely to create slums.
(3) For finding out whether alternate accommodation within the means of the tenant would be available to him, the Comp. Auth. has to inquire into the question of the means of the tenant. A landlord, who files the petition u/s 19, alleging that the tenant has sufficient means would not naturally be in a position to know the exact income of the tenant. However, while filing the petition for permission u/s 19 for institution of eviction proceedings against the tenant he has to allege what according to his knowledge or information is the income of the tenant and adduce such evidence as is possible for him to place before the Comp. Auth. Once the landlord has done that, it is for the tenant to adduce positive evidence regarding his income which is especially within his knowledge. [Petitioner applied to Comp. Auth. On 23.5.70 for permission u/s 19 to sue respondent for eviction, Respdt. was doing business of Auto Spare parts in tenanted premises.
(4) COMP. Auth. in the present case on a specific averment made by the petitioner that alternate accommodation bearing No. 1470, Rang Mahal, was being used as a registered office by the tenant, inspected the premises and made a report on 6.10.71. In his report, he observed that the premised 1470, Rang Mahal comprised of dingy, dusty, foul-smelling suffocating, covered with spider webs, having no ventilation and uneven floors. The premises presented of a look of a godown and, therefore, the premises could not be used as alternate accommodation in place of the disputed premises, which is situated in the main tyre market. It was stated in the report that the alternate accommodation was at a distance of 50 yards from the disputed premises in a lane in which there was not a single shop which deals in tyres. While dealing with the questions of status, the Comp. Auth. observed that the income-tax assessment returns filed by the company for the year 1967-68 and 1969-70 were of no avail as no orders of assessment were passed thereon. Therefore, he relied on the balance-sheets 'filed by the company. The contention of the petitioner that by an order dated 23.3.71 the Ito had not accepted the balance-sheets filed by the company, and therefore, the balance- sheets filed for the subsequent years cannot be relied upon, was not accepted. While accepting the balance-sheets and coming to the conclusion that the company does not have sufficient means to get alternate accommodation, the Comp. Autho. observed :- "I,therefore relying upon the balance- sheet hold that the respondent firm is running into a loss of Rs. 1,359.00 for the year 1970. Even if for the sake of argument, it be assumed that alleged advances are simply paper transactions to their own firms as Shri Paras Nath, Managing Director, is running several "firms, as is evident from the Calendar, filed by the petitioner, the only adverse inference which can be drawn is that the respondent firm must be earning commercial interest of 12% P. a. over these advances. The learned Financial Commissioner has calculated this figure at Rs. 10,000.00 p.a, in his order dated 17.3.71. By adding gross profits of Rs. 4,424.00 this figure would come to Rs. 14,424.00per annum i.e. Rs. 1,202.00 p.m. The respondent is in possession of covered area of more than 1,000.00 sq. ft. Shri Paras Nath, 'Managing Director of the respondent firm has specifically stated in para 14 of his affidadavit, dated 1.9.1971 that the respondent firm will not be able to acquire alternate accomodation equal to the premises in dispute in the same area or in any other commercial area of motor parts business in a city like Delhi for any amount of rent, besides huge amount of 'Pagri money'. This specific averment of the respondent firm has not been denied specifically by the petitioner. From the evidence on record, I am, therefore, of the opinion that the respondent-firm having a monthly income of Rs. 1,200.00 cannot secure alternate business premises within their means without creating any further slums."
(5) The Financial Commissioner while dealing with the question of the financial status referred to the argument made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the balance-sheet as tendered by the respondent suffered from technical flaws of loans and advances as having been shown as a Single unit, held :
"I am afraid I cannot accept the first averment of the learned counsel for the appellant as a perusal of the balance-sheet as placed on record does not show the clubbing together of the loans and advances therein as was so averred to by the learned counsel for the appellant. This was conceded to by the learned counsel when he was so confronted with the copies of the balance-sheet as they existed on the Court's record who accordingly dropped this ground of assailment. The citation relied upon thus having become irrelevant needs no discussion...... As regards the third averment, on the request of the learned counsel for the appellant, books of account of the respondent-firm were sent for and were examined by him in my presence. After a thorough scrutiny, the learned counsel conceded that the balance-sheet as tendered stood supported by the accounts as disclosed to me. In the end the learned counsel very ably conceded that as per the evidence brought on record and explained by the respondent before me, the grounds of assailment as originally contemplated lose force and cannot thus be pressed."
(6) As far as the question of suitability of alternate accommodation is concerned I find that the competent Authority erred in coming to the conclusion that the registered office which was only 50 yards away was in a lane To which there is not a single shop which deals with tyres and that this accommodation was so dingy and dusty that it had no utility other than that of a godown, and, therefore, though it was in the possession of the respondent, being its registered office, was not to be considered as suitable alternate accommodation. There is no doubt that suitability of the accommodation has to be taken into account while deciding whether the tenant was likely to create any slums if evicted, but that does not mean that the alternate accommodation should be exactly similar or that it should have all amenities, facilities and conveniences which a tenant may be having in the premises from which he is sought to be evicted.
(7) As far as the order of the Fin. Comm. is concerned there is some substance in what the learned counsel for the petitioner contended. It seems that a very novel style of noting the contentions of the petitioner has been adopted and it is observed that almost every point has been conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner. However, without going into the question whether a particular point was conceded or not, I find that the Fin. Comm. has also missed the main point.
(8) I find that the Comp. Auth. as well as the Fin. Comm. have not applied their mind to the question whether in a case where the tenant is a corporate body the standard for deciding the financial status would be the same as it would be for an individual tenant. The Comp. Auth. in his order, as reproduced above, has observed that the Directors of the company had several other business which were doing very well but relied on the balance- sheets filed by the respondent and held that the company had an income ofRs.1,202.00p.m. which was not sufficient to acquire alternate accommodation equal to the premises in dispute.
(9) In the case of a juristic person while determining the financial status, the standards have necessarily to be different. It is not unknown that in the present days some companies continue to show losses either because of bad management or because the correct income is not shown in the balance-sheets and the income-tax returns. In the present case, the conduct of the respondent-tenant was such that initially it was even denied that the company was assessable to income-tax. It was only when during the course of the evidence when confronted with the assessment returns and the balance-sheets that it was submitted in evidence that the company was being assessed to tax. Even the question regarding the registered office being at another place at Queen's Road was denied originally in th affidavit but later admitted that the place was being shown as registered office in the calendar and the letter-heads though the accommodation belonged to Shri Paras Nath Jain in hi individual capacity. If persons who have financial interest in a Pvt. Ltd. Co. own severe other concerns and are sufficiently rich, no protection is contemplated under the Slum Ac because even if the company, which Is a tenant is going into losses, because even if eviction order is passed the company is not likely to create slums. The Slum Act was enacted for giving protection to poor individual tenants who have small means and cannot afford to get alternate accommodation outside the slum area or within the slum if evicted. If a couple of persons with substantial means float a company which goes into losses, even if they are evicted from the premises, they cannot create slums, particularly when the same persons own other concerns which also have offices at different places. In the present case, the Comp. Auth. had come to the conclusion that the income of the firm was only Rs. 1,202.00 and, therefore, it would not be in a position to get alternate accommodation in the same area where the tyre market was situated. If this criteria is adopted no company occupying tenanted premises in the notified slum area in the walled city of Delhi can be evicted by a landlord under the Delhi Rent Act, merely because the company is making losses or makes meagre profits. This is a case where an old lady has been trying to seek permission to evict a company carrying on business of spare parts in the tyre market from the premises let out to it, and has been rejected permission only because the company did not show substantial profits. The tenant is admittedly a dealer in motor spare parts, having registered office only 50 yards, away from the disputed premises. In my judgment, this is a fit case where in order to do substantial justice, jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, should be exercised particularly because both the authorities below have not considered the basic question regarding the fact that would determine the status of a juristic person. Petition allowed.
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