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Smt. Angira Devi Gupta v. Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi And Others

Delhi High Court

Apr 15, 1985

Judgment

Subsequent
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Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India sought quashing of acquisition proceedings relating to land in village Mehrauli described as measuring 30 bighas 6 biswas belonging to the petitioner. The challenged steps included a notification dated November 13, 1959 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, declarations dated December 6, 1966 and January 2, 1969 under Section 6 of the Act, and Award No. 60/82-83 dated January 17, 1983.

Key factual timeline as stated in the opinion:

November 13, 1959: A Section 4 notification (No.15(III)/59.LSG) was published covering land for planned development of Delhi, but it specifically excluded “Government land and evacuee land”.
The lands in question were evacuee land that had vested in the Government under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954.
1960: The Regional Settlement Commissioner published an auction notice for the evacuee land; a public auction was held on March 3, 1960. The petitioner was the highest bidder (Rs. 72,000) and the bid was approved; payment was made by adjustment of compensation receivable by the petitioner and an associate for properties in Pakistan. A sale certificate was issued under Rule 90 on February 22, 24, 1966 declaring the petitioner purchaser with effect from August 25, 1960 (copy annexed as Annexure-II to the writ petition).
1966: The petitioner filed an application for mutation (filed in 1966) which was processed in 1981; the land was finally mutated in the petitioner's name in the revenue records on October 8, 1982.
On or about April 28, 1983 the petitioner learned that respondents’ agents sought to enter and take possession; the petitioner discovered that declarations (December 7, 1966 and January 2, 1969) purportedly included her land though it had not been covered by the 1959 Section 4 notification. The petitioner also alleged she had not received notices under Sections 9 and 10.
January 17, 1983: An award (No. 60/82-83) was made in respect of part of the land. Subsequently, the petitioner filed the writ petition on May 5, 1983 seeking certiorari to quash the acquisition proceedings and the award.
Initially the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) was not a party; possession of part of the land was taken February 14, 1983 and handed over to DDA on February 28, 1983. The petitioner moved to implead DDA, which the Court directed.
January 29, 1985: The petitioner filed a supplementary affidavit specifying which portions were subject to possession and which portions were alleged to have been acquired pursuant to Award No. 60/82-83.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether acquisition proceedings and an award made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, can subsist in respect of land in the absence of a Section 4(1) notification specifically covering that land.
Whether a writ petition challenging the validity of acquisition notifications and declarations is barred by delay where the petitioner only discovered dispossession years after the initial notifications and award (the objection of laches / undue delay raised by respondents).
Whether a Section 4 notification that explicitly excludes “Government land and evacuee land” can validly be used as the basis to acquire land that was, on the date of that notification, evacuee land vested in the Government.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The land of the petitioner had been evacuee land vested in the Government and was specifically excluded from the November 13, 1959 Section 4 notification.
The petitioner purchased the land at public auction (highest bid) in 1960 and was declared purchaser by sale certificate issued in 1966 with effect from August 25, 1960; she sought mutation in 1966 and mutation was finally recorded on October 8, 1982.
The petitioner did not receive notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the Land Acquisition Act and therefore had no knowledge of acquisition proceedings until respondents’ agents sought to enter in April 1983; she promptly filed the writ petition thereafter.
The absence of any Section 4(1) notification covering the petitioner's land vitiates subsequent acquisition steps because Section 4 is a condition precedent to further action under the Act.

Respondents' Arguments

A preliminary objection (advanced by Mr. R.K. Anand for the respondents) was that the writ petition was highly belated and barred by delay; reliance was placed on the Supreme Court decision in Babu Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1979 SC 1713) which held that a person who allows acquisition proceedings to be completed and then attacks previously available grounds would be penalized for delay.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P. (1970) 1 SCC 125 : AIR 1971 SC 306	That a notification under Section 4 is the first step towards depriving a person of property and must be strictly construed; any serious lapse in issuance of such notification renders proceedings void.	The Court relied on this principle to emphasize that a Section 4(1) notification is a sine qua non for acquisition proceedings and must be validly issued with reference to the specific land sought to be acquired.
Babu Barkya Thakur (AIR 1960 SC 1203) (as cited)	That proceedings begin with a government notification under Section 4; foundational role of Section 4 notification in acquisition process.	Cited to reinforce the proposition that acquisition machinery commences only upon valid Section 4 notification.
Smt. Somavani v. State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 151)	That notification under Section 4(1) is a condition precedent to making a notification under Section 6(1); observations about simultaneous issue of Section 4 and Section 6 notifications when Section 5-A does not apply.	The Court relied on this authority to restate that Section 4(1) is condition precedent to Section 6(1) and that Section 4 must be in place for subsequent declarations to be valid.
Babu Singh v. Union of India (AIR 1979 SC 1713)	That a person who allows the Government to complete acquisition proceedings and then attacks the notification on grounds available earlier will be penalized for unreasonable delay (principle against dilatory tactics).	The Court considered this decision in addressing the respondents' preliminary objection of delay but distinguished the present facts because the petitioner had not received notices and only became aware of acquisition on dispossession in 1983; the Court found the delay satisfactorily explained and did not apply Babu Singh to bar relief.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded along two principal lines: (A) the legal requirement of a valid Section 4(1) notification as a condition precedent to any acquisition process under the Land Acquisition Act; and (B) whether the writ petition was barred by delay.

A. Requirement of Section 4(1) notification

The Court held that the issuance of a notification under Section 4(1) is a condition precedent and the sine qua non for initiation of acquisition proceedings. In the absence of such a notification covering particular land, subsequent steps (entry by the Collector under sub‑section (2) of Section 4, hearing of objections under Section 5-A, report to the appropriate Government and a declaration under Section 6) cannot lawfully follow.
The award of compensation is calculated with reference to the market value as of the date of the Section 4 notification; thus, where no Section 4 notification exists for the land, the statutory machinery for determining compensation cannot operate.
The Court observed that the 1959 Section 4 notification expressly excluded “Government land and evacuee land”. Because the particular land in question was evacuee land that had vested in the Central Government at the time of the November 13, 1959 notification, the Court concluded the notification could not be used as a basis to acquire that excluded land.
The Court emphasized the statutory requirement of public notice: Section 4(1) requires publication in the official gazette and a public notice in the locality so affected, the purpose being to inform affected persons so that they may take available steps (including objecting).

B. Delay / Laches

The respondents relied on Babu Singh for the proposition that challenge to a notification may be barred by long delay if the challenger had knowledge of the ground earlier but chose not to act. The Court considered that authority but found the present facts distinguishable.
The Court accepted the petitioner's explanation for delay: the petitioner did not receive any notices under Sections 9 and 10, the land had been shown as Government land in records for a long period, the sale certificate was issued with effect from August 25, 1960 but mutation in favour of the petitioner was not recorded until October 8, 1982, and the petitioner only became aware of acquisition when agents sought to enter in April 1983. Given the absence of Section 4(1) notification covering the petitioner's land, the petitioner could not be imputed with notice of subsequent acquisition proceedings.
On these facts the Court found the delay satisfactorily explained and did not apply the laches doctrine to refuse relief.

C. Conclusion of analysis

Because there was no valid Section 4(1) notification covering the petitioner's land and the 1959 notification expressly excluded evacuee land (which included the land in question), the Court concluded the impugned declarations and award could not stand.

Holding and Implications

Writ petition allowed; the challenged declarations and award were quashed.

Direct consequences ordered by the Court (as stated in the opinion):

The impugned declarations dated December 6, 1966 and January 2, 1969 and Award No. 60/82-83 dated January 17, 1983 are quashed.
The Delhi Development Authority is directed to restore possession to the petitioner of the various khasra numbers mentioned in the notification dated February 28, 1983 that placed the land at the disposal of the Delhi Development Authority.
The possession of the remaining khasra numbers should be restored by the Delhi Administration.
The restoration of possession is to be completed within one month from the date of the judgment.
The Court made no order as to costs.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion rests on established principles that a valid Section 4(1) notification is a mandatory prerequisite to acquisition and that exclusion of evacuee or government land from a Section 4 notification precludes acquiring such excluded land under that notification. The Court did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying settled authorities to the facts; the decision's immediate effect is the quashing of the specific declarations and award and restoration of possession to the petitioner.

Result: Petition allowed.

Show all summary ...

This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeks the quashing of the acquisition proceedings pursuant to notification dated November 13, 1959 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, declarations dated December 6, 1966.January 2, 1969 under Section 6 of the Act culminating in an Award No. 60/83 dated January 17, 1983 for the acquisition of 30 bighas 6 biswas of land belonging to the petitioner situate in village Mehrauli.

2. The facts are not in dispute. In 1959 respondent No. 2 issued a notification No. 15(III)/59.LSG dated November 13,1959 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) notifying that land admeasuring 34070 acres and marked with blocks and description specified in the notification was required by the Government at the public expense for a public purpose, namely, the planned development of Delhi. The said notification covered, inter alia, the land of village of Mehrauli but specifically excluded from the purview of the acquisition proceedings “Government land and evacuee land”.

3. The land bearing Khasra Nos. 1452, 1455, 2278/1456-1455, 1458 to 1460, 2006/1462, 1531, 1352, 2071/1533, 2072/1553, 2073/1533. 1534 to 1537, 1539 to 1543, 2362/1544, 2363/1544, 2354/1544. 1545 to 1549, 1551, 1552. 1639, 1642 to 1651, 201/1652, 2016/1652 and 1654 to 1658 measuring 30 bighas 6 biswas situated in village Mehrauli was acquired evacuee land and vested in the Government under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. In 1960 an auction notice was published by the Office of the Regional Settlement Commissioner, Government of India, Ministry of Rehabilitation, putting up the aforesaid and being evacuee land for sale by public auction. The public auction was held on March 3,1960 in pursuance of the powers conferred upon the Managing Officer under Section 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. At the public auction the petitioner herein gave the highest bid for purchase of the said land for Rs. 72,000/-. Her bid was accepted and approved by the Competent Authority. The sum of Rs. 72,000/-was paid by the petitioner by adjustment of compensation of her and her associate's claim against properties left by her in Pakistan. A sale certificate was issued under Rule 90 on February 22, 24,1966 declaring the petitioner as purchaser of the said land with effect from August 25, 1960. A copy of the sale certificate is attached as Annexure-II to the writ petition.

4. The petitioner then filed an application for mutation proceedings to get the properties recorded in her favour in the revenue records. The application although filed in the year 1966 was processed in 1981 and said land was finally mutated in the name of the petitioner in the revenue records on October 8, 1982.

5. According to the allegations in the writ petition the petitioner came to know on or about April 28, 1983 about the acquisition proceedings when the agents/employees of the respondents were seeking to enter upon the petitioner's land to take possession. On enquiry the petitioner was told that the said land had been acquired by the respondents. The petitioner then came to know that declarations dated December 7, 1966 and January 2,1969 were issued including the said land of the petitioner in it, although the said land was not covered by the preliminary notification dated November 13, 1959 issued under Section 4. The petitioner also states that she did not receive any notices under sections 9 and 10 and she was never informed by the respondents probably for the reason that the land was not mutated in the name of the petitioner in the official records. It may be that all along the said land was shown as Government land in those records, and thus no notice was thought to be necessary. The petitioner further came to know that award in respect of part of the land was made on January 17, 1983. It is then that the petitioner filed the present writ petition on May 5,1983 seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the acquisition proceedings and award dated January 17, 1983.

6. Initially the Delhi Development Authority was not made a party to the writ petition. At the time of the grant of interim relief, Mr. R.K Anand who is appearing for the Central Government stated that the possession of a part of the land in dispute was taken on February 14, 1983 and was handed over on February 28, 1983 to the Delhi Development Authority. The petitioner then moved an application for impleading the Delhi Development Authority as a party to the writ petition. The Delhi Development Authority was directed to be impleaded as a party respondent to the writ petition.

7. Although initially the petitioner had alleged that the entire land was the subject matter of award No. 60/82-83 dated January 17,1983 but later on sought leave of the Court to file a supplementary affidavit. The supplementary affidavit was filed on January 29, 1985. Para 2(a) of the supplementary affidavit specifies the portion of the land in village Mehrauli the possession of which was taken over by the Government and that the same is not the subject matter of award No. 60/82-83 dated January 17, 1983. Para 2(b) mentions the portions of the land in village Mehrauli which have been alleged to have been acquired pursuant to the award No. 60/82-83 dated January 17, 1983 and possession of which was taken by the Government and handed over to the Delhi Development Authority.

8. The writ petition is entitled to succeed on the short ground that there is no notification under Section 4(1) of the Act covering the said land of the petitioner. The issue of a notification u/s. 4(1) is a condition precedent to the exercise of any further power under the Act. The process of acquisition must start with the notification under Section 4 and the notification under Section 4 is a sine qua non. In the absence of Section 4 notification no acquisition proceedings can subsist as neither the Collector can enter upon the property for the purposes mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 4 nor can the Collector hear the objections under Section 5 A, nor can it submit the report to the appropriate Government for consideration and issue of the declaration u/s. 6. The essential mandatory requirement of initiation of acquisition proceedings is the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act covering the land proposed to be acquired. The award of the compensation is on the basis of the market value as on the date of Section 4 notification. Where there is no notification under Section 4, the machinery provided by the Act for determination of compensation obviously cannot apply.

9. In “Narendrajit Singh v. State of U.P” (1970) 1 SCC 125 : (AIR 1971 SC 306), the Government of U.P issued a notification purporting to be under Section 4 of the Act that the lands mentioned in the schedule belonging to the appellants there was needed for a public purpose. This case being of urgency the Governor directed the Collector under Section 17 to take possession of the land. The appellants there filed writ petition in the High Court on the ground that the notification under Section 4 of the Act was invalid for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Act rendering the whole proceedings void and that the exact land which was required by the State Government was not specified in the notification. It was held (at P. 309 of AIR) :—

“Any notification which is the first step towards depriving a man of his property must be strictly construed and courts ought not to tolerate any lapse on the part of the acquiring authority in the issue of such notification if it be of a serious nature. In the case of Babu Barkya Thakur (AIR 1960 SC 1203) (supra) it was pointed out by this Court that :—

“The proceedings begin with a Government notification under Section 4 that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose.”

It is well known that a person interested in the land which is affected by any notification under Section 4(1) may immediately object to it and take proceedings in Court against it. In Smt. Somavani v. State of Punjab (AIR 1963 SC 151) one of the main questions before this Court was whether a notification under Section 4(1) and one under Section 6(1) could be issued simultaneously. Although the Court took the view that where Section 5-A was not in the way there was no irregularity in publishing the notification on the same day yet it observed that:

“Notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 is a condition precedent to the making of a notification under sub-section (1) of Sec. 6.”

10. It is not disputed that the said land was acquired evacuee property and vested in the Central Government on November 18, 1959 when the notification under Section 4 was issued. “Government land and evacuee land” is specifically excluded from the purview of the notification dated November 13, 1959. In my opinion, a notification which specifically excludes the “Government land and evacuee land”, cannot be resorted to have further acquisition proceedings in respect of excluded land.

11. A preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. R.K Anand, the learned counsel for the respondents that the writ petition is highly belated as it seeks the quashing of Section 4 notification dated November 13, 1959, declarations dated December 7, 1966.January 2, 1969. Reliance is placed on Babu Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1713. It was held that if a person allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that Section 4 notification and Section 6 declaration are valid and then attacked the notification on the grounds which were available to him at the time when the notification was published, it would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics.

12. In Babu Singh's case (supra) before the Supreme Court the notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 was issued on March 15, 1963 and in view of the urgency the Government by a notification of the same date under Section 17 dispensed with the provisions of Section 5-A and thereafter made a declaration under sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act and issued the notification on the same date. The writ petitions were filed on April 22, 1969. i.e nearly six years and one month after the publication of the notification under Section 4 and about five years after the award. No explanation was offered there why writ petition was filed after such an inordinate delay. In my view the delay in filing this writ petition has been satisfactorily explained. No Section 4 notification has been issued under the Act regarding the said land. The notification dated November 13, 1959 specifically excluded from its purview all “Government land and evacuee land”. On the date of notification dated November 13, 1959 the said land was acquired evacuee land and vested in Government. No acquisition proceedings could have been commenced with respect to said land unless there was a notification under Section 4. The petitioner became owner by virtue of a sale certificate dated February 24,1966 and was declared as the purchaser of the said land with effect from August 25, 1966 (the date on which her bid was confirmed). The petitioner moved an application for mutation which was finally sanctioned in the name of the petitioner on October 8,1982. The petitioner did not receive any notice, under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act and therefore cannot be imputed with any knowledge of the acquisition proceedings. The petitioner came to know of the acquisition proceedings when the agents/employees of the respondents sought to enter upon the petitioner's land. The petitioner thus became aware of the acquisition proceedings in 1983 only. The petitioner then invoked the jurisdiction of this court soon thereafter.

13. In the case before me there is no notice to the petitioner at all. Section 4(1) requires a notification to be published in the official gazette and also a public notice of the substance of the notification at convenient places in the locality. The purpose is to give public notice of the proposal and it is published in the locality so that the persons affected by the proposals are aware that such an activity is taking place. It is only then that the persons can be imputed knowledge of the acquisition proceedings. In the absence of the notification under Section 4, the petitioner cannot be put to notice of the subsequent acquisition proceedings. The petitioner approached this Court immediately after her dispossession from a part of the land.

14. For the above reasons the writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned declarations dated December 6, 1966 and January 2, 1969 and the Award No. 60/82-83 dated January 17, 1983 are hereby quashed. The Delhi Development Authority is directed to restore possession to the petitioner of various khasra numbers mentioned in the notification dated February 28, 1983 placing the land at the disposal of the Delhi Development Authority. The possession of the remaining khasra numbers should be restored by the Delhi Administration. The restoration of the possession be done within one month from today. On the facts and circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.

Petition allowed.