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Smt. Ganga Devi & Ors. v. State (Delhi Admn) .
Summary of Opinion — Charanjit Talwar, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This judgment disposes of two revision petitions heard together: Criminal Revision No. 216 of 1983 and Criminal Revision No. 224 of 1983.
Criminal Revision No. 216 of 1983: Petitioners Ganga Devi, her son Om Parkash and her grandson Bhupinder Kumar sought quashing of a charge framed on 6 August 1983 by the Additional Sessions Judge under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The charge alleged that on 8 June 1982 Smt. Usha Rani committed suicide and that the petitioners, in furtherance of common intention, abetted that suicide by torture and instigation. The trial Court's reasons (order dated 4 August 1983) recorded statements including those of the victim's father and of a witness Zeenat Begum to the effect that the victim had complained of being taunted, humiliated and told to die so that her husband could re-marry; on that basis the trial court found sufficient material to frame a charge.
Criminal Revision No. 224 of 1983: Petitioners Rakesh Kumar Bansal and his mother Smt. Krishna Gupta challenged a charge under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC arising from the suicide of Smt. Usha Bansal on 27 February 1982. The suicide occurred in the in-laws' house; the First Information Report was lodged by the mother-in-law (petitioner No. 2). The trial Court noted two suicide notes written by the deceased (one to her husband, one to her brother) and statements by the deceased's father and brothers alleging maltreatment; the petition sought quashing of the framed charge.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the material and circumstances on record in each case, there was sufficient prima facie material to justify framing a charge under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC (i.e., whether the accused had instigated or abetted the suicides).
- Whether, at the stage of a revision seeking quashing of a charge, the court may go into the merits and weigh the evidence or is restricted to assessing whether there is sufficient material on record to sustain a prima facie charge (including the relevance of Supreme Court authority cited).
- Whether the precedent(s) relied upon (including Brij Lal and the Supreme Court decision in Santokh Singh / Gurcharan Singh) control the standard for quashing charges in such family-suicide contexts, and whether distinctions between different factual contexts (for example, a young bride driven to desperation vs. other kinds of victims) affect that standard.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Counsel for the petitioners in both matters relied on the Court's decision in Brij Lal v. State (Criminal Revision No. 326/83) to contend that the charges framed against their clients were groundless.
- The petitioners' primary contention was that the prosecution had failed to establish a consistent course of torture, humiliation, neglect or oppression amounting to abetment to suicide; therefore, there was no prima facie basis for the charge under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC.
Respondent's Arguments
- Mr. D.R. Sethi, for the respondent, submitted that the decision in Brij Lal was not correct or not applicable insofar as it conflicted with the Supreme Court's judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 1984 (Santokh Singh v. Gurcharan Singh, decided 27 January 1984).
- The respondent argued that the Supreme Court authority limits the High Court's power to quash a charge at the prima facie stage because the High Court should not go into the merits of the prosecution case; therefore this Court should not weigh evidence when considering the revision petitions.
- The respondent also relied on distinctions drawn in Brij Lal itself between different factual contexts (for example, a bride driven to self-immolation versus other categories of victims) to argue that the cases before the Court should be assessed on their own facts.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Brij Lal v. State (Criminal Revision No. 326/83) (15 October 1984) | The decision is used to show that where the material consists mainly of dying declarations or is otherwise weak, quashing a charge may be appropriate to avoid subjecting accused to futile trial; the case also drew distinctions between factual contexts (e.g., an old mother-in-law vs. a young bride). | The petitioners relied on this judgment to argue that the charges were groundless. The Court considered Brij Lal but observed factual distinctions and did not apply it universally; it noted the specific factual differences between the present matters and Brij Lal when assessing whether a prima facie case existed. |
| Santokh Singh v. Gurcharan Singh (Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 1984) — Supreme Court (27 January 1984) | The Supreme Court held that a High Court is not justified in quashing a charge when it purports to go into the merits; quashing at the prima facie stage is constrained by the need not to weigh evidence. | The respondent relied on this Supreme Court authority to submit that this Court should not go into the merits of the prosecution case when considering the petitions. The Court treated this authority as a restriction on its power to weigh evidence at the revision stage. |
| Gurcharan Singh v. State (reported in 1983 Chandigarh Criminal Cases 350) | Illustrative facts where the Additional Sessions Judge had found maltreatment and framed a charge under Section 306; the case proceeded through High Court and Supreme Court review concerning whether a Section 306 charge was justifiable. | The Court referred to the facts and procedural history of this case as part of the discussion on the limits of quashing charges at the prima facie stage and to show how appellate and revisional review had been treated in related circumstances. Counsel relied on that history in their submissions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by stating the controlling procedural principle: at the stage of considering a revision petition to quash a criminal charge, the court cannot go into the merits of the prosecution case, cannot weigh evidence, and must accept the evidence collected by the prosecution for the limited purpose of deciding whether a prima facie charge is justified.
The Court then applied this standard to each petition separately.
Criminal Revision No. 216 (Ganga Devi, Om Parkash, Bhupinder Kumar):
- The Court identified the material on record relied upon by the prosecution: (a) the statement of the victim's father that the victim had repeatedly complained of being taunted and humiliated by her husband, father-in-law and husband's grandmother, and that she was repeatedly told that if she died her husband could re-marry; and (b) the statement of Zeenat Begum, a friend, corroborating that the victim had been complaining that these relatives were always asking her to die so that Bhupinder might re-marry.
- The Court observed that Zeenat Begum's statement, coupled with the father's statement and other witnesses, constituted sufficient material on record to arrive at a prima facie conclusion that the accused instigated the victim to commit suicide.
- The Court applied the ordinary meaning of "instigate" (to goad, provoke, incite, urge or encourage to commit a crime) and found that the repeated suggestions to the victim that she should die could prima facie fall within the purview of instigation.
- On that basis, and without weighing the evidence, the Court refused to quash the charge framed under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC in Criminal Revision No. 216.
Criminal Revision No. 224 (Rakesh Kumar Bansal and Krishna Gupta):
- The Court examined the suicide notes written by the deceased (copies reproduced in the trial Court's order). Those notes express the deceased's emotional state, her sense of being unloved, her belief that her husband's love was dominated by his mother's selfishness, and her own decision to take her life. Importantly, the notes did not allege maltreatment or overt instigation by the husband or the mother-in-law.
- The Court reviewed statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC from the deceased's brothers and father, which contained complaints by the deceased of reprimands, harassment and, on some occasions, physical beating. These statements describe reprimands for small domestic matters and allegations of harassment and abuse.
- However, the Court found that the suicide notes themselves contained no allegation of maltreatment or instigation; and that the section 161 statements, detailing reprimands and domestic quarrels, did not on their face amount to instigation to suicide.
- The Court also considered the personal characteristics noted in the record (the deceased being well-educated and sensitive, and having formed definite views about her situation) as context for the content of the notes, but emphasised that the material did not prima facie establish that reprimands and domestic scolding amounted to instigation.
- Concluding that there was not sufficient prima facie material to support a charge under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC, the Court held that proceeding to trial would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and therefore allowed the revision petition and quashed the charge in Criminal Revision No. 224.
Throughout its analysis the Court adhered to the limitation that it could not weigh evidence at this stage; its determinations turned on whether the available material, taken at face value for the purpose of the revision, was sufficient to sustain a prima facie charge.
Holding and Implications
Final Disposition:
- Criminal Revision No. 216 of 1983 — rejected. The Court found prima facie material on record (including the victim's father's statement and Zeenat Begum's corroboration) indicating repeated suggestions to the victim that she should die, which could prima facie amount to instigation; therefore the charge under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC was not quashed.
- Criminal Revision No. 224 of 1983 — allowed. The Court held that the suicide notes contained no allegation of maltreatment or instigation and that the section 161 statements relating to reprimands and domestic scolding did not, on the material before the Court, amount to prima facie instigation; accordingly, the charge under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC was quashed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the charge in Criminal Revision No. 216 remains effective (the revision was rejected); the charge in Criminal Revision No. 224 has been quashed (the revision was allowed).
- The opinion applies established principles about the limited scope of revisional/quashing review at the prima facie stage — specifically that a court should not go into the merits or weigh evidence but must decide whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, is sufficient to frame a charge.
- This judgment does not purport to lay down a new general precedent beyond applying those principles to the particular materials before the Court; it determines the sufficiency of the prima facie material in the two specific cases before it.
Charanjit Talwar, J.:— This judgment disposes of two revision petitions, namely, Cr. R. Nos. 216 and 224 of 1983, which were directed by Anand J. to be heard together.
2. By Criminal Revision No. 216 of 1983 Ganga Devi, her son Om Parkash and her grand son Bhupinder Kumar have sought quashing of the charge framed against them under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on 6th August, 1983. The charge reads as under:—
“I, Shri B.B Gupta, A.S.J: New Delhi charge you Om Parkash son of Hari Ram, (2) Bhupinder Kumar son of Om Parkash and Smt. Ganga Devi w/o Hari Ram as under:
That on 8.6.1982 at house No. B-5/75, Safdarjang Enclave, New Delhi, in the area of P.S Vinay Nagar, Smt. Usha Rani committed suicide. And you all in furtherance of your common intention abetted the commission of that suicide by torture and instigation, and thereby you committed the offence punishable under Section 306 read with 34 Indian Penal Code and within the jurisdiction of this Court.
Sd/- A.S.J New Delhi.”
The reasons for framing the above charge are contained in a separate order dated 4th August, 1983. It has been noticed therein that immediately after her marriage to Bhupinder Kumar, Usha Rani had been complaining to her parents that her husband, her father-in-law and her grand mother-in-law, the petitioners herein were wanting her to commit suicide so that Bhupinder Kumar her husband might be free to re-marry. Her father in his statement before the police had further stated that Usha Rani was constantly complaining that she was being taunted and humiliated by them. The trial Court has concluded that—
‘'In this case, I find that there is statement of one Zeenat Begum that Usha Rani had been complaining to her that her husband and husband's grand mother and father-in-law had always been asking her to die so that Bhupinder may be free to re-marry. Without going into the merits of the proposition laid down in the above authorities which are binding on this court and which proposition cannot be disputed, at this stage, I am only to consider as to whether there is grave suspicion that the accused instigated Usha Rani to commit suicide. I am of the considered Opinion that in View of statement of Zeenat Begum coupled with the statement of Ram Gopal and other witnesses, there is sufficient material on record to arrive at a prima facie conclusion that the accused did instigate Usha Rani to commit suicide and which is sufficient to frame a charge. Accordingly, I order that the charge against the accused be framed under Section 306 read with Section 34 I.P.C”. In this petition the above reasons are assailed.
3. In the other revision petition (No. 224 of 1983) Rakesh Kumar Bansal and his mother Smt. Krishna Gupta who have also been arraigned under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code seek quashing of the charge framed against them for having abetted Usha Rani in committing suicide. That charge reads as under:—
“I, B.B Gupta, Addl. Sessions Judge, New Delhi hereby charge you Smt. Krishna Gupta w/o S.P Bansal aged 46 years, service, r/o House No. D-20 Gulmohar Park, New Delhi, and (2) Rakesh Bansal s/o Sh. S.P Bansal r/o D-20 Gulmohar Park, New Delhi, as under:
That on 27.2.1982 at about 1.40 p.m at House No. D-20 Gulmohar Park, New Delhi, Smt. Usha Bansal committed suicide and you both in furtherance of your common intention abetted its commission and thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC and within the jurisdiction of this court.”
Smt. Usha Bansal, wife of petitioner No. 1, and daughter-in-law of petitioner No. 2, had hanged herself in her in-laws house on 27th February, 1982. Admittedly, no one else was present at that time in that house. The first information report was lodged by her mother-in-law, petitioner No. 2. The learned trial Court has noticed that Usha Bansal had written two “suicide notes”, one addressed to her husband petitioner No. 1 and the other addressed to her younger brother. The said notes have been reproduced by the trial Court in its order dated 2nd August, 1983. Apart from noticing the said notes, the learned Court has also noticed the evidence of the father as well as her brother alleging that she had been maltreated. In the said notes, however, there is no suggestion that she was being maltreated. The note to her brother reads:—
“Loving Pawan,
Today life has come to such a point as leaves no other wayout than this. You know my condition very well. You all will say that I am a coward that I am running away from life. But Bhaia I'd waited for long and am left with no energies to fight for life any more.
Now we are not on speaking terms even. But you know Rakesh is not responsible for this, So don't curse him. It is only to satisfy his mummy's selfish ends and only compelled by her that he turns against me. But this all is the Almight's will. I can't pull on any more.
So good-bye my dear little bhaia and also convey my good bye to our loving parents, brothers, bhabis and the kids.
once-yours didi”.
The other suicide note addressed to her husband Rakesh Kumar Bansal is to the following effect:—
“Reeku, my dearest one Feb. 27, ‘82.
I loved you Reeku, loved you too much, I still love you and I'll continue to love you for ever and forever. You loved me too, but your love had always been ruled by the selfishness of your mummy and also by the fear that as mummy dominates papa I may also start the same. But darling you had been deceived by this your thought. It was only out of my love for you that Itd killed my passions, desires, emotions. Mentally, emotionally, financially and physically as well I had changed myself altogether. But this all could safisfy, neither you nor your mummy. She needs you only. I'm sorry “ITNI DER KE LIYE MAINE AAPKO UNSE CHHINA” (though only for nights), So now I'm going to make you able to set an examplary mother-son relationship.
May God bless you my love with all the comforts of life. This I'll pray when I'll be quite close to Him.
Wishing all the best in
this universe for you,
once yours
an unfortunate soul
Shabbo.
P.S Don't spoil anyone else's life.
Shabbo.
Please send the other letter to Jaitu if you want to rest my soul in peace.
Shabbo”.
Mr. I.U Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners, in the first case and Mr. D.C Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner in the second case have taken me through the First Informating Reports and the evidence recorded by the Investigation Agency under section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the respective cases. Both of them rely on a judgment of this Court in Brij La! v. State (Criminal Revision No. 326/83) decided on 15th October, 1984, in support of their contention that charges framed against their clients are groundless. Their plea is that prosecution has failed completely to show that there was any consistent course of torture, humiliation, neglect or oppression which could be said to amount to abetment to an act to suicide. Mr. D.R Sethi, learned counsel for the respondent, in both these cases, submits that the decision in Brij Lal's case is not correct as it is not in accord with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 1984 (Santokh Singh v. Gurcharan Singh) decided on 27th January, 1984. At any rate, he further submits that this Court in Brij Lal's case has made a distinction between the cases of a self-immolation by a young bride and that of a mother-in-law being driven to commit suicide. I may note here that in Brij Lal's case the allegations were that an old lady had been goaded by her son and daughter-in-law to commit suicide. The son and his wife were charged under section 306 for having abetted the offence. The material collected by the prosecution in that case consisted mainly of two dying declarations of Durga Devi mother of Brij Lal. The victim had died of self-immolation. The dying declarations were contradictory. There was no other evidence as to the course of conduct and the nature of relationship between the victim and the other members of the family or as to the conduct of the son and daughter-in-Law after the event. Admittedly, the victim had lived with the couple happily for over ten years. The dying declaration's language was not very coherent but it was clear from it that Durga Devi had decided to take her life because she did not like the way she was being treated by her son at the instance of her daughter-in-law. Anand J., concluded that “in the absence of the other material the trial of the couple On the charge would appear to be an exercise in futility, and if the couple must Ultimately be acquitted on the material, which ever Way one looks at the declarations it would certainly be an abuse of the process of the court to subject them to the agony of the trial……”.
4. Now adverting to the facts of the case in Gurcharan Singh v. State reported in 1983 Chandigarh Criminal Cases 350, decided by this Court which was reserved by the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 51 of 1984 decided on 27th January, 1984. Prima facie findings of the Additional Sessions Judge in that case were that Gurcharan Singh had maltreated his wife and thereby created circumstances which made the deceased to end her life. A charge under Sec. 306 read with Sec. 107 of the Indian Penal Code was framed against him. The prosecution case, however, before the High Court was that Gurcharan Singh had burnt his wife and thus committed an offence under Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. While opposing the revision petition seeking quashing of the charge under Sec. 306 of the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution had pressed that the Court in its inherent powers should amend the charge to that under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. On the facts of the case Aggarwal J. held that there was no material on the record for framing a charge under section 306 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner. Consequently, he allowed the petition and quashed the order of the Additional Sessions Judge. In appeal the Supreme Court held that the High Court purported to go into the merits of the case It Was observed that the High Court was not justified in quashing the charge. As noticed above, Mr. Sethi relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in support of his contention that it is not open to this court to go into the merits and to come to a finding whether the charges as framed in these two petitions are justified. His submission is that, at any rate, in Brij Lal's case, the case of bride who is almost driven to a state of desperation iri which self-immolation may appear to her to be the only source of liberation, has been distinguished from a case of mother-in-law burning herself in disgust. It is true that Anand J. has held that the two cases do not appear to have a parallel. It was observed that “while the consistent course of torture, humiliation, neglect and oppression may, in one situation, amount to abetment to an act of suicide. It need not necessarily be so in the other, unless there are other compelling circumstances, which lend support to such a conclusion”. The argument by the counsel for the petitioners is that in the present case it has prima facie not been proved that it was a consistent course of torture and oppression which had led the brides to commit suicide.
5. It is well-settled that I cannot go into the merits of the prosecution case at this stage. It is not open to me to weigh the evidence and that evidence collected by the prosecution has to be accepted. The question whether a charge is justified in each of these two cases is to be decided by keeping in view the material and the circumstances on record. Now adverting to the first petition the statement of the father of the victim Usha Rani highlights the following facts:—
(i) after marriage of his daughter whenever he visited the house of the petitioners herein complaint was made to him by his son-in-law that Usha was not fit for their family and she did not know anything;
(ii) whenever Usha Rani visited his house she had been telling him that she was being taunted by her father-in-law, her husband and her husband's grand-mother;
(iii) Usha Rani used to complain that she was being told repeatedly that if she died Bhupinder Kumar her husband would be free to re-marry; and
(iv) that Usha Rani was being humiliated and maltreated by the petitioners herein.
The prosecution has also recorded the statement of one Zeenat Begum, a friend of the complainant's family who has stated that Usha Rani had been complaining to her that her husband and husband's grand-mother and father-in-law had always been asking her to die so that Bhupinder may be free to re-marry. In this case the statement of Zeenat Begum clearly brings out on record that prima facie the petitioners were repeatedly suggesting to Usha Rani that she should die. This statement corroborates the statement made by the father that it was the course of torture, humiliation and oppression which the victim had been undergoing at the hands of the petitioners which led her to commit suicide. Such a course adopted by the petitioners prima facie can be said to come within the purview of the expression ‘instigation’. A person is said to instigate when he goads, provokes, incites, urges or encourages to commit a crime.
6. In the second case, the suicide notes which I have noticed above show that the victim Usha Bansal had become disgruntled. She had come to the conclusion that her husband did not love her. There is a suggestion that she was disgusted with life. However, she does not allege maltreatment either by her husband or by her mother-in-law in those two notes. With the assistance of Mr. Mathur, I have gone through the statements of Rakesh Raman, Pawan Kumar, the two brothers of the deceased and that of Sudha Ram, her father. The brothers have stated that their sister used to complain to them that after her marriage she had been harassed and reprimanded by her mother-in-law. Rakesh Raman has stated that her mother-in-law used to reprimand her because of ‘small happenings for instance if the light is not switched off etc………”. Pawan Kumar has said that “she complained about her husband and mother-in-law and stated that her mother-in-law reprimands her on small domestic matters and scolds her”. He goes on to say that on the asking of his mother Rakesh Bansal would also badly treat her and “sometimes the situation would come to beating for days together both of them would come to non-speaking terms and her mother-in-law on the point of dowry used sarcastic words”. Her father has stated that “she was vary unhappy in her in-laws house and that her mother-in-law and husband on the point of dowry and other small happenings in the house used to harass her very much and abuse her and reprimand her. Sometimes the situation comes to beating. I always counselled her that according to Hindu customs after marriage the matrimonial house is the home of the wife and that she should adjust”.
7. I may note here that Usha Bansal was highly educated girl. It is on record that she was M.A.B.T Her husband Rakesh Bansal was only a Lower Division Clerk. From her suicide note it appears that she was quite well-read and had definite view about the role of a husband. She was also very sensitive. She considered her mother-in-law to be selfish. She was married for about 6-7 months and in this period she realised that her mother-in-law ruled not only her father-in-law but also her husband. She came to the conclusion that her husband was merely his mother's boy. To her brother she wrote that her husband was not responsible and that “it is only to satisfy his mummy's selfish ends and only compelled by her that he turns against me. But this all is the Almight's will”. To her husband she wrote “you love me but your love has always been ruted by the selfishness of your mummy and also by the fear that as mummy dominates papa I may also start the same”. In these notes there is no suggestion of maltreatment or instigation by the petitioners. From the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also it cannot be said that reprimands given to the victim referred to therein can be said to have instigated her to commit suicide. The trial in this case would in my view, amount to abuse of the process of the Court.
8. The result is that I reject Criminal Revision No. 216 of 1983 but allow Criminal Revision No. 224 of 1983.
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