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L. Maran Petitioner v. The Superintendent Of Police

Madras High Court
Sep 21, 2010
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking certiorari and mandamus to quash an order dated 14.09.2010 issued by the second respondent (police) which refused permission to hold a one-day public meeting on 20.09.2010 at Managiri Village, Thiruppathur Taluk, Sivagangai District. The petitioner claimed to be the District Organiser of the political party "Naam Thamizhar" and sought to hold the meeting to protest killings of Tamil Nadu fishermen and to press for retrieval of Katchadeevu Island. The impugned refusal cited law and order concerns arising from Section 30(2) of the Police Act and the occurrence of several memorial events in the area during the same period, which, in the respondents' view, could lead to breach of public peace.

The matter was taken up urgently. Notice was issued to the learned Special Government Pleader who took instructions from the respondents. After hearing, the court set aside the impugned police order, and, since the originally proposed meeting date had passed, the court directed that the petitioner be permitted to hold a meeting on 24.09.2010 between 05:00 p.m. and 09:30 p.m. at the same venue with sound facilities and appropriate police protection. The petition was allowed; there was no order as to costs and connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondents lawfully refused permission to hold the public meeting on grounds of law and order (relying on Section 30(2) of the Police Act and the occurrence of local memorial events), or whether that refusal unlawfully curtailed the petitioner's fundamental rights.
  2. Whether the regulatory power under Section 30(2) (and (3)) of the Police Act permits a blanket or prolonged suspension of citizens' rights (here, effectively a 45-day prohibition), or whether it must be exercised in a case-by-case, reasonable manner.
  3. Whether the police/authority applied proper mind and relevant factors (and avoided irrelevant considerations) when refusing permission, and whether the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard before the refusal.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner, claiming to be the District Organiser of "Naam Thamizhar", sought permission to hold a peaceful public meeting on 20.09.2010 at Managiri Village to protest killings of Tamil Nadu fishermen and to demand retrieval of Katchadeevu Island.
  • It was asserted that the meeting was part of a statewide series of meetings held democratically and peacefully and that the proposed meeting itself was innocuous and not connected to the memorial events cited by the police.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents refused permission primarily on two grounds: (a) Section 30(2) of the District Police Act (Police Act) was in force in the Thiruppathur Sub Division allowing regulation of assemblies and processions, and (b) several memorial events (Martyr Immanuelsekaran's memorial, memorial of Marudhupandiar brothers, and Devar Guru Poojai) were to take place during the period, which, in their view, made a breach of law and order likely if other meetings were permitted.
  • The learned Special Government Pleader stated that the authority had applied its mind in refusing permission and suggested that the petitioner could hold the meeting after Devar Guru Poojai (noting that, according to the respondents' stand, the ban period effectively ran for about 45 days from one memorial event to another).
  • The respondents maintained that the regulation under Section 30 justified restricting meetings during the period to prevent breaches of public peace.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C.J. Rajan, Madurai-2 v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mayiladuthurai and another (2008 (3) MLJ 926 (Mad)) Police refusal to permit meetings on irrelevant grounds criticized. The court relied on this decision to show that police refusals based on irrelevant grounds have been condemned and to support setting aside the impugned refusal.
Patchaimal K.T v. The Superintendent of Police, Kanyakumari and others (2009 Writ L.R 65) After considering constitutional and statutory principles, police orders refusing demonstrations can be set aside where unjustified. The court cited this decision as precedent where the police order was set aside and a demonstration permitted, supporting the present court's conclusion to set aside the impugned order.
Himat Lal K. Shah v. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad (AIR 1973 SC 87 = 1973 (1) SCC 227) Rule empowering police to refuse permission without guidance is arbitrary; "regulating" may include conditions but arbitrary discretion struck down; limits on restrictions under Article 19. The court referred to the Constitution Bench decision to demonstrate the constitutional limits on police discretion, emphasizing that regulatory powers cannot be a cover for arbitrary prohibitions and must contain guiding principles.
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989 (2) SCC 574) Freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2); anticipated danger must be proximate and direct, not remote or speculative. The court invoked this authority to stress that suppression of speech/assembly requires a proximate and direct danger; remote or conjectural fears do not justify refusing permission.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a reasoned analysis focused on the limits of police regulatory powers and the protection of fundamental rights:

  1. Examination of respondents' grounds: The impugned refusal rested on two stated reasons — the presence/operation of Section 30(2) of the Police Act in the Sub Division and the coincidence of memorial events (Martyr Immanuelsekaran memorial, Marudhupandiar brothers memorial, and Devar Guru Poojai) during the relevant period. The respondents asserted that these factors made a breach of law and order likely.
  2. Limited scope of judicial review: The court noted that its power to set aside administrative orders is limited, but nonetheless must intervene where rights have been unjustifiably curtailed.
  3. On the asserted blanket prohibition: The court rejected the respondents' approach of effectively creating a 45-day period in which no other activities would be permitted. The court found it untenable that the occurrence of three memorial events should subordinate every other activity in the Sub Division for that entire span.
  4. Interpretation of Section 30: The court emphasized that Section 30 (including sub-sections (2) and (3)) is a regulatory power enabling direction and control of assemblies and processions — it is not a licence to impose blanket suspensions of citizens' democratic rights. The court quoted the text of Section 30(2) and (3) as contained in the opinion to underline the regulatory character.
  5. Application of precedent and constitutional principles: Relying on earlier decisions of this court and the Supreme Court (including Himat Lal K. Shah and S. Rangarajan), the court observed that police discretion to refuse permission must be guided by relevant considerations, not arbitrary or irrelevant ones. The court stressed the requirement that any restriction be reasonable and that anticipated danger be proximate and direct, not remote or speculative.
  6. Failure to hear: The court placed weight on the fact that the petitioner had not been heard before the order refusing permission was passed, treating this as an additional reason to set aside the impugned order.
  7. Moulding of relief and remediation: Given the urgency and that the original date had passed, the petitioner proposed an alternative date (24.09.2010). The court declined to require a fresh application and moulded appropriate relief by directing respondents to permit the meeting on that date and to provide police protection.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The writ petition is allowed; the impugned police order refusing permission to hold the meeting is set aside.

Immediate consequences directed by the court:

  • The respondents are directed to grant appropriate permission to the petitioner to hold a public meeting with sound facilities on 24.09.2010 between 05:00 p.m. and 09:30 p.m. at Managiri Village, Thiruppathur Taluk (within Natchiyarpuram Police Station limits).
  • The police are directed to give appropriate police protection for the conduct of the meeting.
  • There shall be no order as to costs, and connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.

Broader implications:

The court's decision reiterates limits on police discretion to refuse permissions for assemblies; it emphasizes that Section 30 is regulatory and cannot be used to impose prolonged or blanket suspensions of fundamental rights. The opinion relies on established precedents to apply constitutional safeguards. The judgment, as recorded, confines its effect to the facts and relief in this petition; the opinion does not state that it establishes a new legal precedent beyond applying existing authority.

Show all summary ...

This writ petition has been preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records pertaining to the impugned order in Aanai:17, dated 14.09.2010 on the file of the second respondent and to quash the same as illegal and consequently to direct the respondents to accord permission to conduct one day public meeting on 20.09.2010 at Managiri Village, Thiruppathur Taluk, Sivagangai District.

ORDER

Heard both sides. The petitioner aggrieved by an action of the respondents in refusing to permit him to hold a public meeting on behalf of his party has come forward with the present writ petition. The petitioner's request to hold a public meeting on 20.09.2010 at Managiri Village, Thiruppathur Taluk coming within the Natchiyarpuram Police Station limits was rejected on grounds of law and order and breach of public peace. Since permission of the meeting was refused and due to the urgency involved, the matter was taken up. Notice was issued to the learned Special Government Pleader Mr. K.M Vijayakumar and he had taken instructions from the respondents.

2. The petitioner claiming to be the District Organiser of “Naam Thamizhar”, a political party, decided to organise a meeting to stop killings of Fishermen belonging to Tamil Nadu and also to retrieve the Katchadeevu Island back to India. The meeting is to be addressed by their State Coordinator and it was to be held on 20.09.2010 at 5.00 p.m in Managiri Village. This was part of series of meetings held by that party all over the Tamil Nadu. It is claimed that such meeting were held in a democratic fashion and in a peaceful manner.

3. However, the respondents by the impugned order refused to grant permission on two grounds. Firstly, in the Thiruppathur Sub Division, in order to deal with law and order problem, Section 30(2) of the District Police Act is in force. Secondly, memorial day of Martyr Immanuelsekaran, memorial day of Marudhupandiar brothers as well as Devar Guru Poojai are to take place during this period in this area. Therefore, in all likelihood breach of law and order may take place. Hence if any permission is granted, then there will be a breach of public peace and law and order.

4. On notice, the learned Special Government Pleader stated that the authority had applied his mind and had refused permission to hold the meeting. The court's power to set aside the order is very limited. If at all the petitioner wants to have a meeting, it could be done after Devar Guru Poojai (incidentally, it falls on 30.10.2010). If one would go by the stand of the respondent, the ban period starts from the memorial day of Martyr Immanuelsekaran and ends with Devar Guru Poojai. Thus there will be no activity during those 45 days by other groups, which in no way connected with creating problems in the sub division of Thiruppathur. It must be noted that there cannot be 45 days suspension of the fundamental rights of the citizens including the petitioner in that sub division.

5. The power of the respondents under Section 30 is one of regulating the meetings and processions. In the guise of regulatory powers, one cannot totally suspend the rights of the citizens or keep it in an animated suspension. The respondents will have to examine the request of each citizen on its own merits and decide the issue. They cannot cloud it with either irrelevant factors or factors which are not germane to the issue on hand. Killings of fishermen from Tamil Nadu by the Srilankan Navy or demand for retrieving Katchadeevu Island is not a new demand. Whenever there is killing of fishermen of Tamil Nadu, such demands are revived in the State and there has been meetings and processions including direct actions on such issue all over the State. It it not clear as to how the respondents can link up such conduct of meetings for the issue which has not even remote connection with the memorial days of Martyr Immanuelsekaran or Marudupandiar brothers or Devar Gurupoojai and how one can refuse permission for such an innocuous request.

6. The claim made by the respondents that for the 45 days in the Sub Division, there can be no other activity only because of the three events mentioned therein is not only preposterous proposition, but virtually subordinating every other issue to these three events which will be taking place in a span of 45 days. It will be a sad day when such orders are sustained and respondent police will be allowed to curtail the fundamental rights of citizens of this part.

7. In this context, it is necessary to refer to two decisions of this court, which will have a bearing on the issue. The first judgment was in C.J Rajan, Madurai-2 v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mayiladuthurai and another reported in 2008 (3) MLJ 926 (Mad). A division bench headed by P.K Misra, J. (as he then was) came down heavily upon the respondent police in refusing permission to conduct meeting on irrelevant grounds.

8. Subsequently, in Patchaimal K.T v. The Superintendent of Police, Kanyakumari and others reported in 2009 Writ L.R 65, after referring to the legal and constitutional issue and precedent on the subject and relevant statutory provisions, this court set aside the order of the police and permitted demonstration to be conducted by the opposition party.

9. In this context, it is necessary to refer the judgment of the Supreme Court in Himat Lal K. Shah V. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad reported in AIR 1973 SC 87 = 1973 (1) SCC 227 rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, wherein, the Court struck down Rule 7 of the Rules framed under the Bombay Police Act on the ground that Rule, which empowered the Commissioner of Police to refuse permission to hold meetings without giving any guidance under the Rule and thereby conferring an arbitrary discretion, was an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of assembly guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court also held that the work “regulating” in Section 33(1)(o) of the Bombay Police Act would include the power to prohibit and impose the condition that permission should be taken a few days before the holding of the meeting on a public street. Mathew, J., dissented from the view of the majority and held that the power to regulate did not include the right to prohibit and the permission sought for holding a meeting ought not be refused. The majority opinion was that regulation is necessary to enable citizens to enjoy the various rights in crowded public streets, and that the State can make regulation in aid of the right of the assemble of each citizen and can impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of Public order.

10. Further, the Supreme Court also in S. Rangarajan V. P. Jagjivan Ram reported in 1989 (2) SCC 574 held that freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India means the right to express one's own opinion by word of mouth, printing, picture or is any one manner of ideas made through any and the communication of ideas made through any medium. Such right, however, was held to be subject to reasonable restrictions in the larger interest of the community and the country as set out in Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Those restrictions are intended to strike a proper balance between the liberty guaranteed, and the social interests specified under Article 19(2). The Court emphasised that the interest of freedom of expression and social interest cannot be regarded as of equal weight and the Court's commitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and community interest is endangered. The anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectural or far fetched, but should have proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interests. It should be inseparably locked up with the action contemplated like the equivalent of a “spark in a powder keg.”

11. Therefore, it is too late for the respondents to refuse permission to hold a meeting on a matter of public importance. With respect to the respondents' reliance upon Section 30(2) of the Police Act, 1861, it can only be said that it enables the respondents to direct the control and conduct of all assemblies and processions on public road or in the public streets or thoroughfares and to prescribe the Rules by which and the times by which the processions may pass and Section 30(2) and (3) on which reliance was placed, is extracted below:

“Sec 30(2): He may also, on being satisfied that it is intended by any persons or class of persons to convene or collect an assembly in any such road, street or thoroughfare, or to form a procession which would, in the judgment of the Magistrate of the district, or of the sub-division of a district, if uncontrolled, be likely to cause a breach of the peace, require by general or special notice, that the persons convening or collecting such assembly or directing or promoting such procession shall apply for a licence. (3)On such application being made, he may issue a licence, specifying the names of the licensees and defining the conditions on which alone such assembly or such procession is to be permitted to take place, and otherwise giving effect to this section.”

12. Therefore, the said provision is only a regulatory power and not a blanket power to trifle any democratic dissent of the citizens by the Police.

13. A further contention that the petitioner was not heard before passing of the order also assumes importance. In the light of the above facts of the case and precedents set out above, this court has no hesitation to set aside the order passed by the police. Accordingly, the impugned order will stand set aside. In view of the fact that the meeting date has come to an end, the counsel for the petitioner filed a memo, dated 20.9.2010, stating that his client is willing to conduct a public meeting in the same village on 24.09.2010 between 5.00 p.m and 09.30 p.m Though the learned Special Government Pleader stated that the petitioner will have to make a fresh application, this court do not think such requirement is necessary. Once the impugned order is set aside, necessary and appropriate relief can be moulded by the court.

14. In view of the stand taken by the petitioner to postpone the meeting to other day, the respondents are hereby directed to grant appropriate permission to the petitioner to hold a public meeting with sound facilities on 24.09.2010 between 05.00 p.m and 09.30 p.m at Managiri village, Thiruppathur Taluk coming with the Natchiyarpuram Police Station limits. It is needless to state that the police should give appropriate police protection for the conduct of such meeting.

15. This writ petition will stand allowed with the above terms. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.

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To

1. The Superintendent of Police, Sivagangai District, Sivagangai.

2. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thiruppathur Sub Division, Sivagangai District.

3. The Sub Inspector of Police, Natchiyarpuram Police Station, Sivagangai District.

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