Mr.E.Joseph v. The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board

Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

2. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner praying for a writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to call for the records relating to the proceedings of the second respondent in Letter No.011631/Adm.II/A.1/2000-2, dated 12.7.2000, quash the same and to direct the respondents to pay compensation of Rs.3,00,000/- for the death of the petitioner's father, on 4.10.92, due to electrocution, with interest.

3. It has been stated by the petitioner that his father who was residing at Rajakamangalam Thurai had died on 4.10.92, at 7.30 p.m, due to electrocution. When the petitioner's father Elias was returning from Periakadu to Rajakamangalam Thurai, on 4.10.92, he had come into contact with the live wire which was lying on the road, and due to electrocution he had died. The petitioner had given a complaint on 5.10.92 and a case in Crime No.205 of 1992, had been registered on the file of Rajakamangalam Police Station, Kanyakumari District. The body of the petitioner's father Elias, was sent for post mortem, on 5.10.92. It was proved that the death of the petitioner's father had been caused by electrocution, due to the negligence of the respondent Electricity Board.

4. It has been further stated that the petitioner had submitted a representation, on 22.7.93, requesting for payment of compensation. The fourth respondent had directed the petitioner to obtain the income certificate of his father and to forward the same to him, as per his letter, dated 16.8.93. Again in the letter, dated 20.9.93, the fourth respondent had required a death certificate and a legal heirship certificate. Pursuant to the said communication, the death certificate and the legal heirship certificate has been forwarded to the fourth respondent. The legal heirship certificate, dated 22.6.93 and the income certificate, dated 17.8.93, were issued by the Tahsildar, Agastheeswaram Taluk. Similarly, the death certificate, dated 9.10.92, was issued by the Registrar of Births and Death, Ganapathipuram and it was forwarded to the fourth respondent.

5. The petitioner had sent a further representation, dated 10.5.97, to the Chief Minister (Special Cell), enclosing all the necessary certificates. The petitioner had sent a petition, dated 11.5.97, to the District Collector, Kanyakumari District, at Nagercoil. Thereafter, the second respondent had sent a letter, dated 9.6.97, informing the petitioner that certain particulars had been called for from the third respondent and that necessary action would be taken for payment of compensation, as requested by the petitioner. Subsequently, by a letter, dated NIL.3.98, the second respondent had called for certain records in original and directed the petitioner to forward the same through the Executive Engineer, Nagercoil. Accordingly, the petitioner had sent a letter, dated 3.3.99, to the second respondent, through the third respondent, enclosing all the necessary certificates. However, the respondents did not take any action. Therefore, the petitioner had sent another representation, dated 6.3.2000, to the second respondent. The second respondent in his letter No.011631/Adm.II/A.1/2000-2, dated 12.7.2000, rejected the request of the petitioner. In such circumstances, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition before this Court, under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India.

6. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, the claims and averments made on behalf of the petitioner had been denied. It has been stated that, on 5.10.92, at about 10.30 hours, one Joseph had informed the fourth respondent that Elias had died, on 4.10.92, at 7.30 p.m due to his coming in contact with a snapped live wire between Loc.No.FII/37 and FII/38. Immediately, the fourth respondent had rushed to the spot and preferred a complaint with the Sub Inspector of Police, Rajakkamangalam and a case had been registered, under Crime No.205 of 1992. It is false to say that Elias had died due to the negligence on the part of the respondents. The conductor between Loc.No.FII/37 and FII/38 had snapped due to heavy wind and rain which had resulted in the fatal accident.

7. It has also been stated that as per the Board's proceedings B.P.Ms.FB.No.100 (Technical Branch), dated 26.4.83, when a non-departmental person is involved in a fatal accident arising due to the Board's installations, the Board might disburse the amount sanctioned by way of compensation or adhoc payment, on compassionate grounds, to the dependants, in accordance with the definition of `dependant' contained in Clause (d) of Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

8. With regard to the present case, the legal heirs of the deceased Elias were not minors even at the time of his death. Hence, as per the Board order, in B.P.Ms.No.FB100(Technical Branch), 26.4.83, the petitioner is not entitled for compensation or for adhoc payment, on compassionate grounds. It has also been stated that it is false to say that the death of the petitioner's father was caused due to the negligence of the respondent Electricity Board. The death was due to an electrical accident which had happened due to the touching of the line conductor that had snapped due to heavy wind and rain. The age of the legal heirs being the main criterion for compensation or for adhoc payment, on compassionate grounds, such compensation or adhoc payments could not been given to the petitioner. In such circumstances, the writ petition filed by the petitioner, demanding compensation for the death of his father due to electrocution, is liable to be dismissed, as being without substance and merits.

9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted that the refusal by the respondents to award compensation for the death of the petitioner's father due to electrocution is arbitrary and illegal. The reasons given by the respondents for non-payment of the compensation are without any legal basis. The refusal of the respondents to grant compensation stating that the legal heirs of the deceased Elias had attained majority cannot be a valid ground for the refusal of the payment of compensation by the respondents. Even if such restriction is prevalent, it could probably apply only to the employees, who are working under the respondent Corporation. It cannot be applied to a common man who had died due to electrocution, due to the negligence of the respondent Board. The respondents have not disputed the factual aspects of the incident, except stating that the snapping of the electrical line was due to heavy wind and rain. Even in such circumstances, it is clear that the respondents are liable to pay compensation for the death of the petitioner's father, in accordance with the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, as well as by this Court.

10. Since the facts relating to the incident are not disputed by the respondents, the petitioner need not go before the Civil Courts to establish the facts leading to the fatal accident. It has been shown by documentary proof that the petitioner's father was engaged in fishing and his annual income was not less than Rs.9,000/- per annum. At the time of his death the petitioner's father was aged about 56 years and he was hale and healthy. The petitioner's mother had died, on 4.2.93. The petitioner had two sisters Mary and Agnasal. They have given their consent to the petitioner to collect the amount that would be paid as compensation for the death of their father. The consent letter given by the petitioner's sisters, dated 3.3.99, had also been forwarded to the respondents. In such circumstances, the respondents cannot deny the payment of compensation to the petitioner for the death of his father, on 4.10.92, due to electrocution.

11. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents had submitted that according to the Board proceedings in B.P.Ms.No.FB100 (Technical Branch), dated 26.4.83, the petitioner is not entitled for compensation or for adhoc demand on compassionate grounds. Since the petitioner, as well as his sisters, who are the legal heirs of the deceased Elias, are not coming under the definition of `dependants', under Clause (d) of Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. Further, there was no negligence on the part of the respondent Electricity Board as the snapping of the Electricity line was due to heavy wind and rain. The fatal accident had happened due to the deceased touching the line and therefore, the accident had happened only due to the negligence of the deceased person. Since certain facts are disputed, the petitioner is to claim compensation for the death of his father by electrocution only before a Civil Court.

12. At this stage of the hearing of the writ petition, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had placed before this Court, a recent decision of a Single Judge of this Court, made in Lilly Stanislaus Vs. The Chairman TNEB and two others (2008 Writ L.R. 278), wherein, this Court had issued directions to the respondent Tamil Nadu Electricity Board to pay a compensation of Rs.90,000/- to the petitioner therein. Even though in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Board it has been stated that the accident did not occur due to the negligence on the part of the respondent Board and it was only due to an act of God, this Court had held that once it was found that the petitioner's husband had died due to electrocution, the respondent Board cannot be permitted to raise the plea that the Board is not negligent and therefore, they are not liable to pay the compensation. It may not be proper for this Court to drive the petitioner to seek his remedy before the Civil Court after the lapse of many years from the time of the accident.

13. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioner, as well as the respondents and on a perusal of the records available before this Court, it is clear that the basic facts in the present case are not in dispute. The respondent Board had not disputed the fact that the petitioner's father had died, on 4.10.92, due to electrocution. Even if it is accepted that the petitioner had touched the snapped electric line which was lying on the road, it cannot be said that his death was solely due his negligence. Further, it is not open to the respondent Electricity Board to contend that there was no negligence on the part of the respondents.

14. The contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents is that the electricity line had snapped only due to the heavy wind and rain and that it was not due to any fault on the part of the respondent Electricity Board. In such circumstances, there should be a presumption of negligence on the part of the electricity Board, as it cannot be assessed with arithmetical precision or by clear logical reasoning, unless it is clearly proved by the respondent Electricity Board that the entire fault was on the deceased person.

15. Once it is accepted by the respondent electricity Board that the death was caused as a consequence of the snapped electricity line belonging to the respondent Electricity Board, there would be an obligation cast on the respondent Board to pay atleast a reasonable compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased person. Raising of technical pleas to avoid payment of such compensation is not to be appreciated. Only when there are seriously disputed facts, the party making the claim for compensation may be asked to go before the Civil Courts to seek his remedies. Such a situation does not prevail in the present case, as the basic facts are not in dispute.

16. In such circumstances, in view of the averments made on behalf of the petitioner, as well as on behalf of the respondent Board and in view of the decision cited above, this Court is of the view that the respondent Electricity Board, is liable to compensate the petitioner and the other legal heirs of the deceased person. Since it has been stated that both the sisters of the petitioner had submitted a consent letter to the respondent Board stating that they have no objection for the compensation amount to be paid to the petitioner, the respondent Electricity Board is directed to pay an amount of Rs.75,000/- to the petitioner as compensation, within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Accordingly, the proceedings of the second respondent is set aside and the respondent Electricity Board is directed to pay the compensation to the petitioner within the specified period.

This writ petition is allowed to the extent noted above. No costs.

csh To

1.The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Rep. by its Chairman, Mount Road, Chennai-2.

2.Superintending Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Nagercoil.

3.Executive Engineer, (Distribution) Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Nagercoil.

4.Junior Engineer, (Distribution) Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Rajakamangalam, Kanyakumari District.

5.Junior Engineer (Distribution) Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Eathamozhi, Kanyakumari District [ PRV / 16184 ]