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J.Gnana Kumar v. Joy Kanmani

Madras High Court
Nov 16, 2007
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the husband and sole accused in C.C.No.37 of 2006 before the Judicial Magistrate No.VI, Madurai, while the respondent is the complainant. The respondent filed a private complaint against the petitioner alleging defamation punishable under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), based on statements made by the petitioner in a counter affidavit filed in D.O.P.No.37 of 2005 before the Family Court, Madurai. The respondent had sought a decree for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 33 of the Indian Divorce Act, alleging desertion by the petitioner and an adulterous life. The petitioner’s counter affidavit alleged illicit intimacy of the respondent with another man, which led to the defamation complaint.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the statements made by the petitioner in the counter affidavit before the Family Court constitute defamation under Section 500 IPC by satisfying the essential ingredient of publication to a third party as required under Section 499 IPC.
  2. Whether the truth of the statements or good faith in making the statements are relevant at this stage for quashing the defamation complaint.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • One essential ingredient of the offence under Section 500 IPC is publication of the defamatory statement to the knowledge of a third party, which is absent in this case.
  • Mere allegations in the counter affidavit, even if false, do not satisfy the requirements of Section 499 IPC.
  • The statements made in the counter affidavit are true and thus cannot amount to defamation.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Statements made in good faith are an exception under Section 499 IPC, but whether the statements were made in good faith is a question of fact to be determined at trial.
  • The counter affidavit filed before the Family Court is accessible to third parties, thereby constituting publication to third parties as required under Section 499 IPC.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
C.H.Kader and another v. Munnilakath Valappil Fousia (1990 Cri L.J.2356) View on publication requirement under Section 499 IPC in defamation cases The court relied on this precedent to support the view that the requirement of publication to a third party is essential and was not satisfied in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the essential elements of defamation under Sections 499 and 500 IPC, emphasizing the necessity of publication of the defamatory imputation to a third party by the accused. It found that the complaint did not allege publication either directly or indirectly by the petitioner. The court rejected the respondent’s contention that the counter affidavit’s accessibility to third parties amounted to publication by the accused, clarifying that pleadings filed in court are not public documents freely accessible to all. The mere handling of the documents by court staff or furnishing copies to the respondent does not constitute publication by the petitioner. The court also declined to consider the truthfulness of the statements or the question of good faith at this stage, as these are factual issues to be determined during trial. Consequently, the court concluded that the complaint lacked the foundational element of publication required to sustain a defamation charge under Section 500 IPC and thus was liable to be quashed.

Holding and Implications

The court allowed the petition and quashed the defamation complaint in C.C.No.37 of 2006.

The direct effect of this decision is the dismissal of the defamation proceedings against the petitioner on the ground of absence of publication. The court did not set any new precedent beyond affirming the established requirement of publication for defamation. Additionally, the Family Court, Madurai was directed to explore the possibility of compromise between the parties in the matrimonial proceeding D.O.P.No.37 of 2005, reflecting the court’s inclination towards amicable resolution in matrimonial disputes.

Show all summary ...

The petitioner is the sole accused in C.C.No.37 of 2006 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.VI, Madurai and the respondent is the complainant.

2. The petitioner is the husband of the respondent. The respondent has filed a private complaint against her husband for an alleged offence punishable under Section 500 IPC. Seeking to quash the same, the petitioner herein has come forward with this petition.

3. The respondent has filed a case in D.O.P.No.37 of 2005 before the Family Court, Madurai under Section 33 of the Indian Divorce Act seeking for a Decree for restitution of conjugal rights. In the said petition, she has stated that the petitioner has deserted her and he is living in adulterous life with one Muthulakshmi.

4. In the said D.O.P., the petitioner herein has fled a counter dated 19.10.2005. In the said counter, among other things, the petitioner has stated that the respondent had developed illicit intimacy with one Arthur Sundarrajan and he used to visit her house during the absence of the petitioner herein and so also the respondent used to visit Virudhunagar to see him without the knowledge of the respondent. On one occasion when the said Aruthur Sundarrajan came to his house, the petitioner who was then present, instructed him not to come again. In reply Arthur Sundarrajan had informed the petitioner that if his wife (respondent herein) says so, he would stop visiting his house. When the petitioner enquired about it, the respondent informed him that if he adjusted with the said Arthur Sundarrajan, then alone his life would be peaceful.

5. Alleging that the above said statement of the petitioner contained in the counter affidavit amounts to defamation, the respondent has filed the above private complaint in C.C.No.37 of 2006 to punish the petitioner under Section 500 IPC.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that one of the essential ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 500 IPC is that there must be publication of the defamatory statement to the knowledge of a third party. Further, according to the learned counsel, merely making certain allegations in the counter even if they are false, the same would not satisfy the requirements of Section 499 IPC. He further added that the statement made in the counter is true and therefore, making such true statement in the counter will not amount to defamation.

7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent submits that making a statement in good faith is one of the exceptions to Section 499 IPC. But, whether such statement was made in good faith or not a question of fact which requires to be proved or disproved only at the time of trial of the case.

8. Learned counsel for the respondent further contends that the counter affidavit filed before the Matrimonial Court is accessible to third parities and thus, the statements made in the said counter is deemed to have been published to the knowledge of third parties and as such the act of the petitioner satisfies the requirement of Section 499 IPC.

9. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the records.

10. One of the basic legal requirements of Section 499 IPC is that the imputation should be either made directly to the knowledge of third parties or the same should be published to the knowledge of third parties. In this case, even as per the allegations made in the complaint, it is not as if the imputation said to have been made by the petitioner was published either directly or indirectly. Thus, in my considered opinion, the act of the petitioner does not satisfy the requirement of Section 499 IPC so as to attract the offence punishable under Section 500 IPC.

11. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the counter filed in the lower Court is accessible to third parties and in such a way there is publication of defamatory statement, is only to be rejected. Pleadings filed before the Courts of law are not public documents to which any body can have free access. Further, as per Section 499 IPC, the publication should be made by the accused to third parties. It is true that it is handled by the court staff and copy is furnished to the respondent herein, which can be made public even by the respondent. But these things would not amount to publication by the accused.

12. Thus, in my considered opinion, in the absence of the satisfaction of the basic requirement of publication of imputation by the accused, the complaint is liable to be quashed.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the judgment in C.H.Kader and another v. Munnilakath Valappil Fousia (1990 Cri L.J.2356), wherein a the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court, has taken a similar view.

14. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the statement contained in the counter reflects only the truth and making such a statement would not amount to defamation. But I do not want to go into this question at this stage for the reason that whether the statement is true or not is a matter to be either proved or disproved on evidence before the lower Court by the respective parties.

15. The question of good faith pleaded by the petitioner has also got no relevance at this stage. Since good faith is a question of fact to be proved before the lower Court, I do not deem it proper to go into the question whether the statement contained in the counter affidavit is true or not and whether the allegation was made in good faith or not. However, I am inclined to quash the case on the sole ground that making certain allegations in the counter filed before the Court would not satisfy the requirements of Section 499 IPC at all.

16. In the result, Criminal O.P. is allowed and the case in C.C.No.37 of 2006 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.VI at Madurai is quashed.

17. At this juncture, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the Family Court, Madurai may be directed to explore the possibility for compromise between the parties since the dispute is essentially matrimonial in nature. Learned counsel for the petitioner also agrees for the same.

18. In view of the said submissions, the Family Court, Madurai is directed to explore the possibility of compromise between the parties in D.O.P.No.37 of 2005.

To

1. The Judicial Magistrate No.VI, Madurai.

2. -do- Through the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai.

3. The Judge, Family Court, Madurai.

4. The Public Prosecutor, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, Madurai.