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Rajam Engg. Contractors v. State Of T.N.

Madras High Court
Feb 3, 2006
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Factual and Procedural Background

These Original Petitions were filed under Section 11(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, raising a common question about the interpretation of a Government Order (G.O.Ms No. 1545 dated 26.07.1990) issued by the State of Tamil Nadu and whether its terms constitute an arbitration agreement for disputes above a monetary threshold.

The opinion takes facts from O.P. No. 58 of 2003 by way of illustration. In that petition the petitioner had been awarded a contract for formation of the Inner Ring Road in Hosur (including minor bridges and culverts). The petitioner alleged non-completion due to the respondents' indifferent attitude and non-payment of amounts due, and abandoned the work. The petitioner requested reference to arbitration pursuant to special conditions for arbitration, but the 3rd respondent refused by letter dated 03.05.2002, relying on G.O.Ms No. 1545 which, the 3rd respondent said, empowered an arbitrator to settle claims only up to Rs. 2 lakhs — while the petitioner’s claim was for Rs. 2,69,13,200/-. The petitioner served an advocate's notice dated 29.11.2002 asking the respondents to appoint an arbitrator; receiving no response, the petitioner filed the present petition seeking appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(4) of the Act.

The Government Order at issue provided that (inter alia): the existing system of departmental arbitration may continue; claims up to Rs. 2 lakhs be referred to departmental arbitration; claims above Rs. 2 lakhs be referred to the Court; and that a specific special condition be incorporated in tenders stating that claims exceeding Rs. 2 lakhs shall be filed before a civil court of competent jurisdiction. The threshold figure of Rs. 2 lakhs was later replaced by Rs. 5 lakhs. There was an apparent conflict between single-judge decisions of this High Court on the interpretation of that Government Order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under G.O.Ms No. 1545 (and the special tender condition derived from it), claims above Rs. 2 lakhs are to be referred to arbitration (via Court nomination) or must be adjudicated by a civil court of competent jurisdiction (i.e., whether the words "be referred to Court" mean reference to Court to appoint an arbitrator or direction to litigate before a civil court).
  2. Whether the doctrine of issue estoppel prevents respondents from denying the existence of an arbitration agreement, given prior single-judge decisions favorable to arbitration for claims above the threshold.
  3. Whether the principle of stare decisis (and reliance on prior single-judge decisions) requires the Court to follow earlier High Court views that were contrary to Supreme Court authority.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Government Order should be read so that claims above Rs. 2 lakhs are to be referred to Court under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for the Court to nominate an arbitrator — i.e., such claims can and should be referred to arbitration through the Court.
  • Clauses (v), (ii) and (iii) of the Governmental Order together imply that claims up to Rs. 2 lakhs are departmental arbitration, and claims above Rs. 2 lakhs must be referred to arbitrators nominated by the Court (not exclusively litigated before a civil court).
  • Two single-judge decisions of this Court (by C.V. Govardhan, J. and A. Ramamurthi, J.) have accepted the petitioners' interpretation, and therefore issue estoppel should apply; the respondents are estopped from denying existence of an arbitration agreement.
  • Several matters involving amounts over Rs. 2 lakhs were already referred to arbitration following this interpretation; departing from it now would disrupt settled positions and litigation, so stare decisis should be applied.

Respondents' (State) Arguments — Advocate General

  • The phrase "be referred to Court" in the Government Order must be understood to mean that parties are directed to move the civil Court for adjudication; it does not mean referral to the Court for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 20 of the old Arbitration Act.
  • Under the old Act (Section 20 and Section 23), the procedure was an application to Court under Section 20 to file an arbitration agreement and then the Court referring the matter to an arbitrator under Section 23; but that is distinct from the Government Order's instruction that claims above the threshold be referred to Court for adjudication.
  • The arbitration clause in the contracts (as informed by the Government Order) clearly contemplates filing before the Court for claims above Rs. 2 lakhs and only departmental arbitration for claims below that threshold.
  • The State never conceded the petitioners' position; the doctrine of issue estoppel is inapplicable, particularly because earlier decisions involved different parties; earlier views by two former Chief Justices support the State's interpretation.
  • Supreme Court authority (State of A.P. v. Obulu Reddy) holds that where a Government Order specifies adjudication by Court above a threshold amount, resort to arbitration does not arise for amounts above that threshold; thus the petitioners' interpretation conflicts with Supreme Court law.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of A.P. v. Obulu Reddy, 2001 (10) SCC 30 Held that when a Government Order provides that claims above a specified amount (Rs. 50,000 in the Andhra G.O.) shall be decided by a civil court, the question of resort to arbitration does not arise for claims above that amount. The Court relied on this Supreme Court decision to support the interpretation that the Tamil Nadu Government Order does not create an arbitration agreement for claims exceeding the stated monetary threshold; it demonstrates that "be referred to Court" means adjudication by civil court, not referral to arbitration.
Vishakhapatnam Urban Development Authority v. V. Narayana Raju, 1999 (9) SCC 568 The Supreme Court's reasoning (approved in Obulu Reddy) that an inartistic drafting in a Government Order which lists "Court of competent jurisdiction" among a panel of arbitrators cannot reasonably be construed to mean that such claims are to be decided by arbitration; claims above the threshold are to be adjudicated by court. The Court adopted and applied this reasoning as authoritative support for interpreting the Tamil Nadu Government Order to require court adjudication for claims above Rs. 2 lakhs.
Thoday v. Thoday, 1964 (1) All ER 341 Explains estoppel per rem judicatam, distinguishing "cause of action estoppel" and "issue estoppel", and sets out the conditions under which issue estoppel operates (notably, same parties and identical issues). The Court used this authority to explain that issue estoppel cannot be invoked here because the petitioners were not parties to the earlier proceedings on which they sought to rely.
Molar Mai v. M/s. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 1261 States that courts should correct an erroneous interpretation of law even if it has stood for a considerable time; stare decisis is not a bar to correcting an error, especially where Supreme Court law is clear. The Court invoked this principle to reject the petitioners' reliance on stare decisis arising from previous single-judge decisions of this High Court and to justify not following earlier inconsistent views when Supreme Court authority is contrary.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the language and structure of G.O.Ms No. 1545 and its incorporated tender condition. Clauses (i) to (iii) preserve departmental arbitration for certain claims and direct that claims "above the value of Rs. 2 lakhs be referred to Court." The Court analyzed competing interpretations:

  1. The petitioners' interpretation — that "be referred to Court" requires a party to approach the Court under Section 20 of the old Arbitration Act to enable the Court to nominate an arbitrator (so that claims above Rs. 2 lakhs would still be resolved by arbitration via Court nomination) — was rejected as impermissible.
  2. The Court read the phrase "be referred to Court" in context and held it means that parties are directed to proceed to a civil Court of competent jurisdiction for adjudication of claims above the specified threshold, not that the Court should refer those disputes to arbitration. The Court noted that construing the Government Order to require the Court to act as an arbitrator would be absurd and contrary to Supreme Court authority.
  3. The Court relied on the structure of the old Arbitration Act (reference to Section 20 and Section 23) only to demonstrate that a reference to Court under the Act is procedurally distinct and cannot be presumed to be what the Government Order intended by the phrase "be referred to Court." Thus the Government Order's plain meaning controls the existence (or non-existence) of an arbitration agreement for claims above the threshold.
  4. On issue estoppel, the Court explained (drawing on Thoday) that issue estoppel applies only where identical issues were decided in prior litigation between the same parties; because the petitioners were not parties to the prior proceedings relied upon, issue estoppel did not apply.
  5. On stare decisis, the Court observed that where there are conflicting single-judge decisions and the Supreme Court has laid down the law clearly, it is improper to continue an erroneous interpretation merely because it has stood for some time. The Court referred to Molar Mai to justify declining to follow inconsistent earlier High Court decisions in the face of controlling Supreme Court authority.
  6. Overall, the Court concluded that the plain reading of the Government Order and controlling Supreme Court decisions make clear that claims above the monetary threshold specified in the Government Order fall to be adjudicated by civil courts of competent jurisdiction and do not give rise to an arbitration agreement for those higher-value claims.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED — All the original petitions are dismissed.

Direct effect on the parties: the petitions under Section 11(4) seeking appointment of an arbitrator were dismissed because, in the Court's view, the Government Order and the relevant contract clause require that claims exceeding the specified monetary threshold (Rs. 2 lakhs, later replaced by Rs. 5 lakhs in the State) be brought before and adjudicated by a civil Court of competent jurisdiction rather than being referred to arbitration.

Broader implication: the Court reaffirmed prior Supreme Court authority (notably State of A.P. v. Obulu Reddy and Vishakhapatnam Urban Development Authority v. V. Narayana Raju) that Government Orders which direct claims above a threshold to the Court do not create an entitlement to arbitration for such claims. The Court also held that issue estoppel did not apply to bind the respondents because the petitioners were not parties to earlier proceedings, and that stare decisis does not require perpetuating an erroneous interpretation when Supreme Court law is clear.

Note: The opinion does not state that it establishes a novel precedent beyond applying and reaffirming existing Supreme Court authority on the subject.

Show all summary ...

1. These Original Petitions filed under Section 11(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) raise a common question on the interpretation of a certain Governmental Order issued by the State of Tamil Nadu, the terms of which supposedly constitute an arbitration agreement. There is, however, apparent conflict between the decisions rendered by the single Judges of this Court on the interpretation of the said Government Order.

2. We take the facts in O.P No. 58 of 2003 to understand the issue involved in these petitions. The petitioner was awarded a contract for the work of formation of Innner Ring Road in Hosur including construction of minor bridges and culverts by the respondents. It is the case of the petitioner that the work could not be completed due to the indifferent attitude of the respondents, and the petitioner is no way responsible for the delay. Further, the amount due to the petitioner was not paid by the respondents for the reasons best known to them. All these factors compelled the petitioner to abandon the work halfway and request the respondents to refer the matter for arbitration as contemplated under special conditions for arbitration. The request of the petitioner for reference to the arbitration was refused by the 3rd respondent vide his letter dated 03.05.2002 stating that as per G.O.Ms No. 1545 dated 26.07.1990 the arbitrator is empowered to settle the claims upto Rs. 2 lakhs only, and since, the claim of the petitioner was for Rs. 2,69,13,200/-, it could not be referred to arbitration. The petitioner vide advocate's notice dated 29.11.2002 requested the respondents to appoint an arbitrator within a period of 30 days to resolve the dispute between the parties, but there was no response from the respondents, and therefore, the petitioner has preferred the present petition seeking appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(4) of the Act.

3. The relevant portion of the G.O.Ms No. 1545 dated 26.07.1990 is as under:

“In the circumstances stated above the Government approved the following procedure to be followed in respect of Highways and Rural Works Department:-

(i) The existing system of referring the dispute between the contractor and the Department to the Arbitrator may be continued.

(ii) Claims upto the value of Rs. 2 lakhs be referred to Departmental arbitration.

(iii) Claims above the value of Rs. 2 lakhs be referred to the Court.

(iv) If both the parties agree to the award passed by the Arbitrator there is no need to file it in the Court and obtain a decree on it.

(v) If the parties move the Court, under the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Central Act X of 1948) then the provisions of the said Act have to be followed and the judgment of the Court shall be final.

(vi) In the case of Tamil Nadu State Construction Corporation Limited the Commissioner and Secretary to Government, Public Works Department will be the arbitrator in disputes between the Corporation and the Highways and Rural Works Department. The orders issued in GO.Ms No. 1344, Finance (CFC) dated 2 7.09.1979 in this regard may be followed scrupulously.”

4. A copy of the Governmental Order referred to above was communicated to all the Superintending Engineers and Divisional Engineers (H & RW) including special divisions with a direction that in all the tenders a special condition be incorporated as follows:

“In case of any dispute or difference between the parties to the contract either during the progress of or after the completion of the works or after the determination abandonment or breach of contract or as to any matter arising thereunder and if the claims exceed monetary value of more than Rs. 2 lakhs the same shall be filed before a civil Court having jurisdiction for decision”.

5. The figure of Rs. 2 lakhs in G.O.Ms No. 1545 dated 26.07.1990 was later replaced by Rs. 5 lakhs. There is no dispute that almost all the contracts in the present petitions contain the condition referred to above.

6. The question is whether in terms of the above Governmental Order a claim of above Rs. 2 lakhs is to be referred to the arbitrator or is to be adjudicated upon by a Court having competent jurisdiction by filing a regular suit.

7. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners strenuously submitted that the Governmental Order clearly suggests that in cases where the claim is above the value of Rs. 2 lakhs it has to be necessarily referred to the Court under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 in order to enable the Court to nominate an arbitrator to enter into the reference in respect of the dispute between the parties and the same does not contemplate that civil suit alone has to be filed in cases where the claim is above Rs. 2 lakhs. It is submitted that Clause (v) read with Clauses (ii) and (iii) of the said Governmental Order should be interpreted to mean that the claims upto the value of Rs. 2 lakhs can only be referred to departmental arbitration and claims above the value of Rs. 2 lakhs have to be referred to the arbitrators nominated by the Court. It is also submitted that since the issue has already been determined against the respondents by two learned single judges of this Court namely, C.V Govardhan, J. and A. Ramamurthi, J. an issue estoppel would apply in subsequent proceedings, and respondents are estopped from denying the existence of an arbitration agreement. It is also urged that pursuant to the orders passed by this Court, several matters involving the value of more than Rs. 2 lakhs were referred to arbitration and if at this juncture a contrary opinion is expressed, it will open up a series of conflicts and consequent litigation, thereby disturbing the settled position of law in the State. On this score a heavy reliance was placed on the doctrine of stare decisis.

8. In reply, Mr. N.R Chandran, learned Advocate General contended that the words “be referred to Court” should be understood in the proper perspective and the interpretation suggested by the petitioners is incorrect. Under Section 20 of the old Act, an application is filed in a Court to file an arbitration agreement and then reference is made by the Court to an Arbitrator under Section 23 of the old Act. Therefore, the term “be referred to Court” can only mean that party is referred i.e, directed to move the Civil Court for adjudication. He submitted that the arbitration clause between the parties is clear that the claim shall be filed before the Court having jurisdiction for decision and with regard to claims of below Rs. 2 lakhs the matter shall be referred to departmental arbitrator, who shall be the Superintending Engineer. He further submitted that the State never took a stand conceding the position pleaded by the petitioners, but on the other hand disputed the interpretation suggested by the petitioners, which was not accepted by the Court. Therefore, the doctrine of issue estoppel can never be applied, especially when the litigation is not between the same parties. Learned Advocate General also brought to our notice that two former Chief Justices of this Court namely, Hon'ble Shri Justice B. Subhashan Reddy and Hon'ble Shri Justice Markandey Katju categorically held that the said Governmental Order does not contemplate an arbitration agreement where the value is more than Rs. 2 lakhs. According to the learned Advocate General the matter is no more res integra and while considering a similar Governmental Order of the Andhra Pradesh Government the Supreme Court in State of A.P v. Obulu Reddy, 2001 (10) SCC 30 held that the question of reference to arbitration would not arise if the claim was above the amount of Rs. 50,000/-. The learned Advocate General submitted that the interpretation suggested by the petitioners is contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court.

9. Having given anxious thought to the rival arguments made at the Bar, I am of the view that the interpretation suggested by the petitioners cannot be accepted and the petitions are liable to be dismissed. What is contemplated by the Governmental Order is that the existing system of referring the disputes between the contractors and the department to the arbitrator may be continued. The claims upto the value of Rs. 2 lakhs may be referred to the departmental arbitration and claims above the value of Rs. 2 lakhs will be referred to Court. The contention of the petitioners is that the words ‘be referred to Court’ means referred to the Court for appointment of the arbitrator where the value of contract is more than Rs. 2 lakhs. In other words even claims of more than Rs. 2 lakhs should be referred to arbitration through Court. In my opinion, the interpretation suggested by the petitioner's counsel is wholly impermissible. The term ‘be referred’ to Court could only mean that the party may be referred/directed to Court for adjudication. Learned Advocate General is right in contending that Section 20 of the old Act contemplates an application to be filed in a Court to file an arbitration agreement and then reference would be made by the Court to an arbitrator under Section 23 of the said Act. Therefore, the words reference to the Court cannot mean reference to the Court under Section 20 of the old Act. In any event, the existence of arbitration agreement must be decided on the basis of the terms of the arbitration agreement and on a plain reading of arbitration clause it is clear that the claim should be filed before the Court having jurisdiction for decision and only with regard to claims less than Rs. 2 lakhs the matter should be referred to departmental arbitrator, who shall be the Superintending Engineer.

10. In State of'A.P. v. Obulu Reday (supra) a similar Governmental Order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. The relevant portion of the said Governmental Order runs as follows:-

Value of Amount Panel of Arbitration 1. Claims upto Rs. 10,000/- and above 1. Superintending Engineer of another circle in the same department 2. Claims above Rs. 10,000/- upto Rs. 50,000/- 1. Another CE of the same department 2. where there is only one CE in the department, CE will submit proposals to Government in the Administrative Department for nomination of another CE as arbitrator by Government. 3. Claims above Rs. 50,000/- Court of competent jurisdiction.

To avoid ambiguity, a clarification was issued subsequent, which is as follows:-

“All claims above Rs. 50,000/- shall be decided by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction ofregular suit”.

11. When the matter was referred to three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, the Bench took the view that the question of resort to arbitration would not arise if the claim was above Rs. 50,000/-. The earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Vishakhapatnam Urban Development Authority v. V. Narayana Raju., 1999 (9) SCC 568 was approved and the relevant portion in paragraph-5 of the said decision runs as follows:

“Havingperused G.O.Ms No. 430 dated 24.10.1983 we have no doubt that it clearly provides for arbitration in respect of claims only up to Rs. 50,000/- and not above that amount, making it clear in para 2 that the claims above Rs. 50,000 are to be adjudicated by the Court of competent jurisdiction. No doubt the expression ‘Court of competent ‘jurisdiction’ is mentioned under the head ‘panel of arbitrators’ since the same para deals with ‘claims up to Rs. 10,000/- and up to Rs. 50,000/-’. That is, however, an inartistic drafting of the GOMs but it cannot be construed to mean that claims above Rs. 50,000 are to be adjudicated by arbitration in which the Judge presiding over the Court of competent jurisdiction is to act as the arbitrator. It would be absurd to make such a construction of that part of the GOMs which would oblige the Judge to act as an arbitrator. The subsequent G.O Ms. No. 160 dated 01.06.1987 merely clarifies this fact on account of an attempt by some contractors to misconstrue the earlier GOMs as clearly stated in the subsequent GOMs. The contention of the respondent is wholly untenable”.

12. In the present case, the petitioners seek to rely upon Clauses (i) to (iii) of the Governmental Order wherein it is stated that the existing system of referring the dispute between the contractor and the Department to the Arbitrator would continue and if the value is less than Rs. 2 lakhs it would be referred to the departmental arbitration and if the value is more than Rs. 2 lakhs the matter should be referred to Court, which according to the petitioners mean reference to Court for arbitration. If this interpretation is accepted it will mean that the Court should also function as an arbitrator. This interpretation is clearly impermissible and disapproved by the Supreme Court. The only interpretation which can be applied to this clause is that the parties are free to approach Court having competent jurisdiction for adjudicating all their claims of above Rs. 2 lakhs.

13. The reliance by the petitioners on the doctrine of issue estoppel is totally misconceived. This doctrine is explained in Thoday v. Thoday, 1964 (1) All ER 341 in the following words:-

Estoppel per rem judicatam is a generic term”which in modern law includes two species. The first species, ‘cause of action estoppel’, is that which prevents a party to an action from asserting or denying, as against the other party, the existence of a particular cause of action, the non-existence or existence of which has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in previous litigation between the same parties. If the cause of action was determined to exist, i.e, judgment was given on it, it is said to be merged in the judgment, or for those who prefer Latin, transit in rem judicatam. If it was determined not to exist, the unsuccessful plaintiff can no longer assert that it does; he is estopped per rem judicatam. This is simply an application of the rule of public policy expressed in the Latin maxim, ‘nemo debet bis vexari pro una at eadem causa’. In this application of the maxim, causa bears its literal Latin meaning.

The second species, ‘issue estoppel’, is an extension of the same rule of public policy. There are many causes of action which can only be established by proving that two or more different conditions are fulfilled. Such causes of action involve as many separate issues between the parties as there are conditions to be fulfilled by the plaintiff in order to establish his cause of action; and there may be cases where the fulfillment of an identical condition is a requirement common to two or more different causes of action. If in litigation on one such cause of action any of such separate issues whether a particular condition has been fulfilled is determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction, either on evidence or on admission by a party to the litigation, neither party can, in subsequent litigation between them on any cause of action which depends on the fulfillment of the identical condition, assert that the condition was fulfilled if the Court has in the first litigation determined that it was not, or deny that it was fulfilled if the Court in the first litigation determined that it was”.

14. Estoppel would arise, where in two different proceedings identical issues are raised, in which event, the latter proceedings between the same party shall be dealt with similarly as that was done in the previous proceedings. Admittedly, the petitioners were not parties to the previous proceedings, and therefore, the doctrine of issue estoppel has no application.

15. As regards the principle of stare decisis the Supreme Court in Molar Mai v. M/s. Kay Iron Works (P) Limited, AIR 2000 SC 1261 observed that the Court will be failing in its duty, if the Court does not declare an erroneous interpretation solely on the ground that it had stood the test of time. Moreover, this is not a case where a decision has been followed for a long time and in fact, there are conflicting views expressed by the learned single Judges of this Court. When the law is clearly laid down by the Supreme Court it will be improper to follow the earlier decision merely because it had remained for a considerable length of time, and the same cannot be permitted to continue so, when it is erroneous and brought to the notice of the Court.

16. In view of what is discussed above, all the original petitions are dismissed.