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K.M. Valliapan v. Joint Director Of School Education
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This Full Bench opinion arises from an order of reference by a learned single Judge in W.P. No. 8335 of 2003. The single Judge referred the matter to a larger Bench to resolve conflicting decisions of this Court concerning whether disciplinary proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 ("the Act") must be held by the School Committee or may be delegated to others.
The single Judge's reference relied on earlier decisions of this Court that held disciplinary enquiry must be conducted by the School Committee (for example, P.S. Venkataramanujam v. National High School; P. Kasilingam v. Bharathiyar University; C. Ranganathan v. President/Secretary of School Committee; Management of M.G.R Higher Secondary School v. NAG Balaji Singh), and noted a contrary Division Bench decision in Saradha Balakrishnan v. The Director of Collegiate Education. The Full Bench examined the statutory provisions (Act and Rules) and multiple precedents to resolve this conflict.
On the specific facts before the Bench, an initial enquiry had been held by the School Committee but, before finalisation, the enquiry work was entrusted to a Sub-Committee. Some members of the School Committee had deposed as witnesses to the Sub-Committee and subsequently sat as members of the School Committee when the School Committee made the final decision to punish the employee. The Full Bench found that the participation of those witnesses in the final decisional body vitiated the proceedings for breach of natural justice. The Full Bench therefore quashed the order of dismissal. The Full Bench left the question of financial benefit (if any) and the responsible respondent to the learned single Judge for determination, and listed the matter for that purpose on 9.10.2006.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether disciplinary enquiry under the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 must be conducted by the School Committee constituted under the Act, or whether the holding of the enquiry can be delegated to a Sub-Committee, an enquiry officer or other persons/bodies.
- If delegation is permissible, which functions are "essential" and non-delegable (for example: initiation of disciplinary proceedings, framing of charges, consideration of guilt, and imposition of punishment) and which functions (if any) may be delegated (for example: the holding of enquiry and collection/recording of evidence).
- Whether enquiries or disciplinary acts initiated or carried out by persons other than the School Committee (for example, the Secretary, a Special Committee or a Sub-Committee) can be subsequently ratified by the School Committee.
- Whether participation of persons who had earlier been witnesses in a subordinate enquiry and who later sat to decide the matter in the School Committee breaches principles of natural justice and vitiates the disciplinary proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant / Management and Related Arguments (as recorded in the opinion)
- In the Supreme Court appeal arising from the National High School matter, the appellant argued there was no statutory obligation for the School Committee specifically to conduct the enquiry and that the enquiry could be held by the School Committee or by any third person (para 16).
- In cases where parties consented, it was argued that terms of Forms (such as Form VII-A) could be varied by agreement between the parties (paras 16, 31).
- Some managements and authorities relied on the contention that power to hold enquiry could not be delegated only if there is an express prohibition in the statute or rules (discussed in multiple places; see paras 24, 32, 36, 37).
Petitioner's Arguments
- Learned counsel for the petitioner in the present matter submitted that there is no material indicating that the School Committee specifically delegated the power to hold the enquiry; on that basis, the enquiry must be treated as vitiated (para 20).
- The petitioner also relied on the principle that if persons who gave evidence later participated as members deciding the case, that participation violates natural justice (paras 21, 22, 44, 45).
Respondent / School's Reply (as recorded)
- The learned counsel for the school contested the petitioner's submission that the absence of express delegation vitiated the enquiry (para 20). The Full Bench does not reproduce the detailed content of that contest but records that the school combated the petitioner's contention.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| P.S. Venkataramanujam v. National High School, W.A. No. 170 of 1978 (D.B.) and The National High School, Tambaram East, by its Secretary v. P.S. Venkataramanujam & another, 1992 (3) Supp. SCC 106 | The Division Bench held enquiry must be by School Committee; the Supreme Court observed (in relevant appeal) that the respondent had requested an enquiry by outsiders and participated without objection (estoppel); also that terms of Form VII-A could be changed by consent. | The Full Bench notes the Supreme Court's observation limited the earlier Division Bench holding by applying estoppel and the parties' ability to change terms by consent; this reduced the authoritative weight of the earlier Division Bench decision on the non-delegation point (paras 16, 31). |
| P. Kasilingam v. Bharathiyar University & Others, 1990 (1) LLJ 73 | The Division Bench held the Governing Council alone can conduct enquiry and cannot delegate such power (comparable rule in Grant-in-Aid Code). | The Full Bench records that the decision was challenged in the Supreme Court which left certain Division Bench observations open and permitted initiation of fresh proceedings; thus aspects of the Division Bench's broader observations were treated as not finally settled (para 19, 20). |
| Saradha Balakrishnan v. The Director of Collegiate Education and another, 1995 (1) MLJ 610 | Held that the College Committee is the disciplinary authority but clause/procedure does not prohibit appointment of a person/body to conduct the enquiry; a Sub-Committee or an enquiry officer may be nominated to conduct the enquiry and submit a report which is not binding on the disciplinary authority. | The Full Bench regards the ratio of this Division Bench decision as reflecting the correct position (subject to clarifications), and relies on it to permit delegation of the holding of enquiry while preserving the ultimate decision-making function of the School Committee (paras 22–26, 40). |
| C. Ranganathan v. President/Secretary Of School Committee, 1997 (2) LW 872 | Single Judge held a suspension order and charge-memo issued by the Secretary (and not the School Committee) were without jurisdiction; School Committee alone authorised to initiate disciplinary proceedings (relying on single-judge decisions). | The Full Bench records this decision as part of the conflicting body of authorities supporting the view that essential disciplinary acts must be by the School Committee (para 29). |
| Management of M.G.R Higher Secondary School, Kodambakkam v. NAG Balaji Singh & Others, 1998 WLR 769 | Held that disciplinary enquiry could not be delegated and that the Secretary's enquiry/dismissal was improper. | The Full Bench notes this decision as another authority supporting the non-delegation view (para 30). |
| P. Andree v. The Tamil Nadu Medical Council, rep. by its President and another, 1992 WLR 124 | Disciplinary jurisdiction held vested in the Executive Committee; a Special Committee which issued charge-memo was not the disciplinary authority and there was no provision for delegation; Special Committee lacked jurisdiction to issue second show cause notice. | The Full Bench treats this decision as distinguishable on facts and not directly controlling the present dispute (paras 21, 39). |
| Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364 (1964 (1) SCWR 28) | The report of an enquiry officer is only to assist the disciplinary authority and is not binding on it. | The Full Bench relies on this principle to support the proposition that an enquiry officer/Sub-Committee's report may be considered by the School Committee but the Committee must form its own conclusion (para 26, 41). |
| Pradyot Kumar Bose v. The Hon'ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, AIR 1956 SC 285 | A statutory functionary, in the absence of specific prohibition, can delegate the holding of an enquiry, but the ultimate decision must be taken by the disciplinary authority. | The Full Bench cites this as authority for permitting delegation of the holding of enquiries while reserving the final decision to the disciplinary authority (para 33). |
| State of Uttar Pradesh v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi, 1978 All LJ 477 | Disciplinary control vested in courts/authorities may be exercised but the essence of power cannot be diluted. | The Full Bench cites it for the proposition that essential powers cannot be delegated so as to dilute the core authority (para 34). |
| Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, AIR 1994 SC 1074 (1993 (4) SCC 727) | Where an enquiry officer prepares a report, a copy should be served on the delinquent to enable him to make submissions. | The Full Bench applies this requirement: a report of a delegated enquiry must be served on the delinquent and independently considered by the disciplinary authority (para 41). |
| B & C Mills v. B & C Mills, 1970 (1) LLJ 26 | A mill-manager could delegate the function of collecting necessary evidence to another officer; the report/recording by the subordinate was acceptable. | Used to support the proposition that collection/recording of evidence may be delegated while preserving ultimate authority (para 36). |
| A. Krishnaswamy v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 1981 (1) LLJ 374 | A statutory body composed of many members could delegate functions in conducting an enquiry to subordinate officers, provided there is no statutory prohibition. | Cited by the Full Bench as supporting delegation when statute/rules do not expressly prohibit it (para 37). |
| State Of U.P v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 | Where the officer holding an enquiry acted as a witness and then completed the enquiry and passed order, the rules of natural justice were gravely violated and such proceedings were quashed. | The Full Bench applied this principle by analogy to quash the impugned dismissal because witnesses had later participated as decision-makers (paras 44, 21, 23). |
| Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hariram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School and Others, 1993 (4) SCC 10 | Affirmed principles on natural justice where procedural roles of participants improperly changed or where decision-makers had earlier acted as witnesses. | The Full Bench cites it as following the same natural justice principle and applies it to the facts to invalidate the disciplinary order (para 45). |
| Valliappan v. The Madras Seva Sadan Higher Secondary School, 1995 (2) MLJ 488 | Single Judge decision relied upon in Ranganathan that School Committee alone authorised to initiate disciplinary proceedings. | Referenced as part of the line of authorities recognizing School Committee's essential disciplinary role (para 29). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench's analysis proceeds from statutory text to precedent and finally to the facts before it. The main steps in the Court's reasoning are:
- Examination of the statutory scheme: The Court sets out relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 and the Rules (notably Sections 2(3), 15, 16, 18, 22–24, 28, 56 and Rules including Rule 12, Rule 13 and Rule 15). It summarises the composition and functions of the School Committee and the procedural provisions in Form VII-A dealing with disciplinary procedure (paras 3–3.7, 15).
- Identification of "essential" functions: The Court characterises certain actions as essential functions of the School Committee — decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings, framing of charges, final consideration of guilt, and imposition of punishment — and holds these essential powers cannot be delegated (para 32, 39).
- Distinction between essential powers and the act of holding an enquiry: The Court reasons that holding the actual enquiry — i.e., recording evidence, examining witnesses, and preparing a report — is not necessarily an essential function that must be performed personally by the School Committee in every case. Following established service jurisprudence and multiple precedents, the Court holds that the holding of the enquiry can be delegated to a Sub-Committee or an enquiry officer so long as the School Committee retains the essential decision-making functions and considers the enquiry report independently (paras 32, 41).
- Reliance on precedent: The Court reviews several decisions that support both non-delegation and delegation. It observes that some earlier Division Bench decisions advocating non-delegation have been weakened or clarified by later Supreme Court observations (para 31). It finds the Division Bench decision in Saradha Balakrishnan (1995) to reflect the correct position (subject to clarifications), and invokes Supreme Court authorities (for example, Pradyot Kumar Bose; Union of India v. H.C. Goel; Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar) to justify delegation of enquiry-holding functions while preserving ultimate authority with the disciplinary body (paras 24–26, 33–36, 41).
- Procedural safeguards when enquiry is delegated: The Court emphasises that where an enquiry is delegated, the enquiry officer's report must be served on the delinquent so that submissions can be made (following Managing Director, ECIL). The disciplinary authority must independently consider the report; the report is not binding (paras 26, 41).
- Application to the present facts and natural justice: Although delegation may be permissible, the Court finds the present proceedings vitiated for a distinct reason: some members of the School Committee had deposed as witnesses before the Sub-Committee and later participated as members of the School Committee in deciding guilt and punishment. That crossover of role violated principles of natural justice. The Court cites State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh and Rattan Lal Sharma to show that where persons who acted in a testimonial capacity later act as decision-makers, the enquiry is invalid (paras 21–22, 44–45).
- Relief and procedural disposition: Considering the passage of time and that the petitioner has reached superannuation, the Full Bench holds it would not be in the interest of justice to remit the matter for a fresh enquiry; instead, the order of dismissal is quashed. The Full Bench leaves the question of financial benefits (and which respondent should pay them) to the learned single Judge to determine, noting that a Joint Memo between the petitioner and the second respondent will be considered (paras 23–24).
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Full Bench's core ruling is that the order of dismissal of the petitioner is quashed because the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated by a breach of natural justice: certain members who had deposed as witnesses at a Sub-Committee enquiry later participated as members of the School Committee in deciding guilt and punishment (paras 21, 23).
Implications:
- The Court clarifies the legal position: while essential functions of the School Committee (initiation of disciplinary proceedings, framing charges, final decision on guilt and punishment) cannot be delegated, the actual holding of the enquiry (recording evidence and producing a report) can be delegated to a Sub-Committee or an enquiry officer, subject to important safeguards — namely, the report must be served on the delinquent and the School Committee must independently consider the report and is not bound by it (paras 32, 41).
- The Full Bench expresses that the ratio of Saradha Balakrishnan (1995 (1) MLJ 610) reflects the correct position subject to clarifications and aligns with Supreme Court authority (para 40–41).
- On the facts before the Court, because of the natural justice breach, the direct effect is quashing the dismissal order and not remitting the matter for fresh enquiry (para 23). The Full Bench did not itself decide the extent of monetary relief; it remitted financial-relief questions and allocation of liability between respondents to the learned single Judge, noting a Joint Memo to be considered and listing the matter before the single Judge on 9.10.2006 (para 24).
- The Full Bench does not purport to create a novel rule beyond applying and clarifying existing precedent: it reconciles earlier conflicting authorities by distinguishing essential and non-essential functions and by emphasising procedural safeguards when delegating enquiries. The Full Bench's treatment thus clarifies existing law in the context of the Act and the Rules rather than announcing an unrelated new precedent (paras 32–41).
P.K Misra, J.
1. Learned single Judge has referred W.P No. 8335 of 2003 to a larger Bench to resolve the conflict of views between various decisions of this Court on the question relating to holding of disciplinary proceedings by School Committee as per the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’).
2. Learned single Judge in his order of reference has referred to decisions of this Court in (i) P.S Venkataramanujam v. National High School, W.A No. 170 of 1978 dated 13.11.1979 (D.B); (ii) P. Kasilingam v. Bharathiyar University & Others, 1990 (1) LLJ 73 (DB); (iii) C. Ranganathan v. President/Secretary Of School Committee, 1997 (2) LW 872; and (iv) Management of M.G.R Higher Secondary School, Kodambakkam v. NAG Balaji Singh & Others, 1998 WLR 769, wherein it has been held that disciplinary enquiry can be held only by the School Committee as envisaged under the Act and such power and duties cannot be delegated to any other individual or body. The learned single Judge has noticed that a contrary view has been expressed by another Division Bench in the decision in Saradha Balakrishnan v. The Director of Collegiate Education and another, 1995 (1) MLJ 610.
3. In order to resolve such dispute, it is first necessary to notice the relevant provisions contained in the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973.
3.1 Section 2(3)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Recognsied Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973, relates to definition of Educational Agency relating to minority school and Section 2(3)(b) relates to any other private school. The “School Committee” in relation to a private school means the School Committee constituted under Section 15. Section 15 provides that a private school committee shall include the headmaster and the senior most teachers as provided in sub-section (2). As per sub-section (2), the number of representatives of the teachers on such constituted school committee shall be such as may be prescribed.
3.2 Rule 12 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private School (Regulation) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) states that the School Committee shall consist of not more than the following number of members:
(i) Representatives of the Educational Agency who shall be nominated by such educational agency;
(ii) Headmaster of the School;
(iii) Senior-most teachers of the School;
(iv) Parent-Teacher Association nominee;
(v) Senior-most non-teaching staff, if available.
3.3 Under Rule 12(4), an educational agency shall nominate one of the representatives in the Committee as the President. Under Rule 13, the educational agency shall nominate one of its representatives as Secretary of the School Committee. Under Rule 13(3), the Secretary of the School Committee shall function for and on behalf of the School Committee and the educational agency. Under Rule 13(4), the Secretary shall act on the basis of the resolution of the School Committee.
3.4 Section 18(c) empowers the School Committee to take disciplinary action against teachers and other employees of the private school. Under Section 18(2), the educational agency shall be bound by anything done by the school committee in the discharge of its functions and under Section 18(3) any decision or action taken by the School Committee within the jurisdiction shall be deemed to be the decision or action taken by the educational agency.
3.5 Section 16 envisages that the Secretary of the School Committee shall perform such functions as may be prescribed.
3.6 Chapter V relates to terms and conditions of service of teachers and other employees. Under Section 22(1), no order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or suspension of teachers shall be made except with the prior approval of the competent authority. Under Section 23, appeal lies to the prescribed authority and, under Section 24, Second Appeal lies to the Tribunal. Under Section 28, the provisions of such Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law. Section 56 contains the power to make Rules.
3.7 Under Rule 15(2)(i) the School Committee is required to enter into an agreement with the teacher or other person in Form VII-A or VII-B. Under clause 6 of Form VII-A, the School Committee is required to conform to all the provisions contained in the Act and the Rules. Under Clause (7), the Committee can dismiss, remove or reduce in rank or terminate the services without informing the grounds on which they intend to take action and they are required to adopt the procedure indicated in Clause (7) before taking any final action regarding punishment to be imposed. As per Clause 7(a) a memorandum of charge is to be communicated giving reasonable time to give explanation to the School Committee. Under Clause 7(b), after considering the explanation, the School Committee shall communicate the finding and if so desired by the teacher conduct a personal hearing or enquiry, wherein the teacher shall be given the opportunity to examine or cross-examine any or all the witnesses and also produce witnesses. After personal hearing or enquiry, the School Committee is to give report of the personal hearing setting out the proposed punishment. Under Clause 7(d), the School Committee shall inform in writing about its final decision.
4. In the first Division Bench decision in W.A No. 170 of 1978 dated 13.11.1979, it was held that enquiry has to be conducted by the School Committee and such enquiry cannot be delegated to any other Committee, Sub-Committee or person. This matter was however taken to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court by the decision in The National High School, Tambaram East, by its Secretary v. P.S Venkataramanujam & another, 1992 (3) Supp. SCC 106, had observed as follows:
“4. The argument for the appellant before us is that that there is no statutory obligation for the School Committee to conduct the enquiry against the school teacher and the enquiry could be held either by the School Committee or by any third person. In our opinion, it is unnecessary to decide this issue since the Appeal could be conveniently disposed of on another ground. It is not in dispute that the respondent himself demanded that the enquiry should be held by the educationalists other than the School Committee. That request seems to have been necessitated since he has made accusations against the Headmaster of the School. Accordingly a Committee of outsiders was appointed to hold the enquiry. The respondent participated in the enquiry and did not at any time raise objection as to the jurisdiction of the Committee. He was therefore, estopped from raising the objection as to the jurisdiction of the School Committee. Secondly, the Form No. VII(A) relied upon by the Division Bench of the High Court is a form under which the agreement shall be executed by the School Committee while appointing a school teacher. By consent the terms of the agreement could be changed and that is what the parties seemed to have done in this case.”
(Emphasis ours)
5. Then came the decision of the Division Bench in P. Kasilingam v. Bharathiyar University & Others, 1990 (1) LLJ 73. In such decision, while considering the provisions contained in Grant-in-Aid Code relating to disciplinary power resting in Governing Council, which were similar to the provisions contained in the Act, the Division Bench observed that as per the agreement required to be executed in Form VII-A, which has been prescribed by the Rules, the Governing Council alone can conduct the enquiry and it cannot delegate such power to any other person. Such decision was again challenged in the Supreme Court which while declining to interfere with the decision of the High Court, observed as follows:
“2. However, Sri U.R Lalit, Senior Advocate, submitted that certain observations in the judgment as to the lack of the power in the Governing Council to ratify the action of the Principal may not be supportable and at all events unnecessary to support the conclusion reached and that, therefore, those observations maybe deleted. We think we should accept the submission and the question of correctness of these observations is left open. Sri Lalit also said that the management should be free to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings. The High Court at paragraph 14 of the appellate judgment has reserved this liberty. It is, however, made clear that nothing in the order of the High Court nor the dismissal of this Petition here should come in the way of either the Principal or the Governing Council, within respective fields of their powers, to initiate such fresh proceedings as they may consider appropriate in regard to the misconduct attributed to the first-respondent.”
6. Subsequently a question relating to disciplinary proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Medical Registration Act came before a Division Bench in P. Andree v. The Tamil Nadu Medical Council, rep. by its President and another, 1992 WLR 124. The Writ Petitioner in the said case was functioning as a Registrar of the Tamil Nadu Medical Council. Some disciplinary action was initiated against him. After charges were framed by the Special Committee, the enquiry part was entrusted to a District Judge, who submitted his report before the Special Committee and such Special Committee issued second show cause notice. The petitioner challenged such charge-memo as well as the second show cause notice. Learned single Judge observed that the Special Committee had no jurisdiction to issue the second show cause notice as it was not the disciplinary authority. However, the charge-memo had not been quashed. The petitioner filed appeal contending that charge-memo itself should have been quashed. One of the contentions was to the effect that the Special Committee was not competent to issue charge-memo and the disciplinary action proceeded on the basis of such charge-memo is to be held to be incompetent. Upholding such contention, the Division Bench observed that the disciplinary jurisdiction was vested in the Executive Committee and the Special Committee, which has been constituted, was not the Executive Committee and in the absence of any provision for delegation, such authority to issue charge-memo could not have been delegated.
7. A matter relating to Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Rules, 1976, which is exactly similar to the provisions contained in the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private School (Regulation) Rules, 1974, was examined by a Division Bench consisting of Srinivasan, J., as His Lordship then was, and Justice S.S Subramani in Saradha Balakrishnan v. The Director of Collegiate Education and another, 1995 (1) MLJ 610.
In the said case, charge-memo was issued to the Petitioner-Professor by the College Committee. In such memo, it was stated that the charge-memo was placed before the College Committee and initialled by the Chairman. The Secretary of the College was authorised to appoint an enquiry officer to go into the charges and conduct and enquiry and submit his findings before the Committee. The Secretary was also authorised to suspend such petitioner. Such action was challenged by the petitioner by filing Writ Petition. Even though the Writ Petition was entertained, no stay was granted. Subsequently, the College Committee appointed a Sub-Committee to conduct the enquiry. Such Sub-Committee consisted of three persons including the Secretary. Such subsequent action was also challenged by filing further Writ Petitions. Ultimately all the Writ Petitions were dismissed. In Appeal, the Division Bench observed that the earlier Division Bench decision in P. Kasilangam's case was no longer binding as the observations made in such decision had been clarified by the Supreme Court. The Division Bench observed as follows:
“17. Unfettered by the observations made by the Division Bench, if we consider the question on the basis of the fundamental principles of law and the judgments of the Supreme Court, it would be seen that there is no merit in the contention, advanced by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. Clause 7 in the agreement in Form 7-A would only mean that the disciplinary authority is the College Committee of the college. The procedure to be followed by the College Committee in holding a disciplinary enquiry is set out in the clause in order that the principles of natural justice are satisfied. The clause only points out that reasonable opportunity should be given to the person concerned to examine or cross-examine any of the witnesses and also produce witnesses. It is the college committee which has to apply its mind to the charges framed and evidence on record and come to a final decision. Nothing in the clause prohibits the appointment of any person or body to conduct or hold the enquiry. As there is no express prohibition, the normal rule applicable to such cases will come into play.”
After referring to several other decisions relating to power of the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution, it was further observed:
“21. The same reasoning will apply to the present case. If the College Committee is to consider the entire matter, it will be defeating the very purpose of the rules on enquiry. In our opinion, the College Committee is, therefore, entitled to nominate a Sub-Committee for the purpose of conducting the enquiry. It is a general principle of law that in any disciplinary matter, the disciplinary authority is entitled to nominate an enquiry officer, who will only record the evidence and submit his finding. Such finding is certainly not binding on the disciplinary authority. It is for the disciplinary authority to go into the evidence and other materials collected by the enquiry officer and come to a conclusion on its own. This position has been recognised by the Supreme Court in Union Of India v. H.C Goel., AIR 1964 SC 364: 1964 (1) SCWR 28. The contention in that case was that the report of the enquiry officer was in favour of the delinquent officer and that should have been accepted by the disciplinary authority. That contention was rejected and the Court held that the report of the enquiry officer is only to help the disciplinary authority to consider the matter and come to a conclusion and there is no rule that it should be accepted. It is for the disciplinary authority to decide whether the report should be accepted or not.”
It was concluded that factually there was no basis for the contention that the charge has been framed by the Secretary and not by the College Committee.
8. In spite of the aforesaid Division Bench decision relating to Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Rules, 1976, which is pari materia with Tamil Nadu Recognised Private School (Regulation) Rules, 1974, subsequently, the controversy continued.
9. In C. Ranganathan v. President/Secretary Of School Committee, Coimbatore and another, 1997 (2) LW 872, the question related to the order of suspension of a Headmaster issued by the Secretary. The main contention before the learned single Judge was to the effect that the order of suspension and the charge-memo were without jurisdiction as such orders had been passed by the Secretary and not by the School Committee. It was also contended that such illegal order cannot be subsequently ratified by the School Committee. Learned single Judge while relying upon another order of a learned single Judge in Valliappan v. The Madras Seva Sadan Higher Secondary School, 1995 (2) MLJ 488, observed that the School Committee alone was authorised to initiate any disciplinary proceedings against the Headmaster and as such the School Committee could only place the Headmaster under suspension.
10. Similar view appears to have been taken by another single Judge in the decision in Management of M.G.R Higher Secondary School, Kodambakkam v. NAG Balaji Singh, 1998 WLR 769. That was a case relating to order of dismissal pursuant to the disciplinary proceedings initiated and enquired into by the Secretary.
11. In many of the decisions referred to above, the contract required to be executed between the management and the concerned employee has been held to be a statutory contract and, therefore, having the same force as a statute. However, the Supreme Court in The National High School, Tambaram East, by its Secretary v. P.S Venkataramanujam & another, 1992 (3) Supp. SCC 106, has observed that such contract can be changed by both the parties. The object of the statute is to regulate the service conditions of the employees. Certain provisions have been incorporated in Form VII-A obviously with a view to regulate the disciplinary control and proceedings relating to various employees, which cannot be unilaterally changed by the management.
12. The statutory provisions themselves contemplate certain powers as well as laid down certain procedures. Section 18(c) of the Act contemplates that the School Committee is empowered to take disciplinary action against the teachers and other employees of the private school. It is obvious that the essential features relating to disciplinary control vested with the School Committee, which is also envisaged in the contract entered into in Form VII-A, cannot be whittled down. Essential functions as to the decision to initiate any disciplinary proceedings, to frame charge, to consider finally the guilt or otherwise of the delinquent and to impose appropriate punishment are matters which are coming within the specific jurisdiction of the School Committee and such essential functions obviously cannot be delegated. However, holding of an enquiry cannot be said to be one of the essential functions which is required to be performed by the School Committee in all events and by none-else. Following the well settled principle in Service Jurisprudence, holding of actual enquiry can be delegated to any other Sub-Committee or person. It is obvious that the report made by such Sub-Committee or enquiry officer is to be placed before the School Committee for consideration and obviously the School Committee is free to take any decision and it is not bound by the decision taken by the Sub-Committee. The fact that the disciplinary authority is not required to hold the enquiry itself is quite well recognised in service jurisprudence.
13. In Pradyot Kumar Bose v. The Hon'ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, AIR 1956 SC 285, the question was whether the Chief Justice of the High Court could delegate to another Judge an enquiry relating to charges against a member of the High Court. The Supreme Court observed that a statutory functionary in the absence of any specific prohibition while exercising disciplinary control can delegate the power of holding the enquiry to another Judge, but ultimately the decision has to be taken by the disciplinary authority.
Similarly the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi, 1978 All LJ 477, observed that the disciplinary control vested with the High Court may be exercised, however, the essence of power cannot be permitted to be diluted.
Similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in Union Of India v. H.C Goel., AIR 1964 SC 364, relating to exercise of disciplinary authority in other organisations.
14. In B & C Mills v. B & C Mills, 1970 (1) LLJ 26, the Company's Mill-manager issued the charge-sheet, but the senior Labour Officer recorded the evidence. Thereafter on scrutiny of the enquiry report, the Mill-manager passed the order of dismissal. The contention that the Mill-manager had no jurisdiction to delegate to another officer the power to hold the enquiry was accepted and it was held that the Mill-manager could delegate the function of collecting necessary evidence.
15. In A. Krishnaswamy v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, 1981 (1) LLJ 374, a Division Bench of this Court had observed that the Board being a statutory body composing of numerous members could delegate its functions in conducting an enquiry against its employee to its subordinate officer, so long as there is no prohibition against such delegation under the statute.
16. It is no doubt true that on a cursory reading of the contents of Form VII-A, one may prima facie come to a conclusion that the enquiry in the disciplinary proceedings has to be conducted by the School Committee. We do not think that it was the intention of the Legislature that the matter relating to collection of evidence and even submission of report thereon has to be done by the School Committee and not by any other Sub-Committee or person. Such a conclusion would give rise to many impracticable situations which could not have been the intention of the Legislature.
17. Two of the earlier Division Bench decisions had lost their sting by virtue of the subsequent observations made by the Supreme Court arising out of those cases. The other Division Bench decision in P. Andree v. The Tamil Nadu Medical Council, rep. by its President and another, 1992 WLR 124, is distinguishable and had been rendered on a different fact situation.
18. In our opinion, the ratio of the decision of the Division Bench in Saradha Balakrishnan v. The Director of Collegiate Education and Another, 1995 (1) MLJ 610, can be said to be reflecting the correct position, subject to certain clarifications.
19. From the provisions contained in the Act along with the contents of Form VII-A, it is evident that the decision as to whether a disciplinary proceeding should be initiated or not, whether an employee should be placed under suspension or not, whether charges should be framed or not has to be taken by the School Committee. These powers are essential powers of the School Committee and the provisions contained in the Act do not envisage that such essential powers can be delegated. However, the duty of holding the enquiry can be delegated by the School Committee of course and not by any other authority. The Sub-Committee or the person appointed, as enquiry officer is required to hold the enquiry and can submit his report. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, etc. v. B. Karunakar, etc., AIR 1994 SC 1074: 1993 (4) SCC 727, copy of such report is required to be served on the delinquent to enable him to make his submission. Such report is required to be considered independently by the School Committee and obviously such report is not binding on the School Committee. Once the School Committee comes to an independent conclusion regarding the delinquency of the charged employee, the question of punishment is again a matter to be decided by the School Committee and such authority cannot be delegated.
20. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that even adopting the aforesaid yardstick, there is no material to indicate that the School Committee has specifically delegated such power to hold enquiry and, therefore, the enquiry must be taken to be vitiated. This aspect is, however, combated by the learned counsel appearing for the school.
21. In normal course, we would have requested the learned single Judge to decide such aspect by scanning the materials on record. However, we find that the impugned order of dismissal of the petitioner is bound to be quashed on another ground. It is apparent that initially an enquiry was held by the School Committee as a whole, but subsequently before finalisation it was decided to entrust the enquiry to a Sub-Committee. Some of the members belonging to the School Committee deposed at such enquiry held by the Sub-Committee and ultimately some of those members also sat in the School Committee while deciding about the guilt of the concerned employee and while considering the question of punishment. It is thus obvious that such proceedings of the School Committee became vitiated because some of the witnesses sat as members of the School Committee and took the decision and participated in the ultimate decision whereunder it was decided to punish the concerned employee. Therefore, the principles of natural justice stood violated and the order passed cannot be upheld.
22. In State Of U.P v. Mohammad Nooh ., AIR 1958 SC 86, a departmental enquiry was held against an employee. One of the witnesses against the employee turned hostile and the officer holding the enquiry left the enquiry and gave evidence against the employee and resumed to complete the enquiry and passed the order of dismissal. Such action was quashed by the Supreme Court by holding that the rules of natural justice were grievously violated.
Such principle was followed in Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hariram (Co-Education) Higher Secondary School and Others, 1993 (4) SCC 10.
23. The proceedings had been initiated long back and has undergone several vicissitudes. Even though some of the allegations are relatively serious, it is obvious that in the meantime the petitioner had reached the age of superannuation. Having regard to all these aspects, it would not be in the interest of justice to remit the matter for fresh disposal before the School Committee by eschewing the persons who appeared as witnesses.
24. After hearing of the matter before the Full Bench was over, a Joint Memo signed by the petitioner and the second respondent was filed, wherein the financial benefit to be paid to the petitioner on quashing the order of dismissal has been spelt out. However, it is not possible for the Full Bench to deal with such aspect in this judgment. Therefore, while quashing the order of dismissal, the question relating to the extent of financial benefit to be extended to the petitioner and the question as to whether such amount has to be paid by the second respondent or by the first respondent is left open to be decided by the learned single Judge. The Joint Memo filed by the petitioner and the second respondent shall be considered while considering the aforesaid aspect. The matter shall be listed before the learned single Judge on 9.10.2006
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