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J.V Bhoopalan Petitioner v. Rajamanickammal And Others S

Madras High Court
Nov 6, 2006
Judgment
Subsequent
References
CaseIQ
Case Information
CITATION CODES
citation codes
CASE NO.

C.R.P (NPD) No. 929 of 2003

Attorney(S)

Mr. K. Karthick for Mr. T.S Sivagnanam, Advocates for Petitioner.

Mr. S. Parthasarathi, Senior Counsel for M/s. Sarvabhauman Associates, Advocates for Respondent.

JUDGES

S. Rajeswaran, J.

ACTS

Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter called the Act).4.

Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950,

Clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 19-A

Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960,

sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section

sub-section (4) of Section 19-A

Section 19-A(3)(c)

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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Civil Revision Petition under Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Revision Petition was filed challenging the order dated 26.2.2003 in R.C.A. No. 134/1994 of the Rent Control Appellate Authority-cum-II Additional Sub-Court, Coimbatore, which confirmed the order dated 18.8.1994 in R.C.O.P. No. 203/1990 of the District Munsif-cum-Rent Control Authority, Coimbatore.

The revision petitioner is the tenant. The original landlord, D. Shanmugam, had filed R.C.O.P. No. 203/1990 seeking eviction on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent. The Rent Controller allowed the petition by order dated 18.8.1994, holding that the tenant committed wilful default. The tenant appealed in R.C.A. No. 134/1994; the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal by order dated 26.2.2003, upholding the Rent Controller's order. During the pendency of the appeal the original landlord died and additional respondents were added on 12.11.2002. The tenant filed the present Civil Revision Petition under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960.

Material factual points recited in the opinion:

  • The tenancy rent was Rs. 650 per month.
  • The landlord alleged non-payment from December 1988 and issued notice dated 27.6.1990 claiming arrears amounting to Rs. 11,050 for 17 months when the notice was sent.
  • The tenant replied on 12.7.1990 stating rent up to April 1990 had been deposited in Court and enclosed pay orders; various deposits into Court at different dates and amounts are recorded in the opinion.
  • The Rent Controller found the deposits represented only six months' rent whereas arrears of 17 months were due, found that the tenant had not informed the landlord about deposits nor satisfactorily explained deposits, and concluded the deposits were made irregularly (at intervals and at the tenant's convenience), holding that the tenant committed wilful default and ordering eviction.
  • The Appellate Authority re-appreciated evidence, agreed with the Rent Controller, and also held that the tenant did not comply with the conditions precedent under Section 8 of the Act when depositing rent into Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the tenant committed wilful default in payment of rent such as to justify eviction under the Act.
  2. Whether deposit of rent into Court by the tenant complied with the procedural conditions of Section 8 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960, and whether non-compliance disentitles a tenant from relying on such deposit to avoid a finding of wilful default.
  3. Whether this Court, on a Civil Revision Petition under Section 25 of the Act, should interfere with the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority on the evidence presented (i.e., whether re-appreciation of evidence is appropriate in the absence of illegality or infirmity).

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner (Tenant) - Arguments

  • The tenant contended that he had not committed wilful default because the landlord refused to receive rent, which forced him to deposit the rent in Court.
  • The tenant also argued that deposits were sometimes made for two or three months together because of shortage of challans (chalans), and that such practical difficulties should not be attributed to wilful default.
  • The tenant's counsel submitted that failure to follow the procedural steps of Section 8 of the Act does not automatically amount to wilful default, and that when a landlord refuses to receive rent, the landlord cannot later complain that the tenant failed to follow Section 8.
  • The tenant relied on several precedents to support the contention that refusal by the landlord to receive rent and deposits made in other lawful manners could rebut a finding of wilful default (cases relied on by tenant are listed in the opinion).

Respondents (Successors to Original Landlord) - Arguments

  • The respondents' Senior Counsel argued that when a tenant invokes the Section 8 mechanism, the statutory procedure must be followed strictly and in accordance with law.
  • They submitted that, irrespective of invocation of Section 8, the tenant was guilty of wilful default because the rent was not deposited as and when it became due.
  • The respondents relied on the evidence including the Court register for deposit of rent and contended that both authorities below had properly evaluated records and that this Court should not interfere under Section 25 of the Act in the absence of any illegality or infirmity.
  • They relied on precedents, including a Supreme Court decision (E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy), to support the proposition that strict compliance with statutory provisions is necessary to avail statutory protections.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in the opinion) Application by the Court (how the opinion used or treated the precedent)
Durgai Ammal v. R.T. Mani, 1989 (1) LW 155 Section 8 is an enabling provision; when a landlord refuses to receive rent the fault is the landlord's and failure by the tenant to follow Section 8 does not necessarily amount to wilful default. The tenant relied on this Division Bench decision. The opinion records and quotes the decision but ultimately does not accept it as dispositive in the present case in view of the Supreme Court decision in E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy.
Rajalinga Chettiar v. Nataraja Mudaliar, 1995 (2) MLJ 211 Section 8 is optional/enabling and non-adoption of Section 8 procedure does not necessarily indicate lack of bona fides; earlier Division Bench decisions (including Durgai Ammal) were followed. The tenant relied on this authority. The opinion cites and summarises its reasoning but records that it cannot accept these authorities ultimately because of the Supreme Court ruling in E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy.
V.S. Hamid Sultan v. Abdul Latheef, 2000 (1) CTC 137 Where the landlord refused to receive rent, the landlord cannot complain of tenant's non-compliance with Section 8; non-compliance is one relevant circumstance but not conclusive. Relied upon by the tenant. The opinion records the principle but does not accept it as determinative given the Supreme Court authority relied upon by respondents.
J.J. Lal Pvt. Ltd. v. M.R. Murali, 2002 (1) CTC 487 Cited by tenant for the proposition that default may not be wilful in certain circumstances. The tenant cited this decision; the court states it is unable to accept that submission in the facts of the present case.
E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy, 2002 (4) CTC 572 : 2003 (1) SCC 123 Legal fiction and statutory protections are to be limited to their intended purpose; a tenant seeking benefit of a statutory deposit mechanism must satisfy conditions prescribed (strict compliance with procedural pre-conditions under the relevant Act); omission disentitles tenant to protection. The court treated this Supreme Court decision as categorical and decisive on the point of strict compliance with Section 8-like provisions. The opinion declines to accept the tenant's reliance on earlier favorable authorities in view of this decision and follows its principle to uphold the findings below.
M. Gangabai Ammal v. M. Saraswathamma, 2006 (2) MLJ 711 Authority indicating that the tenant must comply with statutory procedures; referenced as a like decision. The opinion refers to its own prior view in this case to support the position that the Court under Section 25 should not re-appreciate evidence to reach a different conclusion.
S. Pandian v. A.G. Velayudham, 2006 (3) LW 304 The tenant should meticulously follow the procedure under Section 8 of the Act (as applied by this Court in that decision). The opinion notes that the author of the instant judgment had occasion to deal with Section 8 in that case and came to the view that the tenant must follow the procedure meticulously; the present decision aligns with that approach.
S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, AIR 1985 SC 582 (98 LW 49) Definition of "wilful default": requires intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious default with full knowledge of legal consequences. The opinion cites this Supreme Court passage to note the high threshold for proving wilful default and records that in that cited case the landlord could not prove such wilfulness; the Court used the principle in assessing whether wilfulness was proved in the present case.
Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal, 1996 (1) SCC 243 Legal fiction should be limited to its legitimate field; conditions for invoking legal fiction must be satisfied; deposit in Court must comply with statutory conditions to avail protection. Quoted within the E. Palanisamy exposition. The opinion relies on the reasoning in E. Palanisamy (which in turn cites Kuldeep Singh) to reject the tenant's contention that mere deposit in Court without following prior subsections suffices.
M. Bhaskar v. Venkatarama Naidu, 1996 (6) SCC 228 When landlord evades receipt of rent, the tenant must follow the Section 8 procedure (notice to name bank, apply to Rent Controller, etc.); omission disentitles tenant to protection. Quoted in the E. Palanisamy extract. The opinion references this principle to support the respondents' contention that statutory procedure must be followed.
Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 General principle: legal fictions are to be limited to the purpose for which they are created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field. Quoted in the E. Palanisamy discussion (as cited in the opinion). The opinion uses this broader principle as part of the reasoning from the Supreme Court authority that strict compliance is required.
G.K. Jose v. Ramathal, 1979 (1) MLJ 372 Referenced in Rajalinga Chettiar as a case producing an earlier contrary view on Section 8 procedure. Mentioned as part of a group of judgments whose views were contrasted in Rajalinga Chettiar; the opinion notes these are contrary views and that the Division Bench decision in Durgai Ammal was followed in Rajalinga Chettiar.
Minor Rajakumari v. V. Natarajan, 1994 (1) LW 340 Referenced as a case where the tenant followed alternate methods of payment (bank account) and the evidence of such deposits, if unrepudiated, could show absence of wilful default. Mentioned in the Rajalinga Chettiar extract; the opinion recounts this authority as part of the debate on whether Section 8 procedure is mandatory.
Marudachala Udayar v. Dhandapani, 1980 (1) MLJ 169 One of several decisions cited in Rajalinga Chettiar reflecting differing judicial approaches to Section 8 compliance. Mentioned in Rajalinga Chettiar; the opinion notes it as part of authorities expressing contrary views to the Division Bench in Durgai Ammal.
Kalyani v. G.V. Subramaniam, 1990 (1) MLJ 29 Referenced among cases taking a view contrary to certain Division Bench decisions on Section 8 procedure. Mentioned in Rajalinga Chettiar as part of the matrix of precedent; the opinion records that those contrary views were not followed.
N. Damodaran Naicker v. Janaki Ammal, 1995 (1) MLJ 33 Referenced as another authority with divergent approach on the import of Section 8 compliance. Mentioned in Rajalinga Chettiar; the opinion identifies these divergent authorities but notes preference for Division Bench authority in Durgai Ammal until the Supreme Court's ruling in E. Palanisamy.
Vasavambal v. Chenniappa Gounder, 1980 (1) MLJ 207 Listed among decisions with views on Section 8 procedure. Mentioned in Rajalinga Chettiar; treated as part of the body of divergent case-law summarized in that decision.
Muktha Bai v. Adinarayana Chetty, 1989 (1) MLJ 502 Referenced among decisions reflecting a particular judicial view on compliance with Section 8. Mentioned in Rajalinga Chettiar; included in the catalogue of contrary authorities discussed in the opinion.
Umrao Bai v. Dhanalakshmi Ammal, 1989 (2) LW (S.N) 7 Referenced among authorities expressing views relevant to Section 8 compliance. Mentioned in Rajalinga Chettiar; recorded as part of contrary judicial approaches.
Selvaraj alias Subbarama Reddiar v. K. Mumtaz Begum, 100 LW 510 Referenced as part of the body of decisions considered in Rajalinga Chettiar. Mentioned in Rajalinga Chettiar; the opinion notes these cases form part of the contextual precedent but are not adopted as controlling in the present judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by (a) reviewing the factual findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority, (b) examining the competing legal authorities on the consequences of deposit of rent into Court and compliance with Section 8 of the Act, and (c) considering whether interference under Section 25 of the Act was warranted.

Key steps in the reasoning as recorded in the opinion:

  1. Factual appraisal: both the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority examined the documentary record, including the register kept in the Court for deposit of rent, and concluded that the rent deposits by the tenant were neither properly timed nor sufficiently proved to represent all the alleged arrears — the deposits amounted to sums representing approximately six months whereas arrears of 17 months were claimed when notice was sent.
  2. On the question whether the landlord had refused to receive rent, the authorities below found that it was not proved by the tenant that rent was refused by the landlord. The Rent Controller additionally found that the tenant failed to inform the landlord about deposits and did not provide acceptable explanations for depositing rent in Court in the manner done.
  3. The Appellate Authority concurred with the Rent Controller and expressly held that the conditions precedent to deposit under Section 8 had not been complied with; it noted that some deposits were made in an earlier R.C.O.P. which was not filed under Section 8(5) and was for another purpose.
  4. Regarding legal principles, the Court acknowledged decisions favorable to the tenant (for example, Durgai Ammal, Rajalinga Chettiar and V.S. Hamid Sultan) which emphasize that Section 8 is an enabling provision and that a landlord's refusal to receive rent may be the landlord's fault such that non-compliance does not automatically amount to wilful default.
  5. However, the Court placed decisive weight on the Supreme Court decision in E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy (2003 (1) SCC 123) and related Supreme Court authority, which the opinion summarises as holding that (i) statutory procedures leading to the benefit of a legal fiction must be strictly observed, and (ii) failure to comply with prior subsections and prescribed procedures disentitles the tenant to the protection of the statutory mechanism and may justify eviction for default.
  6. The Court considered the definition of wilful default as requiring intentional, deliberate and conscious default (citing S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman) and noted that the landlord must prove such wilfulness; nonetheless, on the findings of both authorities below — namely non-compliance with Section 8 and irregular deposits not made as and when due — the Court found no basis to re-appreciate the evidence under Section 25 of the Act.
  7. The Court concluded that there was no illegality or infirmity in the concurrent findings of fact and law by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority that would warrant interference in revision. It emphasized the settled principle that this Court should not re-appreciate evidence on a revision petition in the absence of demonstrable legal error.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISMISSED

The Civil Revision Petition was dismissed. The Court found no merit to interfere with the concurrent decisions of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority. The order of eviction and the Appellate Authority's confirmation of that order were therefore upheld. The petition was dismissed with no costs, and C.M.P. No. 9615/2003 was also dismissed.

Implications:

  • The immediate effect is that the eviction order and the Appellate Authority's confirmation remain operative against the tenant in respect of the rent-default claim described in the record.
  • The Court relied on the Supreme Court authority requiring strict compliance with statutory procedures when a tenant seeks to avail statutory protections for depositing rent; in this case that reasoning led the Court to reject the tenant's reliance on earlier Division Bench authorities.
  • The opinion expressly declines to re-appreciate evidence on revision in the absence of illegality or infirmity; therefore the decision reinforces the principle that concurrent factual findings by lower authorities will not be easily disturbed under Section 25 of the Act.
  • The opinion does not purport to create a new general precedent beyond applying and following the Supreme Court authority cited; its direct consequence is limited to upholding the orders in this litigation.

Note: This summary is prepared exclusively from the provided opinion text and does not add or infer facts beyond what appears in that text.

Show all summary ...

Revision Petition filed against the order dated 26.2.2003, made in R.C.A No. 134/1994 on the file of the Rent Control Appellate Authority-cum-II Addl.Sub-Court, Coimbatore, confirming the order dated 18.8.1994 made in R.C.O.P No. 203/1990, on the file of the District Munsif-cum-Rent Control Authority, Coimbatore.

JUDGMENT

1. This Revision Petition has been filed against the order dated 26.2.2003, made in R.C.A No. 134/1994 on the file of the Rent Control Appellate Authority-cum-II Additional Sub-Court, Coimbatore, confirming the order dated 18.8.1994 made in R.C.O.P No. 203/1990, on the file of the District Munsif-cum-Rent Control Authority, Coimbatore.

2. The tenant is the revision petitioner.

3. The original landlord-D. Shanmugam filed R.C.O.P No. 203/1990 against the revision petitioner for an order of eviction on the ground that the revision petitioner has committed wilful default in the payment of rent. By order dated 18.8.1994 the Rent Controller allowed the R.C.O.P by holding that the revision petitioner/tenant has committed wilful default in the payment of rent. Against the order of the Rent Controller, the tenant filed R.C.A No. 134/1994 and the Rent Control Appellate Authority by order dated 26.2.2003 dismissed the Appeal and upheld the order of Rent Controller. Aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority confirming the order of Rent Controller, the above Civil Revision Petition has been filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’).

4. During the pendency of the Appeal, the original landlord passed away and respondents 1 to 3 herein were added as respondents 2 to 4 in R.C.A No. 134/1994 on 12.11.2002

5. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner and the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents. I have also perused the documents filed and the judgments referred to in support of their submissions.

6. The case of the landlord before the Rent Controller is that the revision petitioner is a tenant paying a monthly rent of Rs. 650/- and he has not paid the monthly rent on and from December 1988. Therefore he sent a notice dated 27.6.1990 calling upon the tenant to pay the rental arrears, for which a reply dated 12.7.1990 was sent by the revision petitioner/tenant informing that rent up to April 1990 was already deposited in Court and he has also enclosed two pay orders for Rs. 650/- each along with the reply. On verification it was found that the revision petitioner/tenant deposited a sum of Rs. 1300/- on 15.3.1989, Rs. 1800/- on 13.7.1989 and on the very same date another sum of Rs. 150/- and yet another sum of Rs. 650/- were deposited by him. Further on 12.7 1990 another sum of Rs. 1300/- was deposited and all these amounts would represent the rental arrears for a period of 6 months, whereas a sum of Rs. 11,050/- for a period of 17 months was due and payable by the revision petitioner/tenant when the notice dated 27.6.1990 was sent by the landlord. Therefore, the landlord prayed for an order of eviction on the ground of wilful default committed by the revision petitioner/tenant.

7. The revision petitioner/tenant opposed the Eviction Petition on the ground that he was forced to deposit the monthly rent in Court as the landlord refused to receive the rent. Similarly he was forced to deposit 2 or 3 months rent in the Court as there were shortage of chalans for which he could not be held responsible. The Rent Controller after going through the entire evidence held that the revision petitioner/tenant has failed to inform the landlord about the deposit of rent in the Court and he has not explained with acceptable reason for depositing the rent into Court. The Rent Controller has further observed that the revision petitioner/tenant has proved the allegation that the landlord has refused to receive the rent when it was paid to him. The Rent Controller after going through the register kept in the Court for deposit of rent found that the rents were not properly deposited as and when it were due and the same was deposited with an interval of few months, that too at the convenience of the revision petitioner/tenant. Therefore the Rent Controller held that the revision petitioner/tenant has committed wilful default and passed an order of eviction.

8. The Appellate Authority after re-appreciating the evidence concurred with the findings of the rent controller in toto.

9. The Appellate Authority has further gone into the aspect of deposit of rent by the revision petitioner/tenant under Section 8 of the Act, 1960 and held that the conditions precedent under Section 8 of the Act before depositing the rent into Court were not complied with by the tenant and the tenant has straight away deposited the rent into Court. The Appellate Authority has also referred to the fact that the deposit of rent was made in R.C.O.P No. 264/1988 which was not filed under Section 8(5) of the Act and R.C.O.P No. 264/1988 was filed for some other purpose.

10. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant contended that there is no wilful default committed by the tenant and having refused to receive the rent which is his statutory duty, the landlord cannot contend that the tenant has failed to follow the conditions spelt out in Section 8 of the Act. Further the learned counsel submitted that failure to follow the steps enumerated in Section 8 does not mean that the tenant has committed wilful default.

11. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant relied on the following judgments in support of his contentions:

(1) Durgai Ammal v. R.T Mani, 1989 (1) LW 155

(2) Rajalinga Chettiar v. Nataraja Mudaliar, 1995 (2) MLJ 211

(3) V.S. Hamid Sultan v. Abdul Latheef, 2000 (1) CTC 137

(4) J.J Lal Pvt. Ltd. v. M.R Murali, 2002 (1) CTC 487

12. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents submitted that when the tenant initiates proceedings under Section 8 of the Act the same should be in accordance with law. He further submitted that even otherwise the tenant is guilty of wilful default as he has not deposited the rent as and when it became due. He finally concluded his argument by submitting that when both the authorities below after going through the records including the register for deposit of rent kept in the Court held that the rent was not properly deposited, the same need not be interfered with by this Court under Section 25 of the Act, in the absence of any illegality or infirmity.

13. He relied on the following decisions in support of his submissions:

(1) E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy, 2002 (4) CTC 572: 2003 (1) SCC 123

(2) M. Gangabai Ammal v. M. Saraswathamma, 2006 (2) MLJ 711

(3) S. Pandian v. A.G Velayudham, 2006 (3) LW 304

14. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that when a landlord refuses to receive the rent sent by the tenant, it is his fault and therefore he cannot subsequently say that the tenant has not exercised his right under Section 8 of the Act and therefore he must be taken to have committed wilful default. For this proposition he relied on the decisions of this Court reported in Durgai Ammal v. R.T Mani, 1989 (1) LW 155, Rajalinga Chettiar v. Nataraja Mudaliar, 1995 (2) MLJ 211 and V.S. Hamid Sultan v. Abdul Latheef, 2000 (1) CTC 137.

15. In Durgai Ammal v. R.T Mani, 1989 (1) LW 155, a Division Bench of this Court held as follows:

“Section 8 provides that in case the landlord refuses to receive rent tendered by the tenant the tenant can call upon the landlord to name a bank where she can deposit it and if he fails to do so the tenant can send it by money order and if even that money order is not received, the tenant can deposit the rent before the Rent Controller. But it is nowhere stated that if the tenant does not do so it will amount to wilful default. When a landlord refuses to receive the rent sent by the tenant it is his fault. He cannot subsequently say that the tenant has not exercised his right given under Section 8, and, therefore, he must be taken to have committed wilful default. Similarly, if the tenant has not deposited the rent before the Rent Controller in case of bona fide doubt as to the person who is entitled to receive the rent and the person concerned does not help to remove the doubt of the tenant, the tenant cannot be said to have committed wilful default in payment of rent. Therefore we find that the finding of the Appellate Authority that the tenant committed wilful default in payment of rent is wrong and hence that finding has to be set aside.”

16. In Rajalinga Chettiar v. Nataraja Mudaliar, 1995 (2) MLJ 211, this Court held as follows:

“27. With respect, I agree with the view taken by Ramaprasada Rao, J., followed by the other learned Judges referred to supra, that Section 8 is only an enabling provision to prove the bona fides of the tenant and absence of wilfulness on the part of the tenant in the matter of payments of the rents. I am also of the view that the non-adoption of the procedure prescribed under Section 8(2) which could be adopted by the tenants in their discretion, does not throw any light upon want of bona fides of the tenants. In the instant case, I am also of the view that the procedure prescribed under Section 8 of the Act is only optional and not mandatory. This apart, the same view was taken by the Division Bench, in Durgai Ammal v. R.T Mani, 1989 (1) LW 155, while reversing the decision of Ramanujam, J., in G.K Jose v. Ramathal, 1979 (1) MLJ 372. As already indicated, Ratnam, J., has distinguished the Division Bench judgments in Durgai Ammal v. R.T Mani, 1989 (1) LW 155, on the ground that Section 8(5) of the Act had been passed due to refusal of the landlord in that case. In Minor Rajakumari, represented by her next friend, Mr. Ramakrishnan v. V. Natarajan, 1994 (1) LW 340, Ratnam, J., himself has observed that it was open to the tenant to have followed the procedure laid down in the Act with reference to the deposit of rent, but instead, the tenant had opened an account and had been depositing the rents in that account so as to make it available to the landlord whenever required. However, the learned Judge said that though it may be that the tenant was not in order in not having resorted to the provisions of the Act with reference to the payment of rents, inasmuch as the evidence of the tenant that he had deposited the amounts in a Bank account, has not been repudiated or rejected as unacceptable, there could not be any wilful default as such in the payment of rents in that case, as contended by the landlord. In the instant case also, deposit of rents had been made in the Post Office Savings Bank Account in the name of the tenants by the tenants, without resorting to the provisions of the Act. With reference to the payment of rents the tenants had produced before the Court below the evidence regarding the deposits. In fact, the landlord has withdrawn the amount after obtaining orders from the Rent Controller, of the deposits made by the tenant. Therefore, it follows that there could not be any wilful default as such in the payment of rents in the instant case as contended by the learned counsel for the landlord. Though a contrary view was taken by Nainar Sundaram, J. in Marudachala Udayar v. Dhandapani, 1980 (1) MLJ 169; by Ratnam, J. in Kalyani v. G.V Subramaniam, 1990 (1) MLJ 29; by Thangamani, J. in N. Damodaran Naicker v. Janaki Ammal, 1995 (1) MLJ 33; Ratnam, J. in Vasavambal v. Chenniappa Gounder, 1980 (1) MLJ 207; by Sivasubramanian, J. in Muktha Bai v. Adinarayana Chetty, 1989 (1) MLJ 502 and in Umrao Bai v. Dhanalakshmi Ammal, 1989 (2) LW (S.N) 7 and by Padmini Jesudurai, J. in Selvaraj alias Subbarama Reddiar v. K. Mumtaz Begum, 100 LW 510. With respect I am unable to agree with the views expressed by them since I am bound by the decision of the Division Bench in Durgai Ammal v. R.T Mani, 1989 (1) LW 155”.

28. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R Pattabiraman, AIR 1985 SC 582: 98 LW 49, held as follows:

“Thus a consensus of the meaning of the words ‘wilful default’ appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.”

In this case, the landlord was not in a position to prove that default in order to be wilful, as intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom.

29. Therefore, I am of the view that the Courts below have erred in holding that the premises, the subject matter of the petitions, is bona fide required by the respondent-landlord for demolition and re-construction and that the petitioners-tenants had defaulted in payment of rents. As already seen, the Courts below have failed to take into consideration the fact that rents were duly remitted in every month in the Post Office Savings Bank Account and that therefore, there cannot be any wilful default on the part of all the three tenants against whom different petitions were filed in an identical manner.”

17. In V.S. Hamid Sultan v. Abdul Latheef, 2000 (1) CTC 137, this Court held as follows:

“13. The present case would be covered by the observation of the Division Bench in the judgment reported in Durga Ammal v. R.T Mani, 1989 (1) LW 155, and the landlord who refused to receive the rent cannot be heard to complain non compliance of Section 8 of the Act as against the tenant. It is undoubtedly, true that in considering whether a tenant was guilty of wilful or not, the circumstance of non-compliance of Section 8 of the Act will also be one of the relevant circumstance, but not the only conclusive circumstance in a case where the landlord refused to receive the rent.”

18. Citing the above decisions, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant assailed the order of the Appellate Authority holding that the mandatory provisions contained in Section 8 of the Act have not been followed.

19. But the learned Senior Counsel relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy, 2002 (4) CTC 572: 2003 (1) SCC 123, and the decision of this Court reported in S. Pandian v. A.G Velayudham, 2006 (3) LW 304, to contend that the tenant is bound to comply strictly with statutory provisions. Otherwise he cannot enjoy the benefits conferred by such provisions.

20. In E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy, 2002 (4) CTC 572: 2003 (1) SCC 123, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

“6. The counsel for the appellant did not dispute that the tenant had not fulfilled the conditions prescribed in Section 8 of the Act before making deposit of rent in Court. Hence similar circumstances and while dealing with almost similar provisions contained in the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal, 1996 (1) SCC 243 held: (SCC p. 249, para 8)

“8. In the present case, the appellant is seeking to avail of the benefit of the legal fiction under Section 19-A(4) of the Act. It is settled law that a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it is created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate field. (See Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661: 1955 (2) SCR 603 (SCR at p. 646). The appellant can avail of the benefit of Section 19-A(4) if the deposit of Rs. 3600 made by him in the Court of Munsif (South), Udaipur, on 29.10.1082, by way of rent for the months of May 1982 to October 1982, can be treated as a payment under Section 19-A(3)(c) so as to enable the appellant to say that he was not in default in payment of rent. Under Section 19-A(3)(c) the tenant can deposit the rent in the Court only if the conditions laid down in the said provision are satisfied. It is the admitted case of the appellant that these conditions are not satisfied in the present case. The deposit which was made by the respondent in Court on 29.10.1982 cannot, therefore, be regarded as a deposit made in accordance with Clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 19-A and the appellant cannot avail of the protection of sub-section (4) of Section 19-A and he must be held to have committed default in payment of rent for the months of May 1982 to October 1982. This means that the decree for eviction has been rightly passed against the appellant on account of default in payment of rent for the period of six months.”

7. Again in M. Bhaskar v. Venkatarama Naidu, 1996 (6) SCC 228, with reference to similar provisions contained in the A.P Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, this Court observed that when the landlord is evading payment of rent, the tenant has to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 8 of the Act i.e, to issue notice to the landlord to name the bank and if he does not name the bank, the tenant has to file application before the Rent Controller for permission to deposit rent. The tenant did not follow that procedure. Omission to avail of the prescribed procedure disentitles the tenant to plead that there was no wilful default on his part. The landlord was, therefore, entitled to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent on the part of the tenant.

8. Admittedly the tenant did not follow the procedure prescribed under Section 8. The only submission that was advanced on behalf of the appellant was that since the deposit of rent had been made, a lenient view ought to be taken. We are unable to agree with this. The appellant failed to satisfy the conditions contained in Section 8. Mere refusal of the landlord to receive rent cannot justify the action of the tenant in straight away invoking Section 8(5) of the Act without following the procedure contained in the earlier sub-sections i.e, sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of Section 8. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the eviction order passed against the appellant with respect to the suit premises on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent needs no interference. The impugned judgment of the High Court, therefore, does not call for interference. These Appeals are dismissed. We are informed that the landlords have already taken possession of the suit premises, in pursuance of the High Court judgment.”

21. In S. Pandian v. A.G Velayudham, 2006 (3) LW 304, I have also had an occasion to deal with Section 8 of the Act and taken a decision that the tenant should meticulously follow the procedure enumerated under Section 8 of the Act.

22. Even though the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant are supporting the contentions of the revision petitioner/tenant, I am not able to accept the same, in view of the categorical decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in E. Palanisamy v. Palanisamy, 2003 (1) SCC 123.

23. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant further submitted that even if there is a default, it is not a wilful default and for this proposition he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in J.J Lal Pvt. Ltd. v. M.R Murali, 2002 (1) CTC 487.

24. I am unable to accept this submission also.

25. Both the authorities below, after going through the entire records including the Court register came to a conclusion that first of all it was not proved by the tenant that the rent was refused by the landlord and even while depositing the rent, the same was not deposited as and when it became due.

26. In such circumstances, as rightly submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents that this Court under Section 25 of the Act cannot re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion and I have also taken a similar view in M. Gangabai Ammal v. M. Saraswathamma, 2006 (2) MLJ 711.

27. In the result, I do not find any merits in the above C.R.P warranting interference by this court and therefore the same is dismissed. No costs. C.M.P No. 9615/2003 is also dismissed.

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