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The Central Bureau O... v. Louis Jalu @ Muthukr...
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Two criminal original petitions were filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI): Crl.O.P.No.28805 of 2005 and Crl.O.P.No.33852 of 2005. Both petitions seek cancellation of bail granted to the respondent/accused by the learned Additional Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai in Crl.M.P.Nos.149 and 148 of 2005 respectively, corresponding to C.C.Nos.58 and 9 of 2003.
The charges against the respondent in Crl.O.P.No.28805 of 2005 include Sections 120-B read with 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in C.C.No.58 of 2003). In Crl.O.P.No.33852 of 2005 the respondent is charged under Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 468 and 471 of the IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
It is reported that the respondent caused a loss of approximately Rs. 30 crores to the Indian Bank by cheating. The trial Judge granted bail, noting (i) no chance for tampering with evidence, (ii) a bleak possibility of abscondence because the respondent's French passport had been seized by the Investigating Agency, and (iii) the respondent's age (67) and ailment; the respondent had been in custody for more than 135 days when bail was granted.
The CBI instituted the present petitions invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and, as a matter of abundant caution, also invoked Section 439(2) CrPC seeking cancellation of the bail order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court can cancel or set aside an order of bail granted by the trial Court when the accused was not actually released on bail because this Court had stayed the trial Court's bail order.
- Whether the petitioner can invoke Section 439(2) CrPC for re-arrest and commitment to custody when the accused was not released on bail in consequence of a stay.
- Whether the High Court can invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to set aside a trial Court's interlocutory bail order in the interest of justice and on what principles that jurisdiction may be exercised in such facts.
Arguments of the Parties
Central Bureau of Investigation (Petitioner) — Arguments
- The High Court has jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to cancel the bail granted by the trial Court.
- The Court should upset the trial Court's bail order in the interest of justice because the respondent was brought to India after prolonged extradition proceedings and was arrested in Dubai by alerting Interpol on 6.2.2005; there is a high risk that he would flee from justice.
- There are 12 other cases pending against the respondent, increasing the risk of abscondence.
- As a precaution, the petitioner also sought relief under Section 439(2) CrPC (re-arrest of a person released on bail).
Respondent / Accused — Arguments
- The High Court should consider only supervening circumstances that arose after the trial Court granted bail; the High Court cannot substitute its view for that of the trial Court on whether bail should have been granted.
- Because the order of bail was stayed by this Court and the accused was not in fact released on bail, Section 439(2) CrPC cannot be invoked by the petitioner.
- There was no abuse of process; the trial Judge properly exercised discretion considering age, ill health, lack of chance to flee, and long custody period.
- The loan obtained from Indian Bank has been properly secured (submission in mitigation of cancellation).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Mohammed Abdul Rab @ Babloo and Ors., 1999 (1) Crimes 422 (Karnataka High Court) | High Court can exercise Section 482 CrPC where accused was not released on bail because the order of bail was stayed; inherent jurisdiction available when no appeal or revision lies against a bail order. | The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that Section 482 CrPC may be exercised even though the accused was not released on bail due to a stay order. |
| Puran v. Rambilas, 2001 CRI. L.J. 2566 (Supreme Court) | High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is not affected by Section 397(3) CrPC; High Court may interfere to secure ends of justice where there is miscarriage of justice or an order is palpably illegal or unjustified. | The Court cited this decision to affirm that the High Court may, in appropriate cases, set aside interlocutory orders under its inherent jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice. |
| Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. and Ors., 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076 | Inherent power under Section 482 CrPC cannot be resorted to if a specific provision in the Code or other enactment exists to redress the grievance. | The Court acknowledged this principle when considering whether Section 439(2) CrPC (a specific provision) should preclude invocation of Section 482; the Court concluded Section 439(2) was inapplicable on facts, leaving 482 available. |
| Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 2002 SCC (Cri) 39 | Similar principle that Section 482 should not be used where a specific statutory remedy exists. | The Court cited this authority as part of the line of cases on limits to Section 482 but distinguished it because Section 439(2) could not be effectively invoked here. |
| State v. Navjot Sandhu, 2003 SCC (Cri) 1545 | Further articulation that inherent power under Section 482 is constrained where specific provisions provide remedies. | The Court noted this authority but applied it to observe limitations; nonetheless, because Section 439(2) was not available practically, Section 482 remained open to the petitioner. |
| B.S. Rawat v. Leidomann Heinrich, 1991 CRI. L.J. 552 (Bombay High Court) | Application for cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) CrPC is premature if no bail has actually been granted and the accused is not released. | The Court relied on this statement to hold that Section 439(2) could not be effectively invoked in the present facts; however the Court distinguished the present case from that authority and found it not to be applicable enough to deny inherent jurisdiction. |
| Bhagirathsinh S/O Mahipat Singh Judeja v. State of Gujarat (Supreme Court) | High Court cannot substitute its view for trial Court's discretion to grant bail; cancellation of bail requires very cogent and overwhelming circumstances; considerations focus on availability for trial and risk of tampering with evidence. | The Court invoked this principle to state the standard for ordering cancellation of bail and to require cogent circumstances for interference; it applied those considerations to the facts before it. |
| Samarendra Nath Bhattacharjee v. State of W.B. | Cancellation of bail valid only on grounds such as intimidation; High Court erred in cancelling bail on inadequate grounds. | The Court cited this decision as authority for the proposition that cancellation must be grounded on appropriate post-bail conduct or risks; it used the principle when assessing whether cancellation was warranted. |
| Nityanand Rai v. State of Bihar | Grounds for cancellation of bail should arise after grant of bail and be referable to the conduct of the accused while on bail. | The Court noted that because the bail was stayed and the accused was not released, conduct after release could not be tested; nonetheless, the Court held that Section 482 could be invoked on the special facts to secure the ends of justice. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the procedural posture: the trial Court had granted bail but this Court had stayed that bail order, so the accused was not in fact released on bail. The Court examined the two statutory provisions invoked by the petitioner.
On Section 439(2) CrPC the Court held that it provides for re-arrest of a person who has been released on bail. Because the accused had not been released due to the stay of the trial Court's order, Section 439(2) could not be effectively invoked by the petitioner. The Court relied on earlier authorities (including B.S. Rawat) to support the proposition that an application under Section 439(2) is premature where no bail has been effected.
The Court then considered the scope of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. It observed that an order granting or refusing bail is interlocutory in nature and that Section 482 is available to correct orders that are palpably illegal or that would cause miscarriage of justice. The Court cited Puran v. Rambilas to confirm that Section 482 is not ousted by other provisions and that the High Court may interfere in the interest of justice.
The Court acknowledged the line of authorities cautioning against using Section 482 where a specific statutory remedy exists (Arun Shankar Shukla, Satya Narayan Sharma, Navjot Sandhu). However, since Section 439(2) was practically inapplicable on the facts (accused not released), it held that the petitioner retained the valuable right to invoke Section 482 to challenge the interlocutory bail order.
On the facts, the Court reviewed the circumstances relied upon by the trial Judge (age, illness, seizure of passport, long custody and the trial Judge's assessment that there was little chance of tampering or absconding). The Court weighed these against the following considerations as borne out in the record:
- The respondent is a citizen of France and had successfully resisted extradition proceedings in France.
- The respondent had been arrested in Dubai by Interpol on 6.2.2005 after having been a fugitive, which indicated prior efforts to avoid jurisdiction.
- There are 12 other cases pending against the respondent (Enforcement Directorate), and the respondent had changed his name to Louis Jalu in order to migrate to France.
- There is an alleged huge loss (about Rs.30 crores) to Indian Bank attributed to the respondent's actions.
- The petitioner had applied in the trial Court to proceed with further investigation, creating a realistic risk of tampering with witnesses if bail were granted.
The Court criticized the trial Judge's apparent reliance on age and illness as decisive factors, noting that medical treatment could be provided in custody. Considering the totality of circumstances, the Court found a real risk of abscondence and tampering and concluded that interference under Section 482 was warranted in the interest of justice.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court set aside the trial Court's bail order. Specifically, the order granting bail to the respondent in Crl.M.P.Nos.148 and 149 of 2005 in C.C.Nos.9 and 58 of 2003 stands set aside and consequently Crl.O.P.Nos.28805 and 33852 of 2005 are allowed. The connected criminal miscellaneous petitions are closed.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the bail order granted by the trial Court has been vacated by the High Court and the CBI's petitions for cancellation of bail have been allowed.
- The Court relied upon its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to set aside an interlocutory bail order where Section 439(2) CrPC could not be practically invoked because the accused had not been released on bail due to a stay.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a new rule of law beyond application of established principles; it applies existing authorities to the special facts to reach the present result.
1. Crl.O.P.No.28805 of 2005 is filed seeking cancellation of bail granted to the respondent/accused in Crl.M.P.No.149 of 2005 in C.C.No.58 of 2003 on the file of the learned Additional Special Judge for C.B.I. Cases, Chennai.
2. Crl.O.P.No.33852 is filed seeking cancellation of bail granted to the respondent/accused in Crl.M.P.No.148 of 2005 in C.C.No.9 of 2003 on the file of the learned Additional Special Judge for C.B.I. Cases, Chennai.
3. In Crl.O.P.No.28805 of 2004, the respondent/accused stands charged with the offences under Sections 120-B r/w Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in C.C.No.58 of 2003 on the file of the learned Additional Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai and in Crl.O.P.No.33852 of 2005, the respondent/accused stands charged with the offences under Section 120-B r/w Sections 420, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
4. The respondent/accused caused loss to the tune of Rs.30 crores to the Indian Bank by committing the offence of cheating, it is reported.
5. The learned trial Judge, having observed that there is no chance for tampering with the evidence collected by the petitioner herein, that the possibility of abscondence is also bleak inasmuch as the French Passport of the respondent was seized by the Investigating Agency and that the ailment of the respondent at the age of 67 requires consideration, granted bail to the respondent who had been in custody for more than 135 days at the time of granting bail.
6. Now the Central Bureau of Investigation, who is the petitioner herein, originally filed these criminal original petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, seeking cancellation of bail. By abundant caution, the petitioner herein chose to invoke Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure also to grant the relief as prayed for.
7. It is contended by the petitioner herein that the respondent/accused who is a citizen of France could be arrested at Dubai by alerting the Interpol on 6.2.2005. It is contended that 12 other cases also are pending before the Economic Offences Court at Chennai. It is further contended that there is every likelihood of his escape from India.
8. Learned counsel for C.B.I., the petitioner herein, would submit that this Court has got jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to cancel the bail granted to the respondent/accused. He would further argue that this Court has every authority to upset the order passed by the trial Judge in the interest of justice. His vehement contention is that the respondent/accused who had been brought to India after a long battle of extradition proceedings and alerting the Interpol will definitely flee from justice.
9. Learned Senior Counsel argued on behalf of the respondent/accused would contend that this Court will have to consider only the supervening circumstances after the grant of bail by the trial Court. This Court cannot decide, stepping into the shoes of the trial Court, as to whether bail should be granted or not. Inasmuch as the accused was not at all released on bail, the provision under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot upon be invoked. It is his further submission that as there was no abuse of the process of law and the learned trial Judge had exercised his discretion properly taking into consideration the age of the respondent/accused, his ill health, lack of chance of fleeing from justice and the long custody, this Court cannot upset the decision of the trial Court invoking the provision under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The last submission made by the learned Senior Counsel argued for the respondent is that the loan obtained from the Indian Bank has been properly secured.
10. Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:-
439. Special powers of High Court or Court of Sessions regarding bail.---(2) A High Court or Court of Sessions may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody.
11. It is a well settled proposition of law that the order granting or refusing bail to an accused is an interlocutory order. As against the order passed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is a co-ordinate jurisdiction for the High Court as well as the Court of Sessions to order re-arrest of the accused and commit him to custody after he had been released on bail by the trial Court. Inasmuch as the order of bail granted by the trial Court was stayed by this Court and on account of which the accused in this case was not released on bail, as rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for the accused, the petitioner herein cannot invoke the provision under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking for re-arrest of the accused and committing him to custody. But as the order passed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an interlocutory order and not a final one, the petitioner herein has every right to approach this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
12. The Karnataka High Court in The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Mohammed Abdul Rab @ Babloo and Ors. 1999 (1) Crimes 422 has observed that in a case where the accused was not released on bail and he has been in custody as the order of bail was stayed by the High Court, the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, inasmuch as no appeal or revision would lie as against the order granting bail.
13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Puran v. Rambilas 2001 CRI. L.J. 2566 has held as follows:-
Even if it is an interlocutory order, the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 is not affected by the provisions of Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That the High Court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 on the basis of self-imposed restriction is a different aspect. It cannot be denied that for securing the ends of justice, the High Court can interfere with the order which causes miscarriage of justice or is palpably illegal or is unjustified.
14. The above authorities would go to show that this Court has got inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to set aside the impugned order in the interest of justice.
15. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the accused referred to the authority in Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076, the authority in Satya Narayan Sharma v. State Of Rajasthan. (2002 SCC (Cri) 39) and the authority in State v. Navjot Sandhu 2003 SCC (Cri) 1545, wherein it has been consistently held that the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other enactment to redress the grievance of a party.
16. Here in this case, the petitioner/complainant has not only invoked the provision under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also the provision under Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Of course, Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides remedy for cancellation of the bail granted by the Court concerned. As already held by this Court, Section 439(2) cannot be effectively invoked as the accused had not been actually released from custody in the aftermath of the order of bail obtained by him in his favour. Therefore, the petitioner/complainant cannot invoke Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under such circumstances, this Court will have to invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to set right the wrong, if any committed by the trial Judge in granting the bail. Further, the quoting of a wrong provision of law will not deprive the valuable right of the petitioner/complainant to challenge the order impugned.
17. Learned Senior Counsel referred to an authority pronounced by the Bombay High Court in B.S. Rawat v. Leidomann Heinrich 1991 CRI. L.J. 552 wherein it has been held as follows:-
In view of the clear and explicit language of Section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C., I am of the view that the application for cancellation of bail filed by the Department, i.e., the Criminal Application No.1712 of 1990 is premature since no bail is granted as yet to the Applicant under the proviso to Section 167(2) and as such he is also not released on bail Criminal Application No.1712 of 1990 is thus liable to be dismissed on this short ground.
18. In the aforesaid case, it appears that even before grant of statutory bail sought for by the accused, the complainant invoked the provisions under Sections 439(2) and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court. Such a recourse cannot be had by the complainant in a case where no order of bail was passed by the trial Judge. The above authority will not in any way apply to the facts and circumstances of this case.
19. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the accused cited a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhagirathsinh S/O Mahipat Singh Judeja v. State Of Gujarat. , wherein it has been observed as follows:-
One could have appreciated the anxiety of the learned Judge of the High Court that in the circumstances found by him that the victim attacked was a social and political worker and therefore the accused should not be granted bail but we fail to appreciate how that circumstance should be considered so overriding as to permit interference with a discretionary order of the learned Sessions Judge granting bail. The High Court completely overlooked the fact that it was not for it to decide whether the bail should be granted but the application before it was for cancellation of the bail. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order seeking cancellation of the bail. And the trend today is towards granting bail because it is now well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the power to grant bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is being imposed. The only material considerations in such a situation are whether the accused would be readily available for his trial and whether he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with evidence.
20. It had been argued before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in that case that the trial Judge should not have granted bail in a case where the victim who was attacked was a social worker. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in such circumstances has said that it was not for the High Court to decide whether the bail should be granted, but the issue was whether cancellation of bail should be ordered.
21. In yet another case in Samarendra Nath Bhattacharjee v. State of W.B. , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the only ground on which the cancellation of bail could have been ordered being the ground of intimidation, the High Court erred in cancelling the bail granted to the appellant.
22. It has been held in Nityanand Rai v. State of Bihar that grounds for cancellation of bail should be those which arose after the grant of bail and should be referable to the conduct of the accused while on bail.
23. Of course in a case where cancellation of bail is sought for, the Court will have to find whether the accused had misused the liberty granted to him or whether he is making any arrangement to flee from justice. Here in this case, though the bail was granted by the trial Court, the petitioner could not come out on bail as the order of bail was stayed by this Court. Therefore the subsequent conduct on his release from jail could not be tested in this case. In such circumstances, the Court, invoking the provision under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, will have to see whether the cancellation of bail is warranted to secure the ends of justice. Such power, in the special facts and circumstances of this case, is very much available with this Court in its inherent regime.
24. There is no dispute as to the fact that the respondent is a citizen of France. In fact, the Government of India could not succeed in the extradition proceedings initiated against the respondent which was hotly contested by the respondent in France. The respondent had remained a fugitive till he was arrested at Dubai by the Interpol on 6.2.2005 based on the tips provided by the petitioner herein.
25. The respondent is facing 12 other cases instituted by the Enforcement Directorate. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent would submit that such revelation only at this stage before this Court shall not be considered by this Court, as the same will prejudice the interest of the accused. It is not as if the accused was not aware of the 12 other cases launched by the Enforcement Directorate are pending against him. The accused is not taken by surprise by such disclosure. Therefore, the pendency of 12 other cases as against the respondent will have to be taken note of by this Court. The respondent has admittedly changed his name as Louis Jalu in order to migrate to the Country of France. Huge loss has allegedly occasioned to the Indian Bank on account of the reported cheating perpetrated by the respondent along with others.
26. In the face of the aforesaid circumstances, the trial Court has unfortunately given much credence to the age of the respondent and his illness. If at all the respondent was ailing, the Jail Authorities could have been directed to extend proper medical treatment to him.
27. Yet another important factor that will have to be taken into consideration by this Court is that the petitioner herein had filed an application before the trial Court seeking permission to go ahead with the further investigation in this matter. When further investigation is contemplated in this case, there is every possibility of tampering the witnesses to be examined by the Investigating Agency. It is unfortunate that the trial Court has come to a conclusion that such a person who had been a fugitive giving tough fight to the extradition proceedings initiated by the Government of India will not abscond.
28. If the respondent, who has as many as 12 other cases to his credit, is let on bail, he will definitely slip away from this Country and flee from justice and will never be available for trial of this case. Rejecting the plea of the petitioner, the order passed by the trial Judge granting bail to the respondent will have to be set aside in the interest of justice.
29. In the result, the order of bail granted to the respondent in Crl.M.P.Nos.148 and 149 of 2005 in C.C.Nos.9 and 58 of 2003 on the file of the learned Additional Special Judge for CBI Cases, Chennai stands set aside and consequently, Crl.O.P.Nos.28805 and 33852 of 2005 stand allowed. The connected criminal miscellaneous petitions stand closed.
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