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V. Sarangapani v. Collector Of Thanjavur District

Madras High Court
Jan 6, 2006
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Judicial Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition challenges a Gazette notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 (Act 31 of 1978) for providing house-sites to Adi-Dravidars of Kalyanapuram Village, Thiruvaiyaru Taluk, Thanjavur District. The opinion contains two different dates for the challenged notification: the petition initially identifies the notification as dated 22.11.1995, while later passages and the ultimate order refer to a publication in the District Gazette Extra-ordinary dated 22.12.1995.

Key chronological facts drawn from the opinion:

  • The first petitioner (since deceased, represented by legal representatives listed in the petition) owned the land sought to be acquired by the first respondent (the District Collector).
  • A notice under Section 4(2) in Form-1 framed under Rule 3(i) was issued by the Special Tahsildar on 27.09.1995, calling upon the first petitioner to show cause and file objections.
  • Objections by the first petitioner were filed on 17.10.1995. An enquiry was conducted by the Special Tahsildar and a report submitted to the District Collector on 16.11.1995.
  • The District Collector rejected the objections by proceedings No. Na.Ka.4 1 033/95 dated 28.12.1995, and that order was served on the first petitioner on 09.01.1996.
  • Notwithstanding the timing of the objection disposal, the impugned notification under Section 4(1) was issued (the opinion refers to issuance on 22.12.1995 in several places and to 22.11.1995 at the outset).
  • An award enquiry was initiated and an award was passed in February 1996, which, according to the petitioners, had not been served on the first petitioner at the time of parts of the proceedings recounted in the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the District Collector followed the procedures prescribed under Act 31 of 1978 when passing the notification under Section 4(1).
  2. Whether the Collector recorded the statutory "satisfaction" required by Section 4(1) before issuing the notification, or whether the notification was issued without such satisfaction (allegedly based on recommendation or compulsion of the Government).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The notification under Section 4(1) was issued before the District Collector considered and disposed of the objections filed by the first petitioner; specifically, the notification preceded the order rejecting objections dated 28.12.1995.
  • Because objections were not considered before publication of the Section 4(1) notification, there was a total non-application of mind by the Collector and a breach of the mandatory procedure under the Act (including the enquiry contemplated by Section 4(3)(a) and (b)).
  • Accordingly, the Collector could not have recorded the statutory satisfaction required to acquire the land; the notification was issued in a cursory manner and is therefore liable to be set aside.
  • The petitioners participated in award enquiry proceedings "without prejudice" to their claim that acquisition proceedings were bad; they approached the Court at the earliest opportunity after verifying the records.
  • The fact that an award was passed (in February 1996) does not preclude challenge to the notification, particularly where the award had not been served on the petitioner.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The second respondent (Special Tahsildar) admits that objections were filed pursuant to the Section 4(2) notice and states that by proceedings Rc. No. 41033/95.11.A dated 28.12.1995 the objections were rejected.
  • The respondents point out that a notice for award enquiry was issued and the first petitioner participated in the award enquiry; therefore, they argue the writ petition should be dismissed.
  • The learned Government Advocate reiterated that the Section 4(1) notification was issued on 22.12.1995 and that the objections were dismissed by the Collector's proceedings dated 28.12.1995, as shown in the counter affidavit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
2002 (2) C.T.C 1 — Land Acquisition Officer and Special Tahsildar (LA) v. R. Manickammal (Division Bench of this Court) Principle that the State Act differs from the Central Act; the Collector is the appropriate and sole authority to decide acquisition and must apply his mind independently; Government intervention/supervisory role is not contemplated under the State Act. The court relied on this authority to reinforce that the Collector alone must independently record satisfaction under Act 31 of 1978 and cannot act under compulsion or as a mere instrument of the Government.
AIR 1995 Supreme Court 2114 = 1995 2 L.W 819 — State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammat Explains Section 4 of the State Act: (a) Section 4(1) requires the Collector to be satisfied before publishing notice; (b) Section 4(2) obliges notice to landowners to show cause; (c) Section 4(3) requires consideration of causes and orders to be passed before arriving at satisfaction — mirroring procedures in Land Acquisition Act but placing the satisfaction duty on the Collector. The court used this precedent to interpret the statutory scheme and to conclude that satisfaction under Section 4(1) can only arise after objections are considered and appropriate orders passed.
AIR 1976 SC 789 — Hukam Chand v. Union of India General principle: where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it must be exercised in that manner and not otherwise; particularly important where the power is drastic and affects fundamental principles of natural justice. The court invoked this principle to support its conclusion that statutory procedures for acquisition must be strictly followed and that failure to do so vitiates the exercise of power.
AIR 1969 SC 634 — State of Gujarat v. Shantilal (and related citations including P. Vajravelu Mudaliar and Taylor v. V. Taylor) Reinforces the rule of statutory interpretation that where a statute prescribes a mode for doing a thing, it must be done in that mode and not otherwise; cited in the context of acquisition procedures and modes of determining compensation under specific statutes. The court cited this to underline the settled rule that statutory procedure is mandatory and non-observance can invalidate actions taken purportedly under the statute.
1965 (I) SCR 614 = AIR 1965 SC 1017 — P. Vajravelu Mudaliar (referenced) Referenced as part of the discussion in State of Gujarat v. Shantilal regarding equality and limits on legislative schemes; also cited for the broader maxim that a statutory mode must be followed. Used as supporting authority (via State of Gujarat v. Shantilal) to buttress the court's insistence on procedural compliance.
Taylor v. V. Taylor (1875 (1) Ch.D 426) (referenced) Classic authority for the proposition that when a statute prescribes a particular mode for doing something, that mode must be followed. Referenced to support the doctrine that statutory procedure is mandatory; the court relied on this long-established rule when assessing the Collector's compliance with the statutory scheme.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by setting out the relevant statutory text of Section 4 of Act 31 of 1978 (subsections (1), (2) and (3) including clauses (a) and (b)). The statute was the foundation for the analytical steps that followed:

  1. The court emphasized the statutory allocation of responsibility: Section 4 requires that the District Collector be "satisfied" that land is necessary for a Harijan Welfare Scheme before publishing a Section 4(1) notice, and Section 4(2) requires that the owner be called upon to show cause why the land should not be acquired.
  2. Where an officer other than the Collector calls for objections (Section 4(3)(b)), that officer must report to the Collector with recommendations, and the Collector must consider that report before passing orders. Thus, the procedure contemplates consideration of objections and recording of a conscious satisfaction only after that consideration.
  3. The court relied on binding and persuasive precedents (including a Division Bench decision of this Court and the Supreme Court decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammat) to establish that the Collector must apply his mind independently and follow the statutory procedure; the State Government is not to exercise a supervisory role in place of the Collector under this Act.
  4. Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the Section 4(1) notification was issued on 22.12.1995 (as the opinion repeatedly records) before the Collector had considered and disposed of the objections (the disposal came by order dated 28.12.1995). The chronology on the face of the record thus showed that the Collector had not taken the objections into account before issuing the notification.
  5. Given that the statute prescribes that satisfaction to acquire land must follow consideration of the objections, the issuance of the notice prior to that process indicated that the Collector had not recorded the requisite satisfaction after application of mind. The court characterized the order passed pursuant to the Section 4(2) notice as an "empty formality" in these circumstances.
  6. The court further reasoned that subsequent initiation of an award enquiry or the passing of an award does not cure the fundamental procedural defect in the initial issuance of the Section 4(1) notification; the initiation or completion of later steps cannot validate an earlier act which was tainted by failure to follow mandatory procedure.
  7. The court drew on the established principle (from the cited Supreme Court authorities) that when a statute requires that power be exercised in a particular manner, that mode is mandatory and deviations will vitiate the exercise of the power — particularly where property rights and the State's power of eminent domain are concerned.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The impugned notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978, published in the District Gazette Extra-ordinary dated 22.12.1995, is set aside.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The writ petition is allowed; the specific Section 4(1) notification identified in the opinion is quashed. The respondents (in particular the first respondent — District Collector, Thanjavur) are at liberty to proceed afresh with acquisition proceedings, if required, but only after complying with the statutory procedure set out in the Act.
  • Costs and ancillary orders: No costs were awarded; the writ miscellaneous petition (W.M.P.) is closed as per the opinion.
  • Precedential effect: The opinion applies existing principles from higher authorities (both the Division Bench and Supreme Court authorities cited) to the facts; it does not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying the established rule that mandatory statutory procedures for acquisition must be strictly followed. The court expressly relied on earlier authorities to support that conclusion.

Reference in the source opinion to two different dates for the Gazette notification (22.11.1995 at the outset and 22.12.1995 elsewhere, including the operative order) is reproduced here exactly as it appears in the provided text; the final order in the opinion treats the date as 22.12.1995.

Show all summary ...

This petition has been filed challenging the Gazette notification dated 22.11.1995 issued under Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 (hereinafter called ‘Act 31 of 1978’) for providing house-sites to Adi-Dravidars of Kalyanapuram Village, Thiruvaiyaru Taluk, Thanjavur District.

2. Brief facts of the case are as under:

The land of the first petitioner (since deceased, represented by legal representatives, namely petitioners 2 to 11 and the fourth petitioner, since deceased, represented by legal representatives, namely petitioners 12 to 14) was sought to be acquired by the first respondent. Therefore, the notice under Section 4(2) in Form-1 under Rule 3(i) of the Rules, 1999, framed under the Act 31 of 1978, was issued on 27.09.1995 by the Special Tahsildar calling upon the first petitioner to show cause as to why the property in question should not be acquired and to give their objections, if any, for the proposed acquisition. The objections were filed by the first petitioner on 17.10.1995 and an enquiry was conducted by the Special Tahsildar and the report was submitted to the District Collector on 16.11.1995 The District Collector rejected the objections by proceedings No. Na.Ka.4 1 033/95 on 28.12.1995 and the same was served on the first petitioner on 09.01.1996 The notification under Section 4(1) was however issued on 22.12.1995

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has raised two issues in his challenge to the notification. The first contention is that the District Collector has not followed the procedures prescribed under the Act while passing the impugned notification under Section 4(1) and the second contention is that the Collector has passed the impugned notification under Section 4(1) of the Act without recording his satisfaction as contemplated and has proceeded to acquire the land based on the recommendation or compulsion of the Government. The contentions are inter-connected with each other and they are considered together.

4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that even before consideration and disposal of the objection on 28.12.1995, the notification under Section 4(1) was issued on 22.12.1995 Therefore, the Collector, at the time of issuing the notification under Section 4(1). did not consider the objections filed by the first petitioner. Thus, there was total non-application of the mind on the part of the Collector while passing the notification under Section 4(1) to the various grounds raised by the first petitioner in the objections submitted pursuant to the notice issued under Section 4(2), namely the enquiry as contemplated under Section 4(3)(a)(b). In view of the above, there is clear violation of the mandatory provision and the notification has been issued in a cursory manner without taking into consideration the objections of the first petitioner. Therefore, the satisfaction of the Collector as contemplated under Section 4 of the Act could not have been recorded as required. Hence, the notification issued under Section 4(1) is liable to be set aside. A counter affidavit has been filed by the second respondent-Special Tahsildar, admitting the fact that pursuant to the notice issued, as contemplated under Section 4(2). the objections were filed by the first petitioner and by proceedings in Rc. No. 41033/95.11.A, dated 28.12.1995, the objections were rejected. Though the writ petition was filed pursuant to the notice issued under Section 4(2), notice for award enquiry was also issued and the first petitioner participated in the award enquiry proceedings and therefore, the writ petition has to be dismissed. As far as the order dated 28.12.1995 rejecting the objections is concerned, learned Government Advocate reiterated that the notice under Section 4(1) was issued on 22.12.1995 and the objections were dismissed by the proceedings of the Collector in Rc. No. 41033/95.11.A, dated 28.12.1995, as borne out by the counter affidavit. The learned counsel for the petitioners draws the attention of the Court to the objections filed in the award enquiry proceedings, in particular, to the portion of the objections, in which, it is clearly stated that the land in question was sought to be acquired in spite of the objections filed by the first petitioner and the contentions made in the award enquiry are without prejudice to the abovesaid claim that the proceedings for acquiring the property in question are bad. It was therefore contended that at the earliest point of time, there was objection to the acquisition proceedings and the participation in the award enquiry was made without prejudice to the first petitioner's claim for dropping the acquisition proceedings. The petitioners' counsel also submitted that the first petitioner has approached the Court at the earliest point of time after verifying all the records and therefore, the contention of the respondents that the award enquiry had been initiated, or an award being passed, will not stand in the way of the challenge to the notification issued under Section 4(1). It is also submitted that though the award has been passed in February 1996, it has not been served on the first petitioner.

5. The relevant provisions under the Act 31 of 1978, namely Section 4, reads as follows:

“Section 4: Power to acquire land — (1) Where the District Collector is satisfied that for the purpose of any Harijan Welfare Scheme, it is necessary to acquire any land, he may acquire the land by publishing in the District Gazette a notice to the effect that he has decided to acquire the land in pursuance of this section.

(2) Before publishing a notice under sub-section(1), the District Collector or any officer authorised by the District Collector in this behalf, shall call upon the owner or any other person, who, in the opinion of the District Collector or the officer so authorised may be interested in such land, to show cause why it should not be acquired.

(3) (a) The District Collector may, where he has himself called upon the owner or other person to show cause under sub-section (2), pass such orders as he may deem fit on the cause so shown;

(b) Where any officer authorised by the District Collector has called upon the owner or other person to show cause under sub-section (2), the officer so authorised shall make a report to the District Collector containing his recommendations on the cause so shown for the decision of the District Collector. After considering such report the District Collector may pass such orders as he may deem fit.”

6. In the case reported in 2002 (2) C.T.C 1 (The Land Acquisition Officer and Special Tahsildar (LA) v. R. Manickammal a Division Bench of this Court, in paragraph 4, it is held as follows:

“State Act is completely different as the Government intervention is not at all contemplated — Collector is appropriate authority to decide acquisition of land — Provisions of State Act is absolute — Decision to acquire land was to be exercised only by Collector by application of mind independently — Legislature did not reserve any power to State Government to have supervisory role as it provided under Central Act — When legislature names particular authority to exercise power, only that authority has to exercise authority and nobody else.”

7. In AIR 1995 Supreme Court 2114 = 1995 2 L.W 819 (State of Tamil Nadu v. Ananthi Ammat), the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of Land for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act and in paragraph 8 it was observed as follows:

“8. Sub-section (1) of S. 4 empowers the District Collector, if he is satisfied that it is necessary to acquire some land for the purpose of an Harijan Welfare Scheme, to acquire that land by publishing in the District Gazette a notice to the effect that he has decided to acquire in pursuance of S. 4. Subsection (2) of S. 4 obliges the District Col lector or any Officer authorised by him in this behalf to call upon the owner or any other person who, in the opinion of the District Collector or the Officer so authorised, is interested in such land to show cause why it should not be acquired. Where the District Collector has called upon the owner or other person to show cause under sub-section (2), Cl.(a) of sub-section (3) requires him to pass orders on the cause so shown. Where an Officer is authorised by the District Collector has called upon the owner or other person to show cause under sub-section (2), Cl.(b) of S. 3 requires that Officer to report to the District Collector his recommendations on the cause so shown and the District Collector is required to pass such orders as he may deem fit after considering the report. Sub-section (2) of S. 4, therefore, obliges the acquiring authority to serve notice upon the land owner and other persons interested in the land to show cause why it should not be acquired. By reason of sub-section (3) of S. 4, such cause has to be taken into account and orders passed in respect thereof. It is only thereafter that the acquiring authority can arrive at the satisfaction that it is necessary to acquire the land. The provisions of S. 4, therefore, substantially encapsulate the provisions of Ss. 4 to 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the only major difference being that, under the said Act, it is the District Collector and not the State Government who must be satisfied that the land js required to be acquired. It does not appear to us that this is a provision which is unreasonable or arbitrary.”

(emphasis supplied).

8. On a reading of the above decision of the Division Bench of this Court and the Apex Court, it is clear that the responsibility is cast on the District Collector in exercise of his power to acquire the land under the provisions of Act 31 of 1978, diligently and consciously. The recording of satisfaction under Section 4(1) to acquire the land, comes into play only after considering and disposing of the objections. Therefore, when the statute prescribes certain procedures to be followed while acquiring the property of an individual, it is incumbent on the authority prescribed under the statute to strictly adhere to the procedures prescribed. The non-observance of the procedures pre-scribed under the Act and the Rules will clearly vitiate the whole proceedings. The authority invoking the power under a statute to acquire the property of the individual in exercise of the State's power of “eminent domain”, is equally bound to follow the Rules and procedures prescribed under the statute before depriving the owner of his property. If the procedures as prescribed under the Act have not been followed by the authority concerned, the Court can take notice of such illegality or impropriety in the procedure and interfere by way of judicial review.

9. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the Collector has proceeded to issue notice under Section 4(1) on 22.12.1995 even before he could consider the objections of the land owner. Admittedly, the order under Section 4(3)(b) of the Act has been passed on 28.12.1995, which clearly establishes the fact that the Collector has not considered the objections and the order passed pursuant to the notice issued in Form-I under Rule 3(i) in terms of Section 4(2), is nothing but an empty formality. Therefore, the Collector has not taken the objections into consideration and hence, the question of recording his satisfaction to acquire the land in question, does not arise.

10. A number of decisions of the Apex Court support the proposition that if the statute requires something to be done in a certain manner, then it has to be done in that manner or not at all.

(i) AIR 1976 SC 789 (Hukam Chand v. Union of India):

“18. It is well settled that where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a certain way, it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. It is all the more necessary to observe this rule where power is of a drastic nature and its exercise in a mode other than the one provided, will be violative of the fundamental principles of natural justice.”

(emphasis supplied).

(ii) AIR 1969 SC 634 (State of Gujarat v. Shantilal):

“54. One more contention which was apparently not raised on behalf of the first respondent before the High Court may be briefly referred to. Counsel contends that Ss. 53 and 67 in any event infringe Article 14 of the Constitution and were on that account void. Counsel relies principally upon that part of the judgment in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar's case, (1965 (I) SCR 614 =AIR 1965 SC 1017) which deals with the infringement of the equality clause of the Constitution by the impugned Madras Act. Counsel submits that it is always open to the State Government to acquire lands for a public purpose of a local authority and after acquiring the lands to vest them in the local authority. If that be done, compensation wiii be payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, but says counsel, when land is acquired for a public purpose of a local authority under the provision of the Bombay Town Planning Act the compensation which is payable is determined at a rate prevailing many years before the date on which the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is issued. The argument is based on no solid foundation. The method of determining compensation in respect of lands which are subject to the town-planning scheme is prescribed in the Town Planning Act. There is no option under that Act to acquire the land either under the Land Acquisition Act or under the Town Planning Act. Once the draft town-planning scheme is sanctioned, the land becomes subject to the provisions of the Town Planning Act, and on the final, town-planning scheme being sanctioned, by statutory operation the title of the various owners is readjusted and the lands needed for a public purpose vest in the local authority. Land required for any of the purposes of a town planning scheme cannot be acquired otherwise than under the Act, for it is a settled rule of interpretation of statutes that when power is given under a statute to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all: Taylor v. V. Taylor, (1875 (1) Ch.D 426)..”

(emphasis supplied)

11. The fact that the award enquiry has been initiated or that the award has been passed will not cure the basic error in passing the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. The initiation of the notification itself is at fault for the aforesaid reason and therefore, the respondents cannot shield themselves by stating that the award enquiry has been initiated and order has been passed. The incurable defect in passing the notification under Section 4(1), cannot therefore be justified in the eye of law. In similar circumstances, this Court in an unreported decision in W.P No. 23777 of 2001, by order dated 14.12.2001, has set aside the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, even after the passing of the award and paragraph 8 of the said order dated 14.12.2001 reads as follows:

“8. In the present case, as stated above, no such particulars have been given. Hence, the impugned notice in Form No. 1 dated 29.6.2001 cannot be sustained. Though the petitioner has filed this writ petition after passing of the award, from the facts stated above, she could not file the said writ petition for want of copies of the notification and notice as they have not been supplied in response to her request. Hence, the respondents cannot sustain the notice in Form No. 1. I am not dealing with the other arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Hence, this writ petition is allowed. If the respondents still want the land to be acquired, they can do so after following procedure contemplated under the Act. W.M.P.No. 35117 of 2001 is closed. No costs.”

12. For the reasons stated above, the impugned notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Act 31 of 1978, published in the District Gazette Extra-ordinary dated 22.12.1995, is set aside. It is open for the first respondent-District Collector, Thanjavur, to proceed further with the acquisition proceedings, if so required, as per law. The writ petition is allowed. No costs. W.M.P is closed.

VCJ/VCS