P.K Misra, J.

1. The present appeal is filed against the order of the learned Single Judge, dismissing the Writ Petition No. 742/2004 solely on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction. The entire order of the learned Single Judge is extracted herein:

“The respondents against whom the relief is sought for are 1 to 4. None of them are within the jurisdiction of this Court. Clause 2 of the Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:

“The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders of writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.”

In the light of the above said clause, this writ petition is dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction. No costs.”

2. The only question to be considered in this present appeal is as to whether the learned Single Judge was correct in dismissing the writ petition only on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.

3. Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India has already been extracted in the order passed by the learned Single Judge and it is not necessary to extract the said provisions again. A bare perusal of the aforesaid clause makes it clear that notwithstanding the fact that the seat of Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom writ application is filed is not within the territory of the concerned High Court, the High Court may exercise the jurisdiction if the cause of action wholly or in part arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court.

4. In the present case, even though the learned Single Judge has not given any reason, it can be assumed that the learned Single Judge has proceeded on the footing that no part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court (Madurai Bench). The only question to be decided in the appeal is as to whether any part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Madras High Court (Madurai Bench).

5. For the purpose of finding out whether any part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of a particular High Court, obviously the averments made in the writ petition are to be considered. In the present case, the appellant has filed the writ petition for issuing a writ of certiorarified mandamus by calling for the records from the file of the third respondent, namely the Record Officer, Office of the Records, Sena Police Corps. Abhilekh Karyala, Corps of Military Police Records, Bangalore, and to quash the order dated 16.02.2004, and consequently to direct the respondents to grant disability pension to the petitioner with effect from 24.7.1996 The other respondents in the writ petition are the Union of India represented by the Secretary, the CCDA (Pensions), Grants-3, Section (Group V), Allahabad and The Commandant, Corps of Military Police, Try Centre, Bangalore-25.

From the assertion made in the writ petition, it is apparent that the petitioner was selected for the post of corps Army Military Police on 23.2.1996 While the petitioner was undergoing training, he was medically discharged on 24.7.1996 under medical category “EEE” for substandard vision. The Medical Board fixed the disability pension at 20%. However, the third respondent rejected the petitioner's claim of disability pension by letter, dated 19.11.1997 The petitioner had made a representation to the third respondent, but no reply was received. Thereafter, the petitioner also sent many representations to other respondents on various dates. Ultimately, by order dated 16.2.2004, his claim has been rejected by the third respondent. Again the petitioner filed two representations on 27.2.2004 and 12.4.2004 to the respondents which are yet to be disposed of. Copies of the representations dated 25.1.1998, 31.1.2004, 27.2.2004 and 12.4.2004 are available in the typed set. All such representations have been sent from Virudhunagar within the territorial jurisdiction of Madurai Bench of Madras High Court, which is the place of residence of the petitioner. The impugned order dated 16.2.2004 is addressed to the petitioner in his Virudhunagar address. Even the original letter issued in November, 1997 rejecting the disability pension is addressed to the petitioner in his Chennai address within the State of Tamil Nadu.

6. These correspondences between the petitioner and some of the respondents clearly indicate that part of the cause of action has definitely arisen within the territory of Madras High Court, within Tamil Nadu and subsequently within the territory of Madurai Bench of Madras High Court. In our opinion, it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Madras High Court (Madurai Bench). Our aforesaid conclusion receives considerable support from several decisions, including that of the Supreme Court in Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra, 2000 (7) SCC 640.

7. In law, the expression ‘cause of action’ means a bundle of facts which the parties are required to prove, if traversed, to entitle him to a judgment in his favour. It is not the relation whatsoever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant. In Chand Kour v. Partab Singh, ILR 1889 (16) Cal. 98, it was observed:

“In determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the Court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an inquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition.”

8. The aforesaid observation was cited with approval in the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above. It is of course true that in the Supreme Court decision question relating to quashing of FIR was in issue and the High Court had decided that since the complaint had been filed at Shillong, the Bombay High Court did not have any jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, however, observed:

“27. …..the High Court did not also consider the alternative prayer made in the writ petition that a writ of mandamus be issued to the State of Meghalaya to transfer the investigation to Mumbai Police. The High Court also did not take note of the averments in the writ petition that filing of the complaint at Shillong was a mala fide move on the part of the complainant to harass and pressurise the petitioners to reverse the transaction for transfer of shares. The relief sought in the writ petition may be one of the relevant criteria for consideration of the question but cannot be the sole consideration in the matter. On the averments made in the writ petition gist of which has been noted earlier it cannot be said that no part of the cause of action for filing the writ petition arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court.”

9. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas observed:

“34. When the Constitution was framed, Article 226, as it originally stood therein provided that—

“every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs…”.

Some of the decisions rendered by different High Courts during the earlier years of the post-Constitution period have given a wider perspective regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court and pointed out that a High Court can exercise powers under Article 226 even in respect of tribunals or authorities situated outside the territorial limits of its jurisdiction if such tribunal or authority exercises powers in such a manner as to affect the fundamental rights of persons residing or carrying on business within the jurisdiction of such High Court vide K.S Rashid Ahmed v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1951 Punj. 74; M.K Ranganathan v. Madras Electric Tramways, (1904) Ltd., AIR 1952 Mad. 659; Aswini Kumar Sinha v. Dy. Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, AIR 1952 Ass. 91. It was Subba Rao, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) who observed in M.K Ranganathan case that:

“If a tribunal or authority exercises jurisdiction within the territories affecting such rights it may reasonably be construed that the authority or the tribunal functioned within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court and, therefore, is amenable to its jurisdiction.”

35. But a Constitution Bench of this Court has held in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Subba Rao, AIR 1953 SC 210, thus—

“The power of the High Court to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is subject to the two-fold limitation that such writs cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction and the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court either by residence or location within the territories subject to its jurisdiction.”

36. It was the said decision of the Constitution Bench which necessitated Parliament to bring the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution by which Clause (1-A) was added to Article 226. That clause was subsequently renumbered as Clause (2) by the Constitution Forty-Second Amendment. Now Clause (2) of Article 226 reads thus—

“226. (2) the power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.”

37. The object of the amendment by inserting Clause (2) in the article was to supersede the decision of the Supreme Court in Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao , AIR 1953 SC 210, and to restore the view held by the High Courts in the decisions cited above. Thus the power conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 could as well be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which “the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises” and it is no matter that the seat of the authority concerned is outside the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of that High Court. The amendment is thus aimed at widening the width of the area for reaching the writs issued by different High Courts.”

10. Before the aforesaid decision was rendered, the question of territorial jurisdiction has been well considered by a Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, 1994 (4) SCC 711. In the said decision, the Supreme Court had indicated that the High Court should not transgress into the jurisdiction of other High Court merely on the ground of some insignificant event took place within the territorial limit of the High Court.

11. We do not think the present case can be characterised one which falls into the category indicated in the Supreme Court decision. As observed by Justice Thomas, in such matters liberal view is to be taken, but, at the same time, the Court should be cautious enough not to transgress into the territorial jurisdiction of other High Court.

12. We find that almost under similar circumstances, a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in a decision Janardan v. Union, 2000 (2) Ori. LR 126, after referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, 1994 (4) SCC 711 and the decision State of Rajasthan and others v. M/s. Swaika Properties and another, AIR 1985 SC 1289, came to the conclusion that the Court had territorial jurisdiction. In the said case, the writ petitioner, a permanent resident of Orissa, had been appointed as a Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force and at the relevant time he was posted in the Central Industrial Security Force Unit at Ranchi within the State of Bihar. On the basis of the disciplinary proceedings held at Ranchi, he was removed from service. He had filed an appeal before the appellate authority, which was again outside the territory of Orissa. After removal from service, the petitioner had to come back to his permanent place within Orissa. The order of dismissal of the appeal by the appellate authority was communicated to the petitioner at his permanent residence within Orissa. Thereafter a writ application was filed before the Orissa High Court and the Division Bench of the High Court, over-ruling the preliminary objection raised by the counsel for CISF regarding territorial jurisdiction, held that Orissa High Court had also jurisdiction as the order of the appellate authority was received by him within the State of Orissa. The Division Bench observed that the two decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above did not lay down that as a general proposition service of notice can never be considered as part of the cause of action, but on the peculiar facts of the case held that the Courts lacked jurisdiction.

13. In our view, the observations made by the Orissa High Court are also equally applicable to the present case, where most of the correspondences relating to rejection of disability pension and subsequent rejection of representation had been made within the territorial jurisdiction of the Madras High Court.

14. In the present case, the petitioner is seeking payment of disability pension. It would be indeed impossible for him to go to Bangalore or New Delhi claiming the relief which now he is claiming if a hyper technical view of the matter is taken.

15. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal and hold that the Madras High Court (Madurai Bench) has territorial jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Since the writ petition was dismissed only on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, the matter is now directed to be placed before the learned Single Judge to consider the writ petition on merit. It is needless to point out that we have not at all examined the merits of the contentions raised in the writ petition.