1. Since, we have decided W.P Nos. 37373 and 37376 of 2003 today, the above Writ Appeals arising out of the common interlocutory order passed in the said writ petitions are dismissed as infructutous.

2. The above writ petitions have been filed for a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records in G.O.Ms No. 164, Transport (I.1) dated 03.12.2003 and to quash the same. By the aforesaid order dated 03.12.2003 passed under Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Government of Tamil Nadu has withdrawn from the acquisition of land in question.

3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

4. In paragraph 4 of the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition No. 37373 of 2003 it is alleged that the petitioners therein own land covered under the Section 4(1) notification dated 1.6.1999 in various town survey numbers as mentioned therein situate in Namakkal town within the limit of Namakkal Municipality. There were houses and buildings put up by many of the petitioners sought to be acquired for the purpose of laying a railway track for Salem-Karur broad gauge railway line project by invoking the urgency clause as provided for under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition (Central Act 1 of 1894). Accordingly, notification under Section 4(1) was issued in G.O.Ms No. 173 dated 1.6.1999 in respect of the lands of the petitioners, which was followed by declaration under Section 6 vide G.O.Ms No. 192, Transport (I.1) Department dated 1.7.1999 for a total extent of about 09.42.5 hectares. The petitioners were dispossessed of their lands covered under the above said acquisition proceedings on 05.7.1999 and the same was handed over to the Requisition Body viz., the 2nd respondent − Railways immediately. By virtue of the said acquisition proceedings, many of the petitioners became homeless and found it difficult to have alternative accommodations, and on that score such of those petitioners incurred heavy financial loss because of immediate dispossession on account of acquisition under urgency clause.

5. In paragraph 6 of the affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition No. 37373 of 2003 it is alleged that the respondents commenced the work of construction to provide a railway track on the acquired land of the petitioners in August 1999 itself. The level of the acquired land was raised to the height of about 40 ft. to 50 ft. by doing necessary escalation and filling up with a number of layers of various materials, such as iron ore, coal, etc. The petitioners further alleged that the respondents have altered the acquired land to make it fit for a long railway track, which cannot be used for any other purpose, much less for the original purpose used by the petitioners. Prior to the date of acquisition, the construction work had reached the final stage in regard to the portion of land acquired from the petitioners.

6. The land sought to be acquired was for laying railway track of 1.9 Km. length on the Salem-Karur Division. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 1.6.1999 for the acquisition of 09.42.5 hectares of land, and thereafter notification under Section 6 was issued on 1.7.1999 Subsequently, the possession of the land was taken by the respondents and the houses of the petitioners were demolished. The award was passed on 29.7.2001 Compensation was awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, which was received by the petitioners under protest. They filed a revision under Section 18 of the Act which was allowed by the Sub Judge on 17.4.2003, but the appeal under Section 54 of the Act against that order is pending with the High Courts.

7. On 29.8.2003 the High Courts passed a stay order subject to deposit of entire amount and the land-owners were permitted to withdraw 50% of the deposited amount. However, on the application moved by the railways on 19.11.2003 the High Courts modified the aforesaid order and directed to pay 25% of the amount awarded under Section 18 of the Act. Thereafter, the impugned notification dated 03.12.2003 was issued.

8. It is alleged in paragraph 12 of the 1st petitioner's affidavit in W.P No. 37373 of 2003 that Section 48-B of the Act enures to the benefit of the land-owners on fulfillment of the conditions mentioned in Section 48-B. It is alleged that Section 48-B does not given any unilateral right on the State Government to re-convey the land which has already been acquired under Section 16 of the Act. The amendment was brought solely for conferring a right on the land-owners. It is further stated that no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners before passing the impugned order.

9. A counter affidavit was filed in both the writ petitions by the 2nd respondent railways, and we have perused the same. There is no averment in the counter that the impugned order under Section 48-B dated 3.12.2003 was passed with the mutual consent of the State Government and the erstwhile land-owners. Hence, on the facts we have to held that the said order was passed unilaterally by the State Government without taking the consent of the erstwhile land-owners.

10. Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act was inserted by the Land Acquisition (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1996 which reads as follows:

“Section 48-B:- “Transfer of land to original owner in certain cases, — Where the Government is satisfied that the land vest in the Government under this Act is not required for the purpose for which it was acquired, or for any other public, the Government may transfer such land to the original owner who is willing to repay the amount paid to him under this Act for the acquisition of such land inclusive of the amount referred to in sub-section (1-A) and (2) of Section 23, if any, paid under this Act.”

11. A perusal of Section 48-B shows that it will apply only to the original owner who is willing to repay the amount paid to him under the Act. Hence, it is obvious that unless the original owner is willing to repay the amount paid to him, Section 48-B will have no application. Thus, Section 48-B contemplates a situation where after the land had already been acquired by the State Government, subsequently, both the original land owner and the State Government agreed that the land be re-conveyed to the original land owner on his willingness to repay the amount paid to him.

12. It may be mentioned that under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land stands vested in the Government the moment the Collector takes possession of the land. There is no dispute that the possession of the land had been taken by the Collector, and hence under Section 16 of the Act, the land stands vested in the State Government.

13. In Government of A.P v. Syed Akbar, AIR 2005 SC 492 (vide para 9) the Supreme Courts observed that under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act the Government could withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken. The Government could not withdraw from acquisition or re-convey the said land to the respondent if the possession had already been taken. The Supreme Courts relied on its earlier decision in State of Kerala v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai, 1997 (5) SCC 432 (vide para 4) in support of this view.

14. In C. Padma v. Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu, 1997 (2) SCC 627 the Supreme Courts observed that when the acquired land had vested in the State Government and compensation had been paid to the claimant, the claimant was not entitled to restitution of possession on the ground that either the original public purpose had ceased to exist or the land could not be used for other purposes.

15. In Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 1996 (6) SCC 405 the Supreme Courts observed:

“We do not think that this Courts would be justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any other public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It is not intended that any land which remained unutilized, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Courts was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions.”

16. Thus, before the enactment of Section 48-B by the Land Acquisition (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1996 the legal position was that once the land stood vested in the State Government under Section 16 of the Act, it could not be re-conveyed to the original owner even by mutual consent between the Government and the original land owner. It was evidently to get over this difficulty that Section 48-B was enacted. In our opinion, Section 48-B clearly contemplates a mutual agreement between the original owner and the Government to re-convey the land which is vested in the State Government under Section 16 to the original owner on his return of the money paid to him in respect of the acquisition. In our opinion, Section 48-B does not contemplate a unilateral withdrawal from the acquisition by the State Government. The land in question stood vested in the State Government under Section 16 of the Act, and in view of the decision of the Supreme Courts in Government of A.P v. Syed Akbar, AIR 2005 SC 492 it could not have even been re-conveyed to the original owner even by mutual consent between the original land owner and the Government, but for Section 48-B which was inserted in the State of Tamil Nadu.

17. The learned Advocate General urged that Section 48-B permits the State Government to transfer back the land to the original land owner unilaterally even after the land stood vested in the State Government under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. We do not agree. If the intention of the legislature in introducing Section 48-B was to permit unilateral re-conveyance by the State Government of the land which is already vested in it, then Section 48-B would have read as follows:

“Where the Government is satisfied that the land vested in it under this Act is not required for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other public purpose, the Government may transfer back such lands to the original owner and realise the amount paid as compensation to the original owner”.

18. The fact that Section 48-B has not been worded in the above manner shows that it was not the intention of the legislature to permit a unilateral re-conveyance of land which has already been vested in the State Government under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, without the willingness of the erstwhile land owner.

19. It is a settled principle that ordinarily we should go by the plain and literal meaning while interpreting a statute, and should not twist or distort its language. If we accept the submission of the learned Advocate General we will be twisting and distorting the language of Section 48-B of the Act and we will be recasting it as mentioned above. In our opinion, Section 48-B is very clear. However, if the interpretation canvassed by the learned Advocate General is accepted we will be deleting the words “original owner who is willing to repay the amount paid to him under this Act” from Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act.

20. It is a settled principle of interpretation that the Courts should neither add nor delete words from a statue. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be resorted to the principles of interpretation, other than the literal rule, vide Swedish Match AB v. Securities & Exchange Board, India, AIR 2004 SC 4219. As held in Prakash Nath Khanna v. CIT, 2004 (9) SCC 686 the language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. The legislature is presumed to have made no mistake. The presumption is that it intended to say what it has said. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Courts cannot correct or make up the deficiency, especially when a literal reading thereof produces an intelligible result, vide Delhi Financial Corporation v. Rajiv Anand, 2004 (11) SCC 625. Where the legislative intent is clear from the language, the Courts should give effect to it, vide Government of A.P v. Road Rollers Owners' Welfare Association, 2004 (6) SCC 210.

21. In Jinia Keotin v. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi, 2003 (1) SCC 730 the Supreme Courts observed:

“The Courts cannot relegislate on the subject under the guise of interpretation against the legislative will expressed in the enactment itself”.

22. The rules of interpretation would come into play only if there is any doubt with regard to the express language used. Where the words are unequivocal, there is no scope for importing any rule of interpretation vide, Pandian Chemicals Ltd. v. CIT, 2003 (5) SCC 590.

23. The learned Advocate General submitted that if a literal interpretation is given to Section 48-B there would be hardship to the State Government as it will have to pay a lot of money to the erstwhile land owners. It is not possible for us to accept this contention, as it is well settled that merely because a law causes hardship, it cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to defeat its object. More over, the Courtss are not concerned with the legislative policy or with the result, whether injurious or otherwise, by giving effect to the language used, nor is it the function of the Courts where the meaning of a statute is clear not to give effect to it merely because it would lead to hardship vide, Easland Combines v. CCE, AIR 2003 SC 843.

24. It is only where the provisions of a statute are ambiguous that the Courts can depart from a literal or strict construction vide, Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal, 2003 (4) CTC 284: AIR 2003 SC 1543. Where the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous effect must be given to them vide, Bhaiji v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla, 2003 (1) SCC 692.

25. Learned Advocate General relied on the purposive rule of construction. It is well settled that purposive construction can be resorted to only when the statute when read literally leads to manifest injustice or absurdity vide, DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana, AIR 2003 SC 1648. In our opinion a plain and grammatical reading of Section 48-B does not lead to any manifest injustice or absurdity.

26. In Shiv Shakti Co-op. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, 2003 (2) CTC 564: AIR 2003 SC 2434 the Supreme Courts observed:

“It is a well settled principle in law that the Courts cannot read anything into a statutory provisions which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent.”

27. It is a well settled principle that the Courts cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. In our opinion, Section 48-B is plain and unambiguous and it requires the mutual agreement of the original land owner and the State Government before the land which has stood vested in the State Government under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act can be re-conveyed to the erstwhile land owner.

28. The learned Advocate General submitted that we have to see the legislative intent when we interpret Section 48-B. In our opinion, resort can be had to the legislative intent for the purpose of interpreting a provision of law when the language employed by the legislature is doubtful or ambiguous. However, when the language is plain and explicit and does not admit of any doubt, the Courts cannot by reference to an assumed legislative intent expand the meaning of an expression employed by the legislature vide, Ombalika Das v. Hulisa Shaw, 2002 (4) SCC 539.

29. Where the language is clear, the intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the language used vide, Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector Of Customs, Bombay., 2002 (4) SCC 297 and Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, 2002 (7) SCC 273.

30. The function of the Courts is only to expound the law and not to legislate vide, District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron and Steel Company, 2001 (7) SCC 358. If we accept the interpretation canvassed by the learned Advocate General, we will really be legislating because in the guise of interpretation we will be really amending Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act.

31. In Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2001 SC 1980 the Supreme Courts observed:

“It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the Courtss are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the law-giver. The Courtss have adhered to the principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute”.

32. The same view has been taken by the Supreme Courts in S. Metha v. State of Maharashtra, 2001 (8) SCC 257 (vide paragraph 34) and Patangrao Kadam v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Yadav Deshmugh, AIR 2001 SC 1121.

33. Mr. R. Krishnamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents-land owners placed reliance on the decision of a learned single Judge in M. Manimegalai v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2004 W.L.R.789 (Vide paragraph 10), wherein it was observed:

“Section 48-B has been introduced with a view to protect the interest of the persons from whom the land has been acquired but not utilised. Such provision is a benevolent provision. Even though it is not specifically indicated in Section 48-B regarding the right of such a person to file application, it is obvious that such a person has to indicate his willingness to get the land back subject to repayment of the compensation”.

34. We respectfully do not agree with the learned single Judge that Section 48-B has been introduced only to protect the interest of the persons from whom the land had been acquired. In our opinion, Section 48-B can also protect the interest of the State Government which wants to re-convey the land which it had acquired, but in such a case the State Government must get the consent of the erstwhile land owner before it can re-convey the land to him under Section 48-B. The State Government cannot act unilaterally in this connection as already held above.

35. For the reasons given above, we are of the opinion that the impugned order dated 3.12.2003 does not fall within the ambit of Section 48-B as it is a unilateral act, and hence it has to be declared as invalid, because by a mere executive order, unsupported by statute, land which stands vested in the State Government under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be unilaterally re-conveyed by the State Government to the erstwhile land owners.

36. For the reasons given above, the writ petitions are allowed and the impugned order dated 3.12.2003 is quashed. However, there will be no order as to costs. As stated in the 1st paragraph of this Judgment, since the writ petitions are allowed, the writ appeals arising out of the interlocutory orders passed in the writ petitions, are dismissed as infructuous. Consequently, all the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.