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V. Ramanujam 2. Jagadeesan v. Rajamani & 9 Others S
Factual and Procedural Background
The present Letters Patent Appeal arises from a suit for specific performance based on an agreement dated 30.6.1980 fixing the sale consideration at Rs. 67,000. The appellants in A.S. No. 469 of 1986 are defendants-1 and 2 in the suit; the first respondent (now deceased) was the plaintiff, and other respondents are legal representatives of the plaintiff and defendants-3 and 5.
According to the plaint, defendants-1 and 2 received an advance of Rs. 10,000 and agreed to accept the balance of Rs. 57,000 on or before 15.11.1980 and execute the sale deed. The plaintiff alleged readiness and willingness to perform and sent a telegram on 15.11.1980 asking defendants-1 and 2 to appear at the Sub Registrar's office at Valappadi to execute the sale deed. The plaintiff alleged defendants failed to attend as promised on 20.11.1980, removed certain items (two electric motors, a tamarind tree and other trees valued about Rs. 5,500), and he issued a notice to deduct that value.
Defendants-1 and 2 denied failure to perform and contended the plaintiff did not appear at the Sub Registrar's office on 20.11.1980 and that the plaintiff delayed filing suit, indicating lack of readiness and willingness. The trial court, on pleadings and evidence, found the plaintiff ready and willing and decreed specific performance, adjusting tree value in the sale consideration. Defendants-1 and 2 appealed; the first appellate court dismissed the appeal, confirming the trial court's judgment and decree. The defendants-1 and 2 then filed the present Letters Patent Appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the incorrect averment made in the plaint (about who was present at the Sub Registrar's office on 20.11.1980) disentitles the plaintiff to the discretionary relief of specific performance?
- Whether the plaintiff should be non-suited for filing the suit belatedly?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Defendants-1 and 2) Arguments
- Though Ex. A1 fixed time up to 15.11.1980, defendants-1 and 2 replied to the plaintiff's telegram (Ex. A2) stating they would perform on 20.11.1980 (Ex. A7); the plaintiff failed to appear on that date.
- The plaintiff subsequently issued a notice on 20.11.1980 as if defendants were not present, which the appellants say is false.
- The plaintiff's long delay in filing the suit indicated he was not ready and willing to perform his contractual obligations.
- The plaintiff's pleading that defendants did not appear on 20.11.1980 is inconsistent with his evidence that defendants were present; this false plea disentitles the plaintiff from equitable relief.
Respondents' (Plaintiff / Respondents) Arguments
- The suit was filed within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, so the plaintiff cannot be faulted for filing belatedly.
- The incorrect statement in the plaint regarding non-appearance of defendants on 20.11.1980 is not a material defect that would affect entitlement to specific performance; it should not be a ground for dismissal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Division Bench decision reported in 1996-2-L.W. 1 | The equitable principle that a plaintiff who has put forward a false case may be disentitled to specific performance, but whether disentitlement follows depends on facts; if the false claim is immaterial and does not affect the main case, relief should not be refused. | The court relied on this authority to hold that the incorrect averment in the plaint (inconsistent statement about presence at the Sub Registrar's office) was not a material defect and did not disentitle the plaintiff to specific performance. |
| Mayawanti v. Kaushalya Devi, 1990 (3) SCC 1 | The court has discretion to grant specific performance even before any breach; one must first see whether there is a valid and enforceable contract and then the nature of obligations arising from it. | The court cited this authority for the proposition that the existence of a valid contract and the obligations flowing from it are foundational to an order of specific performance, underpinning its approach to examining the equities despite delay. |
| Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corpn (P) Ltd., (2002) 5 SCC 481 | In balancing equities, the vendor must be adequately compensated when specific performance is granted. | The court invoked this principle to justify directing compensation to defendants-1 and 2 because of the plaintiff's delay, by requiring an additional deposit as condition for decree. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court considered the parties' rival submissions and the record. It identified an inconsistency: although the plaint alleged the plaintiff was present at the Sub Registrar's office on 20.11.1980 and defendants did not appear, the plaintiff admitted in evidence that defendants were present but the sale deed could not be executed due to disagreement over adjustment of amounts (trees/electric motor).
The court examined whether this inconsistent/incorrect averment in the plaint was a material defect that would disentitle the plaintiff to the equitable relief of specific performance. Relying on the Division Bench decision reported at 1996-2-L.W. 1 (which held that a false claim disentitles a claimant only if it is material to the main case), the court concluded the incorrect statement was immaterial to the core dispute and did not bar equitable relief.
On the question of delay, the court noted the suit was filed on 28.10.1983 (nearly three years after the events) and the plaintiff deposited the amount only on 12.3.1986 (about three years after filing). The court found the suit was not barred by limitation, but that the plaintiff's delay was a relevant equitable factor. Citing Mayawanti v. Kaushalya Devi for the court's discretion in specific performance and Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corpn (P) Ltd. for the need to compensate the vendor to balance equities, the court determined that adequate compensation to defendants-1 and 2 was warranted.
As a result of this analysis, the court directed that the plaintiff must deposit a further sum of Rs. 67,000 (the sale consideration fixed under Ex. A1) within one month to the credit of the suit; upon such deposit, the plaintiff would be entitled to the decree of specific performance. The appeal was allowed on those terms, with no order as to costs.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Letters Patent Appeal is allowed on terms that the plaintiff must deposit a further sum of Rs. 67,000 within one month to the credit of the suit; upon such deposit, the plaintiff is entitled to the decree for specific performance. There will be no order as to costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff obtains the decree for specific performance conditionally upon making the directed deposit of Rs. 67,000 within the stipulated time; defendants-1 and 2 are to be compensated by that deposit.
- The court treated the incorrect averment in the plaint as immaterial to the main issue and therefore insufficient to disentitle the plaintiff from equitable relief.
- No broader or novel precedent was announced by this opinion beyond the application of existing authority (as cited) to the facts of the case.
Judgment — N. Kannadasan, J.
The appellants in A.S No. 469 of 1986 are defendants-1 and 2 in the suit. The first respondent (since deceased) is the plaintiff and the other respondents are the legal representatives of the plaintiff and defendants-3 and 5.
2. The plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance on the basis of an agreement dated 30.6.1980, fixing the sale consideration for a sum of Rs. 67,000/- and the defendants-1 and 2 have received a sum of Rs. 10,000/- as advance. According to the plaintiff, defendants-1 and 2 have agreed to receive the balance sale consideration of Rs. 57,000/- on or before 15.11.1980 and execute the sale deed. It is the further case of the plaintiff that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and he was having necessary money to pay the balance sale consideration. Since defendants-1 and 2 have delayed the execution of the sale deed, the plaintiff issued a telegram on 15.11.1980, requesting defendants-1 and 2 to go over to the Sub Registrar's office at Valappadi to execute the sale deed and complete the formalities.
3. According to the plaintiff, though the telegram was received by defendants-1 and 2, they did not turn up; but sent a reply stating that they would execute the sale deed an 20.11.1980 The plaintiff has further contended that even though it was agreed to sell the land as indicated above, which included the suit property and two electric motors and tamarind tree and other trees, in all worth about Rs. 5,500/-, defendants-1 and 2 removed the same, and as such, a notice was issued to them to deduct the said value. In fact, though the plaintiff was waiting in the office Sub Registrar on 20.11.1980 as requested by defendants-1 and 2, they did not turn up to execute the sale deed. Instead of turning up to the Office of the Sub Registrar, defendants-1 and 2 have sent a reply on 22.11.1980 with various false allegations. Hence, the suit for specific performance was filed for the relief stated therein.
4. Defendants-1 and 2 have contended that though the agreement of sale was entered into and they have received the advance, as stated by the plaintiff, it is not correct to state that they have failed to perform their part of the contract, as alleged by the plaintiff. It is further contended that they were waiting in the Sub Registrar's Office on 20.11.1980 to register the document; however, the plaintiff did not turn up. They have further contended that the plaintiff has not turned up subsequently and the other allegations about the mediation, negotiations, etc., are false. It is also contended that the plaintiff had not approached the Court immediately thereafter and his inaction in filing the suit after a prolonged delay would show that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
5. The trial Court, on the basis of the pleadings and evidence let in by both the parties, has held that defendants-1 and 2 have come forward with a false case as regards the possession of the suit property and that the plaintiff was a man of means and that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. In view of the dispute with regard to the value of the electric motor and cutting of trees, the plaintiff is justified in filing a suit with a delay. After observing to the effect that the value of the trees should be adjusted in the sale consideration, the trial Court has decreed the suit.
6. As against the judgment and decree of the trial Court, defendants-1 and 2 filed the first appeal contending that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the trial Court was not correct in granting the decree.
7. The appellate Court, after considering the pleadings, has dismissed the appeal, confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. Against the said judgment and decree, the above Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by defendants-1 and 2.
8. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that even though in the agreement of sale, Ex. A1, the time was granted to complete the sale till 15.11.1980, defendants-1 and 2 have specifically sent a reply to the telegram sent by the plaintiff under Ex. A2 dated 15.11.1980 to the effect that they were ready to perform their part of the contract on 20.11.1980, by way of sending a reply under Ex. A7. Thereafter, the plaintiff has failed to appear in the Office of the Sub Registrar on 20.11.1980, but sent a notice on the said date as if the defendants were not present in the office. Further, there was no justification for the plaintiff to file the suit after prolonged delay. It is further contended that even though a pleading is raised in the plaint that defendants-1 and 2 were not present in the Sub Registrar's Office on 20.1 1.1980, in the evidence, he has come forward with a contrary statement that defendants-1 and 2 were present, but due to some other controversy, the documents could not be registered. It is further contended that in view of the false plea raised by the plaintiff, he is not entitled for the discretionary relief of specific performance. No other contention was urged on behalf of the appellants.
9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the plaintiff cannot be faulted in approaching the Court belatedly since the suit filed by him was within the time prescribed under the Limitation Act. For the further averment with regard to the non-appearance of defendants-1 and 2 in the Sub Registrar's Office, it is contended by him that the said incorrect statement in the plaint is not a material defect so as to affect the suit for specific performance and the suit should not be dismissed on the said ground.
10. The points for determination in the above appeal are:
(a) Whether the incorrect averment made in the plaint has to be construed so as to disentitle the plaintiff to the discretionary relief of specific performance?
(b) Whether the plaintiff has to be non-suited for filing the suit belatedly?
11. We have considered the rival submissions of the parties.
12. Though the plaintiff has pleaded in the plaint that he was present in the Office of the Sub Registrar on 20.11.1980, defendants-1 and 2 did not turn up, in the evidence deposed before the trial Court, it is admitted by him that defendants-1 and 2 were also present; but the sale deed could not be executed due to the difference of opinion with regard to the adjustment of the amount, as stated supra. Now we have to consider as to whether the said inconsistent stand taken by the plaintiff will disentitle him for the reief of specific performance.
13. In our opinion, the above incorrect statement made in the plaint is not a material defect so as to affect the decision in the case. Our view is supported by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in 1996-2-L.W. 1, in which, it is held as follows:
“17. The principle that the equitable relief of specific performance cannot be granted to a person who has put forward a false case is based on the doctrine that one who seeks equity must do equity. But the question whether the plaintiff is disentitled to claim the relief, will depend on the facts of each case. If in a particular case the false claim set up by the plaintiff is immaterial and does not affect the main case in any manner, the Court shall not refuse the relief.”
14. In the light of the above decision of the Division Bench of this Court, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is not countenanced. Accordingly, we hold that the plaintiff cannot be disentitled for the discretionary relief on this score.
15. As regards the next question, namely, the delay on the part of the plaintiff in approaching this Court, it is seen from the records that the suit was filed after a prolonged delay, namely, on 28.10.1983, and the amount was deposited by the plaintiff only on 12.3.1986 It is also seen from the records that immediately after the receipt of Ex. A8 from the plaintiff, defendants-1 and 2 have issued a reply dated 22.11.1980 under Ex. A9, wherein, the defendants reiterated that the plaintiff is bound to pay the entire amount as agreed in the agreement of sale without resorting to a dispute as to whether the amount has to be adjusted towards the cutting of trees and removal of the electric motor. Even though the plaintiff has filed the suit after a period of three years, it cannot be dismissed as barred by limitation. However, due to the delay on the part of the plaintiff, we have to defendants-1 and 2.
16. The Supreme Court, in is decision reported in 1990 (3) SCC 1 (Mayawanti v. Kaushalya Devi), has observed as follows:
“The discretion of the court will be there even though the contract is otherwise valid and enforceable and it can pass a decree of specific performance even before there has been any breach of the contract. It is, therefore, necessary first to see whether there has been a valid and enforceable contract and then to see the nature and obligation arising out of it. The contract being the foundation of the obligation the order of specific performance is to enforce that obligation.”
17. Similarly, the Supreme Court, in its decision reported in (2002) 5 SCC 481 (Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corpn (p) Ltd., has laid down the law that in order to set right the balance of equities, the vendor has to be adequately compensated.
18. Hence, while holding that the plaintiff cannot be non-suited for filing the suit belatedly, in the light of the above proposition, we are constrained to compensate defendants-1 and 2 adequately. Taking into consideration that the plaintiff has filed the suit nearly after three years and also deposited the amount only on 12.3.1986, namely, three years after filing of the suit, it would be appropriate to direct the plaintiff to deposit a further sum of Rs. 67,000/- (Rupees sixty seven thousand only), which was the sale consideration already fixed under Ex. A1, within a period of one month from today, to the credit of the suit. On such deposit, the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as prayed for.
The appeal is allowed on the above terms. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, C.M.P No. 5383 of 2001 is closed.
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