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Dr.M.Sathiyapriya v. The Secretary To Government Others

Madras High Court

Dec 23, 2004

Judgment

Subsequent
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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This batch of writ appeals concerns the validity of Clause 23 of the Prospectus issued by the State of Tamil Nadu for admission of in-service candidates to Post Graduate Degree/Diploma in Medicine Courses for the academic year 2004–2005. The writ appellants are doctors appointed in various Primary Health Centres in 2001. At appointment the applicable rule permitted in-service candidates to seek postgraduate admission after completing two years' service. In February 2004, the State issued a Prospectus introducing Clause 23 which increased the required continuous satisfactory service for eligibility from two years to three years (as on 1.2.2004).

The appellants challenged Clause 23 as arbitrary and unconstitutional. A learned single Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petitions by an order dated 27.4.2004. The present appeals challenge that order. Interim relief had permitted the petitioners to appear in the common entrance test and their results were to be published; selection was ordered to be kept in abeyance subject to final determination.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Clause 23 of the 2004–2005 Prospectus—raising the minimum continuous service for in-service candidates from two years to three years—is valid.
Whether the enhancement from two to three years has any rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved (rendering continuous quality medical service to rural populations) and thus whether Clause 23 is arbitrary or violates Article 14 of the Constitution.
Whether the retrospective or belated imposition of Clause 23 defeats the appellants' legitimate expectation (promissory estoppel) arising from the eligibility rule in force at their appointment and thus warrants judicial relief.
Procedural question regarding the consequences of interim directions (i.e., whether admissions completed despite interim orders should preclude relief to successful petitioners).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

Until 2003–2004 the minimum required service for in-service candidates to apply for postgraduate courses was two years; the sudden increase to three years in the 2004–2005 Prospectus (Clause 23) lacks nexus to the object and is arbitrary.
The increased service requirement would diminish theoretical knowledge of in-service candidates and impair their ability to compete with open-category candidates; the three-year prescription is therefore unreasonable and violative of Article 14.
The appellants joined service in reliance on the then-existing eligibility (two years) and thus had a legitimate expectation to be considered after two years; the change frustrates that expectation and is hit by promissory estoppel.

Respondents' (State) Arguments

Clause 23 was introduced for dual objects: (a) to ensure that candidates selected under the service quota are more experienced and better qualified, and (b) to ensure continuous three-year posting in Primary Health Centres so as to provide sustained medical assistance to rural populations. Fixing eligibility standards is a policy decision of the Government and not ordinarily amenable to judicial interference.
The prescription of three years has nexus to the objective of selecting meritorious, better-experienced service candidates and to secure continuous rural service; policy-level decisions about eligibility standards must be respected unless demonstrably arbitrary.
Legitimate expectation without more does not create an enforceable right; when a policy change is made for public interest and in good faith, the court should not interfere.

Medical Council of India (third respondent)

The Medical Council of India filed written arguments stating that admissions for the academic year 2004 had been completed by 1.5.2004 and that the last date for admission was 31.5.2004, so that late admissions sought by the appellants could not be granted. (This contention was recorded in the opinion.)

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
N.C. SINGHAL v. D. GENERAL, ARMED FORCES	Quoted for the proposition that a condition of service may not be altered retrospectively to the prejudice of an incumbent. (Text quoted in the opinion.)	Used to underscore that retrospective administrative changes prejudicial to incumbents can be impermissible; considered in relation to whether Clause 23 operates to the prejudice of the appellants.
STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAMSHER JANG	The opinion lists the case as cited by counsel; the provided text does not state the specific principle from this case.	Referenced by counsel and recorded in the list of authorities; the opinion does not set out a specific application in the provided text.
S.B. PATWARDHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA	Quoted for the proposition (via Article 166 and Article 309 context) that executive instructions unlike rules framed under Article 309 cannot have retrospective effect. (Quoted in the opinion.)	Relied on to consider whether the impugned change could be given retrospective effect and to examine fairness of executive action introducing Clause 23.
ONKAR LAL BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA	Quoted for the principle that governmental policy must manifest equity, fair play and justice; decisions must withstand tests of judiciousness, impartiality and non-arbitrariness. (Quoted in the opinion.)	Applied as authority for limits of judicial review over policy and for the standard that policy changes must be non-arbitrary, fair and informed by reasons.
STATE OF M.P. v. GOPAL D. TIRTHANI	Quoted for the proposition that setting aside a definite percentage of postgraduate seats for in-service candidates creates a separate channel of entry and is not a reservation; it supports the legitimacy of in-service quotas. (Quoted in the opinion.)	Relied on to reject the submission that Clause 23 created an impermissible discrimination between service and non-service candidates, by emphasizing distinct channels and the acceptability of a reserved percentage for service candidates.
HARISH VERMA v. AJAY SRIVASTAVA	The opinion quotes the authority to show that courts may give directions to manage delayed commencements of courses and to protect rights of successful candidates; the quoted observation accepts some overlap of batches and directs the State/MCI to sort difficulties. (Quoted in the opinion.)	Used as a precedent to justify giving directions to respondents to permit appellants to join and complete postgraduate studies despite administrative timelines; served as a model for remedial directions in the present case.
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. SWATI SETHI	Listed among authorities cited by appellants; the provided text does not state the specific principle from this case.	Recorded among cited cases; the opinion does not detail a specific application of the case within the provided excerpts.
T.N. HOUSING BOARD v. N. BALASUBRAMANIUN	Listed among authorities; the provided text does not state the specific principle from this case.	Referenced in the list of authorities; no further application is set out in the provided text.
STATE OF PUNJAB v. NESTLE INDIA LTD.	Listed among authorities; the provided text does not state the specific principle from this case.	Referenced in counsel's list of citations; no specific use is described in the provided text.
D.N. CHANCHALA v. STATE OF MYSORE	Quoted for the holding that a Government that sets up and maintains colleges has prima facie power to regulate admissions in its own institutions; absence of a university provision depriving the Government of that power. (Quoted in the opinion.)	Relied upon to support the proposition that the State may lay down eligibility standards for admissions to institutions run by it, subject to consistency with statutory standards (e.g., MCI standards).
Tata Cellular v. Union Of India	Quoted for the proposition that judicial review restrains unbridled executive functioning and that courts may quash administrative decisions on merits where appropriate. (Quoted in the opinion.)	Used to explain the scope of judicial control and to justify court scrutiny of the policy decision insofar as arbitrariness or illegality is alleged.
KRISHNAN KAKKANTH v. GOVT. OF KERALA	Quoted for the principle that courts should not second-guess policy wisdom but may strike down policy only if demonstrably capricious, arbitrary, without reason, discriminatory, or constitutionally impermissible. (Quoted in the opinion.)	Applied to frame the standard of review applicable to the State's policy decision to raise eligibility from two to three years.
K. DURAISAMY v. STATE OF T.N	Quoted for the distinction between fixation of a quota (a separate channel) and ordinary reservation; that candidates outside a quota cannot stake claims to that quota. (Quoted in the opinion.)	Applied to reject the argument that Clause 23 impermissibly discriminated between service and non-service candidates given the separate channel of 50% seats for service candidates.
PRE-PG MEDICAL SANGHARSH COMMITTEE v. DR. BAJRANG SONI	Quoted for the observation that in-service medical candidates are a distinct class with different practical exposure, and may be treated differently from open candidates in eligibility/selection. (Quoted in the opinion.)	Relied on to support the proposition that service candidates can be subject to different eligibility standards appropriate to their distinct circumstance.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. LATA ARUN	Quoted for the proposition that courts can examine whether a policy decision is based on fair, rational and reasonable grounds and whether it takes relevant considerations into account. (Quoted in the opinion.)	Used to justify the court's power to test whether Clause 23 was based on rational grounds and not on irrelevant or mala fide considerations.
UNION OF INDIA v. INTERNATIONAL TRADING CO.	Quoted for the principle that while executive discretion to change policy is wide, changes must be made fairly and not arbitrarily; Article 14 requires state action be for discernible reasons satisfying reasonableness. (Quoted in the opinion.)	Applied as part of the framework (Article 14 fairness/non-arbitrariness) to test the reasonableness of Clause 23.
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA	Listed among authorities cited by the MCI; the provided text does not state the specific principle from this case.	Mentioned among citations for the third respondent; no explicit application is set out in the provided text.
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. MADHU SINGH	Listed among authorities cited by the MCI; the provided text does not state the specific principle from this case.	Referenced in the list for the MCI; the opinion does not quote or apply its holdings in the provided excerpts.
NAVJYOTI CO-OPERATIVE GROUP HOSING SOCIETY v. UNION OF INDIA	Listed among authorities on legitimate expectation; the provided text does not isolate the precise holding from this case in the opinion.	Included in the canon of authorities used to state principles of legitimate expectation summarized later in the opinion.
UNION OF INDIA v. HINDUSTAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION	Listed among authorities relevant to legitimate expectation; the provided text does not reproduce its specific holding.	Part of the authorities referenced when summarizing principles of legitimate expectation; no separate application is detailed.
M.P. OIL EXTRACTION v. STATE OF M.P	Listed among authorities on legitimate expectation; the provided text cites it among cases but does not state the holding in the excerpt.	Referenced in the discussion of legitimate expectation principles; no distinct usage beyond incorporation into the summarized principles is specified.
NATIONAL BUILDINGS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. S. RAGAHUNATHAN	Listed among authorities on legitimate expectation; the specific rule is not set out in the provided text.	Referenced as part of the body of authorities explaining legitimate expectation; not separately applied in the excerpt.
PUNJAB COMMNICATIONS LIMITED v. UNION OF INDIA	Listed among authorities on legitimate expectation; the provided text does not state the case's specific proposition.	Included among authorities underpinning the Court's summary of legitimate expectation principles.
F.C.I. v. KAMEDHENU CATTLE FEED INDUSTRIES	Listed among legitimate expectation authorities; no specific excerpted principle is provided in the opinion text.	Part of the cited corpus relied upon for summarizing legitimate expectation doctrine; no discrete application recorded in the provided text.
MADRAS CITY WINE MERCHANTS' ASSN. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU	Listed among legitimate expectation authorities; the provided text does not specify the holding.	Referenced in the context of legitimate expectation jurisprudence summarized in the opinion.
TAMIL NADU TAMIL & ENGLISH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION v. STATE	Described as a Full Bench decision of this Court dealing with legitimate expectation; the detailed proposition is not reproduced in the provided text.	Placed among the authorities the Court considered in setting out the law on legitimate expectation.
POOVIZHI (MINOR) v. THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU (MINOR v. THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU)	Specifically cited by appellants as precedent the single Judge allegedly failed to apply; the provided text does not reproduce the decision's ratio in full, but records appellants' reliance on it.	The appellants argued that the single Judge erred in not applying its ratio; the Court considered legitimate expectation authorities including the principles summarised and decided that the change defeated legitimate expectation in the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first set out the factual matrix and the principal contentions, then assembled and quoted the relevant Supreme Court and High Court authorities. From those authorities the Court distilled a set of guiding principles (summarised in the opinion at paragraph 29 and relied on throughout): among them, (A) States are entitled to lay down eligibility standards for admissions to institutions they run (subject to MCI standards); (B) standards of eligibility are policy decisions subject to limited judicial review and may be interfered with only if demonstrably arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, without any reason, or constitutionally offensive; (C) a State running colleges has prima facie power to prescribe admissions criteria for its institutions; (D) courts may examine whether a policy is based on fair, rational and reasonable grounds and whether relevant considerations were taken into account; (E) reasonableness must be judged from public interest perspective; and (F) Article 14 applies to government policy, and arbitrariness is tested on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Applying that framework, the Court addressed the appellants' contentions in sequence.

Discrimination between service and non-service candidates: The Court rejected the contention that Clause 23 created impermissible discrimination between service and open-category candidates because 50% of seats are specifically earmarked for service candidates and non-service candidates cannot claim those seats; further, service candidates could still opt to compete for the other 50% of seats without the service qualification. Thus, the comparison between the two categories is misplaced.
Nexus to object / arbitrariness: The Court examined whether increasing the service requirement from two to three years had a rational nexus to the object of securing sustained, higher-quality medical service for rural populations. While accepting the laudable object (to provide quality service to rural masses), the Court found problems in the Government's implementation: specifically, the Court observed that reducing compulsory rural service from five to three years (G.O.(2D) No. 71 dated 24.10.2002) and, at the same time, increasing the minimum eligibility service from two to three years under Clause 23 would produce a practical result that might deprive rural areas of postgraduates returning after training (if they need not return), thereby undermining rather than advancing the avowed object. The Court also noted the belated timing of Clause 23 — it was introduced in the 2004–2005 Prospectus though the G.O. was issued in 2002 and the clause was not imposed for 2003–2004 — and found no explanation for that delay. The Court concluded that the measure lacked a sufficient nexus to the declared object and was not in the public interest in its practical effect.
Legitimate expectation: The Court reviewed the doctrine of legitimate expectation as summarized from the authorities: a reasonable or legitimate expectation alone may not constitute a proprietary right, but ignoring it may render a decision arbitrary; expectations may arise from express promises or accepted regular practice; any withdrawal should be backed by rational grounds and an opportunity to represent. On the facts — the appellants had joined in 2001 under the then-existing two-year eligibility, had acted upon that promise, and applied upon completing two years — the Court found that the sudden introduction of Clause 23 (requiring three years), without adequate reason and without affording an opportunity for representation, defeated the appellants' legitimate expectation. The Court held it was entitled to test whether the policy change defeating the expectation was irrational or perverse and concluded that Clause 23 was opposed to legitimate expectation in these facts.
Interim orders, completed admissions and relief: The Court noted interim orders had permitted appellants to sit the entrance test and had directed that selections be kept in abeyance. Despite admissions reportedly being completed for the academic year, the Court held that the interim directions could not be ignored. Relying on the approach taken in Harish Verma v. Ajay Srivastava (allowing adjustments and remedial directions where necessary), the Court considered it appropriate to issue directions to enable the successful appellants to join and complete postgraduate courses.

Weighing the relevant authorities, the facts (including timing of the G.O. and the Prospectus clause), and the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the Court found for the appellants on the ground that Clause 23, as applied to them, was opposed to their legitimate expectation and lacked sufficient nexus to its stated object in the context described.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ appeals are allowed. No costs. Connected W.A.M. Ps. are closed.

Direct Consequences and Directions

The Court accepted the appellants' contention based on legitimate expectation and found Clause 23 invalid as applied to the appellants' batch in these circumstances.
The Court indicated that respondents should be directed to permit the writ appellants to join the postgraduate courses and complete their studies (in line with the interim direction given on 12.5.2004 and consistent with the guidance in Harish Verma v. Ajay Srivastava regarding remedial directions where necessary to safeguard successful candidates).
No costs were awarded against the appellants; connected miscellaneous petitions were closed.

Broader Implications

The opinion bases its decision on the application of established principles regarding government's power to set eligibility criteria, the limited scope of judicial review of policy decisions, and the doctrine of legitimate expectation. The Court's ruling was directed to the appellants' specific factual circumstances (timing of appointment, the prior eligibility rule, and the belated introduction of Clause 23). The provided text does not purport to lay down any new general precedent beyond applying those established principles to the facts of this case.

Final Observations from the Opinion

The Court emphasized that while States may set eligibility standards for admissions to institutions they maintain, and while policy decisions deserve judicial restraint, changes that defeat a reasonable or legitimate expectation created by prior rules or promises, particularly when applied belatedly to a specific cohort without explanation or opportunity for representation, may be set aside. The Court also reinforced that interim orders should be respected and, where necessary, courts may grant directions to accommodate delayed academic schedules so as not to prejudice successful candidates.

Show all summary ...

1. The issue involved in the above batch of writ appeals is as to the validity of Clause 23 of the Prospectus issued by the State of Tamil Nadu, the first respondent herein in respect of admission of service candidates to the Post Graduate Degree/Diploma in Medicine Course for the Academic year 2004-2005.

2. These writ appeals are directed against the common order of the learned single Judge of this Court dismissing the batch of writ petitions in W.P. No. 2151 of 2004 etc. dated 27.4.2004.

3. All the writ appellants are Doctors, who have passed M.B.B.S. Examination and who are in-service candidates, who have been appointed in various Primary Health Centres in 2001. The relevant rule prevailing at the time of their appointment was that they can seek admission to the Post Graduate Degree/Diploma in Medicine Course only after completion of their two years service in Government Primary Health Centres.

4. The State Government earmarked 50% of seats in admission for service candidates to the Post Graduate Degree/Diploma/M. Ch. (Neuro Surgery) Course as an incentive and to attract candidates to be appointed in rural areas so as to render medical service to the rural public. The writ appellants and alike others have entered into rural service in Primary Health Centres with the fond hope that they will get Post Graduate Degree/Diploma admission under the above said 50% seats earmarked for in-service candidates after finishing their service for two years.

5. In the year 1995, the Notification of Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission was issued for recruitment of the Assistant Surgeons and the G.O. Ms. No. 712, Health Department, dated 14.11.1995 whereby amending the Special Rules, viz., Rule 21(a) of the Special Rules for the Medical Service requiring every Assistant Surgeon should complete five years of service on duty as on 31st December of the year to exercise their option in writing for transfer to the Tamil Nadu Medical Service. As per the condition No. 1 of the said Notification, every Medical Officer who gets appointment in the Primary Health Centre should serve for a period of not less than five years excluding any period spent on training, leave or higher education in Government Primary Health Centre and that thereafter, they should serve for a total period of ten years within the zone. Later, the Government of Tamil Nadu issued G.O.(2D) No. 71, dated 24.10.2002 modifying five years period as set out in G.O. Ms. No. 712, Health and Family Welfare Department, dated 14.11.1995 to the effect that Medical Officers in Primary Health Centres can apply for transfer of service to other wings on completion of three years compulsory continuous service in Primary Health Centres.

6. The writ appellants who were appointed in 2001 desired to seek admission to Post Graduate Course during the academic year, i.e. after two years of service under the 50% reserved seats. At this stage, i.e. in February 2004, the Prospectus was issued by the Government for the year 2004-2005 introducing a new Clause 23 providing eligibility criteria for admission to Post Graduate Degree/Diploma in Medicine Courses increasing the 2 years period of service in Primary Health Centre to three years of satisfactory, uninterrupted, continuous service as on 1.2.2004.

7. On being aggrieved over the increase of the service from two years to three years as eligibility criteria for admission to Post Graduate Degree/Diploma in Medicine Courses, these writ appellants filed a batch of writ petitions questioning the above Clause of the Prospectus on the ground that the same is arbitrary and unconstitutional.

8. The learned single Judge heard the counsel for the parties and considered the materials and dismissed the batch of writ petitions by the order dated 27.4.2004 holding that the Clause 23 of the Prospectus is valid. Hence, these batch of writ appeals.

9. The contentions urged by the different learned counsel appearing for the appellants could be broadly stated under three heads which are as follows:-

(1) Till the year 2003-2004, the minimum period of service for in-service candidates as eligibility criteria for admission to Post Graduate Degree/Diploma in Medicine Courses was two years. The enhancement from two years to three years by the sudden introduction of the impugned Clause 23 of the Prospectus for the year 2004-2005 has no nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Therefore, the same has to be declared unconstitutional and arbitrary.

(2) Increasing the minimum years of service from two years to three years for service candidates would diminish the theoretical knowledge and as such, the same would disable the writ appellants to compete with the open category candidates in the common test conducted for both the categories. Consequently, the above prescription of three years of service as eligibility criteria is liable to be struck down as being unreasonable and arbitrary, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Further, it is against public interest since as per the pre-existing rules, the Doctors could be required to serve in the Primary Health Centres, even after the completion of their Post Graduate Courses.

(3) The appellants had entered into service and have been working on legitimate expectation and they would be eligible to be admitted to the Post Graduate Degree/Diploma in Medicine Courses after two years service. When they complete the two years service, the impugned Clause which has been introduced in 2004 in the Prospectus increasing from two years to three years is opposed to the legitimate expectation and is hit by the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

10. In reply to the above contentions, Mr. R. Muthukumarasamy, the learned Additional Advocate General would make the following contentions:

(i) Clause 23 has been introduced with a dual object, one, to prescribe a better experienced and qualified Doctors to be selected to pursue the Post Graduate Course under the service quota and another, to ensure that the Medical Officers are posted to Primary Health Centres to render continuous service for a period of three years, so as to enable continuous effective medical assistance to the rural masses. The introduction of Clause 23 is in the nature of laying down the standard of eligibility. This is purely a policy decision taken by the Government which cannot be interfered with by the Court.

(ii) The Rules of admission are meant to select the best and meritorious candidates. Therefore, any prescription with a relevance to the merit, has nexus to the above object of selection. The prescription of three years service constitutes higher experience and better qualification. Therefore, it would constitute direct nexus to the object of selecting more meritorious candidates. The Doctors entering medical service although required to serve five years in Primary Health Centres, the practical position is that most of them leave the rural service after two years when they get admitted to Post Graduate Course and after completion of the Post Graduate studies, they get into some jobs or leave the country. In that context, the policy decision was taken to reduce compulsory period of service to be rendered in rural areas in Primary Health Centres from five years to three years and simultaneously increased the minimum eligibility criteria in service condition for entering into Post Graduate studies from two years to three years to enable the Government to have the service of medical officers for a continuous uninterrupted period of three years to the rural masses. 50% of seats are reserved for service candidates to which non-service candidates are not eligible to apply. Therefore, the question of comparing the two categories would not arise.

(iii) The claim based on legitimate expectation without anything more, cannot confer a right. When a policy decision is taken by the Government in public interest and good faith, such decision is not open to Court's interference.

11. On the strength of the above points, elaborate arguments were made by the different learned counsel for the appellants in the batch and also by Mr. R. Muthukumarasamy, the Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 and Mr. R. Singaravelan, the counsel appearing for the third respondent-the Medical Council of India.

12. With a view to substantiate their points relating to the power of this Court to go into the validity of the impugned clause, the respective counsel would cite the following authorities.

13. The authorities cited by the counsel for the appellants are these:

1) N.C. SINGHAL v. D. GENERAL, ARMED FORCES ;

2) STATE OF HARYANA v. SHAMSHER JANG ;

3) S.B. PATWARDHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ;

4) ONKAR LAL BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA ;

5) STATE OF M.P. v. GOPAL D. TIRTHANI ;

6) HARISH VERMA v. AJAY SRIVASTAVA ;

7) MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. SWATI SETHI ;

8) T.N. HOUSING BOARD v. N. BALASUBRAMANIUN ;

9) STATE OF PUNJAB v. NESTLE INDIA LTD. .

14. The citations referred to by the Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 are the following:

1) D.N. CHANCHALA v. STATE OF MYSORE ;

2) Tata Cellular v. Union Of India. ;

3) KRISHNAN KAKKANTH v. GOVT. OF KERALA ;

4) K. DURAISAMY v. STATE OF T.N. ;

5) PRE-PG MEDICAL SANGHARSH COMMITTEE v. Dr. BAJRANG SONI ;

6) STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. LATA ARUN ;

7) UNION OF INDIA v. INTERNATIONAL TRADING CO. .

15. The decisions cited by the counsel for the third respondent-MCI are these:

1) MEDICAL COUNClL OF INDIA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA ;

2) MEDICAL COUNClL OF INDIA v. MADHU SINGH .

16. We have heard the counsel for the parties and given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made on either side.

17. Let us now quote the relevant observations of the Supreme Court made in the decisions cited supra.

18. In D.N. CHANCHALA v. STATE OF MYSORE , the Supreme Court would hold as follows:

"Since the Government has set up these colleges and maintains them, it has prima facie the power to regulate admission in its own institutions. Counsel for the petitioner pointed out to us no provision from the University Acts which deprives the Government of the power of making rules for admission in its own colleges. That being so, it cannot be said that the Government has no power to regulate admission in its own colleges or that because a student is eligible for admission under the University ordinances, he automatically gets a right to admission which he can enforce in a court of law."

19. In N.C. SINGHAL v. D. GENERAL, ARMED FORCES , the Supreme Court would observe as follows:

"We think that the appellant's conditions of service were governed by para 13 of Army Instruction No. I/S of 1954 and his previous full pay commissioned service should be taken in the matter of 'ante-date' for the purpose of his pay. The condition of service in this regard was not liable to be altered or modified to the prejudice of the appellant by a subsequent administrative (Army?) instruction which was given retrospective effect from 26th October, 1962."

20. In S.B. PATWARDHAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA , the Apex Court would hold thus:

"All executive action of the Government of a State is required by Article 166 of the Constitution to be taken in the name of the Governor. The appeals have therefore to be disposed of on the basis that except for the Bombay rules dated September 21, 1939 and the Gujarat Notification dated August 21, 1965 the remaining rules, whether of recruitment or of seniority, are in the nature of executive instructions. These instructions, unlike rules regulating recruitment and conditions of service framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution or Section 241(2)(b) of the Government of India Act, 1935, cannot have any retrospective effect."

21. In Tata Cellular v. Union Of India. , the Supreme Court would hold thus:

"The judicial power of review is exercised to rein in any unbridled executive functioning. The restraint has two contemporary manifestations. One is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court's ability quash an administrative decision on its merits. These restraints bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action."

22. In KRISHNAN KAKKANTH v. GOVT. OF KERALA , the Supreme Court has held as follows:

"To ascertain unreasonableness and arbitrariness in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution, it is not necessary to enter upon any exercise for finding out the wisdom in the policy decision of the State Government. It is immaterial whether a better or more comprehensive policy decision could have been taken. It is equally immaterial if it can be demonstrated that the policy decision is unwise and is likely to defeat the purpose for which such decision has been taken. Unless the policy decision is demonstrably capricious or arbitrary and not informed by any reason whatsoever or it suffers from the vice of discrimination or infringes any statute or provisions of the Constitution, the policy decision cannot be struck down. It should be borne in mind that except for the limited purpose of testing a public policy in the context of illegality and unconstitutionality, courts should avoid 'embarking on uncharted ocean of public policy"."

23. In K. DURAISAMY v. STATE OF T.N. , the Supreme Court would hold as follows:

"Though the prescription of a quality may involve in a general sense reservation in favour of the particular class or category in whose favour a quota fixed, the concepts of reservation and fixation of quota drastically differ in their purport and content as well as the object. Fixation of a quota in a given case cannot be said to be the same as a mere reservation and whenever a quota is fixed or provided for one or more of the classified group or category, the candidates failing in or answering the description of different classified groups in whose favour a respective quota is fixed have to confine their respective claims against the quota fixed for each of such category, with no one in one category having any right to stake a claim against the quota earmarked for the other class or category."

24. In PRE-P.G. MEDICAL SANGHARSH COMMITTEE v. DR. BAJRANG SONI , it is observed by the Apex Court as follows:

"The Doctors who are in-service candidates in various medical institutions run and maintained by the Government or government departments, have wide area and horizon of exposure on the practical side and they may not have the required extra time to keep themselves afresh on the theoretical side like an open candidate who may have sufficient time at his disposal to plod through books. The in-service candidates in contrast to the fresh or open candidates have to spend much of their time on attending and treating the patients in the hospitals they serve gaining excellence on the practical side and, in our view, they would constitute a distinct class by themselves to be given a special treatment and no grievance can be made out on the ground that the minimum eligibility marks for their selection in respect of seats earmarked for them should also be the same as that of the fresh or open candidates."

25. In STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. LATA ARUN , the Apex Court would observe as below:

"In an appropriate case the court can examine whether the policy decision or the administrative order dealing with the matter is based on a fair, rational and reasonable ground; whether the decision has been taken on consideration of relevant aspects of the matter; whether exercise of the power is obtained with mala fide intention; whether the decision serves the purpose of giving proper training to the candidates admitted or it is based on irrelevant and irrational considerations or intended to benefit an individual or a group of candidates."

26. In ONKAR LAL BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA , it is observed by the Supreme Court as under:

"The role model for governance and decision taken thereof should manifest equity, fair play and justice. The cardinal principle of governance in a civilized society based on rule of law not only has to base on transparency but must create an impression that the decision-making was motivated on the consideration of probity. The Government has to rise above the nexus of vested interests and nepotism and eschew window-dressing. The act of governance has to withstand the test of judiciousness and impartiality and avoid arbitrary or capricious actions. Therefore, the principle of governance has to be tested on the touchstone of justice, equity and fair play and if the decision is not based on justice, equity and fair play and has taken into consideration other matters, though on the face of it, the decision may look legitimate but as a matter of fact, the reasons are not based on values but to achieve popular accolade, that decision cannot be allowed to operate."

27. In UNION OF INDIA v. INTERNATIONAL TRADING CO. , the Apex Court has observed thus:

"While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammelled by any statute or rule is wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone irrespective of the field of activity of the State is an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. Actions are amenable, in the panorama of judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validity for a discernible reason, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. The meaning and true import and concept of arbitrariness is more easily visaulized than precisely defined. A question whether the impugned action is arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on the facts and circumstances of a given case. A basic and obvious test to apply in such cases is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness"

28. In STATE OF M.P. v. GOPAL D. TIRTHANI , the Apex Court would observe as follows:

"There is nothing wrong in the State Government setting apart a definite percentage of educational seats at postgraduation level consisting of degree and diploma courses exclusively for the in-service candidates. To the extent of the seats so set apart, there is a separate and exclusive source of entry or channel for admission. It is not reservation. In-service candidates, and the candidates not in the service of the State Government, are two classes based on an intelligible differentia. There is a laudable purpose sought to be achieved. In-service candidates, on attaining higher academic achievements, would be available to be posted in rural areas by the State Government. It is not that an in-service candidate would leave the service merely on account of having secured a postgraduate degree or diploma though secured by virtue of being in the service of the State Government. If there is any misapprehension, the same is allayed by the State Government obtaining a bond from such candidates as a condition precedent to their taking admission that after completing PG degree/diploma course they would serve the State Government for another five years."

29. The gist of the guidelines and principles deducible from the above decisions could be summarised as follows:

(A) It is settled law that the State is entitled to lay down standards of eligibility for admission to medical courses, provided they are not inconsistent with the standards laid down by the Medical Council of India.

(B) Laying down standards of eligibility by the State is in the realm of policy decision. This cannot be interfered with by the court unless such policy decision is demonstrably capricious or arbitrary or not informed by any reasons or suffers from the vice of discrimination or offends any provision of the Constitution.

(C) The Government which bears the financial burden of running the Government Colleges is entitled to lay down criteria for admission in its own colleges and to decide the source from which admission would be made, provided such classification is not arbitrary and has a rational basis and a reasonable connection which the object of the rules.

(D) In an appropriate case the court can examine whether the policy decision is based on a fair, rational and reasonable ground; whether the decision has been taken on consideration of relevant aspects of the matter; whether exercise of the power is obtained with mala fide intention; whether the decision serves the purpose of giving proper training to the candidates admitted or it is based on irrelevant and irrational considerations.

(E) The reasonableness of restriction is to be determined in an objective manner and from the standpoint of the interests of general public and not from the standpoint of the interests of the persons upon whom the restrictions are imposed or upon abstract consideration. A restriction cannot be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case, it operates harshly.

(F) Unless the policy decision is demonstrably capricious or arbitrary and not informed by any reason whatsoever or it suffers from the vice of discrimination or infringes any statute or provisions of the Constitution, the policy decision cannot be struck down. It should be borne in mind that except for the limited purpose of testing a public policy in the context of illegality and unconstitutionality, courts should avoid embarking on uncharted ocean of public policy.

(G) It is trite law that Article 14 of the Constitution applies also to matters of governmental policy and if the policy or any action of the Government fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. A question whether the impugned action is arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on the facts and circumstances of a given case. A basic test to apply in such cases is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness.

30. Bearing these principles in mind, let us now go into the question posed in these cases.

31. The question that arises for consideration in the above batch of cases, as stated above, is whether the Clause 23 of the Prospectus issued by the first respondent increasing the period of service from two years to three years in respect of the admission of service candidates to the Post Graduate Degree/Diploma in Medicine Course for the Academic year 2004-2005 is valid or not?

32. At the outset, it shall be stated that the contention that the impugned clause creates discrimination between the in-service candidates and the open category candidates, has got to be rejected in view of the fact that this point has already been decided by the Supreme Court in (supra), while upholding the reservation of 50% of seats in favour of the in-service candidates. In that decision, it is held that the in-service candidates cannot, on the basis of marks, be considered for the seats earmarked for the open category non-service candidates. Further, the service candidates and non-service candidates form two categories. 50% of seats are reserved for service candidates to which non-service candidates are not eligible to be considered. Among the service candidates, the minimum eligibility has been prescribed so that all service candidates are to be tested on the basis of equal consideration. If a service candidate were to apply as an open candidate for the remaining 50% of the seats, they could do so without completing the minimum period of service as prescribed. In other words, while the minimum period of three years is required for all service candidates to be considered for 50% of seats earmarked for the service candidates, any candidate who opts for the remaining 50% of seats could apply and be considered without any service qualification. In the circumstances, if any of the writ appellants desires to compete for 50% of the seats earmarked for non-service candidates, he or she could do so without reference to the service qualification. Under those circumstances, the question of comparing the two categories would not arise. Therefore, it would be appropriate to deal with the other grounds relating to the validity of the Clause 23 of the Prospectus which would apply to the service candidates alone, without referring to the other arguments advanced by the counsel for the appellants which are not quite relevant to the issue in question.

33. The submissions made by the counsel for the appellants would involve three short grounds:

(1) The enhancement of the period from two years to three years by the impugned Clause in the Prospectus has no nexus to the objects sought to be achieved.

(2) The impugned Clause 23 in the Prospectus is arbitrary and against public interest, since as per the pre-existing Rules, the Doctors could be required to serve in Primary Health Centres, even after completing the Post Graduate Courses. In that event, the Doctors who acquired the Post Graduate qualification would serve to the rural public, who have now been deprived of.

(3) The writ appellants entered into service with the fond hope in 2001 that they would be eligible for admission to Post Graduate Courses after two years of service. Spoiling their hopes, the impugned clause has been introduced increasing the years of service to three years which would amount to violation of the principles of legitimate expectation.

34. On the strength of these three points, it is contended by the counsel for the appellants that the Clause 23 of the Prospectus issued by the Director of Medical Education, Chennai in respect of the admission to the Post Graduate and Diploma Courses for the Academic year 2004-2005 fixing the completion of three years for service candidates as eligibility criteria instead of two years service is arbitrary and unconstitutional.

35. Let us now deal with the merits of the said contentions urged by the counsel for the appellants in the light of the reply given by the counsel for the respondents.

36. We shall now quote Clause 23 of the Prospectus, which reads as follows:

"Those service candidates who are put in less than three years of satisfactory continuous service as on 1.2.2004 either in Tamil Nadu Medical Service or in Local Bodies and Organisations mentioned in the Prospectus, are not eligible to apply for P.G. Degree/Diploma/Five year M. Ch. (Neuro Surgery) Courses."

37. The first point raised by the writ appellants, as stated already, is that there is no nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by increasing the minimum eligibility service from two years to three years. Admittedly, the writ appellants were appointed under the statutory provision, namely Rule 21(a) of the Special Rules for the Medical Service. The said rule has been amended by G.O. Ms. No. 712, Health Department, dated 14.11.1995 by which it was required that every Assistant Surgeon should complete five years of service on duty on 31st December of the year to exercise their option in writing for transfer to the Tamil Nadu Medical Service. As per the condition contained in the Notification, every Medical Officer who is appointed in the Primary Health Centre should serve for a period of not less than five years excluding any period spent on training, leave or higher education in Government Primary Health Centre and that on completion of five years service in Primary Health Centre, the Medical Officers like that of writ appellants can opt for transfer of service to the category of medical service. Thus, it is incumbent on the part of every Medical Officer who is appointed in Primary Health Centre should compulsorily serve to the rural public for a period of five years regardless his qualifying service as a Post Graduate. Such conditions of service have been provided for achieving the avowed object of rendering medical service to the rural public.

38. The writ appellants/Medical Officers, admittedly, were appointed and joined duty in November 2001. They were expected to serve upto October 2006. If such Medical Officer intends to apply for post graduation, he could do so on completion of two years of service as per the previously existing rule for the academic year 2004-2005. On completion of two years Post Graduate Degree, i.e. in 2007, he has to further serve in the Primary Health Centre for three more years, i.e. upto October 2010. Hence, the rural public would be benefited by medical attention by more qualified Post Graduate Doctors who are expertise in specialised subjects as well. It is, this benefit of expertise treatment for a period of three years after post graduation is sought to be curtailed, by virtue of the introduction of the impugned Clause 23 of the Prospectus issued for the academic year 2004-2005 increasing one more year of minimum eligibility service, i.e. three years instead of two years.

39. There is no dispute as to the laudable object, namely to provide quality service to the rural masses by the in-service Medical Officers for a particular period. It is also not in dispute that the State Government earmarked 50% of seats in admission to the Post Graduate Course as an incentive and to attract candidates to be appointed in rural areas so as to render medical service to the rural public.

40. It is pointed out by the counsel appearing for the Government that the fixing of eligibility criteria is only on the basis of the policy decision taken by the Government. Of course, it is settled law that the scope of judicial review in the matter of policy decision is limited. But however, as laid down by the Supreme Court in ONKAR LAL BAJAJ v. UNION OF INDIA , the policy decision should stand the test of judiciousness and impartiality or arbitrary, justice, equity and fair play. In the light of the above legal situation, it is for the Government to establish that the act of increasing the minimum eligibility service from two years to three years has nexus to the object sought to be achieved, namely rendering quality medical service to the rural masses.

41. According to the counsel for the appellants, increasing of one more year service as minimum eligibility criteria would, in fact, deprive the rural public from availing medical care by more qualified persons with expertise knowledge in specialised subjects. On that ground, it is claimed that the introduction of Clause 23 in the Prospectus is arbitrary. As a matter of fact, it is contended by the counsel for the writ appellants that the power or jurisdiction of the State Government is not questioned, but the manner of exercising the power alone is questioned as being arbitrary.

42. At the time of their appointment, as indicated above, the existing rule was that the Doctors who were working in Primary Health Centres could apply for the Post Graduate Course after expiry of two years and after finishing their Post Graduate Course, the Doctors have to come back to Primary Health Centres to complete the service for the balance period of three years in Primary Health Centres. By introducing one more year, the rural masses were made to wait for three years to get the medical service from the more qualified Medical Officers who have acquired the post graduate qualification. In that context, we are to hold that the nexus to the object sought to be achieved is missing.

43. While elaborating the second point, it was urged by the counsel for the writ appellants that by virtue of G.O.(2D) No. 71, dated 24.10.2002, the five years of compulsory service in the Primary Health Centres has been reduced to three years and while so, the increase of one year minimum eligibility service would defeat the object sought to be achieved and as such, it is against the public interest.

44. While replying to the said contention, the Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 would contend that G.O.(2D) No. 71, issued on 24.10.2002 reducing five years compulsory service to three years is in consonance with the impugned Clause 23 and as such, by virtue of the Clause 23 and G.O.(2D) No. 71, dated 24.10.2002, the Medical Officers have to do compulsory service in Primary Health Centres for three years and thereafter, they can apply for the Post Graduate Course and after finishing their Post Graduate Course, they need not go back to the Primary Health Centres.

45. If this argument is accepted, it is clear that the Medical Officers who finished their Post Graduate Course need not come back to Primary Health Centres to serve for the balance period as per their undertaking earlier given and consequently, the rural public would be deprived from availing the medical care by more qualified persons with expertise knowledge in specialised subjects through the Post Graduate Courses.

46. When it is argued by the counsel for the writ appellants that G.O.(2D) No. 71, dated 24.10.2002 would not apply to the writ appellants, the Additional Advocate General would assert that it would apply to the appellants and even assuming that it would not apply to the appellants, it would be made applicable by suitably amending the said G.O.(2D) No. 71, dated 24.10.2002. By this stand taken by the Government, it is clear that the Government is not interested in the rural masses getting the medical service from the more qualified persons with expertise knowledge through the Post Graduate Courses as they need not go back to rural service. This, in our view, would not be in the public interest. In other words, it has to be held that reducing five years to three years by G.O.(2D) No. 71, dated 24.10.2002 and increasing two years to three years in Primary Health Centres to have the eligibility to apply for Post Graduate Courses, would not achieve the object, namely rendering quality medical service to the rural masses by the Medical Officers who are well qualified by obtaining medical knowledge through their Post Graduate Courses. Consequently, we are constrained to conclude that there is no nexus to the object sought to be achieved and also the same is not in the public interest.

47. This could be viewed from yet another angle. Admittedly, G.O.(2D) No. 71, dated 24.10.2002 reducing five years compulsory service to three years was issued as early as on 24.10.2002 itself, However, the respondents have not chosen to impose such clause like that of the impugned clause for the academic year 2003-2004. Admittedly, the Prospectus containing the impugned clause was issued for the year 2004-2005. Why was such clause not introduced for that period? What is the reason for the introduction of this clause belatedly? There is no explanation. Apparently, there is a missing link between G.O.(2D) No. 71, dated 24.10.2002 and the impugned clause introduced for the year 2004-2005. When such is the situation, the contention of the counsel for the appellants that the impugned Clause 23 has been incorporated solely with a view to deny the benefit to one batch of appointees, viz., the writ appellants who got appointment in the year 2001 and the said clause would affect the rights of the writ appellants' batch alone, inasmuch as the Medical Officers appointed subsequently were aware of the minimum eligibility service of three years for them, merits acceptance. As such, it is obvious that the impugned Clause 23 cannot be said to be fair and equitable so as to be saved under the garb of policy decision.

48. The third submission raised by the counsel for the appellants is the doctrine of legitimate expectation.

49. The main grievance expressed by the writ appellants is that the learned single Judge has not applied the ratio laid down in POOVIZHI, MINOR v. THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU (2002(1) M.L.J.590) and the reason given by the learned Judge in distinguishing the proposition of law laid down in the above decision is not in the relevant factor and therefore, the finding with reference to the same by the learned single Judge is quite wrong.

50. Before dealing with this fact situation, it would be worthwhile to refer to the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court with reference to the principles of legitimate expectation in the following decisions:

1) NAVJYOTI CO-OPERATIVE GROUP HOSING SOCIETY v. UNION OF INDIA ;

2) UNION OF INDIA v. HINDUSTAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (1993(3) S.C.499);

3) M.P. OIL EXTRACTION v. STATE OF M.P. (A.I.R.1998 S.C.145);

4) NATIONAL BUILDINGS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. S. RAGAHUNATHAN ;

5) PUNJAB COMMNICATIONS LIMITED v. UNION OF INDIA ;

6) F.C.I. v. KAMEDHENU CATTLE FEED I NDUSTRIES ;

7) MADRAS CITY WINE MERCAHNTS' ASSN. v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU .

51. Referring to the above decisions, the Full Bench of this Court has elaborately dealt with this point in TAMIL NADU TAMIL & ENGLISH SCHOOL ASSOCIATION v. STATE . These decisions and the Full Bench decision have been referred to in 2002(1) M.L.J.590 (cited supra).

52. As stated above, strong reliance is placed by the writ appellants on the decision reported in 2002(1) M.L.J.590. In that case, the First Bench of this Court on the basis of various citations referred to above, would accept the contention of the writ appellants that they have right to write the examinations only for chosen papers for improving performance in papers of their choice and hold that the Government's rule announcing improvement examinations would cover all subjects and it would not cover one or more subjects alone as chosen by the candidates, which would be prospective only and not retrospective on the basis of the principle of legitimate expectation.

53. The proposition of law with reference to the legitimate expectation in gist is as follows:

(1) The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary.

(2) It is clear that legitimate expectation may arise (a) if there is express promise given by a public authority or (b) because of the acceptance of a regular practice, a claimant can reasonably expect it to continue and (c) such expectation must be reasonable.

(3) For a legitimate expectation to arise, the decision of the administrative authority must affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which he had in the past been permitted by the decision maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue, to do until there has been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it.

(4) If the authority proposes to defeat a person's legitimate expectation, it should afford him an opportunity to make a representation in the matter.

(5) The legitimate substantive expectation permits the Court to find out if the change in policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made.

54. In the light of the above principles, let us now consider the above point by evaluating the rival contentions urged by the counsel for the parties.

55. According to the writ appellants that they joined service in Primary Health Centres only on the assurance through the then existing service conditions and eligibility criteria prescribing the minimum qualifying service, namely two years to apply for Post Graduate Course. The writ appellants have acted upon such promise and applied for the Post Graduate Course on completion of two years. At that stage, curiously, the respondents introduced the impugned Clause 23 for the first time in the Prospectus for the academic year 2004-2005. While they joined the service in Primary Health Centres in the year 2001, they were made to believe by the then existing clause that they were to undergo only two years of service in the Primary Health Centres and they can apply for Post Graduate Course in which 50% of the seats were earmarked for the service candidates.

56. It is not debated that the then existing rule at the time of appointment giving the said promise stipulating two years period was made only to attract the Doctors to make them join service in Primary Health Centres to serve the rural masses so that they may readily go to join service and then pursue their studies in the Post Graduate Course by joining the same after serving two years. Had they known at the time of appointment in the year 2001 the initial period for service in Primary Health Centres would be increased from two years to three years or more, they would not have joined the service. On the other hand, they would have opted to seek the chance of joining the Post Graduate Course directly through open category. This was not allowed to be done.

57. In this context, the contention urged by the counsel for the writ appellants that the impugned Clause 23 has been introduced only for the year 2004-2005 even though such criteria might have been incorporated during the year 2003-2004 in view of the fact that G.O.(2D) No. 71, dated 24.10.2002 had been issued well in advance to the date of commencement of admission process for the academic year 2003-2004 was with a view to deprive the writ appellants batch alone, has got to be countenanced. Admittedly, this has not been taken into consideration by the learned single Judge.

58. When there is express promise given by the public authority relating to the compulsory service of two years in Primary Health Centres assuring that they would be allowed to join Post Graduate Service after completion of two years making the writ appellants to believe that it may happen after completion of two years and when the expectation of their entry into Post Graduate Course is reasonable in the light of the promise given earlier, the sudden introduction of the clause making as three years without any reason and without giving any opportunity to make the representation with reference to their grievance would certainly defeat a person's legitimate expectation.

59. If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right guaranteed or is arbitrary and unfair or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned by this Court. The court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference. In determining whether there is any unfairness involved, the nature of the right infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the extent of the evil sought to be remedied, the prevailing condition at the relevant time have to be analysed before the court enters into judicial verdict.

60. In the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the Court is well within its rights to find out whether the introduction of the new clause under the garb of change in policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or unreasonable.

61. In that view of the matter, we are constrained to hold that the introduction of Clause 23 is opposed to legitimate expectation and consequently, this Court has to accept the contention of the writ appellants with reference to the same.

60. Before parting with this case, it shall be stated that even though the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petitions upholding the validity of Clause 23 of the Prospectus, allowed those petitioners who had joined in between 1.2.2001 and 28.2.2001 on the basis of the concession given by the Additional Advocate General making them eligible to apply for Post Graduate Course even though they have not completed three years service in accordance with Clause 23 as those persons joined the service in the month of February 2001. This is again a discrimination mainly on the basis of the concession given by the Government.

61. The claim of the other petitioners who have joined in November 2001 alone has been rejected by making Clause 23 applicable to them. When such a concession has been given to the writ petitioners who have joined in the month of February 2001allowing them to become eligible for entry into the Post Graduate Course, there is no reason as to why such concession has not been extended to the other petitioners who have joined in November 2001.

62. As a matter of fact, by virtue of the interim orders, all the petitioners were permitted to attend the common entrance test and by the subsequent orders of this Court, their results were also directed to be published to enable them to participate in the counselling and it was further directed in the said order dated 23.3.2004 that if the petitioners come under the zone of consideration in the counselling, their allotment of seats are to be withheld awaiting the disposal of the writ petitions.

63. Under these orders, all the writ appellants appeared for the entrance examination and after publication of the results, they participated in the counselling also. However, the selection of the writ appellants was directed to be kept in abeyance subject to the result of the final verdict in the writ appeal. This was not done in pursuance of the interim directions given on 23.3.2004 and 12.5.2004. Admittedly, the Medical Council of India being a party to the writ appeals is bound by the above referred to interim orders.

64. On behalf of the Medical Council, written arguments have been filed stating that admissions have been completed by 1.5.2004 and the last date for admission for this academic year 2004 is 31.5.2004, whereafter no admission is permissible and the prayer for admission of these writ appellants to the Post Graduate Course, at this stage, cannot be granted.

65. This contention is not tenable in view of the interim orders passed on 23.3.2004 and 12.5.2004 directing the selection of the writ appellants to be kept in abeyance subject to the result of the final verdict in the writ appeals and in fact, the respondents were directed to inform the candidates selected in the places of writ appellants that their admission is subject to the result of this writ appeals batch.

66. On the similar facts dealt with by the Supreme Court, suitable directions have been given to the Government as well as to the Medical Council of India in HARISH VERMA v. AJAY SRIVASTAVA . The relevant observation is as follows:

"We are conscious of the fact that there would be some delay in commencement of postgraduation studies and to some extent the 2002 and 2003 batches would overlap. However, that is a situation which cannot be avoided. It is an inevitable consequence for which the successful candidates for the year 2002 and 2003 i.e. those who will be held entitled to admission in postgraduation courses of studies consequent upon this judgment, cannot be made to suffer for no fault of theirs. It will be for the State of Rajasthan, if necessary, then in consultation with the Medical Council of India, to sort out the difficulties and to run the regular courses of the studies."

67. In the light of the above observation, this Court is inclined to give similar direction to the respondents to allow the writ appellants to join Post Graduate Course and complete their studies as held in the interim direction given on 12.5.2004 in W.A.M.P. No. 3855 of 2004 in W.A. No. 2100 of 2004.

68. The writ appeals are allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected W.A.M. Ps. are closed.