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C. Manohar v. B.R Poornima .

Madras High Court
Jul 13, 2004
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The complainant (now appellant) filed C.C. No. 191 of 1996 in the Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur, alleging that the respondent (accused) committed an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (N.I. Act) by issuing a cheque that was dishonoured. By an order dated 20-3-1997, the trial Magistrate acquitted the accused. The complainant appealed against that acquittal.

The underlying civil facts: the accused's husband died in a road accident in June 1992. The accused engaged the complainant (an advocate) to represent her in claim petitions (M.C.O.P. Nos. 2339 of 1992 and 246 of 1993). An award for Rs. 2,50,400/- was passed on 10-6-1995. In part payment, the accused received a cheque for Rs. 63,072.50/- on 14-3-1996.

The complainant alleged that the accused had earlier issued Ex.P-1, a cheque dated 16-3-1993 for Rs. 43,600/- towards legal fee and expenditure. The cheque was presented and returned on 19-3-1996 marked "insufficiency of funds"; a re-presentation on 23-3-1996 was returned with the note "payment stopped". After sending the statutory notice, the complainant filed the complaint under Section 138, N.I. Act.

At trial, the complainant (PW-1) and bank employees (PWs 2 and 3) were examined and documents Ex.Ps 1–8 were marked. The accused's case at trial was that no amount was payable by her because stamp duty and other amounts had already been paid. The trial Magistrate found there was "no debt or legally enforceable liability" and acquitted the accused. The complainant appealed to the High Court challenging that acquittal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial Court was correct in finding that there was no debt or legally enforceable liability arising from the cheque (i.e., whether the cheque was issued for discharge of a debt or other liability)?
  2. Whether the order of acquittal suffers from any infirmity warranting interference by the High Court?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that the accused owed the complainant Rs. 43,600/- towards stamp duty and legal expenses and that the trial Court failed to appreciate that liability properly.
  • The appellant relied on a Supreme Court decision (1998 1 Crimes 268 (SC) / 1998 Crl LJ 1397) to contend that once a cheque is issued, the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act arises and the trial Court should have drawn that presumption in favour of the complainant.
  • On that basis, the appellant prayed for reversal of the trial Court's order of acquittal.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent (accused) submitted that the amounts claimed as legal remuneration and stamp duty had already been paid and therefore no amount was payable to the complainant.
  • The accused maintained that there was no legally enforceable liability and that the complaint under Section 138, N.I. Act was not maintainable. The reasonings of the trial Court in acquitting the accused were defended as well-balanced and not requiring interference.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
1998 1 Crimes 268 (SC) : 1998 Crl LJ 1397 (Supreme Court) Held that once a cheque is issued by the drawer, a presumption under Section 139, N.I. Act arises that the cheque was issued for discharge of a debt or other liability; mere stoppage of payment by the drawer does not preclude action under Section 138 by the payee/holder. The High Court acknowledged the precedent but explained that Section 139's presumption arises only if the cheque was received for the discharge (in whole or part) of a debt or other liability. Because the complainant did not prove that any debt or legally enforceable liability was due to him (no agreement, no proof of having borne stamp duty or fees), the court declined to apply the presumption to overturn the trial Court's finding of "no debt or legally enforceable liability."

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following reasoning (based on the opinion's text):

  1. The court first noted the factual matrix and emphasized the special features of the lawyer-client relationship: it is one of trust and confidence and traditionally service-oriented, though the opinion comments on a contemporary trend toward commercialisation of the profession. The court framed the evidentiary question as whether the complainant had proved that Rs. 43,600/- was due to him from the accused.
  2. The court set out the statutory requirement under Section 138, N.I. Act: for penal liability to arise, a cheque must be drawn for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. If a cheque is issued for reasons other than the satisfaction of a debt or liability, its dishonour will not attract penal consequences under Section 138.
  3. The opinion examined the evidence led by the complainant and found that the complainant did not show that he personally paid stamp duty or bore legal fees on behalf of the accused, nor was there any agreement produced that specified the arrangement between the parties (amount of fees, who would pay stamp duty, etc.). In short, the complainant failed to prove a legally enforceable liability in the amount claimed.
  4. The court considered the appellant's reliance on the Supreme Court decision concerning the presumption under Section 139. It reiterated that Section 139 creates only a legal presumption that a cheque was received for discharge of debt or liability; but that presumption is only engaged if the underlying cheque is one that was received for discharge of a debt or liability. Because the complainant failed to establish that the cheque represented such a debt or liability, the presumption could not be effectively invoked to overturn the trial Court's finding.
  5. The court further observed the general appellate principle that a High Court should be cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal and should do so only where there are glaring infirmities or a miscarriage of justice. The court found no such infirmity in the trial Court's reasoning.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was dismissed. The court upheld the trial Magistrate's finding that there was "no debt or legally enforceable liability" and therefore no criminal liability under Section 138, N.I. Act. The opinion concludes: Appeal dismissed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the trial Court's order of acquittal is sustained and the accused remains acquitted of the offence under Section 138, N.I. Act. The court did not disturb the trial Court's factual conclusion that the complainant had not proved a legally enforceable liability. The opinion does not articulate any broader legal development or new precedent beyond applying established principles (including the Supreme Court's authority on Section 139) to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

1. The complainant in C.C No. 191 of 1996. on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Ambattur is the appellant. By the order (dated 20-3-1997), the trial Magistrate has acquitted the respondent/accused of the offence under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act (in short, the N.I Act). Aggrieved over the order of acquittal, the complainant has come forward with this appeal.

2. This case arises in a strange situation and facts. The Advocate is fastening the liability under Section 138, N.I Act on his client alleging that the amount is payable towards him as legal expenses.

3. The facts which led to the present appeal could be stated thus:—

Husband of the accused died on 13-6-1992 in a road accident, that took place on 10-6-1992, leaving her and a male child. The accused engaged the complainant to file a claim petition in M.C.O.P No. 2339 of 1992. Subsequently, mother-in-law of the accused also filed a claim petition in M.C.O.P No. 246 of 1993 in which also, this complainant has filed vakalat for the accused. Both the claim petitions were heard together and an award for Rs. 2,50,400/- was passed on 10-6-1995. At the request of the accused, the complainant had also filed two suits against her mother-in-law, claiming a share in the house property, as legal heir of her husband and another suit claiming Rs. 30,000/- being the value of the jewels and articles which were retained by the mother-in-law. As per the terms of the award, in part payment of 50% of her share, the accused received the cheque for Rs. 63,072.50/- on 14-3-1996.

4. The case of the complainant is that towards legal fee and expenditure payable for conducting the cases, the accused has issued Ex.P-1 cheque for Rs. 43,600/- dated 16-3-1993. The cheque amount was being given to clear the liability towards the com plainant. The cheque was presented for collection by the complainant through his Banker, Madras Central Co-operative Bank, Anna Nagar. The cheque was returned on 19-3-1996 with endorsement “insufficiency of funds”. The complainant contacted the accused on that day itself and informed her about the return of the cheque. The accused informed the complainant that she would deposit the cheque for the amount of Rs. 63,072.50/- and the complainant could rep resent the cheque. Accordingly, the com plainant has represented the cheque for Rs. 43,600/- on 23-3-1996. During the second presentation also, the cheque was returned as bounced with a note “payment stopped”. After the issuance of the statutory notice, the complainant filed the complaint alleging that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 138, N.I Act.

5. To substantiate the averments in the complaint, in the trial Court, PW-1 com plainant, P.Ws-2 and 3 — Bankers of the complainant and the accused were examined, Ex.Ps 1 to 8 were marked. Case of the accused is that no amount is payable by her and the amount towards stamp duty and others were already paid.

6. Upon consideration of the evidence, the trial Magistrate found that there is no debt or legally enforceable liability. Finding that no amount is payable on the cheque, the learned Magistrate found that by the return of the cheques with endorsement “insufficiency of funds” and “stop payment”, no criminal intention could be attributed to the accused. On those findings, the trial Magistrate has acquitted the respondent/accused of the offence under Section 138, N.I Act.

7. Aggrieved over the order of acquittal, the complainant has preferred this appeal.

8. Assailing the findings of the trial Court, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the amount payable by the accused towards stamp duty paid and the legal expenses was not properly appreciated by the trial Court. Placing reliance upon 1998 1 Crimes 268 (SC) : (1998 Cri LJ 1397), it is contended that once the cheque is issued, presumption under Section 139, N.I Act arises that the holder of the cheque received the cheque of nature referred in Section 138, N.I Act and the trial Court erred in not drawing such a presumption, and prays for reversal of order of acquittal.

9. Countering the arguments, the learned counsel for the respondent/accused has submitted that the amount towards legal remuneration and stamp duty was already paid and that no amount is payable. It is the further contention that there is no legally enforceable liability and the complaint filed under Section 138, N.I Act is not maintainable and the reasonings for acquittal is well balanced and that there is no reason warranting interference.

10. In the factual backdrop of the case the points that are arising for consideration are:—

(i) Whether the trial Court was not right in finding that there is no debt or legally enforceable liability?

(ii) Whether the order of acquittal suffers from any infirmity?

11. The facts are not in dispute. The complainant claims that the amount of Rs. 43,600/- is payable by the accused who is his client who engaged him to make claim of compensation for the death of her husband in a Road accident. The case in hand is an example of the present day trend of the legal profession. Legal profession is essentially service oriental. Ancestor of today's lawyers was no more than a spokesperson, who rendered his services to the needy members of the society, by putting forth their case before the authorities. Their services were rendered without regard to remuneration received or to be received. With the growth of litigation, legal profession became a full time occupation. The trend of the legal profession has changed… profession has almost became a trade. There is no more service orientation.

12. The relationship between the lawyer and the client is one of trust and confidence. The client engages a lawyer for personal reasons and is at liberty to leave, him for the same reasons. Considering the relationship between the lawyer and the client and the present day trend in the profession, it has to be carefully seen whether the complainant has proved that the amount due of Rs. 43,600/- is being payable towards him.

13. To attract the penal provisions under Section 138 N.I Act, a cheque must have been drawn by the accused on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability due. That means, the cheque must have been issued in discharge of debt or other liability wholly or in part. The cheque given for any other reasons not for the satisfaction of any debt or other liability, even if it is returned unpaid, will not meet with penal consequences.

14. Case of the complainant is that on behalf of the accused, he has filed claim petitions in M.C.O.P Nos. 2339 of 1992 and 246 of 1993. Two civil cases were also filed. There is nothing to show that the complainant/Advocate himself has paid the stamp duty and bore the legal fees. The complainant has not produced any agreement showing as to what was the arrangement between him and the accused, as to how much is the fee payable and whether the accused agreed for payment of stamp duty by her counsel itself. In the absence of any agreement, Ex. P-1 cheque cannot be said to have been issued for the purpose of discharge of any substantial debt or liability. Urging the Court to raise the presumption under Section 139 N.I Act, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon 1998 Crimes 268 (SC) : (1998 Crl LJ 1397) wherein the Supreme Court has held that once the cheque is issued by the drawer a presumption under Section 139 N.I Act must follow and merely because the drawer issues a notice to the drawee (Payee) or to the Bank for stoppage of the payment it will not preclude an action under Section 138 of the Act by the drawee (Payee) or the holder of a cheque in due course. Of course, under Section 139 N.I Act, there is a presumption that unless the contrary is proved, the holder of the cheque received the cheque for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other 2-ability. But even in Section 139 N.I Act, the legal presumption is created only for the cheque so received for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability. In the case on hand, the complainant being a practising advocate, has not proved the debt amount payable towards him by the accused, who has engaged him as his lawyer to conduct the case. The finding of the trial Court that there is ‘no debt or legally enforceable liability’ does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference.

15. In an appeal against acquittal, the High Court would be slow to interfere with the order of acquittal. Only if there are glaring infirmities resulting in miscarriage of justice, the High Court would reverse the order of acquittal. No convincing grounds are made out warranting interference in the impugned order. This appeal is bereft of merits and is bound to fail.

16. C.A No. 511 of 1997:—

For the reasons stated above, the appeal is dismissed.

17. Appeal dismissed.