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Indian Additives, Ltd., Chennai v. Indian Additives Employees' Union
Factual and Procedural Background
This writ appeal arises from an interim order dated 5 October 2004, passed by a Single Judge in a writ petition filed by the first respondent union against the appellant. The petition alleged violation of Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, concerning alteration of service conditions of union members. The Single Judge modified an interim stay order and directed the writ petition to be listed for final hearing. The second respondent, aggrieved by this modification, preferred the present writ appeal. Both parties consented to tag the writ petition with the appeal for final hearing and disposal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable when the dispute involves enforcement of rights or obligations created under Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
- Whether the appropriate remedy for alleged violation of Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act is to approach the forums constituted under that Act rather than the High Court under Article 226.
- The scope and exercise of the High Court's discretion under Article 226 in presence of an alternative efficacious remedy under a special statute.
Arguments of the Parties
First Respondent's Arguments
- The first respondent union contended that the appellant violated provisions of Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act while altering service conditions.
- Relied heavily on the Division Bench judgment in Voltas Volkart Employees Union v. Voltas Ltd. to support the maintainability of the writ petition.
- Relied on the Supreme Court decision in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks emphasizing the discretionary power of the High Court under Article 226 and exceptions to the bar of alternative remedy.
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant argued that the dispute involved enforcement of rights under Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, and hence the only remedy was adjudication before the statutory forums such as the Board, Labour Court, or Industrial Tribunal.
- Relied on the Full Bench decision in P. Pitchumani v. Management of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd., which held that matters concerning service conditions governed by the Industrial Disputes Act must be adjudicated only by the forums created under the statute.
- Asserted that the Division Bench decision relied upon by the first respondent did not consider binding Supreme Court precedents and was therefore not good law.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant, [1995 (2) L.L.N 271] | Where a dispute involves enforcement of rights or obligations under the Industrial Disputes Act, the remedy lies exclusively with the statutory forums. | The Court relied on this principle to hold that the writ petition was not maintainable under Article 226 when an alternative statutory remedy exists. |
| Uttar Pradesh State Bridge Corporation Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Sangh, [2004 (2) L.L.N 93] | High Court erred in entertaining writ petitions concerning industrial disputes governed by the Industrial Disputes Act; such disputes must be resolved by the statutory authorities. | Reiterated the exclusivity of statutory remedy and disapproved the High Court's jurisdiction in such matters. |
| Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke, [1976 (1) L.L.N 1] | Where a specific remedy is provided by statute, parties must avail that remedy rather than other forums, except in exceptional circumstances. | Supported the proposition that the High Court should not deviate from statutory remedies unless strong reasons exist. |
| Voltas Volkart Employees Union v. Voltas Ltd., [1999 (4) L.L.N 1107] | This precedent was relied upon by the first respondent but was found not to have considered binding Supreme Court rulings. | The Court held this decision not to be good law in light of higher authority. |
| Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, [(1998) 8 SCC 1] | The High Court has discretion under Article 226 to entertain writ petitions, but generally will not do so if an effective alternative remedy exists, except in cases involving fundamental rights, natural justice, jurisdictional errors, or vires challenges. | The Court clarified that this discretion is not absolute and that ordinarily alternative remedies should be exhausted before invoking writ jurisdiction. |
| P. Pitchumani v. Management of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd., [2004 (2) L.L.N 1086] | Dismissals, transfers, and other service condition matters under the Industrial Disputes Act must be adjudicated only by statutory forums. | The Court relied on this Full Bench ruling to affirm that disputes under Section 9A must be resolved by the Industrial Disputes Act forums, not by writ petitions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the nature of the dispute, which concerned alleged breach of Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act relating to service conditions of employees. It emphasized the well-settled legal principle that when a statute provides a specific remedy and forum for adjudication of disputes, parties must resort to those statutory mechanisms rather than invoke writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The Court reviewed binding Supreme Court precedents which consistently hold that disputes involving rights and obligations under the Industrial Disputes Act must be resolved exclusively by the statutory authorities such as the Board, Labour Court, or Industrial Tribunal.
While the first respondent relied on a Division Bench decision and the Supreme Court's discretion under Article 226 as explained in Whirlpool Corporation, the Court clarified that the availability of an alternative efficacious remedy generally bars writ jurisdiction. Exceptions to this rule—such as fundamental rights violations, natural justice breaches, jurisdictional errors, or vires challenges—were noted, but the Court found none applicable on the facts.
The Court also noted that the Division Bench decision relied upon by the first respondent did not consider the binding Supreme Court rulings and was therefore not authoritative.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the writ petition was not maintainable and the statutory remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act should be pursued.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The writ petition filed by the first respondent is dismissed.
This decision directly affects the parties by requiring the first respondent to seek redressal exclusively through the statutory forums under the Industrial Disputes Act rather than by writ petition. No broader precedent beyond reaffirming existing legal principles was established.
Markandey Katju, C.J:— This writ appeal is preferred against the interim order, dated 5 October, 2004, passed by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition filed by the first respondent herein. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has modified the order of interim stay and directed the listing of the writ petition for final hearing. Aggrieved, the second respondent in the writ petition has preferred this appeal. With the consent of both parties, the writ petition is directed to be tagged along with the appeal for final hearing and disposal.
2. Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side. It appears that the first respondent union has filed the writ petition against the appellant, alleging violation of the provisions of S. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the I.D Act) while altering the service conditions of its members. It is well settled principle that when the dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the claimant is to get adjudication under that Act. In the present case, the grievance of the first respondent is that the provisions of S. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act were breached by the appellant. If that is so, the first respondent's remedy is by approaching the appropriate forum created under the Industrial Disputes Act, viz., Board or Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. Though there is a plethora of case laws on this point, we would rely only on two decisions of the Supreme Court.
3. In the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Krishna Kant, [1995 (2) L.L.N 271], the Supreme Court held as under, in Para. 35, at page 284:
“…Where, however, the dispute involved recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act”
The above principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh State Bridge Corporation, Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Rajya Setu Nigam S. Karamchari Sangh, [2004 (2) L.L.N 93], in the following words, in Para. 11, at page 97:
“We are of the firm opinion that the High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition of the respondent-union at all. The dispute was an industrial dispute both within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as well the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The rights and obligations sought to be enforced by the respondent-union in the writ petition are those created by the Industrial Disputes Act…”
After referring to the observations made in Premier Automobiles, Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke, [1976 (1) L.L.N 1], the Supreme Court observed as follows:
“Although these observations were made in the context of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the proceedings relating to an industrial Dispute and may not be read as a limitation on the Court's powers under Art. 226, nevertheless it would need a very strong cgse indeed for the High Court to deviate from the principle that where a specific remedy is given by the statute, the person who insists upon such remedy can avail of the process as provided in that statute and in no other manner.”
(emphasis supplied).
4. Learned counsel for the first respondent heavily relied on the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Voltas Volkart Employees Union v. Voltas, Ltd., [1999 (4) L.L.N 1107]. We have carefully perused the said judgment. It is to be noticed that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Uttar Pradesh State Bridge Corporation case, [2004 (2) L.L.N 93] (vide supra), Rajasihan State Road Transport Corporation case, [1995 (2) L.L.N 271] (vide supra) and Premier Automobiles, Ltd. case, [1976 (1) L.L.N 1] (vide supra), was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench and, therefore, the decision of the Division Bench, in our opinion is not good law.
5. Learned counsel for the first respondent then referred to the decision in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, [(1998) 8 SCC 1], and very heavily relied on the observations made in Para. 10 thereof, which we quote below:
“Under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.”
In our opinion, the above observations of the Supreme Court cannot be held to mean that a writ petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy when there is an allegation of violation of any of the fundamental rights or the principles of natural justice or the proceedings are without jurisdiction. No doubt, it is well-settled that alternative remedy is not an absolute bar a writ petition but it is equally well-settled that ordinarily if there is an alternative remedy, the discretion under Art. 226 should not be exercised and the party should be relegated to avail the alternative remedy. Hence, even if there is violation of any of the fundamental rights or of natural justice or the proceedings are without jurisdiction, the High Court under Art. 226, on the facts of the particular case, can still dismiss the writ petition on the ground of availability of alternative remedy and ordinarily it should do so if there is an alternative remedy.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant relied on the Full Bench decision of this Court in P. Pitchumani v. Management of Sri Chakra Tyres Ltd., [2004 (2) L.L.N 1086]. After referring to the various decisions including the decisions in Premier Automobiles, Ltd., case, [1976 (1) L.L.N 1] (vide supra), Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, cited supra, the Full Bench categorically held in Para. 14 (ii), at page 1091, as follows:
“…dismissals, transfers and other matters concerning the service conditions of employees governed by I.D Act, have to be adjudicated only by the forums created under the said statute and not otherwise.”
7. In the present case, when the first respondent-union complains that the appellant had breached the provisions of S. 9A of the I.D Act, the only remedy available to it is to raise an “industrial dispute” and seek adjudication of the same before the appropriate forum created under the Industrial Disputes Act rather than approaching this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, by passing the alternative remedy available under the Act.
8. For the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed and impugned order is set aside. The writ petition shall stand dismissed. No costs. Connected W.A.M.P No. 7250 of 2004 is closed.
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