- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
V. Devaraj And Other... v. The State Of Tamil N...
Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The writ petitions challenge land acquisition proceedings initiated for a Housing Scheme by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board in respect of various lands in Kalapatti village. Notifications under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act were issued by Government Orders dated 25.2.1994, 6.8.1994, 2.4.1994 and 28.2.1994. The petitioners contend they were not served notice and thus had no opportunity to object under the statutory enquiry process; declarations under Section 6 and awards were made (some after the filing of writ petitions). Many petitioners had purchased plots after approved lay-outs (dated 1990 and 1992 in several instances), obtained no-objection certificates and constructed houses. In several notifications the land was described in the name of a deceased owner (Sami Naidu). The petitioners filed writ petitions challenging the acquisition on multiple grounds including issuance in the name of a dead person, failure to give opportunity to purchasers, change of stated purpose between Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration, and the existence of prior approved lay-outs and constructions.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the name of a dead person vitiates the acquisition proceedings.
- Whether purchasers/occupiers who were informed to the authorities (or who had constructed houses pursuant to approved lay-outs) were entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard in the Section 5-A enquiry and before declaration under Section 6.
- Whether prior approval of lay-out plans and subsequent sale/construction by purchasers precludes or limits the State's power to acquire such lands for the Housing Board scheme.
- Whether the change in description of purpose from "constructing houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board" (in the Section 4(1) notification) to "formation of Kalapatti neighbourhood scheme" (in the Section 6 declaration) amounted to an impermissible change of public purpose that would invalidate the acquisition.
- Whether the statutory procedures (including giving notice to persons known to be interested) were followed and, if not, whether non-compliance vitiates the acquisition.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- Notifications under Section 4(1) were issued in the name of a dead person; therefore the acquisition proceedings are void ab initio.
- Many petitioners obtained No Objection Certificates, sanctioned lay-out plans from the Director of Town and Country Planning and paid requisite charges; they constructed houses and therefore the acquisition cannot be sustained.
- No opportunity was given to petitioners to participate in Section 5-A enquiry or otherwise to raise objections; in some cases the original owner informed authorities of sales to the petitioners but they were not heard.
- The land had already been utilized for housing purposes; acquiring it for the Housing Board's scheme (or thereafter selling developed sites) does not amount to a legitimate public purpose that justifies depriving petitioners of their houses.
- The stated purpose changed between the Section 4(1) notification and the Section 6 declaration; such change invalidates the acquisition.
- G.O.Ms No. 620 (29.6.1990) provides that lands covered by a lay-out approved prior to a Section 4(1) notification should not be acquired; respondents failed to consider this guideline.
Respondents' / Government Arguments (as recorded)
- The Government Pleader submitted that awards were passed before the writ petitions were filed (the Court found this submission factually incorrect in relation to at least some petitions).
- The Government argued that addresses of purchasers were not furnished when names were given, and therefore notice need not have been given to them (the Court rejected this argument as insufficient and capable of being remedied by asking for proper particulars).
- The Housing Board filed countermaterial denying certain factual claims (for example receipt of objections), but the Court noted lack of counter by the State in at least one petition and observed that Housing Board may not have knowledge of objections sent to the State Government and the land acquisition officer.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Muthuswamy v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) M.L.J 217 | Authorities must verify heirs and ownership; issuing notification or declaration in the name of a dead person without proper enquiry is improper and vitiates acquisition. | The Court held that notifications issued in the name of deceased owner (Sami Naidu) rendered the acquisition proceedings in respect of those lands unsustainable, relying on this authority. |
| State of Tamil Nadu v. Meenakshmi Ammal, 1996 (7) SCC 269 | Addresses whether prior approval of lay-outs affects validity of acquisition (as applied by the Apex Court in related contexts). | The Court observed that merely because authorities had not considered G.O.Ms No. 620 (lay-out approval prior to notification) acquisition would not automatically be interfered with in view of this Apex Court authority. |
| P.C. Thanikavelu v. Spl. Dy. Collector, L.A., Madras, AIR 1989 Mad. 222 | If authorities are informed about the present owners (even if names do not appear in revenue records), they are bound to issue notice and hear them before making a declaration under Section 6. | The Court applied this rule to hold that failure to give opportunity to petitioners/purchasers (when informed) vitiated acquisition proceedings. |
| Lakshmanan v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2000 (1) CTC 382 | Where a notification discloses a person as interested, the authority must treat and hear that person; “person interested” is broad and natural justice requires hearing genuinely interested persons even if not reflected in revenue records. | The Court relied on this decision to criticize failure to treat purchasers as persons interested and to support invalidation of proceedings where such persons were not heard. |
| Chinthamani v. Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition, 2000 (2) CTC 21 | Duty on the Collector to issue notice to a person shown to be interested; non-issuance violates principles of natural justice where interest was brought to the officer’s notice during Section 5-A enquiry. | The Court cited this authority to reinforce the obligation to issue notice to persons shown to be interested even if not in revenue records. |
| P. Tamilarasan v. State of Tamil Nadu rep. by Commissioner & Secretary, Adi Dravidar Welfare Department, 1999 (1) C.T.C 586 | Notice is necessary if a person’s interest is brought to the enquiring officer’s notice during Section 5-A proceedings; omission violates natural justice. | Used to support the conclusion that persons identified during enquiries must be given notice and hearing. |
| Ghaziabad Sheromani Sakhari Avas Samiti Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1990 SC 645 | Where land has been purchased for construction of houses by a cooperative society, a Development Authority constituted for same purpose should not acquire the land to the prejudice of purchasers. | The Court invoked this decision in considering that lands in question were already used for housing and to emphasize protection of purchasers’ interests against acquisition for similar purposes. |
| State of Karnataka v. Narasimhamurthy and others, 1995 (5) SCC 524 | Holds that the right to shelter is a fundamental right (the opinion cites this holding as recognizing a right to shelter under Article 19(1) implications). | The Court used this authority (and its principle) to underscore the importance of not depriving petitioners of existing homes and to justify excluding portions from acquisition where houses were constructed and occupied. |
| Thiruvengadam, R. v. Secretary to Govt., Housing Department, Govt. of T.N., Ms-9, 1997 (2) CTC 323 | Applied the Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to shelter to hold it is neither just nor reasonable to deprive persons of houses they and their ancestors have occupied; State should avoid rendering persons homeless when acquiring land for housing schemes. | The Court relied on the reasoning in this decision to emphasize that acquisition should not uproot persons from their homes and to support quashing acquisition insofar as it affected existing residential constructions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal assessments grounded in statutory procedure and precedents cited in the record:
- Notifications issued in the name of a deceased owner: the Court found it undisputed that some notifications (e.g., G.O.Ms.191 dated 25.2.1994) were in the name of the deceased owner Sami Naidu. Relying on the decision in Muthuswamy, the Court held that failure to make inquiry with heirs and issuance of notification/declaration in the name of a dead person vitiates the acquisition proceedings in respect of those lands.
- Prior lay-out approval and sales: although several lay-outs were sanctioned (1990 and 1992) and plots were sold and developed, the Court noted that mere existence of a prior approved lay-out does not automatically block acquisition — reference was made to State of Tamil Nadu v. Meenakshmi Ammal. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized protection of purchasers and existing residents where appropriate.
- Failure to give notice to purchasers/occupiers: the Court stressed that when authorities were informed (before declaration under Section 6 or during Section 5-A enquiry) about purchasers or present owners, the authorities were obliged to give notice and hearing. It relied on the Full Bench decision in P.C. Thanikavelu and subsequent authorities (Lakshmanan, Chinthamani, Tamilarasan) to conclude that omission to afford such opportunity vitiated the acquisition. The Court rejected the Government's contention that incomplete addresses justified non-issuance of notice, noting that authorities could and should have sought proper particulars.
- Right to shelter and equity considerations: relying on Supreme Court and High Court authorities (Narasimhamurthy; Thiruvengadam; Ghaziabad Sheromani), the Court recognized the significance of the right to shelter and the unfairness of rendering householders homeless where small residential holdings with constructions were involved. The Court treated this as a substantive consideration in favour of excluding or setting aside acquisition insofar as it affected existing residences.
- Specific factual findings: where factual assertions by petitioners (e.g., that objections were posted on 5.4.1993) were not denied by the State in a counter-affidavit, the Court treated those facts as admitted for purposes of the petition and held that failure to give opportunity in the Section 5-A enquiry required setting aside the acquisition (except the initial Section 4(1) notification, in one instance, which the Court retained but ordered further proceedings after giving opportunity).
- Procedure and quality of counter affidavits: the Court criticized the manner in which Government counter-affidavits were being prepared — often reproducing "para-war remarks" without verifying records — and warned that Government Pleaders must ensure accurate verified pleadings.
Holding and Implications
Holding — Core Rulings:
- W.P Nos. 18004 to 18031 of 1996, 9748 and 9749 of 1996 — The notification under Section 4(1) of the Act dated 25.2.1994 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act dated 17.5.1995 are quashed.
- W.P No. 6414 of 1997 — The notification under Section 4(1) of the Act dated 28.2.1994 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act dated 22.5.1995 are set aside.
- W.P Nos. 1595 to 1602 of 1997 (relating to S. Nos. 371 and 372, Kalapatti Village) — The notification dated 6.8.1996 under Section 4(1) and the declaration dated 8.10.1997 are set aside.
- W.P No. 9747 of 1996 — The writ petition is allowed; impugned acquisition proceedings against land bearing S. No. 384/1 are set aside; the Section 4(1) notification is retained intact but authorities are given liberty to proceed further in accordance with law after giving opportunity to the petitioners.
- No costs were awarded; connected writ miscellaneous petitions (W.M.Ps) are closed.
Implications:
- Direct effect: For the specific petitions and survey numbers identified, the acquisition notifications and declarations (as listed above) have been quashed or set aside, which restores protection to the petitioners and requires authorities to re-conduct proceedings (where permitted) after complying with statutory obligations such as notice and hearing to persons shown to be interested.
- Procedural reiteration: The decision reinforces obligations on acquiring authorities to identify, verify and give notice to persons who have been shown to be the present owners or persons interested (even if names do not appear in revenue records), and to avoid issuing notifications or declarations in the name of deceased owners without proper enquiry.
- No new legal precedent was announced by the Court beyond application and reinforcement of existing authorities cited in the opinion; the ruling applies the cited precedents to the facts before it and orders quashing/setting aside of specified acquisition actions on those bases.
This summary has been prepared exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that opinion.
1. In all these cases the petitioners are challenging the impugned acquisition proceedings in respect of their lands sought to be acquired for the purpose of Housing Scheme at the instance of the Tamil Nadu Housing Board.
2. In these writ petitions, a Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, hereinafter called ‘the Act’, was issued in Government Orders dated 25.2.1994, 6.8.1994, 2.4.1994 and 28.2.1994 Since no notice was served on the petitioners, they did not have any opportunity to object the acquisition proceedings. The Government also made declaration under Section 6 of the Act and awards were also passed subsequent to the filing of the writ petitions. For the purpose of constructing houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, the Government proposed to acquire the petitioners' lands.
3. Insofar as the lands of the petitioners bearing Survey Nos. 382, 384/1, 383, 384/2 and 385/1A of Kalapatti village, which are subject matter in W.P Nos. 18004 to 18031 of 1996, 9747 to 9749 of 1996 are concerned, the Government issued notification under Sec. 4(1) of the Act in G.O.Ms No. 191, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 25.2.1994 published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated 30.3.1994 The said notification with regard to the lands in S. Nos. 382, 383 and 384 are concerned, they were made in the name of a dead person, namely, Sami Naidu, the original owner. Insofar as the lands bearing S. No. 382 is concerned, the property was purchased by the petitioners in the year 1993 from one Selvaraj, son of Sami Naidu in whose name the notification under Sec. 4(1) of the Act was issued. Subsequently after forming lay-out therein, the Director of Town and Country Planning sanctioned the lay-out on 7.10.1994 A sum of Rs. 4,17,000 was also paid to Kalapatti Town Panchayat. It is the case of the petitioners that most of them have constructed houses on the basis of the sanctioned Plans. The petitioners in W.P Nos. 18004 to 18031 of 1996 came to know about the acquisition proceedings only on service of the notification issued under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act. They had no opportunity to appear for the enquiry held under Sec. 5-A of the Act. With respect to Survey Nos. 383 and 384/1, the property was purchased by the petitioners in 1965. Though with respect to Survey Number 383 (W.P No. 9748/1996) declaration was made under Sec. 6 of the Act in the name of the petitioner, the petitioner was not given an opportunity to participate in the enquiry held under Sec. 5-A of the Act.
4. With respect to the land bearing S. No. 416 which is the subject matter in W.P No. 6414/1997, notification under Sec. 4(1) of the Act in G.O.Ms No. 217, Housing and Urban Development Department, dated 28.2.1994 was issued.
5. Similarly, with respect to the lands bearing S. Nos. 370, 371 and 372 of Kalapatti village which is the subject matter in W.P No. 1595 to 1602 of 2000, the Government proposed to acquire the same by issuing Gazette notification under Sec. 4(1) of the Act, in G.O.Ms No. 343 Housing and Urban Development Department dated 6.8.1996 Even with respect to the lands situate in S. Nos. 370, 371 and 372 of Kalapatti village, the lay-out was approved as early as 26.10.1990 and 20.2.1992 by the Director of Town and Country Planning and most of the Plots were sold even prior to the notification issued under Sec. 4(1) of the Act. In the enquiry held under Sec. 5-A of the Act, the original owner filed a written objection stating that he sold the properties and he has given the particulars regarding the purchasers, namely, the petitioners. In spite of the same, no opportunity was given to the petitioners to raise their objection with respect to the acquisition proceedings.
6. In all these writ petitions though in the notification issued under Sec. 4(1) of the Act it is stated that the lands are sought to be acquired for the purpose of constructing houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, in the declaration made under Sec. 6 of the Act, the said purpose was given up, but it is stated that the lands are sought to be acquired for formation of Kalapatti neighbourhood scheme by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board which means the Housing Board is going to sell the developed sites without constructing the houses by themselves. On these facts, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners raised the following grounds attacking the impugned acquisition proceedings with respect to the notifications issued in the name of the dead persons:
(i) Notification under Sec. 4(1) of the Act was issued in the name of dead person and so the impugned acquisition proceedings are void ab initio.
(ii) The petitioners in W.P No. 18004 to 18031 of 1996 have constructed the buildings after getting No Objection Certificate from the Special Tahsildar, Housing Scheme, Coimbatore and necessary lay-out plan etc., were obtained from the Director of Town and Country Planning Department and also from the Town Panchayat and so at this stage the impugned acquisition proceedings cannot be sustained.
(iii) No opportunity was given to the petitioners. In W.P Nos. 1595 to 1602 of 2000, it is stated that though the original owner informed the authorities about the sale of the lands in favour of the petitioners with all particulars, the authorities have not given opportunity to the petitioners.
(iv) The purpose for which the impugned acquisition proceedings are made is to construct houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board and the land had already been utilised for the same purpose. So the impugned acquisition proceedings cannot be construed as the same were for public purpose.
(v) In the Notification issued under Sec. 4(1) of the Act, it is stated that the lands are sought to be acquired “for the purpose of constructing houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board”. But, in the declaration made under Sec. 6 of the Act, it is stated that the same is “for the purpose of Kalapatti neighbourhood scheme of Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Coimbatore”. Since the purpose of the impugned acquisition is changed in the declaration made under Sec. 6 of the Act, from the purpose mentioned in the Notification issued under Sec. 4(1) of the Act, the same cannot be sustained.
(vi) Referring to G.O.Ms No. 620, Housing and Urban Development, dated 29.6.1990, it is submitted that the lands, covered under the lay-out duly approved by the Director of Town and Country Planning Department, prior to the issue of notification under Sec. 4(1) of the Act, should not be acquired. According to the petitioners, the said guidelines were not considered by the respondents.
7. Heard Mr. Kandavadivel Doraiswamy, Mr. S.S Sundar and Mr. N. Ishtiaq Ahamed, learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners and Mr. Gomathinayagam, learned Special Govt. Pleader and Mr. D. Veerasekaran, learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent in W.P No. 9749/1996.
8. It is not in dispute that the notifications were issued in the name of dead person. The original owner of the land, Sami Naidu, died and the authorities should have discharged the statutory functions by making due enquiry with the heirs of the said deceased owner. So the impugned acquisition proceedings taken by issuing notification in the name of the dead person vitiate the entire acquisition proceedings. Thiru Raju, J., as he then was, in the decision in Muthuswamy v. The State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 (1) M.L.J 217, has taken similar view holding as follows:
“The authorities, in my view have miserably failed to verify properly about the heirs of the deceased pattadar and the fact that such heirs have not themselves come on record cannot be a valid plea in a case of the nature involving the death of the only owner of the land or justify the issue of a notification or a declaration in the name of a dead person. The procedure adopted by the respondents cannot be approved by a Court of law. On account of the irregularities and lapses committed on the part of the respondents in properly verifying about the ownership or the legal heirship in respect of S.F No. 138/12B, the petitioners have been seriously prejudiced. This vitiates the impugned land acquisition proceedings in so far as it relates to S.F No. 138/12B. The grievance made on the absence of notice as well as the manner of issue of notification and the declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act in so far as it relates to the land of the petitioners in W.P No. 14595 of 1990 deserves to be sustained.”
In the present case, the respondents notified G.O.Ms 191 Housing & Urban Development Department dated 25.2.1994 with respect to the lands bearing Survey No. 382 and 383 was issued in the name of the dead persons and the proceedings with respect to the said lands cannot be sustained.
9. In the present case, with respect to the lands bearing S. Nos. 370, 371, 372 and 382 etc., the lay-out plan was approved by the Director of Town and Country Planning and necessary amounts were paid to the Town Panchayat. On that basis, Plots were also sold to the petitioners. Though submission was made on the basis of G.O.Ms No. 620, Housing and Urban Development, dated 29.6.1990 stating that as lay-out was approved already even before the notification issued under Sec. 4(1) of the Act, the impugned acquisition proceedings cannot be interfered with, merely because the authorities have not taken into consideration the said Government Order, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Meenakshmi Ammal, 1996 (7) SCC 269.
10. Insofar as the lands bearing S. Nos. 370, 372 and 383 are concerned, the authorities were informed even before making declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act about the purchase of the same by the petitioners concerned. In spite of the same, no opportunity was given to the petitioners/purchasers of the said land to raise their objections. Though the authorities are not obliged to make a roving enquiry about the persons whose names do not find place in the revenue records, it is well settled by the Full Bench of this Court in the decision in P.C Thanikavelu v. Spl. Dy. Collector, L.A, Madras, AIR 1989 Mad. 222, that if the authorities were informed about the present owners of the property, they are bound to issue notice and hear such persons before making declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act. In this case, admittedly, such an exercise was not done though particulars were given. Learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the Government submitted that though the names were given, addresses were not furnished and so the petitioners were not given opportunity to raise their objections. I am not able to understand the said arguments. If the particulars are insufficient, they could have asked the correct address from the person who gave such insufficient particulars. The Act contemplates such an enquiry only with a view to afford an opportunity to the landowners who are going to be deprived of their lands. Raising an objection in such circumstances is a valid right which cannot be lightly ignored stating that they are not having full particulars. Hence the failure to afford due opportunity to the petitioners vitiates the impugned acquisition proceedings. This view of mine is supported by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Lakshmanan v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2000 (1) CTC 382, in which it is held as follows:-
“6. In the present case, even assuming that the enquiry officer was justified in ignoring the partition deed on the ground that it was not registered and the name of Lakshman did not appear in the Revenue records and also ignoring the statements of Raman and Annamalai to the effect that Lakshmanan was the real owner of the property, the most crucial feature is that in the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act itself, the name of Lakshmanan is disclosed as one of the interested persons. If even in the absence of his name in the Revenue records, and if in the preliminary enquiry prior to the issue of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act itself, his interest in the property had been disclosed and he is also recognised as a person interested, the subsequent attempt and exercise on the part of the authority to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and to hold that the appellant was; not an interested person, is uncalled for and unsustainable. More so, when both persons whose name appear in the revenue records had come before the authority disclaiming any interest in the property and had disclosed the name Lakshmanan as the real owner. The expression “person interested” is couched in a very wide manner which would include even a tenant or a holder of easementary right etc. The reason is that principles of natural justice require that an opportunity should be given to all persons who are genuinely interested in the property. Of course, we make it clear that the acquiring authority need not mention the persons beyond the names disclosed in the revenue records, but if the enquiry clearly discloses that some other individuals was the real owner of the property and person interested, it would be erroneous to ignore the said claim. In the present case, in stating that the parties where trying to delay the proceedings, it is actually the enquiring authority who is guilty of having unnecessarily delayed and protracted the proceedings by adopting an unreasonable attitude of ignoring their own notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and in having assumed the role of Civil Court adjudicating upon the rights of the parties. All that was required to be done was to have dealt with the appellant's objection also and to have treated him as one of the persons interested. One further strange feature is that even in the declaration under Section 6 of the Act, the appellant's name has been disclosed as the owner of the property. If so, there was absolutely no justification for having held that he was not the owner of the property and to have failed to deal with his objections.”
11. Even the learned Judge of this Court in Chinthamani v. Special Tahsildar for Land Acquisition, 2000 (2) CTC 21 has taken the same view holding as follows:
“The learned counsel relying upon the observation made by the Full Bench has argued that there is a duty cast upon the Collector to issue a notice to the sister of the petitioners when it was brought to the notice of the Officer that she is the person interested and has further argued that non-issuance of notice is in violation of the principles of natural justice. Sufficient time has been granted to the Government-Advocate to produce the records to verify whether notice has been issued to Mrs. Chinthamani. But no records have been produced on behalf of the respondents. Learned Government Advocate has argued that as the name of Mrs. Chinthamani was not found in the revenue records, it is not necessary on the part of the Land Acquisition Officer to issue a notice. In another reported judgment in Tamilarasan, P. v. State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by Commissioner & Secretary, Adi Dravidar Welfare Department, 1999 (1) C.T.C 586, a learned Single Judge of this Court, following the observation made by the Full Bench of this Court held that notice is necessary, if it is brought to the notice of the enquiring officer that the concerned person is interested and non-issuance of notice to the person interested is in violation of the principles of natural justice, when it is brought to the notice of the concerned Land Acquisition Officer during the proceedings under Section 5-A. In this case it is apparent that no notice has been issued to Mrs. Chinthamani, even though it has been brought to the notice of the Land Acquisition Officer in the course of 5-A enquiry that she is the person interested in the property.”
12. The petitioners purchased a small piece of land to construct their houses for their shelter. As a matter of fact, most of them have constructed their houses after purchasing a small extent of land. They have also purchased only on the basis of the plan approved by the concerned authorities. As a matter of fact, the third respondent gave no objection certificate on 29.10.1992 stating that there was no proposal to acquire such lands. The public purpose for which the lands in question are acquired is to provide Plots of lands to construct houses for the public by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board. There is no justification for the respondents to deprive the land and buildings of the petitioners who have constructed the building utilising their hard earned or borrowed money.
13. Considering the validity of acquisition for the purpose for which the land was put into use, the Apex Court in Ghaziabad Sheromani Sakhari Avas Samiti Ltd. v. State of U.P and others, AIR 1990 SC 645 held that as the land measuring 20 acres were purchased by the Co-operative Society for construction of houses to the members, the Development Authority constituted by the State Government for the same purpose should not have been permitted to acquire the same to the prejudice of the petitioners therein.
14. Following the decision of the Apex Court in State of Karnataka and others v. Narasimhamurthy and others, 1995 (5) S.C.C 524, holding that the right to shelter is a fundamental right under Art. 19(1) of the Constitution of India and to make the said right meaningful, the State has to provide facilities and opportunity to the land owners to build houses, the learned Judge of this Court in the decision in Thiruvengadam, R. v. Secretary to Govt., Housing Department, Govt. of T.N, Ms-9, 1997 (2) CTC 323, has held as follows:-
15. In the light of the said pronouncement of the Supreme Court, in my considered view, it is neither purposeful nor it is meaningful nor it is just nor reasonable to deprive the portion of the 15 cents of land, where the petitioner had put up construction and been living there for decades together. The State while exercising powers of eminent domain under the Land Acquisition Act to provide accommodation or shelter should also see that the valuable houses, the petitioner or his ancestors had put up and where he has living from his birth should not be pulled down or render the petitioner homeless and throw out his family to street.
16. The fundamental right of the petitioner shall not be ignored or brushed aside while acquiring the land for purpose of putting up houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board for the benefit of the affluent or resourceful urbanities, while depriving the poor villager, who is not in a position to complete. The respondents should not unreasonably and deprive his fundamental right of shelter or destroy the right of shelter already owned by the petitioner. The State also should see that the very fundamental right of shelter, which shelter the petitioner is already possessed, should not be deprived. The constitutional duty of State to provide shelter could also be achieved by the petitioner being allowed to retain the house and allow him to live there.
17. It is rather surprising for the requisitioning authority or for that matter for respondents to ignore the petitioner's fundamental right of shelter, as a matter of routine by just stating that the writ petitioner could apply to Housing Board afresh under ex-owner category. By such a course there is only a chance of getting alternative accommodation at a higher cost on a later date, which will be beyond his means. It is unreasonable to uproot the villagers against the well settled and affluent urban population, whose demand is sought to be met by the schemes of the Housing Board.
18. There is no justifiable reason at all to proceed further with acquisition and deny the fundamental right of the petitioner to shelter and acquire his only residential house or plot resulting in dislocation of the petitioner and his family. By the compensation the petitioner who is being rendered houseless and uprooted, will not be in a position to secure allotment or even put up a house as day by day the cost of constitution is in the increase. At the same time, the acquisition may deny the house already owned and further deny him the sentiments he has for his house, where he is living since childhood.
19. There is every justification for the fifteen cents being excluded from acquisition as the petitioner is actually residing with his family in the house put up thereon and living there with his kith and kin. There is no justification for the petitioner and his family being uprooted, thrown out and displaced and on the other hand, the Housing Board could very well, with slight change or least deviation proceed with its scheme.
20. In the circumstance, accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that acquisition in respect of 15 cents of land over which the petitioner had put up constitution alone is quashed and in other respects, the respondents are at liberty to proceed further and complete the acquisition.”
In spite of the above said judgment, the respondents have not applied their mind with respect to the said aspect and proceeded with the impugned acquisition proceedings and passed the award even after filing the writ petitions to say that they have completed the acquisition proceedings. Though the Government Pleader submitted that award was passed before filing writ petition, it is factually wrong. So the impugned acquisition proceedings cannot be sustained even on this ground.
15. Though the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P No. 1595 to 1602 of 2000 submitted that the purpose for which the acquisition proposal was notified in the notification under Sec. 4(1) of the Act was given up and new purpose is mentioned in the declaration, the said submission cannot be sustained. In the notification issued under Sec. 4(1) of the Act, it is stated that the lands are required for the purpose of constructing the houses by the Housing Board. In the declaration made under Sec. 6 of the Act, it is stated that the land is required for the formation of neighbourhood scheme. But the ultimate public purpose is to construct the houses. So, it cannot be said that the public purpose for which the acquisition is proposed is changed.
16. The land acquisition proceedings relating to the land bearing S. Nos. 384/1 are challenged in W.P No. 9747/1996. The only argument made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that they were not given opportunity before making declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act. According to the learned counsel, the objection was sent even on 5.4.1993, though the notification was published in the Gazette on 30.3.1994, by certificate of posting, and in spite of that, no opportunity was given to raise objection in the enquiry held in accordance with Sec. 5-A of the Act. Learned Special Government Pleader did not deny the said fact of sending objection either orally or pointing out the same in the counter. No counter is placed before this Court with respect to the allegations made in the said writ petition. Only the Housing Board has filed counter denying the said fact. But, the Housing Board may not have knowledge about the said objection, as the objection was sent to the State Government and the land acquisition officer. In the absence of any counter with respect to the above said factual averment by the concerned officer, it has to be taken that the said fact was not denied. If it is so, the authorities should have given opportunity to the petitioners in the enquiry held under Sec. 5-A of the Act. So, for non-compliance of the said statutory obligation, the impugned acquisition proceedings, except the issuance of notification under Sec. 4(1) of the Act cannot be sustained.
17. Before parting with this case, I would like to mentioned about the way in which the counter affidavits are being prepared in the writ petitions. The Government Pleaders have been entrusted with the work to prepare the counter affidavit, after getting instruction from the concerned officer. Such instruction alone should not be relied on, without verifying the facts with reference to the relevant records available. This observation is made only because in most of the cases, Court is compelled to dispose of the writ petitions basing on the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the Government or other authorities and nowadays counter affidavits are being prepared only on the basis of the remarks, without even verifying the correctness of the same, by perusing the records. In this case, the counter is filed in W.P No. 1595 to 1602 of 2000. On a perusal of the counter, it is clear that, it is only a reproduction of the para-war remarks and the same has been prepared without any application of mind. Even in the counter, it is mentioned that paragraph Nos. 5 to 16 are reproduction of the para-war remarks, which clearly establishes that the said counter is prepared by the Government Pleader without even verifying the records and without even appreciating the importance of files, counter affidavits especially in Land Acquisition cases. Even the Government Pleader who appeared before this Court has not verified the same, but, he proceeded with the argument only on the basis of the said counter. This attitude cannot be appreciated. The Government Pleaders are expected to prepare counter carefully with a view to safeguard the interest of the Government and also to give correct factual position to the Court so as to enable the Court to come to correct conclusion as the counter affidavit is a pleading for the purpose of deciding the case. It cannot be stated that as the same are being signed by the concerned authorities, the Government Pleaders can not be held responsible for the mistakes. Unfortunately, nowadays, most of the authorities are also signing the counter mechanically with the belief that the Government Pleader should have prepared the counter with correct particulars on the basis of records. I am making these observations only due to the fact that I came across number of cases in which counter affidavits are being filed with the facts which are not supported by documents and records.
18. For the reasons stated above, W.P Nos. 18004 to 18031 of 1996, 9748 and 9749 of 1996 are allowed by quashing the notification under Sec. 4(1) of the Act, dated 25.2.1994 and also the declaration made under Sec. 6 of the Act dated 17.5.1995 W.P No. 6414 of 1997 is also allowed by setting aside the notification issued under Sec. 4(1) of the Act dated 28.2.1994 and the declaration made under Sec. 6 of the Act dated 22.5.1995 W.P Nos. 1595 to 1602 of 1997, relating to the land bearing S. Nos. 371 and 372, Kalapatti Village, are allowed by setting aside the notification dated 6.8.1996 made under Sec. 4(1) of the Act and also the declaration dated 8.10.1997 Insofar as W.P No. 9747 of 1996 is concerned, the same is allowed and the impugned acquisition proceedings taken against the land bearing S. No. 384/1 are set aside retaining the notification made under Sec. 4(1) of the Act intact and giving liberty to the authorities to proceed with further in accordance with law, after giving opportunity to the petitioners. No costs. Connected W.M.Ps are closed.
Alert