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Immaculate Heart Of Mary Society Pudapalayam v. Special Tahsildar

Madras High Court
Feb 4, 2003
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a Society formed to conduct charitable and educational activities and had purchased a total of 5.38 acres comprised in Survey Nos. 444/4 and 445/1 by registered sale deeds dated 15.9.1995. One acre in S. No. 444/4 was purchased from Arockiasamy and the remaining 4.38 acres from Fr. A. Sebastian. Construction for institutional buildings was in progress.

A land acquisition notification (for 0.92.0 H / 2.30 acres as reflected in notices) had been published in the District Gazette proposing acquisition under the Central Land Acquisition Act (referred to as Act 1/84). Notices and further proceedings followed: Arockiasamy was served with a notice under Section 4(1) of the Central Act on 12.4.1995 and filed objections. Both Arockiasamy and Fr. Sebastian filed writ petitions (W.P.12142 and 12143 of 1995) challenging the acquisition. The Supreme Court decision of 22.11.1994 concerning the State Act (Act 31/78) was applied, and a learned single Judge of the High Court allowed those writ petitions on 7.9.1995.

Separately, authorities issued notices under the State enactment (Act 31/78). Arockiasamy was served with a notice under Section 4(2) of Act 31/78 on 21.8.1995 and later on 21.11.1995 (Form III) informing the date of enquiry as 19.12.1995. On that date Arockiasamy informed the authorities that he had sold one acre to the petitioner on 15.9.1995. The petitioner asserts it was not personally served with the notices despite its purchase and presence in Form III, and sought quashing of the State Act acquisition notification published in the District Gazette dated 30.1.1996.

The respondents filed a counter affidavit stating, inter alia, that only Arockiasamy was served because there were no village records to prove Sebastian’s title and that the petitioner being a subsequent purchaser could not challenge acquisition but could participate in award proceedings. The High Court considered two central questions and ultimately allowed the writ petition with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether invoking the provisions of Act 31/78 without withdrawing the proceedings already initiated under the Central Act 1/84 or before the Court quashed those proceedings, renders the proceedings under Act 31/78 bad in law?
  2. Whether the petitioner (the Society) can maintain the present writ petition and obtain relief as prayed?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner purchased the lands on 15.9.1995 (one acre from Arockiasamy and 4.38 acres from Fr. Sebastian) and was carrying out construction of institutions.
  • Portions of the lands purchased were under acquisition; only Arockiasamy was served with notices though he owned only one acre and the remaining 1.30 acres (claimed to be part of the acquired extent) were not served with any notice.
  • Although Form III notices mentioned the petitioner’s name, the petitioner was not actually served with those notices and therefore sought quashing of the acquisition notification published on 30.1.1996.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The respondents contended that notice was sent only to Arockiasamy because there were no village records to prove Sebastian’s title.
  • They asserted that the notice under Section 4(2) of Act 31/78 was served on Arockiasamy on 21.8.1995 and that Arockiasamy sold the property only after receipt of that notice, making the petitioner a subsequent purchaser who cannot challenge the acquisition but may participate in award proceedings.
  • The respondents relied on the Supreme Court ruling that where no award had been passed by 22.11.1994 in respect of acquisitions initiated under the Central Act, the State Government may proceed under Act 31/78; hence the pendency of writ petitions at the time of serving notice on Arockiasamy did not affect the validity of proceedings.
  • The respondents prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(1995) 1 SCC 519 Referenced as the Supreme Court decision followed by the High Court in allowing W.P.12142 and 12143 of 1995; establishes the controlling rule on the interplay between the Central Act (Act 1/84) and State Act (Act 31/78). The High Court noted that the two writ petitions were allowed following this decision and treated the effect of the Supreme Court ruling as binding such that authorities could proceed under Act 31/78. The decision was applied to validate proceedings under Act 31/78 in the present matter.
State of Tamil Nadu v. Anandhi Ammal and others, 1995 WLR 781 (Judgment dated 22.11.1994) The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Act 31/78 except as regards Section 11(1) insofar as it provided for payment of compensation by instalments; held that Section 11(1) is valid only to the extent that payment must be tendered and paid in lump sum. The Court further ruled that acquisition proceedings started under the Central Act which had not resulted in an award by 22.11.1994 should lapse and the State Government may proceed under Act 31/78. The High Court applied this ruling to conclude that authorities could validly proceed under Act 31/78 and issue notices (specifically the notice to Arockiasamy dated 21.8.1995). The decision also explained why the High Court's formal allowance of the earlier writ petitions on 7.9.1995 was the only permissible order in light of the Supreme Court ruling.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court structured its analysis in two parts corresponding to the two principal questions raised.

First, the Court considered whether issuance of notices under Act 31/78 (the State Act) while proceedings under the Central Act were pending or before formal withdrawal/dismissal rendered the State proceedings invalid. The Court observed that the Supreme Court's decision of 22.11.1994 (State of Tamil Nadu v. Anandhi Ammal and others) had declared Act 31/78 intra vires except as to specified provisions of Section 11(1), and had further directed that where no award under the Central Act had been passed by 22.11.1994, those Central Act proceedings would lapse and the State could proceed under Act 31/78. The Court held that this Supreme Court pronouncement was binding on all courts and in effect disposed of the pending writ petitions on the issue; accordingly, there was nothing improper in authorities issuing a notice under Act 31/78 to Arockiasamy on 21.8.1995.

Second, the Court examined whether there was any flaw in the acquisition proceedings themselves. It noted factual inconsistencies between the petitioner's and respondents' accounts: the petitioner claimed the acquired land formed part of parcels purchased from both Arockiasamy and Fr. Sebastian, while respondents maintained that revenue records showed the extent as sold by Arockiasamy and that Sebastian had no record title. The Court emphasized the State's duty to act fairly and diligently when compulsorily acquiring private property. It observed that:

  • Fr. Sebastian had also filed a writ petition earlier and the common order disposing those writ petitions did not indicate Sebastian had no interest;
  • At the enquiry on 19.12.1995, Arockiasamy informed the authorities in writing that he had sold one acre to the petitioner on 15.9.1995;
  • The authorities failed to probe further or call for documentation from the petitioner to verify the source and extent of the petitioner’s title.

The Court reasoned that village records do not constitute title but only indicate who is shown as owner in revenue records. Given the competing indicators (Sebastian's earlier writ petition, lack of an express adverse finding about Sebastian in the earlier order, and Arockiasamy's statement at the enquiry), the authorities should have made further inquiries. The officer conducting the enquiry failed in his duty to act diligently and to ensure complete and correct facts were ascertained before progressing the acquisition.

Based on that lapse in procedure and failure to protect the statutory and constitutional interests of affected persons, the Court held that the acquisition process as conducted was flawed and warranted relief to the petitioner.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was allowed. The Court's core ruling can be stated as: WRIT PETITION ALLOWED.

The direct consequences and orders made by the Court (as expressly stated in the opinion) are:

  • The writ petition is allowed with costs of Rs. 2,000 payable to the petitioner.
  • The second respondent shall localise (identify) the concerned officer who failed in his duties; that officer alone shall be made liable to pay the cost personally to the petitioner.
  • Allowing the writ petition does not preclude the authorities from initiating fresh acquisition proceedings under Act 31/78.
  • Connected W.M.P. 7321 of 1996 is closed.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion applied existing Supreme Court precedent to validate the State's ability to proceed under Act 31/78 where Central Act proceedings had not resulted in an award by the controlling date. The Court did not purport to lay down a new legal principle; its orders addressed the specific procedural defects and their consequences for the parties before it.

Show all summary ...

1. The above writ petition has been filed praying this Court to issue a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records of the respondents relating to the land acquisition notification of the first respondent as published in page 2 of the District Gazette, Pasumpon Muthuramalinga Thevar District, Special Edition dated 30.1.1996, Sivaganga and quash the same.

2. The petitioner is a Society and has filed the above writ petition with the following averments.

The Petitioner Society was formed with the noble object of looking after the temporal affairs and to promote spiritual, educational and other interests to do the charitable and benevolent works and that several public oriented institutions like schools and colleges etc. are being run by the Society. The Society, to improve its activities, purchased lands to an extent of 5.38 acres comprised in Survey Nos. 444/4 and 445/1. Those lands were purchased by way of two registered sale deeds dated 15.9.1995 on the file of the Sub-Registrar, Madhagupatti, Sivaganga Taluk. Out of this, one acre in S. No. 444/4 was purchased from one Arockiasamy, son of Anthony Udayar and the remaining 4.38 acres in S. No. 445/1 and 444/4 were purchased from Fr.A Sebastian, son of Adaikalam. The work for the construction of the building for institutions are already going on in full swing and the total cost of construction is estimated at Rs. 20 lakhs.

Petitioner came to know that some portion of the lands purchased by it is under acquisition and on enquiry it came to know that the same is being acquired to provide house sites for Adi Dravidas. Though the extent of 2.30 acres (0.92.0 Hectares) has been shown in the notice issued to the said Arockiasamy alone, in fact he was owner of only one acre. The owner of the remaining portion of the land of 1.30 acres was not served with any notice. Coming to know about the acquisition, both Arockiasamy and Fr. Sebastian, filed W.P.12142 and 12143 of 1995. The said writ petitions were allowed following the decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1995) 1 SCC 519 and the said order was passed on 7.9.1995 The land that is sought to be acquired viz., 2.30 acres forms part of 5.38 acres, purchased from Arockiasamy and Fr. Sebastian. It appears only Arockiasamy was served with notice under Section 4 (2) of the Tamilnadu Acquisition of Lands for Harijan Welfare Schemes Act, 1978 and he was informed about the date of enquiry as 19.12.1995 On that day, the said Arockiasamy informed the authorities that he sold his one acre to the Petitioner. But thereafter the petitioner was not served with any notice. After some time, Arockiasamy received a notice and that is one in Form III and Rule 5 of the Tamil Nadu Acquisition of lands for Harijan Welfare Schemes Rules, 1978, to fix the compensation. Even though the said notice mentions the name of the petitioner, the petitioner was not served with any notice. For the above reasons, the petitioner has sought for quashing of the notification referred above.

3. On behalf of the respondents, a counter affidavit has been filed wherein it is contended that the notice was sent only to Arockiasamy since there was no village records to prove the title of the land with Fr. Sebastian. The'notice contemplated under Section 4(2) of the Act 31/78 was served on Arockiasamy on 21.8.1995 Or in other words, Arockiasamy sold the property only after he received notice on 21.8.1995 Petitioner, being subsequent purchaser, cannot question the acquisition and at best it can take part only in the award proceedings. It is also the case of the respondents that since the Supreme Court has ruled that if any award had been passed by 22.11.1994 in respect of acquisitions initiated under the Central Act, the State Government can proceed only under Act 31/78. The fact that W.P.12142 and 12143 of 1995 were pending on the date of serving of notice on Arockiasamy, would not affect the proceedings. The respondents would pray this Court to dismiss the writ petition.

4. Two questions arise for consideration.

(a) Whether invoking the provisions of Act 31/78 without withdrawing the proceedings already initiated under the Central Act 1/84 or before the Court quashing the proceedings, the Act 1/84 is bad in law?

(b) Whether the petitioner can come forward with the prayer as found in this writ petition?

5. The relevant dates in this writ petition are as follows:

On 5.4.1995, notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1/84 was published in the gazette proposing to acquire an extent of 0.92.0 H comprised in S. No. 444/4 (part). On 12.4.1995 Publication carried only in the name of Arockiasamy. The said Arockiasamy was served with notice on ‘12.4.1995, who also filed objections. W.P.12142 and 12143 of 1995 were filed by Fr. Sebastian and Arockiasamy questioning the acquisition. On 22.11.1994, the Supreme Court of India in State of Tamil Nadu v. Anandhi Ammal and others, 1995 WLR 781, held that the Act 31/78 is valid and further ruled that if acquisition proceedings were already started under Act 1/84, but if no award had been passed by 22.11.1994, those proceedings should lapse and the State Government can proceed only under Act 31/78. On 21.8.1995, Arockiasamy was served with notice under Section 4(2) of Act 31/78. As no award proceeding was completed by that time in the above two writ petitions referred supra, a learned single Judge of this Court on 7.9.1995, allowed both the writ petitions. On 15.9.1995 petitioner purchased one acre comprised in S. No. 444/4 from Arockiasamy and an extent of 4.38 acres comprised in S. No. 444/4 and 445/1 from Fr. Sebastian. On 21.11.1995, Arockiasamy received notice, issued under Section 4(2) under Act 31/78, informing the date of enquiry as 19.12.1995 On the said date, Arockiasamy appeared before the authorities and informed about his sale of one acre on 15.9.1995 to the petitioner herein. On 30.1.1996, Form II (vide Section 4(1) Rule 3(ii)) was issued. On 1.3.1996 Form III (vide Rule 5(1)) was issued and wherein names of Arockiasamy as well as Petitioner have been mentioned.

6. Firstly, let this Court consider whether the authorities issued notice under Section 4(2) to Arockiasamy before withdrawing the acquisition proceedings already instituted under Act 1/84 or before the dismissal of writ petition, is valid. The Supreme Court by its judgment dated 22.11.1994 upheld the validity of the Act 31/78 except for the provision of Section 11(1) of the said-act in so far as they provide- for payment of the compensation amount in instalments, the said Act is intra vires the Constitution. The Court ruled, Section 11(1) is valid only to the extent to provide that after the amount has been determined, the prescribed authority shall tender payment of the amount to the person entitled thereto and shall pay it to them and that it must be in a lump-sum. The rest of Section 11(1) is held ultra vires to the Constitution.

7. True, the general legal position is, when proceedings are initiated under the Central Act, without withdrawing the same, fresh proceedings cannot be initiated under the State Act. But, in this case, the position is different. The Supreme Court has laid down the law of the land and it binds each and everyone, so also all the Courts in this Country. It is rather impossible that a Court of law (i.e) the High Court can lay down a different law. That being so, in effect and for all practical purposes, all the pending writ petitions on this issue are disposed of accordingly in terms of the said decision of the Supreme Court. But only thing is, the formal order was passed by the High Court on 7.9.1995 Or in other words, in effect, so far as the two writ petitions viz., W.P 12142 and 12143 of 1995 are concerned, this Court could not have passed any other order except to allow them and that was done on 7.9.1995 That being so, there is nothing wrong in authorities proceeding under Act 31/78 and issuing notice to Arockiasamy on 21.8.1995

8. The next question is whether there is any flaw in the acquisition proceedings initiated by the authorities. The acquired extent is 2.60 acres. While it is the case of the petitioner that the same is comprised in two survey numbers viz., S. No. 444/4 and 445/1, originally owned by Arockiasamy and Fr. Sebastian, the case of the respondents as reflected from Section 4(1) notification and counter affidavit is that the extent is sold by Arockiasamy. In fact, a specific stand is taken in the Counter affidavit that in the revenue records, nothing is shown as regards the title of Sebastian in respect of the lands to be acquired.

When the State acquires a land belonging to a citizen, it is not that the citizen is giving the land voluntarily. In such an event, it is the bounden duty of the State to see that it acts fairly, prudently and in compliance with the provisions of the Act. As already mentioned, when this land was sought to be acquired under Act 1/84, both Arockiasamy and Sebastian filed two independent writ petitions. The two writ petitions were disposed of by a common order dated 7.8.1995 If really Fr. Sebastian has no title or interest in the property, then certainly the State would have brought it to the notice of the Court. A perusal of the order does not disclose anything to that effect. That apart, admittedly on the appointed day viz., on 19.12.1995, Arockiasamy appeared before the authorities and informed in writing after referring to the notice received by him dated 21.11.1995, that he had already sold an extent of one acre owned by him on 15.9.1995 to the petitioner. That being so, in all fairness, the respondents should have at least on that day woken up and called for details from the petitioner as to from whom he purchased the remaining extent. In the written statement it is stated as under,

“… There was no village records to prove the title over the land by Thiru A. Sebastian. …”

Village records can not prove title to the property, but would only show, as per the revenue records who is the owner. This Court does not know as to what prevented the authorities from calling for the details from the petitioner or further probing into the matter. At the risk of repetition, it has to be pointed out that (a) Fr. Sebastian also filed writ petition earlier, (b) the order in writ petition does not mention as if Sebastian had no interest in the property proposed to be acquired, and (c) at the enquiry, Arockiasamy informed the authorities that he sold only his one acre to the petitioner. By some more probing into the matter, the authorities could have certainly found out the complete and correct facts. As already mentioned they have to remember that the property of a citizen is being compulsorily snatched and the citizen is not before them with a begging bowl. The Officer, who conducted the enquiry has failed to discharge his duties in a diligent manner and in the interest of the public at large.

9. In this view of the matter, the writ petition is allowed with costs of Rs. 2,000. The second respondent shall localise the concerned officer, who has failed in his duties and he alone shall be made liable to pay the cost personally to the petitioner. Allowing this writ petition does not mean that the authorities cannot initiate fresh proceedings under Act 31/78. Connected W.M.P 7321 of 1996 is closed.