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Gangai Vinayagar Temple v. Meenakshi Ammal
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants are the Trustees of Sri. Gangai Vinayagar Temple, Thirumudi Nagar, Pondicherry. On 8 November 1967 they executed a lease deed (Ex.A-2) in favour of Kanniah Chettiar for a plot of land to erect a theatre; the lease period was fifteen years commencing 1 January 1968. The lease document contained a declaration that "the lessors in the above capacity have declared that the said immovable belongs to the said Gangai Vinayagar Temple."
After the lessee died having constructed the theatre, his widow filed a suit originally numbered O.S.125 of 1976 (later renumbered O.S. No. 5 of 1978) impleading the temple and members of the Trust Committee and three persons alleged to be purchasers as defendants 7 to 9. The widow sought an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with her possession till expiry of the lease. The plaint did not question the lessor's title; it alleged the proposed sale would be in breach of trust. In the temple's written statement it was stated that the defendants had no intention to interfere with the plaintiff's possession "otherwise than by due process of law unless the plaintiff herself calls the defendants to take possession otherwise."
During the pendency of that suit the Trustees instituted two suits (O.S. Nos. 6 and 7 of 1978) claiming arrears of rent and alleging the property had been sold to defendants 7, 8 and 9. All three suits were tried together with common evidence and a common judgment.
The Trial Court held that the lessee was entitled to remain in possession for the lease duration, relying on the defendants' statement of non-intention to interfere; consequently it dismissed O.S. No. 5 of 1978 for want of cause of action. The Trial Court also framed an issue (Issue No. 2) in O.S. No. 5 of 1978 which questioned whether the suit property was personal property of Sethuraman Chettiar and whether the plaintiffs were estopped from questioning the landlord's title. In O.S. Nos. 6 and 7 of 1978 it framed Issue No. 3 whether the property belongs to a public temple governed by the Act and whether the suit was maintainable for want of sanction under Section 26 of the Hindu Religious Institution Act.
The Trial Court's discussion considered whether the temple was public or private and whether permission of statutory authorities was required. It found that the property had been acquired for the temple and that the persons who instituted the suits were acting as Trustees both when they executed the lease and when they brought suit. As to the two lessor suits, O.S. No. 6 of 1978 was partly decreed (tenant arrears Rs. 268) and O.S. No. 7 of 1978 was dismissed.
The lessee appealed from the decree in O.S. No. 6 of 1978 by filing A.S. No. 581 of 1983. No appeal was filed against the judgment in O.S. No. 5 of 1978, and the lessor did not appeal from the dismissal of O.S. No. 7 of 1978. The learned single Judge reversed the Trial Court's finding on Issue No. 3 in O.S. No. 6 of 1978, holding the temple to be a public temple and that its property could not be alienated without statutory permission. Before the court giving the present opinion, the sole question argued was whether the learned single Judge erred in holding that the appeal was not barred by res judicata because of the earlier unappealed judgment in the common, three-suit judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appeal was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the appellant had not appealed from the earlier common judgment (specifically, whether the earlier finding recorded as Issue No. 2 in O.S. No. 5 of 1978 was final and therefore precluded the appellant from challenging the finding recorded on Issue No. 3 in O.S. No. 6 of 1978).
- Whether the finding recorded on Issue No. 2 in O.S. No. 5 of 1978 was a matter that was "directly and substantially in issue" in that suit (i.e., whether that earlier finding could operate as res judicata) or whether it was collateral/incidental and therefore not conclusive.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant (learned Senior Counsel Sri. Alagar) contended that the learned single Judge should have dismissed the appeal as barred by res judicata because the common judgment dealt with reliefs in three suits, one of which was brought by the appellant and in which an issue had been raised; the appellant did not file an appeal against the decree in that suit and therefore the finding recorded there became final.
- The appellant relied principally on the Apex Court decision in Premier Tyres Limited v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (three-Judge Bench) for the proposition that non-filing of an appeal renders a judgment final and the same consequence follows when a judgment in a connected suit is not appealed from. The appellant also relied on prior High Court authorities (Panchananda Velan v. Vaithyaanantha Sastrial; Kathoon Bivi Ammal v. Arulappa Nadar; Jai Narain v. Bulaqi Das) and a Division Bench decision (D. Krishnamurthi v. K. Parasuraman) interpreted in light of Premier Tyres.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent (learned Senior Counsel Mr. Masilamani) argued that the authorities relied upon by the appellant were inapplicable because the earlier finding was collateral or incidental and not "directly and substantially in issue" within the meaning of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- The respondent relied on the Apex Court decision in Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr. v. Musa Dadabhai Ummar which explained the distinction between matters collaterally/incidental and those directly and substantially in issue and endorsed the test of whether a matter was fundamental to the prior decision. The respondent also drew attention to general principles and authorities (including foreign authorities quoted in the opinion) to support that not every framed issue or adverse finding operates as res judicata if it was not essential to the prior decision.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Premier Tyres Limited v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (Three-Judge Bench) | Non-filing of an appeal renders a judgment/decree final; same consequence follows when a judgment in a connected suit is not appealed from. | The appellant relied on this decision to argue that the earlier unappealed finding operated as res judicata. The court considered the reliance but analysed whether the earlier finding was directly and substantially in issue before applying the doctrine. |
| Panchananda Velan v. Vaithyaanantha Sastrial (1906 ILR 29 Madras 333) | Historical High Court authority relevant to res judicata (cited as antecedent authority). | The court noted that Premier Tyres had the effect of requiring earlier High Court Full Bench decisions of that kind to be regarded as overruled to the extent inconsistent with the Apex Court's rule; referenced by appellant but weighed against the test of direct and substantial issue. |
| Kathoon Bivi Ammal and another v. Arulappa Nadar and another | Earlier Division Bench authority on res judicata (referred to in the context of Premier Tyres). | Mentioned as earlier High Court authority which Premier Tyres affected; the court treated these authorities in light of Apex Court precedent. |
| Jai Narain v. Bulaqi Das (Full Bench, High Court of Allahabad) | Earlier Full Bench authority on res judicata. | Referred to as part of the body of pre-Premier Tyres authority said to be inconsistent with the Apex Court; court observed the need to follow Apex Court's distinction between direct and collateral issues. |
| D. Krishnamurthi v. K. Parasuraman, 1993 (2) M.L.J. 674 (Division Bench) | Division Bench view consistent with Premier Tyres on the finality of unappealed judgments. | Noted by the court as an authority taking a similar view to the Apex Court; appellant relied upon it but the court proceeded to test whether the earlier finding was essential to the decision. |
| Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr. v. Musa Dadabhai Ummar (Apex Court) | Explains the distinction between what is 'collateral and incidental' and what is 'directly and substantially in issue' under Section 11 CPC; prescribes examination of pleadings, issues and judgment. | The court relied on this authority to apply the correct test for res judicata: whether the earlier finding was fundamental to the prior decision or merely incidental. The opinion repeatedly invokes its principles in analysing Issue No. 2 of O.S. No. 5 of 1978. |
| Blair v. Curran ((1939) 62 CLR 464) | Australian High Court statement (Dixon, J.) on distinguishing matters fundamental to a prior decision from those merely collateral; the inquiry whether a determination is essential to the judgment. | Quoted and applied as an interpretive aid endorsed by Sajjadanashin to sharpen the test: ask whether the prior determination was so fundamental that the judgment could not stand without it. |
| Hoag v. New Jersey ((1958) 356 US 464) | U.S. Supreme Court principle that where a record shows a judgment could not have been rendered without deciding a particular matter, that matter is settled for future actions between the parties. | Quoted to illustrate the standard that a prior decided matter will be conclusive only if it was essential to the earlier judgment. |
| Isher Singh v. Sarawan Singh | Authority stating the need to examine pleadings, written statements, issues and judgment to determine if a matter was directly and substantially in issue. | The court reiterated this law and applied that method to the pleadings, issues and judgment in the three connected suits to determine whether res judicata applied. |
| Run Bahadur v. Lucho Koer (Privy Council) and Asrar Ahmed v. Durgah Committee, Ajmer (AIR 1947 PC 1) | Instances where, despite a specific framed issue and an adverse earlier finding, the finding was treated not as res judicata because it was incidental or collateral to the main issue. | Referred to as precedents where adverse findings were not allowed to operate as res judicata because they were not necessary foundations of the earlier decisions; the court used these as supporting examples for the present conclusion. |
| Pragdasji v. Ishwarlal Bhai | Another instance cited where an adverse finding in an earlier suit was treated as incidental and thus not res judicata. | Used to support the proposition that not all adverse findings on framed issues are necessarily conclusive in later litigation. |
| Mullah (legal treatise/principle as cited) | Statement that it is not to be assumed that matters in respect of which issues have been framed are all directly and substantially in issue; the material test is whether the adjudication of the issue was material and essential for the court's decision. | Adopted by the court as a guiding principle to determine whether the finding on Issue No. 2 was essential to the Trial Court's decision; supported conclusion that the earlier finding was not necessary for the final decision. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning proceeded by careful, textual analysis of the pleadings, issues framed and the Trial Court's judgment(s), applying the legal test for res judicata as explained in the authorities cited.
- Identification of the operative facts and pleadings: The court first set out the lease, demise of the lessee, the widow's suit (O.S. No. 5 of 1978) which sought to protect possession till expiry of the lease, and the Trustees' two suits (O.S. Nos. 6 & 7 of 1978) claiming rents and alleging sale to third parties. It noted the Trial Court's reliance on defendants' written assurance not to interfere with possession.
- Characterization of the issues and how they were treated by the Trial Court: The court observed that Issue No. 2 in O.S. No. 5 of 1978—asking whether the suit property was the personal property of Sethuraman Chettiar and whether the plaintiffs were estopped—was framed despite the lessee never having questioned the Trust's title and despite the pleadings not supporting that precise formulation. Issue No. 3 in O.S. Nos. 6 and 7 of 1978 concerned whether the property belonged to a public temple and whether statutory sanction under Section 26 was required.
- Application of the res judicata test: The court applied the legal principle that for an earlier finding to operate as res judicata it must have been "directly and substantially in issue" in the previous suit — that is, it must have been fundamental and essential to the earlier decision. The court relied on Sajjadanashin and the authorities it approves (including the explanatory passages from Blair v. Curran and Hoag v. New Jersey) to articulate the test: whether the earlier determination was an immediate foundation of the judgment or merely collateral or subsidiary.
- Analysis of whether the earlier finding met that test: Examining the pleadings, issues and judgment, the court concluded Issue No. 2 in O.S. No. 5 of 1978 was unnecessary and erroneously framed; it was not reflective of the parties' pleadings and was not essential to the Trial Court's ultimate decision dismissing O.S. No. 5 (which turned on absence of a real threat to possession). Hence, the finding on that issue was not a finding on a matter directly and substantially in issue.
- Consequence for the res judicata plea: Because the earlier finding was not necessary to the Trial Court's decision and did not constitute the immediate foundation of that decision, it could not be treated as res judicata to preclude the appellant from challenging the finding recorded on Issue No. 3 in O.S. No. 6 of 1978. The court therefore rejected the contention that the appeal was barred by res judicata.
- Final assessment: The court expressly stated that Issue No. 2 was "wholly unnecessary" and "faulty" and that its finding could by no means be regarded as necessary or forming the immediate foundation for the ultimate decision in the prior suit; accordingly, res judicata did not arise.
Holding and Implications
Final Disposition: The appeal is dismissed. The application (C.M.P.) is closed.
Implications:
- The court held that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the appellant's challenge because the earlier finding (Issue No. 2 in O.S. No. 5 of 1978) was not directly and substantially in issue in that suit and was unnecessary and faultily framed.
- As a direct effect, the appellant's challenge to the learned single Judge's decision (which had reversed the Trial Court's finding on Issue No. 3 in O.S. No. 6 of 1978) was unsuccessful and the appeal has been dismissed.
- The opinion applies established principles about when prior findings operate as res judicata; it does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond the application of those principles to the facts of this case. No broader novel legal rule is announced in the judgment beyond the court's conclusion on the facts presented.
This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. No additional facts or external inferences have been introduced.
1. The appellants are the Trustees of Sri. Gangai Vinayagar Temple, Thirumudi Nagar, Pondicherry. They had executed a lease deed on 8.11.1967, marked as Ex.A-2, in favour of one Kanniah Chettiar, in respect of a plot of land on which the lessee was to erect a theatre. The lease was for a period of fifteen years, commencing from 1.1.1968. In that document, Ex.A-2, the persons executing the document as lessors are described as the President, Secretary, Treasurer and Member of the Trust Committee of Gangai Vinayagar Temple. It also contains a declaration that
"the lessors in the above capacity have declared that the said immovable belongs to the said Gangai Vinayagar Temple".
2. The lessee having died after constructing the theatre, his widow filed a suit in O.S.125 of 1976, which suit came to be later renumbered as O.S. No. 5 of 1978, impleading therein the temple as the first respondent and the members of the Trust Committee as persons representing the temple Trust. Three persons, who were alleged to be those to whom the site on which the theatre stood was sought to be sold by the Trustees, were also impleaded as defendants 7 to 9. The prayer made in that suit was for an injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's possession till the expiry of the period of lease. The title of the lessor was not questioned. It was alleged in the plaint that the proposed sale would be in breach of trust. In the written statement that was filed on behalf of the temple and the Trustees, it was specifically stated that
"...the defendants have no intention to interfere with the plaintiff's possession otherwise than by due process of law unless the plaintiff herself calls the defendants to take possession otherwise."
3. During the pendency of that suit, the Trustees instituted two other suits, which were numbered as O.S. Nos. 6 of 1978 and 7 of 1978, claiming arrears of rent from the lessee. In those suits it was also alleged that the property had been sold to the defendants, impleaded as 7, 8 and 9 in the suit that had been filed by the lessee. The three suits were tried together, common evidence was recorded and a common judgment pronounced.
4. The Trial Court held that the lessee was entitled to remain in possession of the property for the duration of the lease. For so holding, it relied upon the statements made by the defendants in the suit wherein they had categorically stated that they had no intention to interfere with the plaintiff's possession. That finding was sufficient to dispose off the lessee/plaintiff's suit O.S. No. 5 of 1978. The trial Court dismissed that suit on the ground that as there was no real threat to plaintiff's possession, there was no cause of action for the suit.
5. The Trustees in their further additional written statement filed in O.S. No. 5 of 1978 had pleaded that the property was the personal property of the temple and the Trustees. That plea was of no materiality for the purpose of adjudicating upon the lessee's right to retain possession for the duration of the lease. The Trial Court taking note of that plea had framed an issue in O.S. No. 5 of 1978, that issue being issue No. 2, which reads thus:-
"Whether the suit property is not the personal property of Sethuraman Chettiar and whether the plaintiffs are not estopped from questioning the title of the land lord or his vendors?"
The lessee/plaintiff had not questioned the title of the Trust at any point of time. Moreover, the plea of the defendants was not that the property was the personal property of Sethuraman Chettiar. That issue was framed without properly appreciating the pleadings and the scope of the suit.
6. In the two suits filed by the Temple and the trustees, the following issue was framed as Issue No. 3:-
"Whether the suit property belongs to a public temple governed by the Act? If so whether the suit is maintainable for want of sanction under Section 26 of the Hindu Religious Institution Act?"
7. The trial Court considered Issue No. 3 so framed in O.S. Nos. 6 and7 of 1978 along with Issue No. 2 that it had incorrectly framed in the lessee's suit O.S. No. 5 of 1978. In its common discussion under those issues it went into the question as to whether the temple was a public temple or a private temple and as to whether the permission from the statutory authorities was required for effecting the sale of the property owned by the temple as pleas that had been raised in O.S. No. 6 and O.S. No. 7 of 1978. That discussion shows that there was no dispute whatever on the point that the property had been acquired for the temple and that the persons who had instituted the suits were acting as the Trustees when they executed the lease and also when the suit was brought by them. The finding recorded by the Trial Court at the end of that discussion, therefore, has to be understood as the finding recorded by it on Issue No. 3 in O.S. Nos. 6 and 7 of 1978 and not as a finding recorded in relation to an issue in O.S. No. 5 of 1978, which issue neither directly nor substantially arose for consideration in O.S. No. 5 of 1978.
8. O.S. No. 6 of 1978 was decreed in part with the finding that the tenant was in arrears of rent in the sum of Rs. 268/-. The last suit O.S. No. 7 of 1978 was dismissed and no relief was granted to the lessor in that suit.
9. The lessee being aggrieved by the decree in O.S. No. 6 of 1978 filed an appeal in A.S. No. 581 of 1983. No appeal was filed against the judgment in O.S. No. 5 of 1978. The lessor did not file any appeal against the dismissal of their other suit, O.S. No. 7 of 1978.
10. The learned single Judge in a very elaborate judgment overruled the objection that was raised by the learned counsel for the temple and its Trustees that the appeal was barred by res judicata on the ground that the finding recorded on issue No. 2 in O.S. No. 5 of 1978 had become final and that precluded the lessee from challenging the finding recorded on issue No. 3 in O.S. No. 6 of 1978. The learned single Judge examined the evidence and held that the temple is a public temple and that the property belonging to the temple cannot be alienated without obtaining the requisite permission from the statutory authorities. He, therefore, reversed the finding recorded by the trial Court on issue No. 3 in O.S. No. 6 of 1978.
11. Before us, the only question that was argued by Sri. Alagar, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, was that the learned single Judge was in error in holding that the appeal was not liable to be dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Premier Tyres Limited v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation. , a decision rendered by a three Judge Bench, wherein it was inter alia held thus:-
"Effect of non-filing of appeal against a judgment or decree is that it becomes final. This finality can be taken away only in accordance with law. Same consequence follows when a judgment or decree in a connected suit is not appealed from."
The effect of that judgment, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel, is that the law that had been declared by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Panchananda Velan v. Vaithyaanantha Sastrial (1906 ILR 29 Madras 333); by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Kathoon Bivi Ammal and another v. Arulappa Nadar and another ; and by a Full Bench of the High Court of Alahabad in the case of Jai Narain v. Bulaqi Das is to be regarded as having been overruled to the extent the same is inconsistent with the law laid down by the Apex Court. Learned counsel also relied on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of D. Krishnamurthi v. K. Parasuraman 1993 (2) M.L.J., 674, wherein the Court has taken similar view as has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of Premier Tyres Limited v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation. .
12. Learned counsel submitted that as the judgment under appeal before the learned single Judge was a common judgment which dealt with the relief sought in three suits, one of which had been brought by the appellant and in which suit the Court had raised an issue which issue had been considered along with the issues that were raised in the two suits that had been filed by the respondent in the appeal, the effect of the appellant not filing an appeal against the decree in the suit that it had brought earlier and which suit also was disposed of by the common judgment was to render the finding recorded in the suit filed by the appellant final and binding and that finding would constitute res judicata.
13. This argument would be impeccable and would have to be accepted, only if the appellant succeeds in establishing that issue No. 2 in O.S. No. 5 of 1998 was in fact an issue which directly and substantially arose for consideration in that suit and that a finding had been recorded thereon in favour of the appellant.
14. Mr. Masilamani, learned Senior Counsel by the respondents, submitted that the decision relied upon for the appellants is inapplicable to the facts of this case. Learned counsel drew our attention to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sajjadanashin Sayed Md. B.E. Edr. v. Musa Dadabhai Ummar , wherein the Apex Court elaborately discussed the distinction between that which is 'collateral and incidental' and that which can be regarded as 'directly and substantially being in issue'. The Court emphasised the words employed in Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, 'directly and substantially in issue' and held that they do not have the same meaning as 'collaterally or incidentally in issue'. The Court observed at paragraph 14 thus:-
" collateral or incidental issue is one that is ancillary to a direct and substantive issue; the former is an auxiliary issue and the later the principal issue."
The Court referred with approval to the statement of law by Dixon, J. of the Australian High Court in Blair v. Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 (553) that, "The difficulty in the actual application of these conceptions is to distinguish the matters fundamental or cardinal to the prior decision on judgment, or necessarily involved in it as its legal justification or foundation, from matters which, even though actually raised and decided as being in the circumstances of the case the determining considerations, yet are not in point of law the essential foundation of a groundwork of the judgment. The authors say that in order to understand this essential distinction, one has always to inquire with unrelenting severity -- is the determination upon which it is sought to find an estoppel so fundamental to the substantive decision that the latter cannot stand without the former. Nothing less than this will do.
The Court further noted,
"It is suggested by Dixon, J. that even where this inquiry is answered satisfactorily, there is still another test to pass; viz., whether the determination is the 'immediate foundation' of the decision as opposed to merely a proposition collateral or subsidiary only, i.e., not more than part of the reasoning supporting the conclusion."
15. The Court also quoted with approval the observation of Harlan, J. of the Supreme Court of The United States in the case of Hoag v. New Jersey (1958) 356, US 464:
"Under this rule, if the records of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties."
The Court reiterated the law that had been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Isher Singh v. Sarawan Singh that one has to examine the pleadings, the written statement, the issues and the judgment to find out if the matter was directly and substantially in issue.
16. The Court further pointed out that even where issues had been framed in the suit, it would not necessarily follow that the findings recorded thereon are to be treated as being findings on issues which directly and substantially arose for consideration in the suit. The Court approved the statement of the principle by Mullah that
"it is not to be assumed that matters in respect of which issues have been framed are all of them directly and substantially in issue. Nor is there any special significance to be attached to the fact that a particular issue is the first in the list of issues. Which of the matters are directly in issue and which collaterally and incidentally must be determined on the facts of each case. A material test to be applied is whether the Court considers the adjudication of the issue material and essential for its decision."
17. After referring to the decisions of the Privy Council in the case of Run Bahadur v. Lucho Koer (1985 ILR 11 Cal. 301 (PC) and Asrar Ahmed v. Durgah Committee, Ajmer (AIR 1947 PC 1) and that of the Supreme Court in Pragdasji v. Ishwarlal Bhai , the Court held,
"These three cases are therefore instances where in spite of a specific issue framed and an adverse finding thereon in an earlier suit, the finding was treated not as res judicata as it was purely incidental or auxiliary or collateral to the main issue in each of these cases and not necessary for the earlier case nor its foundation."
18. The principles so enunciated by the Apex Court have to be applied to the facts of a given case by examining the pleadings, the issues that had been framed and the judgment that had been rendered thereon. If it is found after such examination that the findings recorded was one which was not necessary for the final decision in the case or that it did not constitute the immediate foundation for the ultimate decision, such a finding cannot be regarded as a finding on a matter which was directly and substantially in issue and no question of res judicata would arise.
19. We have, at the outset, set out the pleas that were taken by the parties to the suits, the nature of the issues and the findings recorded by the Trial Court on those issues. They clearly show that issue No. 2 framed in O.S. No. 5 of 1978 was wholly unnecessary, the issue framed also being faulty and not being reflective of the pleas that had been taken by the parties. The finding on that issue can by no means be regarded as being necessary and it is impossible to regard it as constituting the immediate foundation for the ultimate decision in the suit. No question of regarding the finding thereon as res judicata would, therefore, arise.
20. No other question was argued before us. We do not find any merit in this appeal. The same is dismissed. The C.M.P. is closed.
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