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Rajendran Gnanaolivu... v. Sundar Gnanaolivu (G...

Madras High Court
Mar 22, 2002
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Revision under Article 227)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the decree-holder in O.S. No. 7414 of 1996 (originally C.S. No. 653 of 1991 on the Original Side of the High Court) concerning title and recovery of possession of Flat No. 1-D, Marble Arch, Bishop Wallace Avenue, Mylapore, Chennai. The suit was decreed on 2.8.1999. The petitioner filed Execution Petition E.P. No. 151 of 2000 before the IXth Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. Notice was issued in the execution proceeding and the judgment-debtor (the first respondent) was set ex parte on 8.7.2000. Delivery of possession was ordered.

When the bailiff attempted to execute the decree, persons in possession locked the doors and obstructed delivery. The petitioner filed applications in the execution petition seeking to break open locks and for police aid. The second respondent then filed E.A. No. 3919 of 2000 under Section 151 CPC seeking to be recorded as an "Obstructor" in the execution proceeding, claiming to be a tenant who had been inducted into the property on 18.1.1999 by Rukmani (said to be Power Tenant Agent of the first respondent). The petitioner opposed the application, contending it was barred by Order 21 Rule 102 CPC (transferee pendente lite not entitled to be heard as an obstructor).

The Executing Court (by the impugned order dated 31.1.2001) allowed E.A. No. 3919 of 2000. The petitioner challenged that order by way of this revision under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High Court heard counsel for both sides (Mr. R. Srinivas for the petitioner; Mr. M.L. Ramesh for the second respondent) and dismissed the revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether E.A. No. 3919 of 2000 (application by the second respondent to be recorded as an "Obstructor") was barred by Order 21 Rule 102 CPC because the second respondent was a transferee/tenant pendente lite of the judgment-debtor.
  2. Whether a person who claims to be a tenant in possession (and not a party to the original suit) may have his claim adjudicated by the Executing Court under Order 21 Rule 97 read with the subsequent rules (e.g., Rule 101) during execution proceedings, thereby qualifying as an "obstructor" whose objections must be considered.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Executing Court erred in allowing E.A. No. 3919 of 2000 because that application was barred by Order 21 Rule 102 CPC (transferee pendente lite is not entitled to be heard as an obstructor under Rules 98 and 100 as stated in Rule 102).
  • The second respondent was only a tenant/transferee from the judgment-debtor and, being a person who became tenant during the pendency of the suit, could not be heard in execution proceedings as an obstructor.
  • The petitioner relied on earlier decisions (including Annapoorni v. Janaki and Arthur Theodore James v. Hanna Rosaline) and invoked the jurisdictional scope of Section 115 CPC and Article 227 to challenge the Executing Court's order.

Second Respondent's Arguments

  • The second respondent was in possession of the suit property at the time of the decree and, therefore, the Executing Court correctly recognised him as an obstructor and adjudicated his application to that effect.
  • His application to be recorded as an obstructor (E.A. No. 3919 of 2000) was properly maintainable before the Executing Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Annapoorni v. Janaki, 1995 (1) LW 141 Referred to by petitioner; focuses on powers under Section 115 CPC and Article 227. The Court noted the petitioner relied on this decision but observed that it concentrates on the High Court's powers under Section 115 and Article 227; it did not alter the conclusion that E.A. No. 3919 was maintainable.
Arthur Theodore James (deceased) & Ors. v. Mrs. Hanna Rosaline & Ors., 1999 (1) L.W. 222 Discussed the position of a lease entered into pendente lite and the lessee's liability under the decree. The Court observed that this decision (relied on by the petitioner) was not helpful to the petitioner’s case in light of subsequent Supreme Court authority; it did not change the finding that the executing Court could adjudicate the obstructor's claim.
N.S.S. Narayana Sarma v. M/s Goldstone Exports (P) Ltd., A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 251 Interprets scope of Rule 97 and clarifies that executing Court must determine only those questions that legally arise between the parties; executing Court can decide whether a question raised by an obstructor legally arises. The Court relied on this authority to affirm that it is for the Executing Court to decide the issues raised by an obstructor, and that the Executing Court's consideration of E.A. No. 3919 was appropriate.
Shreenath v. Rajesh, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 1827 Explains that after amendment (post-1976), disputes raised by persons claiming rights (including tenants) can be adjudicated by the Executing Court under Rule 97 read with Rule 101; prior procedures differed under Rule 99. The Court relied on these observations to conclude that a tenant or other person claiming rights need not file a fresh suit and can have their claim adjudicated in execution proceedings. This supported the validity of E.A. No. 3919 filed by the second respondent.
Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal & Anr., 1997 (3) SCC 694 Holds that "any person" in Order 21 Rule 97(1) is comprehensive and includes persons who are strangers to the decree; executing Court must follow the procedure in Order 21 when such resistance is offered. The Court referred to this authority to underscore that Rule 97(1) is wide enough to include third parties and that the Executing Court had to proceed to adjudicate the obstructor's application under the procedural provisions of Order 21.
Bhagwat v. Kasturi, A.I.R. 1974 M.P. 26 Holds that when a third person resists delivery, the Executing Court must refrain from proceeding until satisfied that the person is bound by the decree or has made an application under Order 21 Rule 97. The Court cited this decision to show that the Executing Court correctly "stayed its hands" and dealt with the second respondent's application to determine whether he should be treated as an obstructor or was bound by the decree.
Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain & Anr., J.T. 1994 (6) S.C. 626 Confirms Order 21 Rule 97 empowers the Court to enquire whether obstruction by any person was legal and to adjudicate rights raised by a resister, including persons claiming independent title or tenancy. The Court relied on this authority to reinforce that the executing Court possesses the power to conduct an enquiry into objections raised by a person resisting delivery of possession and to decide the legal validity of such obstruction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by setting out the factual matrix: decree in O.S. No. 7414 of 1996 was passed on 2.8.1999; execution was initiated in E.P. No. 151 of 2000; the judgment-debtor was set ex parte and delivery of possession was ordered; when execution was attempted, persons in occupation resisted and the second respondent filed E.A. No. 3919 of 2000 seeking to be recorded as an obstructor.

The Court examined the relevant statutory provisions: Order 21 Rule 97(1) and (2) (which permits a decree-holder to apply when resisted and requires the Court to adjudicate such application) and Order 21 Rule 102 (which excludes application of Rules 98 and 100 to a transferee pendente lite). The petitioner's contention was that Rule 102 barred consideration of the second respondent's application because he was a transferee/tenant from the judgment-debtor who took possession pendente lite.

The Court then analysed the chronology asserted by the parties: the second respondent allegedly entered into a tenancy agreement on 18.1.1999 (by induction from Rukmani, who held a power of attorney dated 17.1.1998) and was therefore in possession prior to the decree pronounced on 2.8.1999. The Court emphasised that Sub-rule (1) of Rule 97 uses the words "any person," and that a person in possession claiming tenancy or independent rights may properly apply under Rule 97 to be recorded as an obstructor. Given that the second respondent claimed to have become tenant prior to the decree, the Court held that he was justified in filing E.A. No. 3919 of 2000 before the Executing Court.

The Court reviewed relevant authorities (including Shreenath, N.S.S. Narayana Sarma, Brahmdeo Chaudhary, Bhagwat, Bhanwar Lal) which collectively establish:

  • Rule 97(1) is wide enough to include "any person" who resists execution, including third parties and persons claiming tenancy or independent rights;
  • After statutory amendment(s), disputes as to rights asserted by such persons can be adjudicated by the Executing Court under the procedure in Order 21 (notably under Rule 101 in the adjudicatory scheme);
  • The Executing Court has the power to decide whether a question raised by an obstructor legally arises for determination during execution proceedings and to proceed accordingly.

Applying these principles to the facts before it — specifically, the second respondent's claim of tenancy and possession predating the decree — the Court concluded that the Executing Court properly entertained and allowed E.A. No. 3919 of 2000. The Court also noted that decisions relied on by the petitioner (such as Arthur Theodore James) were not helpful in the face of Supreme Court authority clarifying the executing Court's jurisdiction under Order 21.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court dismissed the civil revision and upheld the order of the Executing Court allowing E.A. No. 3919 of 2000. The core ruling is: THE REVISION IS DISMISSED.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The impugned order of the Executing Court (allowing the second respondent's application to be recorded and adjudicated as an obstructor) stands; the revision brought by the petitioner under Article 227 fails. The petitioner is not granted relief in respect of the Executing Court's decision to adjudicate the second respondent's claim.
  • Costs and connected matters: The Court ordered "No costs." The connected miscellaneous petition (CMP) was also dismissed.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion applies established principles from Supreme Court authority that the executing Court may adjudicate rights claimed by third parties (including tenants) in execution proceedings. The Court did not purport to lay down any new law; it applied existing authorities to the facts before it and observed that earlier decisions relied on by the petitioner were not dispositive in light of Supreme Court pronouncements.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. No information not contained in the opinion has been added.

Show all summary ...

1. The decree holder in O.S No. 7414 of 1996 on the file of IXth Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai is the petitioner in the above revision filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

2. The petitioner filed the said suit against the first respondent herein initially on the file of Original Side of this Court. The suit was filed for declaration of title and recovery of possession concerning the Flat No. 1-D, Marble Arch, No. 4 and 5, Bishop Wallace Avenue (East), Mylapore, Chennai 600004. The said suit was filed in the year 1991 and the same was numbered as C.S No. 653 of 1991 and it was transferred to the City Civil Court and re-numbered as O.S No. 7414 of 1996 on the file of the Second Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. The first respondent herein contested the suit and the same was decreed after full trial on 2.8.1999 After the decree, the petitioner filed the execution petition in E.P No. 151 of 2000 on the file of IXth Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. Notice was ordered in the Execution Petition and finally the first respondent herein was set ex-parte on 8.7.2000 and delivery of possession was ordered. When the bailiff went to the suit property, first respondent's people locked the doors and prevented the execution. Therefore, the petitioner filed two Execution Applications in the above Execution Petition for brake open the lock and police aid respectively. The second respondent at that point of time filed E.A No. 3919 of 2000 in the above Execution Petition under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seeking to record him as an Obstructor in the proceedings. The case of the second respondent is that he became a tenant in the suit property in January, 1999. He was inducted into the suit property by one Rukmani, has said to be a Power Tenant Agent of the first respondent. The second respondent has alleged that there is a rental agreement in his favour. The petitioner herein filed a counter opposing the said application. The said petition is also barred by the provisions of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure as in accordance with Rule 102 of the said order a transferee pendente lite of the suit property from the judgment debtor is not entitled to be heard as an Obstructor. The Court below by the impugned order dated 31.1.2001, allowed E.A No. 3919 of 1999. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred the present revision.

3. Heard Mr. R. Srinivas for the petitioner and Mr. M.L Ramesh for the second respondent.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner after taking me through the relevant provisions, namely Order 21 Rule 97, Rule 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure would contend that the court below failed to note that E.A No. 3919 of 2000 was barred by Order 21 Rule 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He further contended that the Executing Court failed to see that the second respondent herein was claiming to be only a tenant (transferee) from the first respondent herein and that the person who had become the tenant during the pendency of a suit, namely, O.S No. 7414 of 1996 could not be heard at all in execution proceedings as an Obstructor.

5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the second respondent supporting the order under challenge would contend that, inasmuch as he was in possession of the suit property at the time of decree, rightly recognised him as an obstructor, accordingly prayed for dismissal of the revision.

6. I have carefully considered the rival submissions.

7. It is seen that the Civil Suit in O.S No. 7414 of 1996 filed by the petitioner was decreed on 2.8.1999 Based on the said decree, he filed E.P No. 151 of 2000 for execution of the same. The judgment debtor - second respondent herein on receipt of notice did not participate in the execution proceedings, therefore he was set ex-parte on 8.7.2000 Accordingly, the Court below passed an order for delivery of possession in terms of the decree. When the Court bailiff went to the premises in question for handing over possession, the same was objected to by the second respondent herein stating that he is a statutory tenant. In order to substantiate his claim, E.A No. 3919 of 2000 was filed before the Court below to recognise him as an Obstructor.

8. Now, I shall consider the relevant provisions applicable to the issue in question. Order 21 Rule 97 (1) and (2) reads as under.

“ 97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property.-

1. Where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance of obstruction.

2. Where any application is made under sub-rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provision herein contained.”

Order 21 Rule 102 states thus,

“ 102. Rules not applicable to transferee pendente lite.- Nothing in Rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any person. “

9. Mr. R. Srinivas, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that, in the light of the fact that the Obstructor being a tenant is also bound by the decree in O.S No. 7414 of 1996 dated 2.8.1999, his claim need not be considered or adjudicated by the Executing Court. For that, he very much relied on Rule 102, which says that procedure prescribed under Rule 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the suit in which the decree was passed. In this regard, it is relevant to note that the petitioner herein - plaintiff secured a decree against the first respondent herein -judgment debtor in O.S No. 7414 of 1996 on 2.8.1999 Since the first respondent herein - Judgment Debtor was out of the country, he executed a Power in favour of Rukmani Ammal on 17.1.1998 giving full power to deal with the property in question. It is the case of the Obstructor that from the said Rukmani Ammal he entered into an agreement of tenancy on 18.1.1999 and occupied the house. In other words, even prior to the date of the decree dated 02.08.1999, the second respondent - Obstructor entered into an agreement and was in possession of the suit property as a tenant on 18.1.1999 with the power of attorney holder Rukmani Ammal. In such a circumstance, in the light of the language used in Sub-clause (1) of Rule 97,I am of the view that the second respondent herein is justified in filing E.A No. 3919 of 2000 before the Executing Court to establish that he is an obstructor. This aspect has been rightly considered by the Court below and allowed the said application.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner very much relied on the decision of M. Srinivasan,J., (as he then was) in the case of Annapoorni… v. Janaki…., 1995 (1) LW 141. The said judgment concentrates only on the power of this Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He also relied on the decision of S.S Subramani,J., in the case of Arthur Theodore James (deceased) and 2 others v. Mrs. Hanna Rosaline and 4 others, 1999 (1) L.W 222. In the said decision the learned Judge has observed that,

“14…. The so-called lease in favour of Savarinathan was entered into pending suit for partition and, therefore, he is also bound by the decree. He cannot have a better claim than the so-called lessor. If Savarinathan has put up any construction pending litigation, he is bound to remove the same. Merely, because the decree does not provide for removal of the structure, the power of the executing Court and the decree will not become inexecutable. “

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of N.S.S Narayana Sarma v. M/s. Goldstone Exports (P) Ltd., A.I.R 2002 S.C 251. While considering Rule 97, their Lordships have held,

“16… The words “all questions arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97” would envelop only such questions as would legally arise for determination between those parties. In other words, the Court is not obliged to determine a question merely because of the resister raised it. The questions which the executing Court is obliged to determine under Rule 101, must possess two adjuncts. First is that such questions should have legally arisen between the parties, and the second is, such questions must be relevant for consideration and determination between the parties e.g, if the obstructor admits that he is a transferee pendente lite it is not necessary to determine a question raised by him that he was unaware of the litigation when he purchased the property. Similarly, a third party, who questions the validity of a transfer made by a decree-holder to an assignee, cannot claim that the question regarding its validity should be decided during executing proceedings. “

It is to be noted that, in the very same judgment their Lordships have further held,

“16…In the adjudication process envisaged in Order 21 Rule 97 (2) of the Code, the execution Court can decide whether the question raised by a resister or obstructor legally arises between the parties. An answer to the said question also would be result of the adjudication contemplated in the sub-section.”

It is clear that it is for the Executing Court to decide the question raised by the resister or obstructor. In our case, the claim made by the obstructor had been considered by the Executing Court. In the light of the conclusion of the Supreme Court, the decision referred to in Arthur Theodore James (deceased) and 2 others v. Mrs. Hanna Rosaline and 4 others, 1999 (1) L.W 222 is not helpful to the petitioner's case.

12. It is useful to refer the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in the case of Shreenath v. Rajesh, A.I.R 1998 S.C 1827. This judgment was referred to by the Executing Court in support of its conclusion. After considering Sub-clause (1) of Rule 97, their Lordships have held that,

“13. … all disputes relating to the property made under Rules 97 and 99 is to be adjudicated under Rule 101, while under unamended provision under sub-clause (2) of Rule 97, the executing Court issues summons to any such person obstructing possession over the decretal property. After investigation under Rule 98, the Court puts back a decree-holder in possession where the Court finds obstruction was occasioned without any just cause, while under Rule 99 where obstruction was by a person claiming in good faith to be in possession of the property on his own right, the Court has to dismiss the decree-holder application. Thus even prior to 1976 right of any person claiming right on his own or as a tenant, not party to the suit such person's right has to be adjudicated under Rule 99 and he need not fall back to file a separate suit. By this, he is saved from a long litigation. So a tenant or any person claiming a right in the property, on his own, if resists delivery of possession to the decree-holder the dispute and his claim has to be decided after 1976 Amendment under Rule 97 read with Rule 101 and prior to the amendment under Rule 97 read with Rule 99. However, under the old law, in case order is passed against the person resisting possession under Rule 97 read with Rule 99 then by virtue of Rule 103, as it then was, he has to file a suit to establish his right. But now after the amendment one need not file suit even in such cases as all disputes are to be settled by the Executing Court itself finally under Rule 101 “

It is clear that even prior to 1976 and after the said amendment, the person claiming right as a tenant in respect of the property in question need not file a separate suit and he is entitled to file an application in the Executing Court to prove his claim. As stated earlier, the second respondent herein rightly filed an application and the same was considered by the Executing Court.

13. It is also relevant to refer the case of Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and another, 1997 (3) S.C.C 694, wherein their Lordships have held that, the resistance and/or obstruction to possession of immovable property as contemplated by Order 21, Rule 97, CPC could have been offered by any person. The words “any person” as contemplated by Order 21, Rule 97, sub-rule (1) are comprehensive enough to include apart from judgment-debtor or anyone claiming through him even persons claiming independently and who would be, therefore, be total strangers to the decree. In that case, the respondent one though seeking only reissuance of warrant for delivery of possession with aid of armed force, in substance sought to bypass the previous resistance and obstruction offered by the appellant on the spot and their Lordships in such a circumstance have held,

“Thus it was squarely covered by the sweep of Order 21, Rule 97, sub-rule (1) CPC. Once that happened the procedure laid down by sub-rule (2) thereof had to be followed by the Executing Court. The Court had to proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the subsequent provisions contained in the said order.”

14. In the case of Bhagwat v. Kasturi, A.I.R 1974 M.P 26, the Division Bench has held that as soon as the third person resists or obstructs delivery of possession, the Executing Court must stay its hands, until the decree holder either satisfies it that such a person is bound by the decree, or makes an application under Order 21, Rule 97, complying resistance or obstruction. The third person can give intimation in writing to the Execution Court of his intention to resist or obstruct after or even before a warrant of possession is issued.

15. In the case of Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain and another, J.T 1994 (6) S.C 626, the following conclusion of their Lordships is relevant.

“ 4 A reading of Order 21, Rule 97, CPC clearly envisages that “any person” even including the judgment debtor irrespective whether he claim derivative title from the judgment debtor or set up his own right title or interest de horse the judgment debtor and he resists execution of a decree, then the court in addition to the power under Rule 35 (3) has been empowered to conduct an enquiry whether the obstruction by that person in obtaining possession of immovable property was legal or not. “

16. In the case of Shreenath v. Rajesh, 1998 A.I.R S.C.W 1619, the Supreme Court has held that the third party in possession of a property claiming independent right as a tenant not a party to the decree for possession of immovable property under execution, could resist such decree by seeking adjudication of his objections under Order 21, Rule 97.

17. In the light of the legal position as well as the procedure prescribed in the Code and also of the fact that the second respondent - Obstructor became a tenant even prior to the date of the decree, I hold that his application in E.A No. 3919 of 2000 to declare him as an Obstructor is valid and the Executing Court is fully justified in adjudicating the matter. Accordingly, I do not find any error or infirmity in the order impugned. Consequently, the civil revision petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs.

18. In view of the dismissal of the main revision, connected CMP., is also dismissed.