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Meccane Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax

Madras High Court
Jul 25, 2001
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — R. Jayasimha Babu, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessee purchased 6.76 acres of land together with factory and godown buildings on February 11, 1959. The built-up factory and godown occupied less than an acre; the remainder consisted of open area where some agricultural operations continued. Seven years later the lands were demarcated and an agreement to sell was entered into on August 19, 1966. On that date the assessee received an advance of Rs. 50,000 and delivered possession to the buyer. The agreement envisaged execution of conveyance deeds in favour of nominees of the purchaser and provided for balance payments in instalments (one on December 31, 1966, and two others on March 31, 1967, and June 30, 1967).

In its accounts the assessee recorded a receipt of Rs. 2,28,902. The assessee accepted capital-gains liability for the industrial portion but contended that 6.22 acres were agricultural and not chargeable. The Assessing Officer treated the lands as non-agricultural (on the basis of intended post-sale use as house sites), treated Rs. 2,50,000 received under the agreement as the value of capital assets sold, deducted original cost and treated Rs. 2,28,902 as capital gain. That order was upheld by the Commissioner and appealed to the Tribunal.

The Tribunal members disagreed on disposal and referred the matter to a Third Member. In a two-member order it was observed that charge to capital gain arises only on execution of a registered deed of transfer and that capital gain should be recomputed by taking into account only transfers completed by registered deeds to individual purchasers in the relevant previous years. A rectification application resulted in modifying the previous order's wording from "dismissed" to "disposed of." Four questions were referred to this Court concerning extent of liability for capital gain, whether agreement plus delivery of possession can amount to transfer, whether agricultural land sold for use as house sites becomes non-agricultural, and the appropriate date/cost of acquisition for computing capital gains.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. To what extent should the assessee be held liable for the capital gain alleged in the assessment year 1968–69?
  2. Whether an agreement to sell accompanied by delivery of possession can amount to a "transfer" for the purposes of the Income-tax Act as it then stood?
  3. Whether agricultural land, when sold for use as house sites, can be regarded as non-agricultural for the purpose of assessing capital gains?
  4. Whether the cost of acquisition should be the original cost of acquiring the agricultural land or the market value as on the date the agricultural land was converted/put to non-agricultural use (e.g., as house sites)?

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • Counsel for the assessee submitted that the agreement to sell (even with delivery of possession) did not amount to a transfer under the law as it then stood; capital gain would accrue only on execution of conveyance deeds.
  • The assessee argued that the lands originally acquired were agricultural and that when sold for use as house sites they were converted to non-agricultural use; the market value on the date of conversion (or the agreement) should be treated as the cost of acquisition for the purpose of computing capital gain.
  • In support of the first point, counsel relied on Alapati Venkataramiah v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1965) 57 ITR 185 (Supreme Court) to the effect that delivery of possession alone is not equivalent to conveyance.
  • In support of the cost-of-acquisition argument the assessee relied on the Supreme Court's observations in Dhun Dadabhoy Kapadia v. CIT (1967) 63 ITR 651 (regarding application of commercial/accounting principles in computing capital gains) and on CIT v. Bai Shirinbai K. Kooka (1962) 46 ITR 86 (where conversion of a capital asset into stock-in-trade made the date of conversion relevant for cost).

Revenue / Assessing Officer's Arguments

  • The Assessing Officer treated the lands as non-agricultural having regard to their intended use after sale (house sites) and held that amounts received under the agreement represented the value of capital assets sold, from which original cost was to be deducted to compute capital gain.
  • The Assessing Officer's order (upheld by the Commissioner) treated the capital gain as accruing in the assessment year on the basis of the agreement and receipts recorded.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Alapati Venkataramiah v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Hyderabad, [1965] 57 ITR 185 (SC) Held that in the context where the word "transfer" was used, it meant effective conveyance of the capital asset and that delivery of possession alone could not be equated with conveyance of immovable property. The court relied on this decision to conclude that, as the law stood in the relevant assessment year, capital gain accrues only when the conveyance deed is executed and not at the date of agreement or delivery of possession.
Dhun Dadabhoy Kapadia v. CIT, Bombay, [1967] 63 ITR 651 (SC) Observation that principles of commercial/accounting practice are relevant in working out capital gain or loss for taxation purposes (in the factual context of renunciation of rights to receive additional shares). The court found that the factual matrix of Dhun Dadabhoy Kapadia (renunciation of rights embedded in shares and set-off of resulting depreciation) did not support the assessee's case here and therefore did not apply to require using the market value on conversion as the cost of acquisition.
CIT v. Bai Shirinbai K. Kooka, [1962] 46 ITR 86 (SC) Held that where a capital asset is converted into stock-in-trade and thereafter sold, the cost of acquisition should be taken with reference to the date on which the capital asset was converted into stock-in-trade. The court observed that this decision was inapposite because in the present case the asset was not treated as stock-in-trade and no claim on that ground was made by the assessee.
M. Nachiappan v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, [1998] 230 ITR 98 In a case where agricultural lands were acquired by the karta of a HUF, later converted into housing sites at partition and then allotted/sold, the cost of acquisition of lands so sold was taken as the cost at which the karta had originally acquired the agricultural lands (not the notional cost on date of conversion/partition). The court cited this case to support the Tribunal's and its own conclusion that the cost of acquisition for the assessee is the original cost when the agricultural land was acquired, not a notional market value on the date the land was put to non-agricultural use.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining the statutory meaning of "transfer" as it stood in the relevant assessment year (section 2(47) of the Income-tax Act as it then stood), which included sale, exchange, relinquishment or extinguishment of rights. The material facts of the agreement (execution on August 19, 1966; receipt of advance; delivery of possession; requirement to execute conveyance deeds in future; and staggered instalment payments) were considered against that statutory framework.

On whether the agreement plus delivery of possession amounted to a transfer, the court accepted the assessee's reliance on Alapati Venkataramiah and held that delivery of possession by itself did not constitute a conveyance under the law as it stood. Consequently capital gain could not be regarded as accruing at the date of the agreement/delivery of possession; rather, accrual occurred when the conveyance deeds were executed. The Tribunal's direction to recompute capital gain by considering only those transfers completed by registered deeds in the relevant previous years was endorsed.

On the cost-of-acquisition point, the court examined the assessee's submission that conversion of agricultural land into house sites created a new asset and that the market value on the date of conversion (or agreement) should be treated as the cost. The court analysed the authorities relied upon. It found Dhun Dadabhoy Kapadia distinguishable because that case involved renunciation of rights embedded in shares and required application of accounting principles to determine net capital gain after set-off of an inevitable loss; those factual circumstances were not present here. The Bai Shirinbai principle (cost measured at date of conversion into stock-in-trade) was inapplicable because the asset was not treated as stock-in-trade and no claim on that basis was made.

The court referred to M. Nachiappan as a closely analogous decision in which the cost of acquisition of lands converted into housing sites was held to be the original cost at which the agricultural land had been acquired (and not a notional cost on the date of conversion). Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that the cost of acquisition remained the price paid by the assessee when it acquired the agricultural lands; the subsequent intended use did not alter that cost for capital-gains computation.

The court therefore answered the referred questions by upholding the Tribunal's approach: the land ceased to be agricultural when the assessee agreed to sell it for use as house sites; the cost of acquisition is the original cost when the assessee acquired the agricultural land; and capital gains accrued in the year in which the conveyance deeds were executed.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Tribunal's findings are upheld.

More specifically, the court held:

  • The land in question ceased to be agricultural when the assessee agreed to sell it for use as house sites.
  • The cost of acquisition for the purpose of computing capital gains is the cost at which the assessee originally acquired the agricultural land (not a notional market value on the date of conversion/Agreement).
  • Capital gains accrued to the assessee in the year in which the registered conveyance deeds were executed; delivery of possession under the agreement did not by itself give rise to chargeable capital gain under the law as it then stood.

Direct consequences for the parties (as reflected in the opinion): the capital-gains computation must be recomputed taking into account only those transfers completed by registered deeds in the relevant previous years; the applicable cost of acquisition for those deeds is the original acquisition cost of the agricultural land; and the timing of accrual for taxation purposes is the year of execution of the conveyance deeds.

The opinion does not set out any broader legislative or doctrinal change; its conclusions apply to the facts and statutory context described in the judgment.

Show all summary ...

R. Jayasimha Babu, J.:— The extent to which the assessee should be held liable for the capital gain alleged to have been secured by it in the assessment year 1968–69 is the matter which the Tribunal considered. The correctness of the consideration so made having been called into question, at the instance of the assessee four questions1 have been referred to us. In substance those questions are as to whether an agreement to sell accompanied by delivery of possession can amount to transfer; as to whether when an agricultural land is sold for use as house sites, it can be regarded as non-agricultural, and as to whether the cost of acquisition should be the cost of acquiring the agricultural lands or the market value as on the date the agricultural land is converted for use as land meant for use as house sites.

2. The assessee had purchased 6.76 acres of land together with a factory and godown buildings, that factory and godown building being located in an area of about less than an acre, the remaining extent being open area on which some agricultural operations were continued to be carried on. The purchase was on February 11, 1959. Seven years later, the lands were sold after demarcating the open area from the area in which the factory and godown buildings were located. An agreement to sell was entered into on August 19, 1966, on which date the assessee received an advance of Rs. 50,000 and also delivered possession to the other party. The agreement, inter alia, required the assessee to execute conveyance deeds in favour of the nominees of the other party to the agreement and to receive the balance of the amount agreed to be paid for the land in instalments one of which was payable on December 31, 1966, and the other two instalments on March 31, 1967, and June 30, 1967.

3. In the books of account of the assessee, the assessee recorded the receipt of a sum of Rs. 2,28,902. The assessee accepted the liability for capital gains in respect of what it regarded as the industrial portion of the land, but not for the gains from the sale of the area 6.22 acres which the assessee claimed to be agricultural lands. That claim of the assessee was rejected and the Assessing Officer held that the sum of Rs. 2,50,000 which the assessee had received in that assessment year under the agreement for sale represented the value of the capital assets sold by the assessee, by treating the lands sold as non-agricultural land, having regard to the purpose for which it was to be used after the sale. From that sum, he deducted the original cost of acquisition and treated the balance of Rs. 2,28,902 as capital gain arising from the sale of the capital asset. That order having been upheld by the Commissioner, the assessee went up in appeal to the Tribunal. The Members of the Bench of the Tribunal which heard the appeal having disagreed about the manner in which the appeal should be disposed of, the matter was referred to a Third Member. In the course of the order made by the two members who had disagreed, it had been observed that, since the charge to capital gain arises only on the execution of a registered deed of transfer, the capital gain should be recomputed by taking into account only those transfers which are completed by registered deeds of transfer to the individual purchasers in the relevant previous years. On a rectification application filed by the assessee an order was made modifying the order which had been made earlier in which it is stated that the appeal had been dismissed, into an order which merely said the appeal is accordingly disposed of.

4. We may first consider the question as to whether there was a transfer by reason of the execution of the agreement of sale and delivery of possession of the property on August 19, 1966, under the law as it then stood. Section 2(47) of the Act, as it then stood, defined “transfer” in relation to a capital asset, as including “the sale, exchange or relinquishment of the asset, or the extinguishment of any rights therein, or the compulsory acquisition thereof under any law”.

5. The agreement to sell itself contemplates the execution of conveyance in favour of the nominees of the third party to the agreement. The payment of the part of the amount agreed to be paid under that agreement was to be made only on dates subsequent to the date of the agreement. However, 50 per cent, of that amount was to be paid only in the succeeding year. The conveyance deed was to be executed in respect of the portions; of the property and when nominees of the third party to the agreement were brought to the assessee. Having regard to these facts, it was submitted by counsel for the assessee that there was no transfer merely by virtue of the agreement.

6. Counsel in this context relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Alapati Venkataramiah v. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Hyderabad, [1965] 57 ITR 185. That case arose under section 12B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, which used the word “transfer”. In that decision, the court held that in the context in which it was used, “transfer” meant effective conveyance of the capital asset to the transferee and that delivery of possession of immovable property could not, by itself, be treated as equivalent to conveyance of the immovable property.

7. Having regard to the law that prevailed in the relevant assessment year, we agree with counsel that capital gain can be regarded to have accrued only when the conveyance deed was executed and not at any earlier point of time. The Tribunal has rightly directed that the capital gain should be recomputed by taking into account only those transfers which were completed by registered deeds of transfer to the individual purchasers in the relevant previous years. We, therefore, hold that the capital gain accrued to the assessee only in the year in which the conveyance deeds had been executed.

8. As regards the question of the cost of the acquisition of the capital asset, it was submitted by counsel that what was bought by the assessee was agricultural lands and when the assessee proceeded to sell it for use as house sites and when it was put to non-agricultural use, the market value as on the date of the agreement should be considered for the purpose of determining the capital gain. It was submitted that an asset which was in the nature of agricultural land was not an asset for the purpose of levy of capital gain at the relevant time. When that land was converted and put to use as non-agricultural land it became an asset to which the capital gain provisions would apply, and it is that date that would be relevant for determining the cost of acquisition. It was, submitted that, that would be the correct approach having regard to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhun Dadabhoy Kapadia v. Cit, Bombay, [1967] 63 ITR 651, wherein it was observed that (page 655):

“The High Court, in dealing with this question, had expressed the view that principles of accountancy applicable to valuation of such right to receive new shares issued by a company are not applicable when computation has to be made for purposes of taxation; but we are unable to accept this proposition. In working out capital gain or loss, the principles that have to be applied are those Which are a part of the commercial practice or which an ordinary man of business will resort to when making computation for his business purpose's the principle of accounting indicated by us above are clearly the principles that must be applied in order to find out the net capital gain or loss arising’ out of a transaction of the nature with which we are concerned.”

9. The transaction with which the apex court was concerned in that case was one whereby a shareholder had renounced the right to acquire additional shares. The assessed claim was that the profit that was realised by renouncing the right would-be a profit which she realised by renouricing the right to the additional shares and it must be set off against the loss by way of depreciation in the value of her original shares as the right to receive the additional shares was embedded in the original shares and by renouncing that right the value of the original shares stood reduced. The court accepted that stand of the assessee and held that the capital gain that was derived from renouncing the right to receive additional shares must be determined by setting off the depreciation in the value of the shares originally held, against the profit realised from renouncing the right to receive additional shares.

10. That decision of the apex court and the observations made thereunder do not support the case pleaded for the petitioner here. The petitioner here did not suffer any loss which was required to be set off against his gain, a loss which was an inevitable consequence of the sale transaction. The assessee had acquired the land at a certain value and when the assessee sold those lands, it was sold at a much higher value. The cost of acquisition did not change. It remained constant. The fact that by the time the assessee so sold, it was to be put to use for non-agricultural purposes, did not involve any additional cost being incurred by the assessee. The object of applying commercial principles of accounting is to ascertain the real profit which can appropriately be regarded as a capital gain and brought to tax. Here in this case, the real extent of the gain is obviously the difference between the price at which the assessee sold the property and the price which the assessee had paid for acquiring the property.

11. Counsel contended that when the agricultural land was sold for the purpose of use as non-agricultural land, it amounted to the assessee bringing into existence a new asset and the date on which that asset was created was to be regarded as the date of acquisition, and the market value prevailing on that date should be treated as his cost of acquisition. In this context counsel referred to the decision reported in CIT v. Bai Shirinbai K. Kooka, [1962] 46 ITR 86 (SC). In the case relied on by counsel the court held that when a capital asset is converted into stock-in-trade and thereafer sold, the cost of acquisition should be taken with reference to the date on which the capital asset was converted into stock-in-trade. In this case no such question arises as the asset of the assessee was not treated as stock-in-trade and also there was no claim made on that ground.

12. All that the assessee did here was to sell the land which it had acquired several years earlier at a much lower price, and had agreed to execute the conveyance in favour of the nominees of the persons to whom the assessee agreed to sell the property. So far as the assessee was concerned, the person who agreed to buy the land was the one who was required to pay the price as fixed in the agreement.

13. This court had an occasion to consider a case which was more or less similar in the case of M. Nachiappan v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax., [1998] 230 ITR 98. In that case, the agricultural lands had been acquired by the karta of a Hindu undivided family which was later converted into housing sites at a partition. Thereafter, the assessee received some of the housing sites so formed which were later sold. The cost of acquisition of the land so sold was determined by the court as the cost at which the karta had acquired the agricultural lands and not the cost as on the date of conversion into house sites or the date of the partition at which the sites were allotted to the share of the assessee. The Tribunal has correctly held that the cost of acquisition is the cost of acquisition of the agricultural land and not the notional cost as on the date the lands were put to non-agricultural use.

14. We, therefore, answer the questions referred to us by holding that the Tribunal was right in giving the finding that the land ceased to be agricultural when the assessee agreed to sell the same for use as house sites; that the Tribunal was right in holding that the cost of acquisition is the cost to the assessee when it acquired the agricultural land; that the Tribunal was right in holding that capital gains accrued to the assessee and that such accrual was in the year in which the sale deeds were executed.