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Essorpe Mills Ltd. v. Central Provident Fund Commissioner And Others

Madras High Court
Feb 10, 2000
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Structured Summary of the Judgment delivered by E. Padmanabhan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner-company filed this writ petition seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari to call for and quash the order dated 15 November 1999 passed by the third respondent in C5.TN/CB/3924.Enf/CBE.V 99, an adjudication under section 7A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 ("EPF Act"). The impugned adjudication determined the dues payable by the petitioner for the period March 1998 to February 1999 and assessed total contributions of Rs. 17,97,576, with an express note that the employer would be liable to damages under section 14B for belated remittance.

Procedurally, the petitioner was given opportunities in the enquiry before the competent authority; on 20 September 1999 counsel appearing for the petitioner in the enquiry accepted the dues as per the enforcement officer's report dated 29 July 1999. The respondents had earlier conducted an inquiry under section 7A for the period August 1997 to February 1998, assessed dues of Rs. 13,27,209.40 with adjudication on 17 March 1999, a recovery certificate issued on 21 April 1999, and an order under section 8F served on the petitioner's bankers on 6 May 1999. The petitioner did not avail itself of the option to pay arrears by instalments earlier nor furnish a bank guarantee.

The petitioner informed the court that it had approached the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) and that a reference under section 15 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 ("SICA") was registered as Case No. 300 of 1999 (the opinion records registration as on 6 September 1999 in one place and as on 9 September 1999 in another). The petitioner argued that once proceedings are pending before the BIFR, the respondents could not pass adjudication or take action. The respondents countered that section 22 of SICA bars coercive enforcement (execution, distress) but does not bar passing an adjudication under section 7A of the EPF Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. When a case has been registered under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, whether the respondent could pass an order of adjudication under section 7A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952.
  2. Whether the writ petition is maintainable without the petitioner first exhausting the statutory remedy of appeal under section 7-I of the EPF Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as recorded)

  • The petitioner had sustained losses and had made a reference to the BIFR; the BIFR reference (registered under section 15 of SICA) prevents the respondents from taking any action, including passing an adjudication under section 7A, because section 22 of SICA bars proceedings including adjudication and enforcement while BIFR proceedings are pending.
  • On that basis, the adjudication passed by the third respondent was submitted to be illegal and without jurisdiction.

Respondents' Arguments (as recorded)

  • Section 22 of SICA does not bar passing an order of adjudication; it only bars coercive action (execution, distress or the like) against the properties of the sick industrial company without the consent of the Board (BIFR) or the Appellate Authority.
  • The impugned proceeding is an adjudication under section 7A and is not a distress/enforcement action; therefore it was competent to pass the adjudication. The petitioner had been afforded sufficient opportunity and had, on earlier occasions, accepted the quantum of dues determined.
  • The petitioner has an available statutory remedy of appeal under section 7-I of the EPF Act; since that remedy is efficacious, this Court should not ordinarily interfere by writ jurisdiction with the adjudication proceedings.
  • The respondents stated that while the matter is pending before BIFR they would not take coercive steps to enforce the adjudication without following the procedure required by section 22 of SICA (i.e., obtaining the Board's consent for distress/coercive action).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 144; [1993] 78 Comp Cas 803 Interpreted section 22(1) of SICA: the expression "proceedings" must be widely considered; during pendency of inquiry/scheme/appeal, proceedings for winding up or execution, distress or the like shall not be proceeded with except with the consent of the Board/Appellate Authority. The court relied on this interpretation to support the view that section 22 bars enforcement/distress proceedings but is to be read with its object of preserving the possibility of rehabilitation; it helped the court conclude that adjudication itself is not prohibited by section 22(1).
Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals, (1997) 10 SCC 649; [1997] 89 Comp Cas 1; AIR 1997 SC 2027 Explained that section 22 provides an embargo on execution, distress or the like, to avoid impediment to implementation of schemes; the language is wide but targeted to avoid impediments to sanctioned scheme implementation. The court cited this authority to reinforce that section 22 primarily prevents coercive recovery steps that would impede implementation of a rehabilitative scheme, rather than suspending the liability to contribute or forbidding adjudication.
Gram Panchayat v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., (1990) 2 SCC 440; AIR 1990 SC 1017; [1991] 71 Comp Cas 169 Held that section 22(1) suspends certain proceedings automatically (winding up; execution, distress or the like; appointment of receiver) while inquiry/scheme/appeal is pending, but such proceedings may continue with consent of Board/Appellate Authority. The court referenced this decision to show that the statutory bar under section 22 applies to execution/distress and similar proceedings and to emphasize that continuation is permitted only with BIFR/Appellate consent.
Tata Davy Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1997) 6 SCC 669; [1998] 93 Comp Cas 1; AIR 1998 SC 2928 Confirmed that section 22(1) prevents creditors from recovering arrears (such as taxes) by coercive process without the Board's consent during pendency of relevant SICA processes; also explained broader constitutional and legislative context. The court used this precedent to support the proposition that recovery by coercive processes is barred without Board consent, thereby distinguishing enforcement from the power to adjudicate liabilities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court dealt first with the question of maintainability of the writ petition in the presence of an alternative statutory remedy. It observed that an adjudication order under section 7A of the EPF Act is appealable under section 7-I of that Act and that the remedy of appeal is available and efficacious. Since the petitioner did not contend that the adjudication was ex parte or that it lacked opportunity, and because the adjudication record showed that sufficient opportunity had been afforded and the quantum of contributions was accepted by the petitioner on the materials before the authority, the court held that the writ court would not ordinarily interfere with such adjudication. The court therefore held that the petitioner should move the appellate forum under section 7-I and that the writ petition was liable to be rejected on this ground.

On the substantive contention based on section 22 of SICA that the registration of the BIFR reference barred the respondents from passing an adjudication under section 7A, the court analyzed the language and object of section 22 and surveyed Supreme Court jurisprudence. Relying on the cited precedents, the court concluded that section 22 prohibits enforcement measures such as execution, distress or the appointment of a receiver without the consent of the Board or the Appellate Authority, but does not prohibit the passing of adjudication orders under other statutes (in this case, section 7A of the EPF Act) nor does it suspend the liability to contribute under the EPF Act.

The court emphasized that what section 22(1) disables is resort to coercive or distress proceedings to implement adjudication; it does not suspend the delictual or statutory liability itself or the process of adjudication. The court noted the respondents' admission that no distress or coercive proceedings had yet been taken to enforce the impugned adjudication and accepted the respondents' statement that they would not take coercive steps against the assets of the company while the matter is pending before the BIFR except in accordance with section 22.

Accordingly, the court held that the impugned adjudication proceedings were not invalid merely because the petitioner had filed a reference before the BIFR, and that the petitioner must seek relief by way of the statutory appeal under section 7-I if it wished to challenge the adjudication.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is dismissed. The court directed that the petitioner should move an appeal under section 7-I of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The parties shall bear their respective costs. The connected Writ Miscellaneous Petition (W.M.P.) is also dismissed.

Implications (direct effects on the parties based on the judgment as recorded):

  • The adjudication dated 15 November 1999 under section 7A stands; the proper remedy to challenge it is an appeal under section 7-I of the EPF Act.
  • The liability to contribute under the EPF Act is not suspended by the mere registration of a reference before the BIFR under SICA.
  • Section 22 of SICA bars coercive enforcement measures (execution, distress or the like) against the properties of the company without the consent of the Board/Appellate Authority; the respondents represented that they will not take coercive action in breach of that provision while BIFR proceedings are pending.
  • The court applied existing Supreme Court precedents in reaching its conclusion; the judgment does not purport to lay down a novel principle beyond the application of those authorities.

End of summary based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

E. Padmanabhan, J.:— In this writ petition the petitioner-company prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari calling for the records in respect of the order dated November 15, 1999, passed by the third respondent in C5.TN/CB/3924.Enf/CBE.V 99 and quash the same.

2. Heard Mr. C.S Dhanasekaran, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner and of Mr. V. Vibishanan, learned standing counsel appearing for the respondents. On behalf of the respondents a counter has been filed. With the consent of counsel for either side the writ petition itself is taken up for final disposal. The order impugned is an order of adjudication dated November 15, 1999, passed by the second respondent, who is the competent authority under section 7A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The impugned proceeding is an adjudication proceeding passed by the third respondent in exercise of powers conferred under section 7A of the Act and the dues payable by the writ petitioner for the period from March, 1998, to February, 1999, in respect of the petitioner's establishment determined on the basis of materials collected by the second respondent and its subordinate.

3. In fact before the second respondent sufficient opportunity had been afforded to the writ petitioner and on September 20, 1999, counsel who had appeared for the writ petitioner in the enquiry, accepted the dues arrived at by the second respondent, based upon the enforcement officer's report dated July 29, 1999. The content of the said report has also been accepted by the writ petitioner. In terms of the impugned proceedings a sum of Rs. 17,97,576 is the total contribution due and payable by the petitioner. It is also made clear that the employer would be liable for damages under section 14B of the Act, for belated remittance of contributions.

4. Mr. Dhanasekaran, learned counsel for the writ petitioner, contended that the writ petitioner had sustained loss during the last two years and it has approached the BIFR and the said BIFR had just registered the reference under section 15 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act on September 6, 1999, as Case No. 300 of 1999, and hence when proceedings are pending before the BIFR, no action can be taken by the respondent, or an order of adjudication or order could be passed by the respondents.

5. According to learned counsel, the proceedings of adjudication passed by the third respondent are illegal, without jurisdiction, as section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act bars the respondents from taking any action including passing an order of adjudication under section 7A as well as enforcement of the same. It was mainly contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act bars the respondent from taking an action or taking up adjudication or passing an order of adjudication as proceedings are pending before the BIFR.

6. Per contra, Mr. V. Vibhishanan, learned counsel for the respondent contends that section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act will not bar the respondent from passing on order of adjudication and what is provided for by the section is taking coercive action against the petitioner or its establishment.

7. In the counter filed on behalf of the respondents, it has been stated that the petitioner has defaulted in payment of provident fund and other contributions for the period from August, 1997, to February, 1998, and an inquiry under section 7A of the Act was conducted and the dues were assessed at Rs. 13,27,209.40 and appropriate adjudication proceedings were passed on March 17, 1999, and a recovery certificate was also issued to the recovery officer on April 21, 1999. An order under section 8F of the Act was also served on the petitioner's bankers on May, 6, 1999. When the petitioner was called upon to express its consent for payment of the arrears in instalments, the petitioner had not chosen to avail of the same, nor had it furnished the required bank guarantee.

8. The petitioner defaulted in payment of provident fund and other dues from March, 1998, onwards. Hence, after following the procedures prescribed, the impugned order of assessment has been passed after serving notice on the petitioner. The petitioner was represented by its managing director and a member of the board. At their request, hearing was adjourned on four occasions.

9. After affording” sufficient opportunity, the order of adjudication has been passed after considering the entire facts and there had been no dispute about the quantum of contributions payable by the petitioner. The petitioner had produced a letter from the BIFR to the effect that the petitioner's application has been registered in reference as Case No. 300 of 1999 on September 9, 1999. Excepting registration, there was nothing to indicate that any further proceedings had been proceeded with by the said BIFR, or a proceeding is pending consideration, nor any direction has been issued so far.

10. According to the respondent, passing an order of adjudication under section 7A is not a distress action, which is barred by or prohibited by section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, as the said provision merely restricts distress action or proceedings for recovery of the amount. The impugned proceeding is only an adjudication proceeding and not a distress action nor an enforcement of the adjudication proceedings.

11. In respect of an earlier recovery order, the petitioner filed W.P No. 12078 of 1999 and after hearing either side, this court ordered payment of the amount outstanding in instalments, which instalment the petitioner had paid up to November, 30, 1999. The request for modification of the earlier order passed in W.P No. 12078 of 1999, was dismissed. It is pointed out by the respondent that the petitioner's attempt is to delay the statutory payment and liability. It is further contended that proceeding's passed under section 7A of the Act could be challenged by preferring an appeal under section 7-I of the Act. section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act is not a bar to pass the impugned proceedings and the petitioner cannot also invoke the provisions of section 22 of the Act. The respondent prays for dismissal of the writ petition.

12. The points that arise for consideration are:

(i) When ‘a case has been registered under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act 1985, “Whether the respondent could pass an order of adjudication under section 7A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act? and

(ii) Whether the writ petition is maintainable without exhausting the remedy of statutory appeal?

13. Taking up the second point for consideration, it has been rightly pointed out that an order of adjudication passed under section 7A of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, is appealable under section 7-I of the Act, which is a statutory remedy of appeal and it is an efficacious remedy. When the remedy of appeal is available and when it is efficacious, this court will not normally interfere with the impugned adjudication proceedings.

14. It is not the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the adjudication proceeding was behind the back of the petitioner nor is it the contention that no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner. The very impugned proceeding's would show that sufficient opportunity had been afforded to the petitioner and the quantum of contribution payable was arrived at on the materials collected and admitted by the writ petitioner. That being so, the petitioner, even assuming that the impugned proceeding's are liable to be challenged has to move the appellate forum constituted under section 7-I of the Act. Hence on this point this court holds that the writ petition is liable to be rejected and the petitioner is directed to move appeal under section 7-I of the Act.

15. Mr. Dhanasekaran, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, in support of his contention that no action, nor an order of adjudication could be passed by the respondents when once a reference has been registered in respect of the petitioner's industrial undertaking and all proceedings including adjudication are barred.

16. Per contra, it is contended by Mr. V. Vibhishanan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents that section 22 is not a bar to passing” orders of adjudication nor does section 22 suspend the operation of the provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, or the liability to contribute, and what is disabled or prohibited under section 22 being enforcement or recovery of money due from the petitioner by coercive action alone shall not be resorted to by way of execution, distress or the like. What is relied upon is sub-section (1) of section 22. Section 22 of the Act reads thus:

“22. Suspension of legal proceedings, contracts, etc. —(1) Where in respect of an industrial company, an inquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration or a sanctioned scheme is under implementation or where an appeal under section 25 relating to an industrial company is pending, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) or any other law or the memorandum and articles of association of the industrial company or any other instrument having effect under the said Act or other law, no proceeding's for the winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof (and no suit for the recovery of money for the enforcement of security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans, or advance granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority.”

17. This point is no longer res integra and section 22 was the subject matter of consideration before the apex court in a number of cases.

18. In Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharasthra Ltd., [1993] 78 Comp Cas 803; (1993) 2 SCC 144 the scope of section 22(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, A.M Ahmadi J., as he then was, speaking for the Bench after analysing the entire statutory provisions, scheme and the object of the enactment held that the expression “proceedings” in section 22(1) must be widely considered and held thus (page 813):

“The basic idea is to revive sick units, if necessary, by extending further financial assistance after a thorough examination of the units by experts and only when the unit is found to be no more capable of rehabilitation, that the option of winding up may be resorted to. It is for that reason that section 22(1) provides that during the pendency of (i) an inquiry under section 16 or (ii) preparation or consideration of a scheme under section 17 or (iii) an appeal under section 25, no proceedings for winding up of the concerned industrial company or for execution, distress or the like shall lie or be proceeded with in relation to the properties of that concern unless the BIFR/Appellate Authority has consented thereto.”

(emphasis1 supplied)

19. In Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals, [1997] 89 Comp Cas 1; (1997) 10 SCC 649 : AIR 1997 SC 2027, while considering the language of section 22 as well as the object behind the section, their Lordships held thus (page 10 of Comp Cas):

“In order to see that the scheme is successfully implemented and no impediment is caused to the successful carrying out of the scheme, the Board is enabled to have a say when the steps for recovery of the amounts or other coercive proceeding's are taken against the sick industrial company which, during the relevant time, acts under the guidance/control or supervision of the Board (BIFR). Any step for execution, distress or the like against the properties of the industrial company or other similar steps should not be pursued, which will cause delay or impediment in the implementation of the sanctioned scheme. In order to safeguard such state of affairs, an embargo or bar is placed under section 22 of the Act against any step for execution, distress or the like or other similar proceedings against the company without the consent of the Board or as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. The language of section 22 of the Act is certainly wide. But, in the totality of the circumstances, the safeguard is only against the impediment, that is likely to be caused in the implementation of the scheme.”

20. In Gram Panchayat v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., (1990) 2 SCC 440 : AIR 1990 SC 1017; [1991] 71 Comp Cas 169 it has been held thus (page 172):

“Section 22(1) provides that in case the enquiry under section 16 is pending or any scheme referred to under section 17 is under preparation or consideration by the Board or any appeal under section 25 is pending, then certain proceedings against the sick industrial company are to be suspended or presumed to be suspended. The nature of the proceedings, which are automatically suspended are: (1) winding up of the industrial company; (2) proceedings for execution, distress or the like against the properties of the sick industrial company and (3) proceedings for the appointment of a receiver. The proceedings in respect of these matters could, however, be continued against the sick industrial company with the consent or approval of the Board or of the Appellate Authority as the case may be.”

21. In Tata Davy Ltd. v. State of Orissa, [1998] 93 Comp Cas 1; (1997) 6 SCC 669 : AIR 1998 SC 2928, the apex court held thus (page 5 of Comp Cas):

“Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., (1990) 2 SCC 440 : AIR 1990 SC 1017; [1991] 71 Comp Cas 169 judgment covers these appeals. Arrears of taxes and the like due from sick industrial companies that satisfy the conditions set out in section 22(1) of the Central Act cannot be recovered by coercive process unless the said Board gives its consent thereto.

The Central Act is enacted under entry 52 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule. The said entry 52 empowers Parliament to legislate in respect of ‘Industries’ the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be in the ‘public interest’. The Central Act declares that it is ‘for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of article 39 of the Constitution’ namely, ‘that the ownership and control of the material resources of, the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good’ and ‘that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and, means of production to the common detriment’. The Central Act does not impair or interfere with the rights of the States to legislate with respect to sales tax under entry 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. In the larger interest of the industrial health of the nation, section 22 of the Central Act requires all creditors seeking to recover their dues from the sick industrial companies in respect of whom an inquiry under section 16 is pending or a scheme is under preparation or consideration or has been sanctioned, to obtain the consent of the said Board to such recovery. If such consent is not secured and the recovery is deferred, the creditors' remedy is protected, for the period of deferment is, by reason of sub-section (5) of section 22, excluded in the computation of the period of limitation. The words ‘any other law’ in section 22 cannot, therefore, be read in the manner suggested by learned counsel for the respondents.

The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals, [1997] 89 Comp Cas 1, 11 (SC), judgment dealt with a sick industrial company, which was enabled to collect amounts like sales tax after the date of the sanctioned scheme. This court said, ‘such amounts like sales tax, etc. which the sick industrial company is enabled to collect after the date of the sanctioned scheme, legitimately belonging to the Revenue, cannot be and could not have been intended to be covered within section 22 of the Act’. It added that the issue that had arisen before it had not arisen in the case of Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., (1990) 2 SCC 440 : AIR 1990 SC 1017; [1991] 71 Comp Cas 169. It did not appear therefrom or from any other decision of this court or of the High Courts ‘that in any one of them, the liability of the sick company dealt with therein itself arose, for the first time after the date of the sanctioned scheme. At any rate, in none of those cases a situation arose whereby the sick industrial unit was enabled to collect tax due to the Revenue from the customers after the sanctioned scheme but the sick unit simply folded its hands and declined to pay it over to the Revenue, for which proceedings for recovery had to be taken’. Clearly, the facts in Deputy Commercial Tax Officer v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals, [1997] 89 Comp Cas 1 (SC) differ from the facts of Vallabh Glass Works Ltd.'s case, (1990) 2 SCC 440 : AIR 1990 SC 1017; [1991] 71 Comp Cas 169 and those before us. The reference to Corromandal Pharmaceuticals, [1997] 89 Comp Cas 1 (SC) is, therefore, inapposite.

We hold, in the premises, that the respondents cannot recover the aforementioned arrears of sales tax from the appellants without first seeking the consent of the said Board in this behalf.”

22. In the light of the said catena of pronouncements, the contention advanced by Mr. Dhanasekaran, learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be sustained and the contentions advanced by Mr. V. Vibhishanan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents have to be sustained. What is prohibited under section 22(1) is the enforcement and not the passing of an order of adjudication under section 7A of the Act. The adjudication proceedings under section 7A have not been barred or prohibited, nor the contributions to be paid under the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act is suspended, and what is provided for in section 22(1) being, resorting to coercive or distress proceeding's to implement the adjudication proceedings. On this ground the impugned proceeding's are not liable to be invalidated.

23. It is fairly admitted that so far no distress action or coercive proceedings or the like had been taken to enforce the adjudication proceeding's. It is fairly stated by Mr. V. Vibhishanan, learned counsel for the respondents that when the matter is pending before the BIFR, the respondent will not take coercive steps or distress action against the assets of the company for the enforcement of law arrears except by following the procedure prescribed by the said section 22.

24. The section makes it clear that no proceedings for execution, distress or the like against any of the properties of the petitioner-company shall be taken or be proceeded with except with the consent of the Board. Thus merely because the petitioner had moved the BIFR, it cannot be said that no order of adjudication could be passed against the petitioner under section 7A of the Act. Hence the first contention raised by the petitioner also fails. It is needless to add that as fairly stated by learned counsel for the respondent, the respondent will not take any distress or coercive proceeding's to recover the amount with respect to which an order of adjudication has been passed under section 7A of the Act. But, it will be open to the respondents to take any other action as may be open to the respondents in terms of the provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, as the liability to contribute has not been suspended under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.

25. Hence the writ petition is dismissed. The parties shall bear their respective costs. Consequently, connected W.M.P is also dismissed.