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Pakkiammal Petitioner v. Anaiappan

Madras High Court
Jul 14, 2000
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 392 of 1989 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Ulundurpet. The petitioner sought restoration of an earlier petition filed under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC (I.A. No. 1597 of 1994), which had been dismissed for default in payment of costs on 18.1.1995. He filed I.A. No. 1341 of 1995 under Section 151, CPC to restore the Order 9, Rule 9 petition. The lower court initially allowed restoration on condition of payment of costs by 18.1.1995; the petitioner did not comply, attributing non-compliance to ill-health. The petition to restore was ultimately dismissed by the lower court (fair and decretal order dated 1.4.1997). The petitioner lodged the present civil revision petition challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a court may grant an extension of time or restore a petition where the application for extension (or restoration) is moved after the expiry of the time originally fixed—specifically, whether the lower court erred in dismissing an application filed under Section 151, CPC to restore an Order 9, Rule 9 petition.
  2. Whether a petition filed under Section 151, CPC without a separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (to condone delay) is maintainable where the relief sought is essentially an enlargement of time or restoration of an earlier petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner relied on precedents holding that courts possess ample power to enlarge time even when the application is made after the expiry of the originally fixed period (decisions interpreting Section 148, CPC), and argued the lower court should have extended time or restored the petition instead of dismissing it.
  • The petitioner contended his non-compliance with the condition (payment of costs) was due to ill-health and that the lower court should have taken a lenient view and allowed restoration, imposing cost if necessary.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondents argued the petition was filed late (petition filed on 22.2.1995 though the period to file had expired on 18.2.1995) and there was no separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay; hence the petition was not maintainable.
  • They also argued that the precedents cited by the petitioner dealt with Section 148, CPC, whereas the petitioner invoked Section 151, CPC, and therefore those authorities were not directly applicable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Periaswami Asari v. The President, Eluppur Panchayat Board and others, 1972 TLNJ 603 The wording of Section 148 allows extension of time even if the original period fixed has expired; but Section 148 cannot be applied where the court has become functus officio (i.e., the suit is finally disposed of). If the court retains control, it may extend time; extension need not be sought before expiry. Cited by the petitioner to support the proposition that a court may enlarge time even after the prescribed period; the High Court relied on this principle to hold the lower court could have extended time or restored the petition.
Bokaro and Ramgur Ltd. v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1965 Cal. 308 Even where an order prescribes a time and prescribes dismissal if not complied with, the court has jurisdiction under Section 148 to extend time if sufficient cause is shown, even after expiry; the application merely invokes that jurisdiction. Relied upon (as interpreted by the Division Bench and Full Bench authorities) to support the view that courts have jurisdiction under Section 148 to enlarge time after expiry and that this principle supports granting relief here.
AIR 1961 SC 882 (Supreme Court decision cited) Authoritative judicial pronouncement interpreted to mean courts can exercise jurisdiction to enlarge time under Section 148 even after expiry where sufficient cause is shown. Referenced as an authoritative precedent interpreted consistently with the Calcutta and Allahabad decisions; used to buttress the view that courts retain power to enlarge time in appropriate circumstances.
AIR 1972 All. 246 (Full Bench of Allahabad High Court) Interpreted alongside other authorities to support the proposition that courts possess jurisdiction to enlarge time under Section 148 in appropriate cases. Relied upon as consistent authority supporting the power to enlarge time and applied by the Court in concluding that the lower court could have exercised its powers to allow restoration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the material on record and the submissions of both sides. It accepted the petitioner's reliance on authorities that interpret Section 148, CPC as conferring discretionary power to enlarge time even after the expiry of the originally fixed period, subject to the court retaining seisin of the matter (i.e., not being functus officio). The opposing argument — that those cases dealt with Section 148 while the present petition was filed under Section 151, CPC — was considered but the Court emphasized that the focus must be on the relief sought rather than the precise provision quoted by the litigant.

The Court analyzed the relationship between Sections 148 and 151: Section 148 expressly authorizes enlargement of time, and Section 151 embodies inherent powers to make orders necessary for ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process. The Court held these provisions should not be read in isolation; they are complementary and may be read together when the circumstances warrant relief. Given the short delay (five days), the petitioner's explanation (ill-health) and the authorities showing courts may exercise discretion to enlarge time post-expiry, the Court found the lower court applied an unduly strict standard of proof and erred in dismissing the restoration petition as a dilatory tactic without adequate basis.

The Court also noted the accepted practice that where parties acknowledge fault and seek extension, courts should adopt a liberal approach, ordinarily imposing costs rather than refusing relief where sufficient cause is shown. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court concluded that the lower court should have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction to allow restoration (or enlargement of time) rather than dismiss the petition.

Holding and Implications

CIVIL REVISION PETITION ALLOWED; the fair and decretal order dated 1.4.1997 made in I.A. No. 1341 of 1995 in I.A. No. 1597 of 1994 in O.S. No. 392 of 1989 is set aside.

Consequences: The principal immediate effect is that the impugned order of the lower court (dated 1.4.1997) has been quashed and the relief sought by the petitioner in this revision has been granted. The Court ordered no costs. The opinion confines its reasoning to the facts of the case and the proper exercise of judicial discretion under Sections 148 and 151, CPC as interpreted by cited authorities; it does not purport to lay down a wider new precedent beyond applying these principles to the present facts.

Show all summary ...

1. The plaintiff in the suit in O.S No. 392 of 1989 on the file of the Court of Principal District Munsif, Ulundurpet is the petitioner in this civil revision petition and he has filed this revision against the fair and decretal order dated 1.4.1997 made in I.A No. 1341 of 1995 in I.A No. 1597 of 1994 in O.S No. 392 of 1989.

2. When the above matter was taken up for consideration, in the presence of both the learned counsel, on perusal of the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, what comes to be known is that I.A No. 1341 of 1995 had been filed before the lower court under Section 151, CPC praying to restore the petition filed under Order 9, Rule 9 by the petitioner which had been dismissed by the court below on 18.1.1995; that the court below had allowed the petition filed on the part of the petitioner on condition to pay the costs on or before 18.1.1995, but the petitioner would come forward to say that in spite of the same being intimated by his lawyer, on account of ill-health, he was not able to comply with the condition imposed by this Court resulting in the order passed in favour of the petitioner having come to be lapsed.

3. On the part of the other side, it would be argued that the petition had been dismissed on 18.1.1995 and in fact, within 18.2.1995, the petitioner should have filed the petition, but only on 22.2.1995, the petition had been filed without even an application to condone the delay of five days that had occurred in filing the very petition to restore the same under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC. Hence, having filed the said petition without a separate petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, the same is not maintainable in law and hence would plead that the petition would become liable only to be dismissed.

4. Based on these pleadings and arguments, the court below rejecting the reasons offered on the part of the petitioner that he was not keeping good health since no materials were placed on record to substantiate the said reason and hence, remarking that only to adopt a delatory tactics, the petitioner had come forward to file the petition to restore the earlier petition and would dismiss the same.

5. It all happened in the petitioner filing the petition under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC before the lower court seeking to restore I.A No. 1597 of 1994 which was dismissed for default in payment of costs as fixed by the court on 18.1.1995 It is only to restore the petition filed under Order 9, Rule 9, CPC by the petitioner, he had filed yet another petition under Section 151, CPC and the same having come to be dismissed by the lower court, now the petitioner has come forward to file the above CRP on certain grounds as brought forth in the grounds of the civil revision petition.

6. During the arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner would cite two already decided cases relating to the facts of the case in hand, the first one delivered in Periaswami Asari v. The President. Eluppur Panchayat Board and others, 1972 TLNJ 603 and the second one delivered in M. Ponnaiyyan v. M. Muthayyan and others, 1981 TLNJ 332. So far as the first decision cited above is concerned, it is held:

“The wording of Section 148 allows extension of time even if the original period fixed has expired. It has been held that when the effect of the order, in the event of non-compliance, has to operate automatically without further intervention of the court, Section 148 cannot be applied as the court ceases to be seized of the matter and becomes functus officio. This principle will apply when the suit is finally disposed of. If the order is not final and the court retains control over it and seized of the matter, it will have power to make an appropriate order extending time. The court can grant time, taking note of events and circumstances which happened within the time fixed. It is not necessary that the extension should be asked for before the expiry of the period.”

So far as the second decision of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court reported in Bokaro and Ramgur Ltd., v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1965 Cal. 308 is concerned, it is held:

“Even in cases where an order is made by the Court for doing a thing within a particular time and the order further provides that the application, suit or appeal shall stand dismissed if the thing is not done within the time fixed the Court has jurisdiction, if sufficient cause is made out to extend the time even when the application for extension of time is made after the expiry of the time fixed. It is not the application for grant of further time, whether made before or after the expiry of the time granted, which confers jurisdiction on the Court. The Court possesses the jurisdiction under Section 148 C.P.C to enlarge the time and the application merely invokes that jurisdiction”. Therefore, in view of the authoritative judicial pronouncement of the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 882, which decision, in my view, has been correctly interpreted by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Bokaro and Ramgur Ltd., v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1965 Cal. 308 and by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1972 All. 246. I am of the view that if sufficient cause is shown to extend the time even when the application for extension of time is made after the expiry or the time originally fixed, the Court has got ample power under Section 148, CPC, to enlarge the time, and it cannot be said that the Court has lost seisin over the matter merely because the final order has been passed.”

7. Both the above orders are pointed to the ample powers conferred on courts, in enlarging the time even when the application for extension of time is made after the expiry of the time originally fixed. By such arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner would substantiate his point stating that the lower court instead of dismissing the application filed on his part, should have allowed the same with extension of time already granted even if the condition imposed had not been complied with within the prescribed time.

8. On the part of the other side, it would be argued that the petitions in those decisions have been made under Section 148, CPC wherein the petition filed by the petitioners herein was under Section 151 CPC and hence the proposition evolved in those two decisions are not applicable to the case in hand.

9. Time and again, the upper forums of law have concluded that on account of misquoting the provisions of law by a party would not deny him the proper remedy that is sought for in the petition. Hence, it is the prayer that is to be taken care of and given importance to, and not the provision of law under which the petition is filed. There, is no denying of the fact that regarding enlargement of time, Section 148 confers ample discretionary powers and Section 151 also speaks of the inherent powers conferred on Courts to make any order that is necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. What is relevant at this juncture is, in such matters, neither Section 148 nor Section 151, CPC should be read in isolation of the other. On the contrary, both these. Sections should be read along with when the result could be easily arrived at in the circumstance as one that is made in the case in hand. The lower court should have easily allowed the petition filed on the part of the petitioner seeking extension of time. On the contrary, expecting a very strict standard of proof, it has dismissed the petition which is not correct.

10. On the other hand, even if circumstances favour a little for allowing such a petition, if the parties come forward to realise the fault and seek for extension of time to comply with the order, the courts are expected to be liberal in conceding such requests made on the part of the parties on imposition of cost on the petitioner. In the case in hand, it is only a delay of five days that had occurred and the court could have taken a lenient view and in exercise of its powers conferred by law, such as, Section 148 and 151, CPC, the lower court should have allowed the petition filed by the petitioner.

11. For all the above discussions held, this Court is fully satisfied with the contentions raised on the part of the petitioner to allow the above civil revision petition granting the relief as sought for by the petitioner.

12. In result, the above civil revision petition succeeds and the same is allowed. No costs. The fair and decretal order dated 1.4.1997 made in IA. No. 134.1 of 1995 in I.A No. 1597 of 1994 in O.S No. 392 of 1989 on the file of Principal District. Munsif, Ulundurpettai is hereby set aside.