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Somasundaram Petitioner v. Palani.
Structured Summary of the Opinion — S.C. No. 9 of 1997
Factual and Procedural Background
The revision petitioner (plaintiff in S.C. No. 9 of 1997 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Polur) sued for recovery of money on the basis of a promissory note (Ex.A.1) dated 10.1.1994, alleging that the respondent borrowed Rs. 3,200 and agreed to pay interest. A demand was made under Ex.A.2. The defendant/respondent replied denying execution of the promissory note and denying the borrowing; he alleged earlier paddy dealings and that the plaintiff had forged his signature and fabricated the promissory note.
At trial, the plaintiff gave evidence as P.W.1 and one attestor to Ex.A.1 gave evidence as P.W.2. The defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and another witness (the scribe of Ex.A.1) as D.W.2. Exhibits PWs 1 to 3 were marked for the plaintiff and Exx.D-1 and D-2 for the defendant. The trial Court dismissed the suit. The plaintiff challenged that dismissal by filing the present revision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial Court correctly dismissed the suit primarily on the basis of a comparison of signatures between Ex.A.1 and signatures in the defendant's written statement and vakalat, documents which were executed after the promissory note was filed into Court.
- Whether a Court may, in the absence of expert evidence or admitted pre-dispute specimens, base its decision on a lay comparison of disputed signatures with admitted signatures (and whether signatures on documents executed after the dispute are appropriate specimens for comparison).
- Whether this Court (in revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code) may re-appreciate evidence or whether re-appreciation would exceed its jurisdiction, as contended by respondent counsel.
Arguments of the Parties
Revision Petitioner (Plaintiff) — Arguments
- The trial Court's procedure of reaching a decision mainly by comparing signatures was improper; the Court should not have given decisive weight to such comparison.
- The comparison made by the trial Court used signatures appearing in the written statement and in the vakalat, both of which came into existence after the promissory note was filed and after the dispute had arisen; therefore those signatures were not proper admitted specimens for comparison.
- No document anterior to the transaction was produced in Court to prove an admitted signature that could legitimately be compared with Ex.A.1.
- Evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 supports the genuineness of the transaction and Ex.A.1; the evidence of D.W.2 should not have been relied upon by the trial Court.
Respondent (Defendant) — Arguments
- The revisional Court should not re-appreciate the evidence because such re-appreciation would amount to acting as a court of first appeal, which according to respondent counsel is beyond the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code; respondent supported the reasoning and conclusion of the trial Court and sought dismissal of the revision.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| O. Bliarathan v. K. Sudhakaran and another, (1996) 2 SCC 704 | Judicial caution that while a Judge may compare disputed and admitted writings, it is prudent not to base a decisive finding on the Judge's unaided comparison; expert opinion should ordinarily be obtained. | The Court relied on this authority to criticize the trial Court's primary reliance on a lay comparison of signatures and to support the conclusion that the trial Court's procedure was improper. |
| State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram, (1979) 2 SCC 158 | Earlier authority explaining the prudence and caution required when a Judge compares disputed handwriting with admitted handwriting without expert assistance. | The Court cited this decision (as followed in O. Bliarathan) to reinforce the principle that sole reliance on a judge's comparison is undesirable, particularly when such comparison forms the "sheet-anchor" of the case. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, 1992 (3) SCC 700 (at p. 730) | Though Section 73 of the Evidence Act empowers the court to compare disputed and specimen writings, prudence demands extreme caution in venturing an opinion based on mere comparison—especially where specimen writings are of poor evidential quality. | The Court invoked this principle to underscore that even if statutory power to compare exists, the trial Court should have been slow to base its finding on mere comparison with the documents used by it. |
| Dhanakodi Padayachi v. Muthukumaraswami, 1997 (II) M.L.J. 37 | Judicial view (by Raju, J. as he then was) aligning with the cautionary approach to comparisons of handwriting by the Judge without expert assistance. | The Court noted that this decision took a similar approach and used it to bolster the conclusion that the trial Court's method was not legally proper. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The revisional Court proceeded step-by-step as follows (based strictly on the materials in the opinion):
- Identified the main basis for dismissal by the trial Court: a comparison of the signature on Ex.A.1 (the promissory note) with signatures appearing on the defendant's written statement and vakalat. The trial Court found differences and treated that as a strong circumstance against the plaintiff, concluding forgery.
- Recited established jurisprudence (O. Bliarathan; Pali Ram; Sukhdev Singh; Dhanakodi Padayachi) that, while a Judge may compare disputed and admitted writings, prudence and caution require hesitation to base a decisive finding solely on the Judge's unaided comparison and that expert opinion should ordinarily be obtained.
- Found that, even if the trial Court had power to compare signatures, it compared the disputed signature in Ex.A.1 with signatures from the written statement and vakalat—documents executed after the dispute and after Ex.A.1 was filed into Court—making them improper specimens for legitimate comparison in the opinion of the revisional Court.
- Examined primary evidence: the Court reviewed the testimony of P.W.1 (plaintiff) and P.W.2 (an attestor to Ex.A.1) and inspected Ex.A.1. The Court found that P.W.2 supported execution of the promissory note and passing of consideration and that P.W.1 denied maintaining accounts that would show the defendant's signatures in the manner alleged by the defendant.
- Observed that the defendant's allegation (that the plaintiff had forged signatures from plaintiff's accounts maintained for paddy dealings) was not supported by production of such accounts; the plaintiff had not been prevented from producing any such accounts if they existed.
- Held that the evidence of D.W.2 (the scribe) should not have been relied upon in the way the trial Court did, since reliance on D.W.2 could imply making him a party to the alleged fraud—an inference the revisional Court saw no basis for.
- Concluded that the trial Court had failed to consider relevant materials (the attestor's testimony and other evidence in support of the promissory note) and had instead considered irrelevant materials (the post-dispute specimens and D.W.2's evidence) and based its conclusion on those irrelevant materials.
The Court thus found the trial Court's judgment legally tainted because its decisive reliance on a lay signature comparison—particularly with post-dispute documents—was not in accordance with the prudence mandated by cited Supreme Court authorities.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revisional Court set aside the judgment of the lower Court and allowed the Revision. S.C. No. 9 of 1997 (on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Polur) was decreed in favour of the revision petitioner with costs; the revision petitioner was also awarded costs in the revision.
Implications
- Direct effect on the parties: The trial Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit is reversed; the plaintiff's suit based on Ex.A.1 is decreed and the plaintiff (revision petitioner) is entitled to costs both in the trial Court matter and in this revision.
- On broader law: The Court applied and reiterated existing Supreme Court authority cautioning against a Judge's relying solely on his own unaided comparison of disputed signatures—particularly when the specimens used are documents executed after the dispute arose. The opinion did not purport to create a new legal principle beyond the existing precedents it cited.
1. Plaintiff in S.C No. 9 of 1997, on the file of District Munsif's Court, Polur, is the revision petitioner.
2. Suit filed by revision petitioner was one for recovery of money on the basis of a promissory note alleged to have been executed by the respondent herein.
3. It is alleged that as per Ex.A.1 dated 10.1.1994, respondent herein borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,200 from plaintiff, agreeing to pay interest which is also stated in the promissory note. Demand was made under Ex.A.2, to settle the transaction, for which the defendant sent a reply denying the execution and the borrowing. The suit was, therefore, necessitated.
4. In the written statement filed by the defendant, respondent herein, he denied the execution and stated that as between himself and plaintiff, there had been earlier transactions in dealing with paddy, and plaintiff has forged his signature from the accounts and has fabricated the promissory note.
5. The trial Court examined P.W.1 (plaintiff) and also one of the attestors to Ex.A.1 as P.W.2 Defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and another witness as (scribe of Ex.A1 as D.W.2 P.Ws 1 to 3 were marked on the side of plaintiff, and Exx.D-1 and D-2 were marked on the side of defendant.
6. The lower Court dismissed the suit, and the same is challenged in this revision.
7. One of the main reasons for dismissing the suit is that the lower Court compared the signature in Ex.A.1 with the signature of the defendant in the written statement and vakalath, and found that there is difference. The lower Court took it as a big circumstance against the plaintiff and came to the conclusion that the document is forged. Learned Counsel for petitioner submitted that the procedure adopted by the lower Court is not proper, and a decision should not have been arrived by lower court, mainly relying on the signatures. It was further argued that the comparison is only on the basis of written statement and the vakalat at which came into existence after the reply notice and after the promissory note was filed in Court. No document anterior to the transaction been filed before Court, to prove the admitted signature on the basis of which alone comparison could be made. Learned Counsel further argued that the evidence of PWs. 1 and 2 would conclusively show that the transaction is true. It was further argued that the evidence of D.W.2 should not have been relied on.
8. Learned Counsel for respondent submitted that this Court may not re-appreciate the evidence as it is a court of first appeal, as the same will be beyond the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of C.P.C He supported the reasoning of the lower Court, and wanted the revision to be dismissed.
9. After hearing learned Counsel for both parties, I feel that the procedure adopted by the Court below is not proper. As rightly contended by Learned Counsel for petitioner, the main reason for dismissing the suit is based on a comparison of the signature. It is settled law that the Court cannot act as an expert. In a recent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in O. Bliarathan v. K. Sudhakaran and another, (1996) 2 SCC 704. Their Lordships followed an earlier decision of the Supreme Court reported in State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram., (1979) 2 SCC 158” and held as follows in paragraph 18. Relevant portion reads thus:
“Though it is the province of the expert to act as judge or jury after a scientific comparison of the dispute signatures with admitted signatures, the caution administered by this Court is to the course to be adopted in such situations could not have been ignored unmindful of the serious rapercussions arising out of the decision to be ultimately rendered. To quote, it had been held in Pali Ram, (1979) 2 SCC 158” SCC p. 168, para 30.
‘The matter can be viewed from another angle, also. Although there is no legal bar to the Judge using his own eyes to compare the disputed writing with the admitted writing, even without the aid of the evidence of any handwriting expert, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence and caution, hesitate to base his finding with regard to the identity of a handwriting which forms the sheet-anchor of the prosecution case against a person accused of an offence, solely on comparison made by himself. It is, therefore, not advisable that a Judge should take upon himself the task of comparing the admitted writing with the disputed one to find out whether the two agree with each other; and the prudent course is to obtain the opinion and assistance of an expert.”
The necessity for adhering to the said sound advice and guidance is all the more necessary in a case where hundreds of signatures are disputed, and the striking dissimilarities noticed by the court at the time of trial of the election petition.”
10. In an earlier decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, 1992 (3) S.C.C 700 at page 730, it was held thus:
“…Although the section (Section 73 of Evidence Act) specifically empowers the court to compare the disputed writings with the specimen/admitted writings shown to be genuine, prudence demands that the court should be extremely slow in venturing an opinion on the basis of mere comparison, more so, when the quality of evidence in respect of specimen/admitted writings is not of high standard. . …”
11. Raju, J., as he then was, has also taken a similar view in the decision reported in Dhanakodi Padayachi v. Muthukumaraswami, 1997 (II) M.L.J 37.
12. The Court below has concluded its judgment in para. 16 thus:
13. It is clear therefrom that the main reason for dismissing the suit is comparison of the signatures. Even though the Court may have the power to compare the signatures, there must be some admitted signature of the defendant, on the basis of which a comparison will have to be made. In this case, a comparison has been made on the basis of signatures affixed by defendant in the vakalath and written statement, which are documents that have come into existence after the dispute arose, and after the promissory note in question was filed into Court along with plaint. A comparison should not have been made on the basis of those signatures. If that be so, it has to be held that the comparison was not made in accordance with law, even though the Court is empowered to make a comparison.
14. I have gone through the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2, and also perused Ex.A-1. On going by their evidence, I feel that the transaction pleaded by plaintiff is true. P.W.2 is one of the attestors to the promissory note, and he has also spoken about the execution of the promissory note and also about the passing of consideration. According to the defendant, the plaintiff might have forged the signature from the accounts maintained by plaintiff in connection with paddy transactions. P.W.1 denies having, maintained any such accounts though he admits that he had paddy dealings with defendant. Again, accounts are being maintained by plaintiff for which the signature of defendant is not necessary. It is not the case of defendant that he has affixed his signatures in the so called accounts. If there were accounts, nothing prevented the plaintiff from producing the accounts and file the suit on that basis. The evidence of D.W.2 also should not have been relied on. If we are to act on the evidence of D.W.2, the Court will have to take him as a party to the fraud. There is no necessity for a document writer to write a promissory note, especially when Ex.A.1 is in a printed form, and, except the amount and signature, all other details are printed. The lower Court has found fault with the evidence of P.W.1 on the ground that some portions of Ex.A.1 seem to have been obliterated. It assumed that the plaintiff wanted to give a colour of genuineness for the same. I do not find any justification in coming to that conclusion when the defendant himself has no such case.
15. I find that the judgment of the Court below is illegal, and that the lower Court has not considered relevant materials, but at the same time, it has considered irrelevant materials and has based its conclusion on the same.
16. In the result, the judgment of the Court below is set aside, and the Revision is allowed. S.C No. 9 of 1997, on the file of District Munsif's Court, Polur, is decreed with costs. Revision petitioner is entitled to costs in this Revision also.
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