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Hindustan Photo Film... v. R. Lakshmanan

Madras High Court
Jul 20, 1998
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Summary of the Opinion (Revision under Article 227)

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision under Article 227 challenged an interim order of the lower Court that granted an interim injunction restraining the petitioner (a company, a Government of Tamil Nadu undertaking) from superannuating/continuing in the service of the respondent.

The relevant facts stated in the opinion are:

  • The respondent joined the petitioner-company on 24.1.1981 as Deputy Personnel Manager and stated his date of birth as 3.2.1940. Under company rules his retirement date would be 28.02.1998 (month end of the year when he attains age 58).
  • Before retirement, the respondent filed O.S. No. 289 of 1997 in the District Munsif Court, Udhagamandalam (filed 29.4.1997) seeking a declaration that his date of birth is 1.9.1940. No application for injunction was filed in that suit.
  • The respondent later filed Tr.O.P No. 6 of 1998 to transfer O.S. No. 289 of 1997 to the Sub-Court, Udhagamandalam; that transfer petition was dismissed on 26.2.1998.
  • On 26.2.1998 (with procedural defects remedied and re-presented on 27.2.1998) the respondent filed a second suit, O.S. No. 37 of 1998, in the Subordinate Court seeking a permanent injunction restraining the petitioner from superannuating him until disposal of O.S. No. 289/1997 or until 31.8.1998, and moved I.A. No. 296 of 1998 for interim relief. An ad-interim injunction was granted in O.S. No. 37/1998.
  • The petitioner challenged that interim injunction by filing the present revision. On admission of the revision, notice of motion was ordered on 20.4.1998 and an interim order suspending the injunction was also granted; the respondent filed a counter affidavit in the revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the filing and maintenance of O.S. No. 37 of 1998 in the Subordinate Court (after a previous suit O.S. No. 289 of 1997 was pending in the District Munsif Court) constituted an abuse of process of court or sharp practice such that the later suit should be struck off the file.
  2. Whether the lower Court erred in granting an ad-interim injunction in O.S. No. 37 of 1998 without adequately considering that an earlier suit on the same cause of action was pending and without proper reasoning.
  3. Whether the asserted ground of "advocates boycott" justified institution of a second suit in a different court or justified transfer/relief not available in the earlier suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The lower Court was adjourning matters and had not disposed of or decided the issues despite counter-affidavits and objections filed by the petitioner.
  • An earlier suit (O.S. No. 289 of 1997) was already pending seeking declaration of the respondent's date of birth as 1.9.1940, and the relief sought in O.S. No. 37 of 1998 was merely consequential to that earlier suit; therefore there was no necessity to file a separate suit.
  • The lower Court granted the interim injunction without properly considering these facts and in violation of settled legal principle concerning injunctions and abuse of process.

Respondent's Position (as stated in the opinion)

  • The opinion records that the respondent had filed O.S. No. 289 of 1997 and later instituted O.S. No. 37 of 1998 in the Subordinate Court; the opinion also notes that one stated reason for filing the later suit (as mentioned by the respondent) was an alleged advocates boycott. The opinion does not set out a detailed narrative of other arguments in the respondent's counter affidavit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kamla Devi, 1996 (8) S.C.C. 285 Principle that institution of proceedings or framing of litigation designed to create jurisdiction in an inconvenient forum or to deceive or mislead the court is an abuse of process; courts may set aside such proceedings and impose exemplary costs where there is mala fides or misuse of the legal system. The Court relied on this authority to illustrate the type of conduct that amounts to abuse/misuse of process and to justify striking off the later suit (O.S. No. 37/1998) as a similar example of sharp practice and abuse of process by the respondent.
Rajendran v. Nagercoil Municipality, 1995 (2) L.W. 111 (Madras High Court) Transfer of suits or proceedings cannot be ordered or justified merely on the ground that local advocates are boycotting courts; the fact that advocates do not appear is not a ground to treat a court as non-functioning for transfer or related relief. The Court applied this local authority to reject the idea that "advocates boycott" justified filing a second suit in another court; it supported the conclusion that the alleged boycott did not legitimize instituting O.S. No. 37/1998 in the Subordinate Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the following reasoning steps, relying solely on the material and conclusions stated in the opinion:

  1. Comparison of Reliefs: The Court examined the reliefs pleaded in both suits. O.S. No. 289/1997 sought a declaration of the date of birth as 1.9.1940 and consequential corrections in service records. O.S. No. 37/1998 sought a permanent injunction restraining superannuation until disposal of O.S. No. 289/1997 (or until 31.8.1998). The Court observed the second suit’s relief was consequential and could have been pursued within the earlier suit.
  2. Chronology and Concealment: The Court noted the transfer petition to move the first suit to the Subordinate Court had been dismissed on 26.2.1998, but that dismissal was not disclosed when the second suit was filed on or about the same date in the Subordinate Court. Filing the second suit in the Subordinate Court after the failed transfer created suspicion about the respondent’s bona fides.
  3. Assessment of Motive and Sharp Practice: Given the facts that the respondent initially sought transfer to the Subordinate Court and, after the transfer application failed, nevertheless instituted a new suit in that court and obtained interim relief, the Court found the respondent’s conduct raised a strong inference of sharp practice and abuse of process intended to obtain relief by forum-shopping.
  4. Evaluation of the "Advocates Boycott" Explanation: The Court considered the respondent’s stated reason (advocates boycott) for instituting the second suit and rejected it as a legitimate basis for filing a separate suit, referencing its own decision in Rajendran v. Nagercoil Municipality to the effect that advocates’ boycott is not a ground for transfer or substitute litigation.
  5. On the Impugned Interim Order: The Court criticized the lower Court's interim order as lacking reasoning — observing that the lower Court merely stated it had perused records but failed to consider that an earlier suit and written statement existed, that the plaintiff had admitted a date of birth of 3.2.1940 in earlier records, and that the identity and documentary issues were disputed and unproven. The High Court held that the lower Court should have considered these matters before granting an injunction.
  6. Authority for Striking Off and Costs: The Court cited Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kamla Devi to underscore the power of superior courts to act against abuse of process and to impose consequences for such misuse. Applying these principles, the High Court concluded that the second suit amounted to abuse and should not be retained on the file.
  7. Conclusion on Relief to be Granted: On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the Court held the second suit O.S. No. 37/1998 to be an abuse of process and ordered it struck off the file; it directed the Registry to inform the subordinate Court and allowed the revision, awarding costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Revision allowed; O.S. No. 37 of 1998 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Udhagamandalam is struck off the file.

Consequential orders (direct effects on the parties):

  • The Registry is directed to inform the Subordinate Court that O.S. No. 37 of 1998 stands struck off the file.
  • The revision was allowed with costs: advocate fee ordered at Rs. 3,000/-.
  • The connected miscellaneous petition (C.M.P) is closed.

Broader implications:

The Court relied on established precedent condemning abuse of process and confirmed that filing a second suit in another forum to obtain interim relief, when a prior suit on the same cause of action is pending, may amount to sharp practice and justify striking off the later suit. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal rule; it applies existing principles (as illustrated in the cited authorities) to the facts and directs remedial relief accordingly.

Note: This summary contains only information expressly stated in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. This revision is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the interim order of the lower Court granting interim injunction restraining the petitioner herein from continuing in the service of the respondent.

2. The facts necessary for proper disposal of the revision could be summarised thus: Respondent herein joined the petitioner-company limited on 24.1.198 1.which is a Government of Tamil Nadu undertaking, as Deputy Personnel Manager stating his date of birth as 3.2.1940 and he was promoted thereafter. As per rules governing the company, he has to retire on 28-02-1998, i, e. at the month end of the year when he attains the age of 58 years. A fare-well party was conducted and the respondent also participated and received gifts and mementos. Even before his retirement, he filed a suit on 29.4.1997 as O.S No. 289 of 1997 on the file of District Munsif Court, Udhagamandalam, seeking a declaration that his date of birth is 1.9.1940 In that suit, he did not file any application for injunction. Thereafter, he filed a petition in Tr.O.P No. 6 of 1998 before the District Court, Udhagamandalam, to transfer the suit pending on the file of the District Munsif Court, Udhagamandalam to the file of Sub-Court, Udhagamandalam. The transfer petition was dismissed on 26.2.1998 Without disclosing the dismissal of the transfer petition, another suit was filed on 26.2.1998 seeking permanent injunction restraining the petitioner herein from superannuating him, till the disposal of O.S No. 289 of 1997 or till 31.8.1998 When the plaint was presented on 26.2.1998 there were some defects and the same was returned on the same and represented on 27.2.1998 and numbered as O.S No. 37 of 1998 and I.A No. 296 of 1998 was also filed along with it to restrain the petitioner herein from superannuating the respondent. An ad-interim injunction was granted.

3. The grievance of the petitioner is that even though he filed a counter, the lower Court was adjourning the case from time to time. Even when the matter was heard for some time, the lower Court has not passed any order and the settled law is being violated.

4. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that already a suit has been filed as O.S No. 289 of 1997 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Udhagamandalam to declare the date of birth as 1.9.1940 and the present relief in this suit O.S.No37 of 1998 is only a consequential declaration and so, there was no necessity to file a separate suit when the earlier suit itself is pending. The lower Court has not considered any of these facts and simply granted interim order and that too, extending the order, inspite of the objections raised by the petitioner herein.

5. At the time of admission of this revision, I ordered notice of motion on 20.4.1998 and also granted interim order suspending/injunction. Respondent was served and he has filed his counter affidavit.

6. The facts stated above shows that the respondent herein has filed O.S No. 37 of 1998 only to harass the petitioner and is purely an abuse of process of Court. It is better to take into consideration the relief sought for in the plaints in both the suits. In O.S No. 289 of 1997 the relief sought for reads thus:

(a) Declaring the plaintiff's date of birth as 01.09.1940

(b) Consequently directing the defendant to alter the date of birth of the plaintiff in the service records under the custody of the defendant as 1.9.1940

(c) Such other and further relief as the court may deem fit under the circumstances of this case.”

In the later suit in O.S No. 37 of 1998 the relief sought for is as follows:

(a) Granting a permanent injunction restraining the defendant's company from superannuating the plaintiff and discharging the plaintiff from the defendant's company till the disposal of the suit in O.S No. 289 of 1997 pending before the District Munsif Court, Ootacamund or till 31.8 1998;

(b) Cost of the suit; and

(c) Such other and further relief as the court may deem fit under the circumstances of this case.”

7. Eventhough I do not want to make any remark, I would say that the filing the later suit before the Subordinate Court, Udhagamandalam was not proper. After filing O.S No. 289 of 1997, the respondent himself wanted that suit to be transferred to the Subordinate Court, Udhagamandalam. I do not know the reason why the said request was made. When that attempt failed, he files another suit before the Subordinate Court and gets the relief. All these taken together creates a suspicion as to the bona fides of the respondent herein and sharp practice exercised by him. The lower Court has also not considered whether such a suit is not maintainable. From the relief portion of O.S No. 37 of 1998, it is clear that already a suit is pending on the same cause of action and the relief sought in O.S No. 37 of 1998 could very well be obtained in the suit filed earlier. That is why, in the later suit, he wanted an injunction to restrain the petitioner herein from superannuating him till the disposal of the earlier suit. How such a suit could be filed is nowhere stated.

8. The only reason that is mentioned for filing the second suit is advocates boycott. I do not think that will be a cause of action to file a separate suit for a similar relief. The allegation that the later suit had to be filed because of the Advocates Boycott also cannot be true, since immediately after O.S No. 289 of 1997 he wanted the suit to be transferred to the file of the Subordinate Court, Udhagamanadalam. His intention was very clear. He actually wanted to file a suit in the Subordinate Court. I do not want to comment on the officer concerned, since he is not a party to this proceedings. The circumstances show that the second suit was filed with an oblique motive.

9. A recent decision reported in Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Kamla Devi, 1996 (8) S.C.C 285 will throw some light regarding such cases. In that case, the respondent before the Honourable Supreme Court filed a suit before the Gaziabad Court and summons were also served to the Municipal Corporation, Delhi and when they failed to appear an ex parte decree was passed. Challenging the procedure adopted, the respondent therein filed an appeal after getting S.L.P Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. While considering the same, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:

“The facts and circumstances of the case show that it was a clear case of abuse of process of court and of law. The averment made in the plaint to the effect that the officers of the appellant Corporation went Ghazibad to attach the moveables of the respondent or her grandchildren to realise the tax under the order of assessment was total falsehood and a mere pretence to create jurisdiction in Ghaziabad court as no document had been filed before the Ghaziabad court in support of the allegations. Moreover, the frame of the suit and the language and terms in which the declaration and prohibitory injunction were asked for suggest a clear attempt overreach the process of court. The object clearly was to obtain a declaration that the assessment order was illegal and invalid from the court outside Delhi. The fact that the plaintiff-respondent choose to conceal the fact of her filing the appeal against the assessment order is also indicative of the mala fides on her part. The bill of demand pursuant to the assessment order was sent to the respondent after filing of the suit. once the Supreme Court is satisfied that the respondent abused the process of law and misused the legal system, the objections put forward by the respondents counsel are of no consequence. The Supreme Court is entitled to act in such cases to prevent such abuse and misuse. Accordingly, the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge, Ghazibad is set aside. In view of their reprehensible conduct, the respondents are directed to pay exemplary costs in a sum of rupees fifty thousand. Such practices ought to be put down with a stern hand so that others similary minded may desist from indulging in similar acts.” (Italics supplied).

10. The impugned order also lacks reasoning. The lower Court has stated that it has perused the records. From the list of documents filed along with the plaint, it is seen that the respondent admits that he has filed O.S No. 289 of 1997 on the file of the District Munsiff Court, Udhagamanadalam and the written statement is also filed by the petitioner. If only the lower Court has considered the same, the interim order would not have been passed. It seems that the lower court was very lenient in granting interim order without taking into consideration the law. Even the power of Court in granting injunction in such cases is very much limited. The court must understand that the plaintiff himself has admitted that his date of birth is 3.2.1940 Until the same is corrected, the admission stands. As on date, except the allegation in the plaint, there is no evidence. It is further alleged in the written statement filed in O.S No. 289 of 1997 that even the name of the mother of the respondent herein is different. The identity of the person was also disputed in regard to the date of birth certificate. When these facts are brought to the notice of the Court, I feel that the Court below was duty bound to consider the same while passing the interim order. Merely because the respondent therein was not heard at that time, that does not follow that the Court is duty bound to pass an order. The procedure adopted by the lower Court and the order passed by it are perverse.

11. It may not be out of place to make reference to a decision of this Court reported in Rajendran v. Nagercoil Municipality, 1995 (2) L.W 111 That was a case where a litigant moved an application before this Court to transfer a suit pending in the Court of District Munsif, Nagercoil on the ground that Advocate were boycotting therein. The learned Judge of this Court held thus:

“Now the transfer sought for is only on the ground that the advocates at Nagercoil and Kuzhithurai are boycotting the courts and they are not permitting any outside lawyers to appear in the Courts. The provisions for filing and transfer in the High Court is made available only in cases where the relevant Sub-Courts are closed or are not functioning. Such a condition cannot be said to prevail in this case. The Sub-Courts are very much kept open and functioning and it is only the lawyers in the Southern Districts who are avoiding appearance before Courts by adopting the measure of boycott. It is not as though the Courts are not passing orders. As a matter of fact, in applications moved by parties and also by the counsel in cases at times in Chambers in some places, Courts have been passing orders. Therefore, the refusal of the lawyers to appear and plead before courts is no ground or reason to contend legitimately that the Sub courts or a particular court in the districts is not functioning. If the transfer is to be ordered on this ground, I am of the view, then, this Court will not only be opening the flood gates for such transfer applications, but encouraging and putting its seal of approval over extra legal methods adopted on extraneous grounds. I can take judicial notice of the fact that the entire Bar Members throughout the southern District from Madurai to Kanyakumari are boycotting the courts for the past three months and refusing to appear and plead before courts though the Presiding Officers are available and sitting and courts as such are functioning and do not remain closed. In such situation, I do not think any transfer can be ordered on the ground now putforth.” (Italics supplied).

If this is the decision in regard to the transfer application, when the litigant pleads before the Court, to transfer the case on the ground of Advocates boycott, the same law must apply in regard to institution of suits. If a suit cannot be taken up because of advocates boycott, naturally, for the same purpose another suit cannot be filed before another court.

12. In the result, I find that the suit filed by the plaintiff in O.S No. 37 of 1998 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Udhagamandalam is purely an abuse of process of Court and is a sharp practice exercised by the respondent herein. It is not proper to retain the same on file. The plaint in O.S No. 37 of 1998 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Udhamandalam shall stand struck off the file and the Registry is directed to inform the same to the Court concerned.

13. Consequently, the revision is allowed with costs. Advocate fee Rs. 3,000-. The connected C.M.P is closed.