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South Arcot District Central Co-Operative Bank Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner Of Labour
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner-association filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking a writ of mandamus to restrain the second respondent (a bank) from altering conditions of service of workmen — specifically regarding the filling up of the post of Manager in charge of taluk administration — without following the procedure prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
The parties had entered into a settlement dated 15 September 1982 under S. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act which: (a) provided a special allowance of Rs. 50 per month to Field Managers Grade I posted in charge of taluk level administration; and (b) provided that posting of Field Managers Grade I to be in charge of taluks would be strictly on seniority basis.
Subsequent disputes were raised and the Government referred issues for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal at Madras by G.O. Ms. No. 621, Labour Department, dated 7 April 1988. One relevant issue (Issue 42) relating to recruitment and promotion policy was registered as I.D. No. 25 of 1988 and was pending.
On 6 June 1989 the second respondent directed a Field Manager to hand over charge to a Co-operative Society Registrar recruited from a Government Department. The petitioner protested by letter dated 2 August 1989. The second respondent issued a notice purportedly under S. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act on 19 August 1989. The petitioner protested the notice and contended that the earlier settlement remained binding and that the dispute was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, which led to the present writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable against actions of a co-operative society or private party in circumstances where rights under the Industrial Disputes Act are alleged to be violated.
- Whether the second respondent could alter conditions of service (notably the posting of Field Managers in charge of taluks) after issuing a notice under S. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, particularly while conciliation or adjudication (I.D. No. 25 of 1988) was pending.
- What is the legal effect and continuing force of a settlement made under S. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act — specifically whether the settlement continues to govern service conditions until altered by a fresh settlement, award or valid legislation.
Arguments of the Parties
Second Respondent's Arguments
- The writ petition is not maintainable insofar as it is filed against a co-operative society; reliance was placed on a Full Bench decision in K. Ganesan v. Special Officer, Salem Co-operative Sugar Mills [1994 W.L.R 509] to support the maintainability objection.
- The second respondent contended that the period of the earlier settlement had expired and, therefore, after issuing a notice under S. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act it was entitled to alter the service conditions immediately.
Petitioner-Association's Arguments
- The petitioner argued that rights accruing under the Industrial Disputes Act were being violated and that this Court can and should exercise powers under Article 226 to protect the interests of aggrieved workmen.
- The petitioner relied on multiple precedents to contend that a writ is maintainable in circumstances where there is a patent violation of mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, where principles of natural justice are breached, where unfair labour practice is demonstrated, or where the situation is sufficiently “monstrous” to warrant extraordinary relief against a private or cooperative body.
- The petitioner further argued that the settlement under S. 12(3), although its specified period had expired, remained in force unless cancelled or superseded, and that issuance of a S. 9A notice allows conciliation and does not permit immediate alteration of service conditions during conciliation or pending adjudication.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| K. Ganesan v. Special Officer, Salem Co-operative Sugar Mills [1994 W.L.R 509] | Held (as relied upon by the second respondent) that a writ petition cannot be maintained against a co-operative society. | Relied upon by the second respondent to argue non-maintainability; the court considered this view but proceeded to examine other authorities permitting relief in certain circumstances against private/co-operative bodies. |
| V. Pandurangan v. Special Officer, Sriperumbudur Rural Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. [1995 (1) L.L.N 263] | Held that a writ is maintainable to challenge an order and to prevent a State officer from indirectly forcing a society to pass orders that violate principles of natural justice and rule of law; impugned orders were quashed with liberty to proceed afresh. | Used by the petitioner and relied on by the court as authority that relief under Article 226 is available where an official of the State seeks to evade accountability and an order is made in gross abuse of natural justice and rule of law. |
| R. Varadharajan v. Special Officer v. Kadambathur Co-operative Land Development Bank [1995 (1) L.L.N 265] | Applied the principle that an order passed without observing natural justice can be quashed even if impugned order is of a co-operative body; relied on Rohtas Industries. | Cited to support the proposition that absence of natural justice alone justifies issuance of writs; used by the court in its reasoning on maintainability where principles of natural justice are infringed. |
| Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union [1976 (1) L.L.N 165] | Held that the scope of Article 226 is wide enough to affect even a private individual. | Relied upon in subsequent Division Bench decisions and considered by the court as part of the line of authority establishing circumstances in which Article 226 can reach private/co-operative bodies. |
| C. Marianandam v. Government of Tamil Nadu [1989 (1) L.L.N 728] | Held that a “monstrous” situation (e.g., gross denial of natural justice) warrants issuance of a writ even against a private institution. | Used to demonstrate that where fundamental principles (natural justice) are flouted, extraordinary relief against private bodies is appropriate; the court relied on this consideration in assessing whether relief should be granted. |
| Chemplast Sanmar Ltd. (W.A. Nos. 848 and 849 of 1997) | Held that patent violation of mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, constituting unfair labour practice or alteration of service conditions without following S. 9A and Fourth Schedule, justifies Court's interference under Article 226. | Applied to support the proposition that alteration of service conditions without compliance with statutory procedure (S. 9A and Fourth Schedule) can justify writ relief; the court relied on this principle in reaching its conclusion. |
| Madras Labour Union v. Binny Ltd. [1995 (1) L.L.N 687] | Formulated propositions on maintainability of writs against private bodies: (1) private bodies are not generally amenable to Art. 226; (2) writs can protect fundamental rights; (3) writs issue in extraordinary circumstances; (4) mandamus may issue if there is public duty and no other remedy; (5) implementation of S.12(3) settlement is not a public duty; (6) jurisdiction may be exercised where there is gross violation of law. | The court applied these propositions as the governing analytic framework to determine if the writ petition was maintainable in the present case against a co-operative/management given the alleged violations of the Industrial Disputes Act and principles of natural justice. |
| Life Insurance Corporation v. D.J. Bahadur [1980 (2) L.L.N 575] | Explained that a settlement, once operative, creates a contract modifying terms and conditions of work; such a settlement endures indefinitely unless altered by fresh settlement, award or valid legislation; immediate reagitation of covered matters is banned for prescribed periods. | Relied upon to support the proposition that the parties remain bound by the earlier S. 12(3) settlement until it is lawfully altered, and that the settlement therefore continued to govern relations unless lawfully changed. |
| W.P No. 963 of 1987 (Nainarsundaram, J.) | Concluded that while conciliation proceedings are pending before the conciliation authority under S. 33(1), proposed changes should not be effected without the express written permission of that authority. | Referenced to support the procedural protection during conciliation proceedings — i.e., that changes to service conditions should not be implemented while conciliation is pending. |
| W.P Nos. 11258 & 11259 of 1983 (Sathiadev, J.) | Held that a Special Officer appointed under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies (Appointment of Special Officers) Act, 1976 becomes a statutory authority and, when a party to a S.12(3) settlement, cannot transgress S. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act; thereby the writ petition was maintainable. | Invoked to show that a statutory officer cannot act so as to circumvent S. 9A procedures and that writ relief may be available when such transgression is alleged; the court relied on this reasoning in disallowing the second respondent's contention. |
| Tamilarasan case [1989 (2) L.L.N 69] | Referenced as a Full Bench decision cited to resist maintainability of writ petitions against co-operative societies (as relied upon in earlier litigation). | Mentioned in the context of authorities cited by parties; the court reviewed other decisions that limited the effect of Tamilarasan in cases involving patent statutory violations or gross abuse. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the objection to maintainability that was advanced by the second respondent and examined a series of precedents to determine whether, in the present facts, the writ petition could be entertained despite the involvement of a co-operative society/private party.
Key steps in the court's analysis (as expressed in the opinion):
- The court acknowledged the Full Bench and other authorities relied upon by the second respondent which support non-maintainability of writs against co-operative societies in ordinary circumstances.
- The court then reviewed and relied upon several authorities (including V. Pandurangan, R. Varadharajan, C. Marianandam, Chemplast Sanmar, and Madras Labour Union v. Binny) which establish that Article 226 may be invoked against private/co-operative bodies in extraordinary circumstances — e.g., where there is a gross violation of statutory mandates, denial of natural justice, unfair labour practice, or a “monstrous” situation that would otherwise permit the Court to exercise its prerogative jurisdiction.
- The court applied the analytical propositions extracted from Madras Labour Union v. Binny (the six propositions listed in that decision) to the facts of the case to test whether an exception to the general non-amenability rule applied.
- The court examined the legal effect of the S. 12(3) settlement (citing Life Insurance Corporation v. D.J. Bahadur): once operative the settlement modifies terms and conditions and endures until lawfully altered by a fresh settlement, award or valid legislation; thus the settlement continued to govern relations unless and until altered legally.
- The court considered the effect of issuing a notice under S. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act and relied on authorities (including decisions construing S. 33(1) and cases involving special officers) to conclude that the issuance of a S. 9A notice permits conciliation but does not authorize immediate alteration of service conditions while conciliation or adjudication is pending.
- On these bases — the alleged patent violation of the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, the continuing effect of the S. 12(3) settlement, and the procedural protections during conciliation/adjudication — the court found the contention that the settlement period's expiry allowed immediate alteration unpersuasive.
- Consequently, the court held that the second respondent could not lawfully alter the service conditions mentioned in the earlier agreement until they were altered, modified or replaced in accordance with law.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition is allowed. The court ordered that the second respondent cannot alter the service conditions set out in the earlier S. 12(3) settlement until those conditions are lawfully altered, modified or replaced in accordance with law. The petition was allowed with no costs, and W.M.P No. 18530 of 1989 was closed.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The second respondent is restrained from altering the service conditions specified in the S. 12(3) settlement (including posting and allowances for Field Managers Grade I) until a lawful alteration occurs (by fresh settlement, award or other valid legal process) and cannot effect immediate change merely by issuing a S. 9A notice while conciliation/adjudication is pending.
- The court's reasoning follows and applies existing authorities that permit the exercise of Article 226 against private/co-operative bodies in extraordinary circumstances (e.g., gross statutory violation or denial of natural justice). The opinion does not state it is creating a new precedent; it applies established principles from cited case law to the facts at hand.
JUDGMENT
1. The petitioner-association has filed the above writ petition seeking to issue a writ of mandamus, directing the second respondent-bank to forbear from altering the conditions of service of workmen relating to filling up the post of Manager incharge of taluk abministration without following the procedure prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. According to the petitioner, the petitioner-association entered into several settlements with the second respondent-Management. By settlement, dated 15 September 1982, signed under S. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act it was agreed as follows:
“It is mutually agreed that a special allowance of Rs. 50 per months shall be paid to Field Managers Grade I who are posted to be incharge of Taluk level administration. Posting of Field Managers Grade I to be incharge of taluks will be strictly on seniority basis.
Subsequent to the said settlement the petitioner-association raised disputes. The Government in G.O Ms. No. 621, Labour Department, dated 7 April 1988, have referred the issues for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal at Madras. Issue (42), according to the petitioner, related to recruitment and promotion policy. The said dispute has been taken on file as I.D No. 25 of 1988 and the matter is pending. In the order, dated 6 June 1989 the second respondent directed the Field Manager to handover the charge to the Co-operative Society Registrar recruited from the Government Department. The petitioner-association protested the same in and by the letter, dated 2 August 1989. Thereafter the second respondent issued a notice purporting to be under S. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act on the same date namely 19 August 1989. The petitioner-association protested against the said notice and requested the second respondent not to resort to such a change in service condition in view of the binding nature of the earlier settlement and in view of the fact that the dispute itself is pending consideration of the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, in I.D No. 25 of 1988. So aggrieved the petitioner-association has filed the above writ petition.
3. The learned senior counsel appearing for the second respondent has raised an objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition as the same has been filed against the co-operative society. The learned senior counsel has relied on the decision of the Full Bench in K. Ganesan v. Special Officer, Salem Co-operative Sugar Mills [1994 W.L.R 509], in which the Full Bench of this Court has held that the writ petition cannot be maintained against the co-operative society. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that while the rights accrued under the Industrial Disputes Act are violated, this Court has categorically held in so many decisions that by exercising powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India this Court can interfere to safeguard the interest of the aggrieved workman.
4. In order to overcome the hurdle in the writ petition as also the incompetency alleged in seeking the relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, Sri Chandru, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, has relied on a number of decisions. Though the learned senior counsel has placed reliance upon several decisions, I am not referring to all the cases for the reason that some of them have iaid down the same proposition of law and so I am referring only some of the decisions to decide the issue in question.
5. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied on the decision in V. Pandurangan v. Special Officer, Sriperumbudur Rural Co-operative Housing Society, Ltd. [1995 (1) L.L.N 263]. Sri D. Raju, J., as he then was, in the said decision, has held that the writ is maintainable challenging the order passed by the second respondent and to prevent the first respondent from acting on the said order. In the said case, the second respondent/Deputy Registrar ordered recovery of the bonus paid to the petitioners therein and the first respondent sought to recover the same from the petitioners. So, the petitioner challenged the said proceedings by filing the writ of certiorarified mandamus. The said writ petition was resisted as not maintainable, citing the Full Bench decision of this Court in Tamilarasan case [1989 (2) L.L.N 69]. The learned Judge, while allowing the said writ petition, has held as, in Para. 5, at page 265, of 1995 (1) L.L.N:
“…Allowing the respondents to take shelter under the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Tamilarasan case [1989 (2) L.L.N 69] (vide supra), in matters like the one before this Court in these writ petitions, would amount to.… undermine the very principle of rule of law. An official of the State Government in the Co-operative Department could avoid in such circumstances passing orders directly and by indirectly directing the society to pass orders and deny an effective remedy to the person aggrieved against an order made in gross abuse of the basic principles of natural justice as well as the fundamental principles of rule of law secured to citizen under the Constitution of India, particularly under Art. 14 which strikes at the root of any arbitrary action of the authorities of the State. An authority of the State cannot escape from the purview of the Court by indirectly bringing pressure upon the society to pass an order instead of himself passing such an order. For all the reasons stated above, I am of the view that the impugned orders are liable to be quashed, of course with liberty, to the respondents to proceed in the matter afresh by issuing due and proper notice and given sufficient opportunity to the petitioner to show-cause against the proposed action before passing any order adverse to the interests of the petitioner…”
6. The learned senior counsel appearing for the second respondent has submitted that the said decision will not help the petitioner herein to sustain the writ petition as in the said case the order was passed admittedly by Government officer. But, even with respect to the prayer for mandamus against the first respondent, the learned Judge has sustained the writ petition holding that if the order was made in gross abuse of the principles of natural justice as well as the fundamental principles of rule of law, secured to citizen under the Constitution of India, particularly under Art. 14, the writ can be issued, and so the objections raised by the learned Senior Counsel cannot be countenanced.
7. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has further relied on the decision of the Division Bench in R. Varadharajan v. Special Officer v. Kadambathur Co-operative Land Development Bank [1995 (1) L.L.N 265], in which the petitioner therein filed the writ petition against the co-operative society, and the Division Bench of this Court had an occasion to deal with the issue regarding the maintainability of writ petition against the co-operative society. While allowing the writ petition and dismissing the writ appeals, the learned Judges, following the decision in Rohtas Industries, Ltd. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union [1976 (1) L.L.N 165], in which it was held that the scope of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India was wide enough to affect even a private individual, have held as follows, in Para 10, at page 268 of 1995 (1) L.L.N:
“In this case we do not find any difficulty in applying the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court as referred to above, as, admittedly, the impugned order was passed without observing the principles of natural justice. Therefore, on that simple ground, we are inclined to allow the writ petition, and accordingly, the impugned order of the respondent, dated 31 July 1991, is quashed. The writ petition is allowed. No costs.”
8. The Division Bench of this Court in C. Marianandam v. Government of Tamil Nadu [1989 (1) L.L.N 728], has held as follows, in Para. 11, at page 733:
“In my view, the monstrosity of the situation in the present case would undoubtedly warrant the issue of writ to the third respondent even if it is a private institution. On the admitted facts of the case, it is seen that the services of the headmaster of the school are terminated on a very serious charge of misbehaviour with a lady teacher and other charges without giving an opportunity to him to deny the same. It is a shocking state of affair that the management or an educational institution should throw to the winds the elementary principles of natural justice in dealing with its headmaster, who is at the helm of affairs on the academic side. This is a case in which the Court should exercise its prerogative power and would be failing in its duty if it chooses to remain a mute witness to the situation on the ground that the third respondent is not a statutory authority.”
9. Similar view has been taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Chemplast Sanmar, Ltd. case W.A Nos. 848 and 849 of 1997, in which it is held as follows:
“On a careful consideration of the respective submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side in this regard and on going through the relevant decisions which have been adverted to in the decision rendered in Binny case [1995 (1) L.L.N 687], we are of the view that the stand taken for the appellant that there is no monstrous situation to warrant this Court's interference in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be countenanced. If a patent violation of the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, which would constitute unfair labour practice, and alteration of conditions of service without following the procedure laid down under S. 9A of the Act read with the Fourth Schedule to the Act is demonstrated to exist, the powers of this Court to come to the rescue of the victimised workmen, cannot be seriously disputed. In our view, the ratio of the decision in Binny case in W.P No. 11862 of 1996 would equally apply to the case on hand and the learned Single Judge could not be said to have committed any error in choosing to exercise his discretion in the matter by entertaining the writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.”
10. The Division Bench of this Court in the decision in Madras Labour Union v. Binny, Ltd. [1995 (1) L.L.N 687] (vide supra), has formulated the propositions regarding the maintainability of the writ petition and has held as follows, in Para. 48, at pages 705 and 706:
“On an analysis of the above rulings, the following propositions emerge:
(1)A private body which is not a ‘State’ witnin the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India is not generally amenable to Art. 226 of the Constitution.
(2) A writ will be issue against a private body to protect the fundamental rights declared under Part HI of the Constitution of India.
(3) A writ will issue in extraordinary circumstances if the monstrosity of the situation warrants it.
(4) A mandamus will be issued against a private body, if there is no equally convenient remedy and if there is a public duty.
(5) The implementation of a settlement under S. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is not a public duty and no writ will lie against a private body.
(6) If the features are patent and they establish gross violation or the mandates of law, the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution could be exercised to quash a settlement under S. 18(1) or S. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act.”
11. On the basis of the abovesaid decisions, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the writ petition is maintainable especially when I.D No. 25 of 1988 is pending on the same issue. From the abovesaid decisions it is very clear that this writ petition is maintainable even against a private party in certain circumstances. If a patent violation of the mandatory provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, which will constitute unfair labour practice, and alteration of conditions of service without following the procedure laid down under S. 9A of the Act, the powers of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India can be exercised to rectify the mistake committed by the management even if it is a co-operative society. So, in view of the fragrant violation of the provisions of the Act, in this case, the writ can be maintained since the monstrosity of the situation is present.
12. Moreover the period of the earlier settlement, though it is expired, unless it is cancelled or superceded by another settlement, the said settlement will be in force. Pursuant to the notice under S. 9A of the Act it is open for conciliation. Meanwhile, according to the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, the respondents cannot alter the service conditions.
13. The Apex Court has analysed the principles applied in this regard in Life Insurance Corporation v. DJ. Bahadur [1980 (2) L.L.N 575], holding as follows, in Para. 75, at pages 604 and 605:
“…As soon as the settlement is concluded and becomes operative, the contract embodied in it takes effect and the existing terms and conditions of the workmen are modified accordingly. Unless there is something to the contrary in a particular term or condition of the settlement the embodied contract endures indefinitely, continuing to govern the relation between the parties in the future, subject of course to subsequent alteration through a fresh settlement, award or valid legislation. I have said that the transaction is a contract. But it is also something more. Conceptually, it is a ‘settlement.’ It concludes or ‘settles’ a dispute. Differences which had arisen and were threatening industrial peace and harmony stand resolved in terms of a new contract In order that the new contract be afforded a chance of being effectively worked out, a mandate obliging the parties to unreservedly comply with it for a period of time is desirable. It was made ‘binding’ by the statute for such period. Section 19(2) was enacted. The spirit of conciliation, the foundation of the settlement, was required by law to bind the parties for the time prescribed. Immediate reagitation in respect of matters covered by the settlement was banned. Section 23(c) prohibited strikes by the workmen in breach of the contract and lockouts by the employer in respect of such matters. A breach of any term was made punishable by S. 29. Certainty in industrial relations is essential to industry, and a period of such certainty is ensured by S. 19(2). On the expiry of the period, prescribed in the sub-section, the conceptual quality of the transaction as a ‘settlement’ comes to an end. The ban lifts. The parties are no longer bound to maintain the industrial status quo in respect of matters covered by the settlement. They are at liberty to seek an alteration of the contract. But until altered, the contract continues to govern the relations between the parties in respect of the terms and conditions of service.”
14. Nainarsundaram, J., as he men was, in VV.P No. 963 of 1987, dated 10 February 1987 while construing the scope of S. 33(1) of the Act has held as follows:
“It is only in this context, a contention is raised by the petitioner that the fourth respondent should not implement the change in the shift timings and that would be violative of S. 33(1) of the Act. That mere is a conciliation proceeding pending before the third respondent over the dispute relating to the change in the shift timings cannot and need not be disputed now, if this is so, as per S. 33(1) of the Act, the change should not be effectuated, save with express permission in writing of the third respondent before whom the conciliation proceedings pending.”
15. While considering the similar issue, Sathiadev, J., in W.P Nos. 11258 and 11259 of 1983 has held as follows:
“Since the special officer is appointed under Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies (Appointment of Special Officers) Act, 1976 (Act 25 of 1976), he becomes a statutory authority in relation to the affairs of the co-operative society. Therefore, when he is a party to a S. 12(3) settlement which comes into existence under the I.D Act and till the matter is decided in a Labour Court, he cannot transgress S. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is in this view, the writ petition filed is maintainable.”
16. In view of the above, the submission of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second respondent that the period of settlement has already been expired and so the second respondent is entitled to alter the service conditions immediately after issue of notice under S. 9A of the Act, cannot be sustained. Even after issue of notice under S. 9A of the Act, the second respondent can have conciliation and he cannot immediately alter the conditions of service.
17. In view of the discussions made earlier, the second respondent cannot alter the service conditions mentioned in the earlier agreement until it is altered or modified or replaced by another agreement or otherwise in accordance with law.
18. For the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P No. 18530 of 1989 is closed.
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