- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
M. Sundaram Alias Vettukati Sundaram v. R. Thangasamy Nadar
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is the defendant in O.S.No. 191 of 1997 before the Principal District Munsif, Kuzhithurai. The respondent (plaintiff in the original suit) filed O.S.No. 191/1997 seeking an injunction restraining the petitioner and others from interfering with his alleged possession of the suit property. The plaint alleges the respondent has been in possession of the property since 1966, having purchased the equity of redemption by a deed dated 12.10.1960 and obtained a release deed dated 25.4.1966.
The plaint recounts earlier litigation between the respondent and his elder brother Arumuga Nadar and his wife in O.S.No. 640 of 1974 which resulted in a decree declaring the elder brother and his wife entitled to a 3/4 share and concluding in partition; preliminary and final decrees were passed, execution followed and delivery was effected. The respondent thereafter filed O.S.No. 589 of 1978 seeking setting aside of the decree in O.S.No. 640 of 1974 (and recovery of possession), which was dismissed; appeals including a second appeal (S.A. No. 1003 of 1988) were dismissed.
A later suit, O.S.No. 82 of 1993, was instituted by the same respondent for declaration of title and injunction against the present petitioner; that suit also was dismissed, with an observation that a sale deed in favour of one Sathiya George (who subsequently died and under whom the petitioner claims) was invalid as it violated provisions of the Registration Act. The present suit (O.S.No. 191 of 1997) was filed after dismissal of O.S.No. 82 of 1993.
The petitioner filed the present revision contending that the suit is an abuse of the process of the court and sought striking off the plaint under Section 151 read with Order 6, Rule 16 and Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On admission of the revision, notice of motion was ordered and a stay was granted.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the suit in O.S.No. 191 of 1997 is an abuse of the process of court and whether the plaint ought to be struck off under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Order 6, Rule 16 and Order 7, Rule 11, CPC.
- Whether the respondent can re-agitate issues (title and possession) already concluded by earlier decrees and judgments (including O.S.No. 640 of 1974, O.S.No. 589 of 1978 and O.S.No. 82 of 1993).
- Whether the plaintiff's pleaded possession since 1966 and any claim of title by adverse possession can sustain the present suit in light of earlier adjudications against him.
- Whether the validity of the sale deed dated 30.1.1997 or related issues require consideration in the injunction suit or are concluded by prior proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The petitioner's primary contention was that the respondent's suit is an abuse of process, being a collateral attack on earlier final decisions in which the respondent had full opportunity to contest the matter.
- It was argued that the respondent has repeatedly filed suits and pursued appeals after failing in earlier litigation, thereby harassing the other parties.
- The petitioner sought striking off the plaint under Section 151, Order 6, Rule 16 and Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- The petitioner also relied on factual assertions that a boundary had been put up (following intervention of this Court in certain criminal revisions) and that the petitioner had physical possession following court-ordered delivery in earlier proceedings; these facts were relied upon to show the petitioner’s possession/title under the predecessor (Sathiya George).
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent asserted that he had been in possession of the suit property since 1966 and therefore was entitled to injunction to protect that possession.
- The respondent contended that although O.S.No. 589 of 1978 was dismissed, interim orders were obtained in the second appeal (S.A. No. 1003 of 1988 / C.M.P. No. 951 of 1991) from this Court and that those orders operated in his favour, enabling him to continue in possession.
- The respondent argued that even if the sale deed in favour of the petitioner's predecessor is invalid, continuous possession would permit him to perfect title by adverse possession.
- The respondent addressed factual matters about the boundary and criminal proceedings, contesting the petitioner’s version of police assistance in putting up the boundary and relying on relevant earlier orders, though the judgment records the court’s view that such matters do not assist the respondent given the earlier dismissals.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| I.T.C. Limited v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (Hon'ble Supreme Court) | Consideration of the scope of Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C.; whether court can refer to materials beyond plaint to test cause of action. | The court relied on this decision to justify examining material beyond the face of the plaint when considering rejection under Order 7, Rule 11 and to reject the submission that allegations in the plaint must be accepted as true without reference to other material. |
| Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi (1986 S.C.C. (Supp.) 15) | Held that the power to reject a petition under Order 7, Rule 11 can be exercised even after framing of issues; a matter need not proceed to full trial if plainly bound to fail. | The court cited Azhar Hussain for the proposition that framing of issues does not preclude application of Order 7, Rule 11 to strike out a plaint which discloses no cause of action. |
| Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath (1987 S.C.C. (Supp.) 663) | Authority following the Azhar Hussain principle on the exercise of Order 7, Rule 11 powers notwithstanding framing of issues. | The court noted that Samar Singh followed Azhar Hussain and used it to support the approach that issues framed in the suit cannot prevent consideration of an application under Order 7, Rule 11. |
| Hunter v. Chief Constable of West Midlands and Anr. (1981 All E.R. 727) | Definition of 'abuse of process' — initiating proceedings as a collateral attack on a final decision of a competent court is an abuse of process. | The court relied on Hunter to define what constitutes an abuse of process and to support striking the plaint where the identical question had already been finally decided against the plaintiff. |
| Stephenson v. Garnett (1898) 1 Q.B. 677 and Reichel v. Magrath (14 App. Cas. 665) | Authorities cited in Hunter and repeated to underline the rule that courts should be slow to dismiss but must do so where the identical question has been decided; it would be a scandal to permit re-litigation of the same question by changing the form of proceedings. | The court repeated these authorities (as cited in Hunter) to emphasize public policy against permitting parties to re-litigate identical questions already decided by competent courts and to justify striking the plaint as frivolous/vexatious repetition. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded through a factual and legal analysis which it set out step-by-step:
- Scope of Order 7, Rule 11: The court first recalled the Supreme Court authority (I.T.C. decision) explaining that when considering rejection of a plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 the court is not confined to the bare averments of the plaint and may look into the real substance to determine whether a genuine cause of action is disclosed. The court also relied on Azhar Hussain and Samar Singh to show that framing of issues does not prevent the court from exercising the power under Order 7, Rule 11.
- Abuse of Process: The court discussed the concept of abuse of process, relying on Hunter and related authorities to articulate that initiation of proceedings as a collateral attack on a final decision is an abuse of process and can justify striking out a plaint.
- Examination of the plaint and pleaded facts: The court then examined the plaint's narrative, noting the respondent's own admissions: the chronology, the existence of earlier partition/decree in O.S.No. 640 of 1974, execution and delivery, the dismissal of O.S.No. 589 of 1978 (for setting aside the decree and recovery of possession) and the dismissal of O.S.No. 82 of 1993 (declaration and injunction). The court quoted the plaint's own cause of action paragraph which claimed possession since 1966 and a sale in favour of the defendant on 30.1.1997.
- Effect of earlier adjudications: From the admissions in the plaint and the history of earlier litigation, the court reasoned that the respondent's claims to title and possession were already concluded adversely in earlier proceedings — including findings that he had no title or possession — and that delivery and physical possession had been effected in execution proceedings favouring the decree-holder (the respondent's brother originally).
- Relevant submissions considered and rejected: The court addressed the respondent's submissions that interim orders in the second appeal allowed him to remain in possession and that he could perfect title by adverse possession even if the sale deed was invalid. The court found that the order in C.M.P. No. 951 of 1991 did not determine merits nor establish the respondent's possession and therefore did not assist his case. The court also held that the observation regarding invalidity of the sale deed in favour of Sathiya George in an earlier suit did not help the respondent because the earlier suits had concluded that the respondent had no title or possession.
- Conclusion on abuse and appropriate remedy: Given the pleaded admissions and the history of prior adjudication, the court concluded the respondent was attempting to re-agitate matters concluded by competent courts and that the present suit was an abuse of process. The court held that the powers under Section 151, Order 6, Rule 16 and Order 7, Rule 11 CPC read with Article 227 of the Constitution were available and should be exercised to strike out the plaint and reject interim applications.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revision is allowed; the plaint in O.S.No. 191 of 1997 is struck off the file and all interim applications filed by the respondent in that suit are rejected. The revision is allowed with costs (advocate fee Rs. 3,000).
Implications:
- Immediate effect on the parties: The plaintiff's suit (O.S.No. 191 of 1997) is dismissed at the threshold by striking off the plaint as an abuse of process; interim applications connected to that suit are rejected; the revision in the present proceeding is allowed and the connected miscellaneous petition (C.M.P.) is closed.
- Scope with respect to precedent: The opinion grounds its decision on established principles and prior decisions about Order 7, Rule 11 and abuse of process; the judgment applies those principles to the facts of the case. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal precedent beyond applying cited authorities to the admitted facts and procedural history; no broader rule beyond the application to the present facts is announced in the text.
1. Petitioner is the defendant in O.S.No. 191 of 1997 on the file of the Principal District, Munsif, Kuzhithurai. The respondent herein filed the above suit for injunction restraining the petitioner and others from interfering with his possession.
2. According to the respondent/plaintiff he was in possession of the property from 1966 onwards and his possession is not liable to be disturbed by any one including the petitioner. He also filed for an appointment of a Commissioner verified and report about the physical features of the suit property and the building situated therein, and to specifically note the details of the compound wall with the gate surrounding the suit property etc. In the plaint it is stated that there was earlier a suit in between the respondent and his elder brother Arumuga Nadar and his wife Ponnachi in O.S.No. 640 of 1974. The suit was decreed declaring that Arumuga Nadar and his wife are entitled to 3/4th share in the property and the same is allowed to be divided and partitioned. A preliminary decree and a final decree were passed. An Execution Application was also filed and the property was also taken delivery through court. It is submitted in the plaint itself that the very same respondent filed O.S.No. 589 of 1978 for setting aside the decree in O.S.No. 640 of 1974 and the same was dismissed. An appeal was taken in A.S.No. 3 of 1978 which also met the same fate and the Second Appeal No. 1003 of 1988 is also admittedly dismissed.
3. Thereafter, the respondent also filed another suit in O.S.No. 82 of 1993 making the present petitioner as a party. It is at this juncture, Arumuga Nadar and his wife who were not able to take possession as per the decree in O.S.No. 640 of 1974 executing a sale deed in favour of one Sathiya George on 15.5.1980 and the present petitioner is claiming under Sathiya George who is also now dead.
4. O.S.No. 82 of 1993 was also filed by the very same respondent for declaration of the very same title of the property and for consequent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession. That suit was also dismissed. Of-course, there is an observation in that case that the sale deed in favour of Sathiya George was against the provisions of Registration Act. It was also held in that case that the sale deed ought to have been registered within the area of jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar where the property is situated. But, since it is registered within the jurisdiction of another Sub-Registrar, it violates the principles of law and therefore invalid.
5. It was also found in that case that the respondent herein has no title or possession and his rights are already adjudicated in earlier litigation. It is also to be taken note that O.S.No. 589 of 1978 was filed for setting aside the decree in O.S. No. 640 of 1974 and for recovery of possession. Therefore, he is also not entitled to get injunction as prayed for. It is after dismissal of O.S.No. 82 of 1993, the present suit is filed.
6. The main reason for filing this revision is that present suit is an abuse of process of court. The respondent has himself filed the earlier litigation and has failed. He cannot collaterally attack the judgment and again repeatedly file suits after suits and thus harass the parties.
7. It is also contended that there is a boundary separating the property which was put up by him after Intervention of court in criminal revisions. It is said that he has put up boundary and the same was demolished and a police complaint was filed which was not taken note of by the authorities and therefore, the petitioner has come to this Court and it is in pursuance to the orders of this Court the boundary was put up with the police aid. When the respondent himself has filed a suit for recovery of possession after setting aside the earlier decree and having failed in his attempt he cannot file the suit as if he is in possession and that too from the year 1966, onwards.
8. Learned Counsel argued that it is a fit case where this Court should strike out the plaint invoking Section 151 read with Order 6, Rule 16 and Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
9. At the time of admission, I ordered notice of motion and granted stay.
10. In a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in I.T.C. Limited v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal . Their Lordships considered the scope of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An argument was taken that it is not permissible to the court to refer to any other materials for the purpose of trying whether there is any cause of action against the parties. It was contended before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the allegation disclosing the course of action must be taken as true. This contention was not accepted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The relevant portions in paras 12 and 13 read thus:
12. The first point here is whether the power to reject the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. can be exercised even after the framing of issues, and when the matter is posted for evidence. This point has arisen because the Division Bench of the High Court has referred to this aspect while dismissing the appeal.
13. We may state that in the context of Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C., a contention that once issues have been framed, the matter has necessarily to go to trial has been clearly rejected by this Court in Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi 1986 S.C.C. (Supp.) 15 at 24 as follows (S.C.C.) para. 12):
In substance, the argument is that the court must proceed with the trial, record the evidence, and only after the trial...is concluded that the powers under the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing appropriately with the defective petition which does not disclose cause of action should be exercised. With respect to the learned Counsel, it is an argument which is difficult to comprehend. The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the court....
The above said judgment which related to an election petition is clearly applicable to suits also and was followed in Samar Singh v. Kedar Nath 1987 S.C.C. (Supp.) 663. We therefore hold that the fact that issues have been framed in the suit cannot come in the way of consideration of this application filed by the appellant under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C.
Thereafter, Their Lordships considered the question whether the cause of action as set out in the plaint alone shall be looked into. It was further held in para 16 of the Judgment thus:
The question is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. Clever drafting creating illusions of cause of action are not permitted in law and a clear right to sue should be shown in the plaint.
14. In this connection, it may also be noted that Order 7, Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure was amended under the act 104 of 1976 where the power is given to court at any stage of the suit to strike of the plaint, "which is otherwise an abuse of process of law". Apart from the same, under inherent powers, under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court is given the poser to strike of the plaint if it comes to the conclusion that there is an abuse of process of law.
15. What is an abuse of process? In a decision in Hunter v. Chief Constable of West Midlands and Anr. 1981 All E.R. 727, it was held thus:
The initiation of proceedings in a court of justice for the purpose of mounting a collateral attack on a final decision adverse to the intending plaintiff reached by a court of competent jurisdiction in previous proceedings in which the plaintiff had a full opportunity of contesting the matter was, as a matter of public policy, an abuse of the process of the court.
It is further held by the House of Lordships in that case thus:
My Lords, collateral attack on a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction may take a variety of forms. It is not surprising that no reported case is to be found in which the facts present a precise parallel with those of the instant case. But the principle applicable is, in my view, simply and clearly stated in those passages from the judgment of A.L. Smith, L.J. in Stephenson v. Garnett (1898) 1 Q.B. 677 and the speech of Lord Halsbury LC in Reichel v. Magrath (1889) 14 App. Cas. 665 which are cited by Goff L.J., in his judgment in the instant case. I need only repeat an extract from the passage which he cited from the judgment of A.L. Smith, L.J., in Stephenson v. Garnett (1898) 1 Q.B. 677 at 680-681:
...the court ought to be slow to strike out a statement of claim or defence, and to dismiss an action as frivolous and vexatious, yet it ought to do so when, as here, it has been shown that the identical question sought to be raised has been already decided by a competent court.
The passage from Lord Halsbury LC's speech in Reichel v. Magrath 14 A.C. 665 at 688 deserves repetition here in full:
...I think it would be a scandal to the administration of justice if, the same question having been disposed of by one case, the litigant were to be permitted by changing the form of the proceedings to set up the same case again.
16. As found by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, from a clear drafting alone the court is not debarred from looking into the real contention. The cause of action in the suit is at para 16 of the suit which reeds thus:
The cause of action for this suit arose within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court when the plaintiff has entered into possession of the plaint schedule property immediately after purchasing the right of equity of redemption by a deed dated 12.10.1960 and after obtaining release deed from the mortgagees dated 25.4.1966 and subsequently when the plaintiff has been in continuous possession and subsequently on 30.1.1997 when the defendant got the sale in his favour and further attempting to take forcible possession:
17. In the entire narration of the facts as stated in the plaint in various paragraphs it is seen that the plaintiff had been in possession from the year 1966. It is also stated in the plaint that his brother has filed a suit O.S.No. 640 of 1974 for partition and recovery of possession, that is after he purchased the property, and obtained the release from mortgages. A preliminary decree was granted in favour of his brother and his wife and he also filed Execution Application for recovery of possession. Even though he says that the delivery has been recorded, it is only a paper delivery.
18. It is also admitted in the plaint itself that he also filed O.S.No. 589 of 1978 for setting aside the very same decree obtained by his brother which was dismissed. The same was confirmed in the appeal and in the second appeal. The suit was one for declaration of his title for setting aside the decree and for recovery of possession. That means he is not in possession and the delivery was effected in O.S.No. 640 of 1974. The decree holder therein also obtained physical possession in execution. It is also admitted in the plaint itself that O.S.No. 82 of 1993 was filed for declaration of title and for prohibitory injunction to restrain the petitioner herein from interfering with his possession. The suit filed by him was also dismissed. He has not preferred any appeal against the judgment in O.S.No. 82 of 1993. The suit was one for permanent prohibitory injunction also claiming possession from 1966 onwards. It is also dismissed as stated in the plaint itself. The question in such cases is whether the plaintiff/respondent be permitted to re-agitate the. matter which is already concluded.
19. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that O.S.No. 589 of 1978 was dismissed and in the second appeal interim orders were obtained from this Court and this Court passed orders in his favour and he continues in possession. It is further stated that even if the sale deed in invalid, if he continues in possession, he can prescribe title by adverse possession. He also brought to my notice the order in C.M.P.No. 951 of 1991 in S.A.No. 1003 of 1988. In the second appeal filed by the respondent herein an application was filed for injunction by the petitioner predecessor. The injunction application was dismissed on the ground that in the suit filed by the plaintiff, the defendant cannot get an injunction.
20. The court did not pass any orders on merits nor it found that the respondent is in possession. In fact, the suit in O.S.No. 589 of 1978 is for setting aside the decree and for recovery of possession. That relief was denied to the respondent. It follows that he was not in possession and the order in C.M.P.No. 951 of 1991 has nothing to do with this case, nor will it advance the argument of the respondent in any way.
21. Learned Counsel for the respondent further submitted that in the judgment in O.S.No. 82 of 1993 there is a finding that the sale in favour of Sathiya George is invalid since it violates the provisions of Registration Act. I do not think that the said finding will also help the respondent.
22. It is not disputed by the respondent that O.S.No. 82 of 1993 was dismissed wherein it was found that the respondent has no title or possession over the property. In such cases, whether the defendant has title to the property or whether the sale deed is valid or not is irrelevant passing an observation regarding the sale deed in favour of the petitioner's predecessor also cannot be made use of by the respondent to his advantage.
23. Learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the orders in the criminal proceedings does not disclose that it was with the help of the police, boundary was put up by the petitioner. Initially, the same was denied. The matter came to this Court and this Court allowed the application of the petitioner and a boundary was also put up. That also strengthens the case of the petitioner that he is in possession, of the property and by virtue of court delivery in earlier proceeding, physical possession was also passed to the decree holder therein.
24. Having failed in all these attempts, can he be permitted again to reagitate the very same issue in another proceeding. In the counter affidavit itself, it is stated in para 22, that the following issues arises for consideration in this case:
(1) Whether the sale deed dated 30.1.1997 is valid and binding on me the respondent?
(2) Whether I have perfected my (respondent) title by adverse possession; and (3) Whether the petitioner (petitioner herein) has any right or interest in the Property
25. If these are the points to be considered I feel that all these are concluded by the earlier decisions. In fact, the validity of the sale deed dated 30.1.1997 does not arise for consideration since the suit is only for injunction claiming possession. Regarding adverse possession, the admission of the plaint itself is sufficient to hold otherwise. On a reading of the plaint, I feel that the respondent has come to this Court only to re-agitate the matter which has already been concluded and which is admitted in the plaint. I find that this is a fit case wherein the powers under Section 151, Order 6, Rule 16; Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India will have to be invoked. Since the respondent has abused the process of court, the plaint in O.S.No. 191 of 1997 is to be striked off the file and consequently, all the interim applications filed by him in the case is also to be rejected, and I direct the lower court to do so.
26. In the result, I allow the revision with costs. Advocate fee Rs. 3,000. Consequently, the connected C.M.P. is closed.
Alert