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J. Victor v. General Manager, Rani Mangammal Transport Corporation
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, employed as a Junior Engineer (joined 22 February 1988; absorbed on 7 April 1992), was alleged to have taken charge of and driven a Corporation lorry on 30 January 1996. While driving, the vehicle struck and killed a pedestrian. The police registered a case under Section 304-A IPC (Cr. No. 30 of 1996), which remained under investigation. The petitioner was placed under suspension, later reinstated on 24 February 1996, and served with a charge memo on 27 February 1996. A departmental enquiry was conducted; the enquiry officer submitted a report. The respondent-Corporation accepted the enquiry report and, proposing dismissal, issued a second show-cause notice dated 25 July 1996 directing the petitioner to show cause why he should not be dismissed. Instead of replying to that second notice, the petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking quashing of the impugned order of 25 July 1996. By consent, the writ petition was taken up for final disposal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the disciplinary authority could accept the enquiry officer's report and proceed to propose the penalty of dismissal without first furnishing the enquiry officer's report and proceedings to the delinquent employee so that he may make representation before the disciplinary authority (i.e., whether the procedure adopted violated the principles of natural justice and Article 311).
- Whether departmental disciplinary proceedings should be stayed pending disposal of the criminal proceedings arising from the same incident (i.e., whether simultaneous criminal and departmental proceedings are barred in the circumstances of this case).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by learned senior counsel Sri R. Shanmugham)
- The disciplinary authority, without giving the petitioner opportunity to make representation against the enquiry officer's findings before taking a decision, had effectively concluded the charges were proved and proposed dismissal — contrary to the decision in Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India v. B. Karunakar [1994 (2) L.L.N 9].
- Because the criminal proceedings and the departmental enquiry related to the same incident, departmental proceedings should be deferred pending the criminal trial; reliance was placed on Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. [1988 (2) L.L.N 912].
Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Sri S. Jayaraman)
- The respondent contended the writ petition was not maintainable since it attacked the second show-cause notice.
- The respondent asserted that the petitioner had been given a reasonable opportunity in accordance with the respondent-Corporation's Standing Orders and that a copy of the enquiry officer's report, past records and proceedings were enclosed with the second show-cause notice to enable the petitioner to reply; therefore, there was no illegality in the impugned order and the writ petition should be dismissed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India Ltd. v. B. Karunakar [1994 (2) L.L.N 9] | Holds that when the inquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the inquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on guilt; the right to represent against the inquiry report is an integral part of reasonable opportunity and a principle of natural justice. The decision explains the two-stage disciplinary process and the distinct rights at each stage. | The court held this decision squarely applicable: because the disciplinary authority accepted the enquiry report and effectively arrived at a decision on guilt and punishment before the petitioner had an opportunity to represent against the report, the procedure was contrary to the rule in Karunakar and amounted to a breach of natural justice. This led to quashing of the impugned order. |
| Union of India v. Mohamed Ramzan Khan [1991 (1) L.L.N 380] | The opinion quotes the Supreme Court's position that the rule in that case should apply to employees in all establishments, public or private, and concerns the right to receive the inquiry report and make representations. | The court referenced this decision as part of the legal foundation (as noted in the Karunakar judgment) to support the proposition that furnishing the enquiry report to the employee is required before the disciplinary authority reaches its conclusions; it informed the court's conclusion that the respondent's procedure was deficient. |
| Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. [1988 (2) L.L.N 912] | Recognizes that while there is no absolute legal bar to simultaneous criminal and disciplinary proceedings, there may be cases where it is appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings pending criminal trial; whether to do so depends on facts and circumstances of each case. | The court considered this precedent on the second issue and concluded that in the facts of the present case — where departmental charges included matters beyond the criminal charge for causing the accident — simultaneous departmental proceedings were not barred and it was appropriate to allow the departmental process to continue (subject to compliance with natural justice on the report issue). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in two parts, addressing each principal objection in turn.
First, on the procedural fairness issue, the court relied primarily on the Constitutional Bench decision in Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India Ltd. v. B. Karunakar. The opinion set out the Karunakar Court's analysis that disciplinary proceedings are to be viewed as having two stages when the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority:
- Stage one: the disciplinary authority considers the evidence, the enquiry officer's report and the delinquent employee's representation against that report; the right to receive the report and represent against its findings is an integral part of the employee's right to defend himself and a requirement of natural justice.
- Stage two: if the disciplinary authority, having considered those materials, proposes a penalty, the employee has the distinct right to show cause against the penalty proposed (unless that right has been dispensed with by constitutional amendment), which is separate from the first-stage right to rebut the enquiry findings.
Applying this framework, the court found that the respondent-Corporation had accepted the enquiry officer's report and had, in effect, reached conclusions on guilt and punishment before affording the petitioner the opportunity to make representations against the enquiry report at the disciplinary authority stage. Although the respondent contended that a copy of the report and proceedings were enclosed with the second show-cause notice, the court held that the right to representation against the report must be given before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions; the respondent's procedure contravened the Karunakar principle and thus violated the principles of natural justice and the protections contemplated by Article 311.
Second, on whether departmental proceedings should be stayed pending the criminal trial, the court examined the Kusheshwar Dubey principle that simultaneous proceedings are not per se barred and that the decision whether to defer disciplinary proceedings depends on case-specific factors. Noting that the departmental charges included six additional charges under the Standing Orders beyond the criminal charge arising from the accident, the court concluded that there was no bar to proceeding with departmental action concurrently with the criminal prosecution in the present circumstances.
Given the court's conclusion that the procedure adopted by the respondent was deficient for failure to allow the petitioner to confront and represent against the enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority reached its conclusions, the court determined that the impugned order had to be set aside.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 25 July 1996 is quashed. No costs were awarded.
Immediate consequences for the parties:
- The impugned second show-cause order (dated 25 July 1996) is set aside because of failure to furnish the enquiry officer's report and allow representation before the disciplinary authority reached its conclusions.
- The respondent is permitted, if it so desires, to proceed further after following the required procedure — i.e., furnish the enquiry officer's report and proceedings to the petitioner and afford him an opportunity to reply before the disciplinary authority takes any fresh decision on guilt or punishment.
- If a fresh enquiry is held and the petitioner is directed to be reinstated, the authority is left to decide according to law how to treat the period between dismissal and reinstatement, and to determine the benefits (if any) and their extent to which the petitioner would be entitled. The court clarified that any reinstatement resulting solely from setting aside for failure to furnish the report should be treated as reinstatement for the purpose of holding a fresh enquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more.
The opinion applied and followed existing Supreme Court decisions (notably Karunakar and the authorities referenced therein) in resolving procedural fairness and simultaneous proceedings questions; it did not purport to lay down a novel legal doctrine beyond the precedents it applied.
JUDGMENT
1. By consent of both parties, the main writ petition itself is taken up for final disposal. The prayer in the writ petition reads as follows:
2. To issue a writ of certiorari after calling for the records of the respondent herein in his proceedings St. A1/840, dated July 25, 1996, and quash the same.
2A. The case of the petitioner as seen from the affidavit is briefly stated hereunder:
The petitioner joined as Junior Engineer in Cholan Roadways Corporation on February 22, 1988. The said Corporation was later taken over by Rani Mangammal Transport Corporation, Dindugul. Respondent in the above writ petition and he was absorbed as Junior Engineer in the said Corporation on April 7, 1992. According to him, he was asked to go to Theni for checking the Corporation vehicles on January 30, 1996. While he was proceeding to Theni, the driver of the lorry who belongs to Theni Division of the respondent-Corporation, on seeing him informed that the lorry is not moving properly. The petitioner inspected the lorry and found certain defects. While he continued to drive the lorry for finding the defects, a pedestrian crossed the road from right side to left side. He sounded the horn and slowed down the speed. But the pedestrian, who crossed back to left side, hit on the vehicle and he died on the spot. The police has registered a case under S. 304-A of IPC, in Cr. No. 30 of 1996 on January 30, 1996. The criminal case is still under investigation. The petitioner was placed under suspension by the department and later the order of suspension, was revoked and he rejoined duty on February 24, 1996. The petitioner was served with a chargememo on February 27, 1996 asking him to submit his explanation to the charges. A departmental enquiry was conducted and the petitioner attended the enquiry. A show-cause notice was issued to him by the respondent asking him why the punishment of dismissal cannot be awarded. At this stage the petitioner has approached this Court stating that he was not given an opportunity before a decision was taken by the disciplinary authority to impose a major penalty of dismissal from service. According to him, the action of the respondent is opposed to the principles of natural justice and in violation of Art. 311 of the Constitution of India.
3. The respondent herein filed a counter-affidavit disputing the various averments made by the petitioner. In the counter it is submitted that the writ petition itself is not maintainable in law, since the same has been filed against the second show-cause notice. After explaining the factual position, it is contended that the respondent-Corporation concurred with the findings of the enquiry officer and proposed to dismiss him from service having regard to the gravity of the misconduct and after taking into account the past record of the employee which was also full of blemishes. A second show-cause notice was issued on July 25, 1996 (impugned order) to the petitioner directing him to show cause as to why he should not be dismissed from service for the above said misconduct. It is also explained in the counter that along with the second show-cause notice, copy of the enquiry officer's report, details of the past records and other proceedings were also enclosed so as to enable him to submit his reply to the said second show-cause notice. Instead of submitting a reply to the second show-cause notice, the petitioner approached this Court and obtained an order of stay.
4. In the light of the pleadings of the parties narrated above, I have heard Sri R. Shanmugham, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Sri S. Jayaraman for the respondent.
5. Sri R. Shanmugham, learned senior counsel has raised the following two objections:
(i) The respondent without giving any opportunity, has provisionally come to the conclusion that charges are proved and has decided to impose capital punishment of dismissal. The action of the respondent is contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Managing Director, Managing Director, Electronic Corporation Of India v. B. Karunakar. [1994 (2) L.L.N 9].
(ii) The criminal proceedings and the present departmental enquiry relate to one incident, hence pending disposal of the criminal case departmental proceedings should not be proceeded with. In support of the above said proposition, he relied on a decision reported in Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal, Ltd. [1988 (2) L.L.N 912].
6. On the other hand Sri S. Jayaraman, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, submitted that inasmuch as the petitioner was given a reasonable opportunity as per the Standing Orders of the respondent-Corporation applicable to the petitioner, there is no error or illegality in the impugned order and prays for dismissal of the writ petition.
7. First I shall consider the first objection of the learned senior counsel, namely, issuance of show-cause notice before taking a decision to impose punishment. In this case, when the petitioner was working as Junior Engineer in the respondent-Corporation, on January 30, 1996 at about 8.50 P.M, near the place called Bommaiya Gowndanpatti, the petitioner took possession of the lorry from the driver and while he was driving the same, the lorry hit against a pedestrian who was crossing the road from right side to left side, which resulted in the death of the pedestrian. Thus, according to the respondent, the respondent (petitioner) without prior approval and unauthorisedly took the vehicle and drove the same resulting in the death of an individual and also caused loss to the Corporation. An explanation was called or from the petitioner as well as the driver in-charge of the said vehicle. Since the explanation was not satisfactory, the respondent ordered an enquiry into the charges. In the domestic enquiry on the side of the management, one Thiru K. Kalimuthu was appointed as the enquiry officer. After full-fledged enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted a report to the respondent-Corporation. The respondent-Corporation after accepting the report of the enquiry officer, decided to impose a capital punishment, namely, removal from service. In those circumstances, by the impugned notice, directed the petitioner to submit his explanation if any. No doubt, the respondent-Corporation also enclosed a copy of the enquiry report and the entire enquiry proceedings along with the impugned order, in order to facilitate the petitioner to submit his explanation. At this stage, it is relevant to refer the leading Constitutional Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India, Ltd., Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar [1994 (2) L.L.N 9] (vide supra) After considering the entire earlier case laws, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court have held that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the enquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defending himself against the charges and the denial of the said right is a breach of the principles of natural justice. They have also held that it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Union of India v. Mohamed Ramzan Khan case [1991 (1) L.L.N 380], should apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government, public or private This will be a case where there are rules governing the disciplinary proceedings or not and whether they expressly prohibit the furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent to the subject. Whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever, the rule requires an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the inquiry officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Since the decision of the Apex Court referred above clearly has (sic) an answer for our question, I am hereunder reproducing the relevant conclusion arrived by the Supreme Court in the above said decision 1994 (2) L.L.N 9 (vide supra), in Paras 24 to 29, at pages 23 to 25:
“24. What emerges from the above survey of the law on the subject is as follows:
Since the Government of India Act, 1935, till the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, the Government servant had always the right to receive report of the inquiry officer/authority and to represent against the findings recorded in it when the inquiry officer/authority was not the disciplinary authority. This right was however, exercisable by him at the second stage of the disciplinary proceedings, viz., when he was served with a notice to show cause against the proposed penalty. The issuance of the notice to show cause against the penalty necessarily required the furnishing or a copy of the inquiry officer's report since, as held by the Courts, the right to show cause against the penalty also implied the right to represent against the findings on the charges. This was considered to be an essential part of the ‘reasonable opportunity’ incorporated earlier in S. 240(3) of the G.O.I Act, and later in Art. 311(2) of the Constitution as originally enacted. The right to receive the inquiry officer's report and to show cause against the findings in the report was independent of the right to show cause against the penalty proposed. The two rights came to be confused with each other because as the law stood prior to the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, the two rights arose simultaneously only at the stage when a notice to show cause against he proposed penalty was issued. If the disciplinary authority after considering the inquiry officer's report had dropped the proceedings or had decided to impose a penalty other than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, there was no occasion for issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty. In that case, the employee had neither the right to receive the report and represent against the finding of guilt nor the right to show cause against the proposed penalty. The right to receive the report and to represent against the findings recorded in it was thus inextricably connected with the acceptance of the report by the disciplinary authority and the nature of the penalty proposed Since the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution dispensed with the issuance of the notice to show cause against the penalty proposed even if it was dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, some Courts took the view that the Government servant was deprived of his right to represent against the findings of guilt as well. The error occurred on account of the failure to distinguish the two rights which were independent of each other.
25. While the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of the inquiry; viz., before the disciplinary, authority takes into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its conclusion. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the 42nd Amendment.
26. The reason why the right to receive the report of the inquiry officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the inquiry officer from an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is the negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the inquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the inquiry officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the inquiry officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the inquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the inquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, required that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the inquiry officer's findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the inquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it.
27. It will thus be seen that where the inquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, inquiry officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority-decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee's right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to him, he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings.
28. The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle. Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a ‘reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him.’ The findings on the charges given by a third person like the inquiry officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or arrived at by over looking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. What is further, when the proviso to the said articles states that:
‘where it is proposed after such inquiry to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed,’
it in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the inquiry officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee's reply to the inquiry officer's report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the inquiry officer. The latter right was always there. But before the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage, viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that had happened after the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the inquiry officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges.
29. Hence it has to be held that when the inquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has a right to receive a copy of the inquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is apart of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the inquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges, is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.”
8. The law laid down by the Apex Court in the above referred decision is squarely applicable to the facts of this case, as rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel. In our case, the enquiry officer has submitted a report to the disciplinary authority. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority, after considering the said report, accepted the same in toto. The disciplinary authority on the basis of the report of the enquiry officer, decided to impose a capital punishment, viz., removal from service as per the Standing Orders. The procedure adopted by the respondent-Corporation is certainly contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court referred above. No doubt, the petitioner had ample opportunity before the enquiry officer. However on receipt of the report from the enquiry officer, before taking any decision, a duty is cast on the respondent-management to send the entire copy of the report including the enquiry proceedings to the delinquent employee. After receipt of reply or explanation from the delinquent employee, it is open to the respondent to arrive at a decision regarding punishment as per the provisions of the Standing Orders. As rightly stated, a perusal of the impugned order clearly shows that the respondent after accepting the enquiry officer's report and after arriving at a decision that a capital punishment of removal from service has to be imposed on this case, notice has been sent to the petitioner calling upon him to offer his explanation with regard to the proposed punishment. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that along with the notice the disciplinary authority has also enclosed a copy of the report as well as the proceedings, hence, according to him, it is sufficient compliance of the provisions of natural justice. In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court referred above, I am unable to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent. As observed by the Supreme Court, the right to make a representation before the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the enquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity against the charges, and if the same is denied, it would amount to breach of principles of natural justice. Irrespective of the nature of punishment whenever an enquiry is held, the delinquent employee should have the effect of the report of the enquiry officer before the disciplinary authority regarding his findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence, in view of the absence of such procedure, the conclusion arrived at by the respondent cannot be countenanced and the first submission of the learned senior counsel in this regard is well founded.
9. Secondly, the learned senior counsel submitted that till the disposal of the criminal case, the departmental proceedings should not be proceeded with for which he relied on the decision reported in Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal, Ltd. [1988 (2) L.L.N 912] (vide supra). The criminal case filed against him is for causing accident leading to the death of a pedestrian. In the departmental proceedings, apart from causing accident resulting in death of a pedestrian, the management has framed six more charges with reference to the Standing Orders. Hence, considering the charges levelled against him in the departmental proceedings and the charge in the criminal case, I am of the view that the present departmental proceedings is not a bar. No doubt, in the said decision, the Apex Court has held, in Para. 7, at page 914, that:
“… While there can be no legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken, yet, there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case …”
The Apex Court has further held, in Para. 7, at page 914:
“… Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the Court will decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted, pending criminal trial, and that as we have already stated that it is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast, strait-jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual situation …”
As already stated, in view of the facts available in our case, I am of the view that there is no bar in proceeding with the departmental proceeding simultaneously along with the criminal prosecution.
10. In view of my conclusion reached on the first submission made by the learned senior counsel, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order, dated July 25, 1996 is quashed. No costs.
11. Since the impugned order is set aside only on the ground that non-furnishing of the enquiry officer's report before taking a decision with regard to punishment by the respondent, I make it clear that after following the said procedure, it is open to the respondent to proceed further if they so desire. I also make it clear that if the petitioner employee succeeds in the fresh enquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled to. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report, should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh enquiry is held.
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