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S. Saraswathiammal (Deceased) And Two Others v. R.S Mallikarjun Raja And Two Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The matter originates with an eviction petition filed by Packialakshmiammal (landlady) as R.C.O.P. No. 13 of 1980 before the Rent Controller (District Munsif), Madurai Taluk, Madurai, seeking possession of premises bearing Door No. 38, Pappankinatru Lane. The landlady alleged the building was very old and had only light roofing sheets; she stated she had three sons and intended to demolish and reconstruct the premises so as to divide the property among them, and she produced a plan and estimate for demolition and reconstruction.
The tenant filed objections denying that the building was old or in such a condition as to require demolition and contending that the landlady's intention was not bona fide. The Rent Controller accepted the landlady's case and held the requirement for demolition and reconstruction to be bona fide. The tenant appealed by R.C.A. No. 215 of 1981; the Appellate Authority, by order dated 30.3.1982, allowed the appeal and set aside the Rent Controller's order. The landlady then filed C.R.P. No. 1656 of 1983 before this Court.
This Court, by its order dated 4.3.1986, remanded the matter for further consideration, observing that the Appellate Authority could not conclude from the plan alone that Section 14(1)(b) would not apply, and noting gaps in the evidence about whether demolition was immediately required and the precise nature of proposed works.
After remand, the landlady produced further documents (Exs. A8 and A9) to show the age of the building. Pending the appeal the original parties died and the present parties are their legal representatives. The Appellate Authority, in an order dated 23.3.1992, confirmed the Rent Controller's order and directed eviction. The revision before this Court challenges that confirmation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a petition under Section 14(1)(b) of Act 18 of 1980 is maintainable on the facts of this case (i.e., whether the proposed works constitute demolition and reconstruction rather than merely roof replacement).
- Whether the landlady's requirement of the premises for demolition and reconstruction is bona fide.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners / Tenant (as argued by learned counsel)
- The petition under Section 14(1)(b) cannot be maintained because the landlady intends only to replace damaged roofing (a change of roof), which should fall under Section 14(1)(a) and not under Section 14(1)(b).
- The Appellate Authority failed to apply its mind to paragraph 5 of the remand order of this Court.
- The Court misconstrued Ex. A3 and applied the substance of that document against the tenant's case.
- Earlier in proceedings the tenant had expressly alleged that the building was not old and is in good condition and that the landlady's intention was not bona fide.
Respondents / Landlady (as argued by learned counsel)
- The landlady does not intend only to replace the roofing; she intends to demolish and construct a pucca building (to enable division between her sons) as deposed by P.W.1 and shown in Ex. A1 (plan).
- Exs. A8 and A9 (sale deeds) prove the age of the building.
- The tenant failed to lead any evidence to discharge the burden of proving that the building is in good condition or that the landlady's intention is mala fide.
- The respondents relied on a number of decisions (cited in the opinion) to support their position that the petition under Section 14(1)(b) is maintainable in these circumstances.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| K. Krishnan v. Munuswamy, 1978 (2) M.L.J. 510 = 91 L.W. 454 | Holds that a petition for mere change of roof cannot be maintained under Section 14(1)(b) and should be under Section 14(1)(a). | The Court held this authority did not support the tenant's contention because, on the evidence (Exs. A1, A2 and P.W.1), the landlady proposed demolition and further construction beyond mere roof replacement. |
| T. Thiruppathi v. Maimoon Bibi, 1982 (1) M.L.J. 154 = 95 L.W. 35 | Also establishes that replacement of roof alone is not a ground under Section 14(1)(b) but comes under Section 14(1)(a). | The Court found this precedent inapplicable for the same reason as K. Krishnan: the proposed work here includes reconstruction and additional construction after demolition. |
| Central Hameedia Stores v. Valliammal Atrajammal, 1996 (1) C.T.C. 330 = 1996-2-L.W. 720 | Explains evidentiary position: when tenants give no contradictory evidence, there is nothing wrong in accepting the landlord's evidence on condition and bona fides; burden on landlord to prove condition when tenants also testify, but tenants must provide contra-evidence. | The Court relied on this principle to observe that the tenant did not lead any contra-evidence and thus the landlady's evidence on bona fides and the condition/age of the building could properly be accepted. |
| K.J. Sivalingam v. S. Guruswamy, 1983 (II) M.L.J. 8 = 96 L.W. 114 | Holds that the age and condition of the building are relevant but it is not necessary that the building be in imminent danger of crumbling before Section 14(1)(b) can apply; stringent tests are not warranted. | The Court applied this principle to support the proposition that demolition and reconstruction may be directed even if the building is not in an imminent state of collapse, and thus the landlady's claim could be bona fide without proving imminent danger. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:
- Characterisation of proposed work: The Court examined the pleadings, the plan and estimate (Exs. A1 and A2) and P.W.1's testimony, observing that these documents and oral evidence showed not merely roof replacement but demolition followed by additional construction including construction of a bathroom and lavatory and subdivision of the portion for the landlady's sons. On that basis the Court concluded the petition fell within Section 14(1)(b) rather than being limited to mere roof replacement under Section 14(1)(a).
- Evidentiary burden and absence of contra-evidence: The Court noted that the tenant did not lead any evidence at the remand stage (and in the counter had not alleged that the landlady intended only to replace the roof). Given that, the Court relied on the settled approach (as reflected in Central Hameedia Stores) that in the absence of contra-evidence the landlord's proof of condition and intention could be accepted.
- Legal tests for bona fides: The Court identified three conditions for a petition under Section 14(1)(b): (1) bona fide intention of the landlady not motivated solely to evict tenants; (2) age and condition of the building; and (3) the financial capacity of the landlady to demolish and rebuild. The Court emphasized that the building need not be in an imminently dangerous or dilapidated condition to satisfy Section 14(1)(b), citing K.J. Sivalingam v. S. Guruswamy for that proposition.
- Application of precedent and facts: The Court held that the precedents relied upon by the tenant (K. Krishnan and T. Thiruppathi) were distinguishable because those cases concerned mere roof replacement. The Court accepted the landlady's evidence as to age (Exs. A8 and A9), intention and financial capability, and found no evidence of mala fide intention by the landlady.
- Remand compliance and assessment of evidence: The Court rejected the submission that the Appellate Authority decided the case only on the plan after remand. It found that oral and documentary evidence had been considered and that the authorities below had applied their minds to the relevant factors (condition, age, intention, financial position).
- Conditional undertaking and remedy: The landlady gave an undertaking to demolish and commence construction within a specified period; the Court noted the tenant's remedy of seeking restitution under the Act if the undertaking was not honoured.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revision petition is dismissed and the eviction order confirmed. The Court found that the petition under Section 14(1)(b) of Act 18 of 1980 was maintainable on the facts and that the landlady's requirement for demolition and reconstruction was bona fide.
Direct implications for the parties:
- The eviction order as confirmed by the Appellate Authority stands.
- The tenants (or their legal representatives) were granted three months' time to vacate the premises on condition that they file an affidavit of undertaking within two weeks that they will vacate within three months; failure to file the affidavit or to vacate will render the eviction order operative immediately.
- The landlady gave an undertaking to commence demolition and reconstruction within a stipulated period; if she does not comply the tenant may seek restitution under the Act.
Broader legal implications: The Court applied existing principles rather than announcing a new legal rule. It affirmed that Section 14(1)(b) can apply where demolition and reconstruction (not merely roof replacement) are proposed, that the building need not be imminently dangerous for Section 14(1)(b) to be invoked, and that absence of tenant evidence can justify acceptance of the landlord's case on condition and bona fides. The opinion does not purport to create a novel precedent beyond applying settled authorities.
Costs: No costs were awarded.
The Legal Representatives of the tenant have filed the above revision challenging the order of eviction. One Packialakshmiammal filed R.C.O.P No. 13, of 1980 on the file of the Rent Controller (District Munsif), Madurai Taluk, Madurai to direct the tenant to deliver possession of the premises bearing Door No. 38, Pappankinatru Lane, Madurai Town. This eviction petition was filed on the ground that the demised premises is a very old building and it has only a light roofing sheets for the roof. She has got three sons and they intended to divide the properties by putting up additional constructions after demolition. It is also stated in that petition that they have submitted a plan and estimate for demolition and reconstruction. On the basis of the said averments the landlady has submitted that she requires the premises for immediate demolition and reconstruction and her intention is bona fide one. Objecting this petition, the petitioner/tenant filed a statement of objections stating that the building is not old and it is in good condition and the intention to demolish and reconstruct the same is not a bona fide one. The Rent Controller after considering the oral and documentary evidence found that the requirement of the petition mentioned building for demolition and reconstruction is bona fide. Aggrieved against that finding, the tenant filed R.C.A No. 215 of 1981. The Appellate Authority in his order dated 30.3.1982 allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Rent Controller. The landlady filed C.R.P No. 1656 of 1983 before this Court. This Court in its order dated 4.3.1986 remanded the matter with the following observations:—
“The Appellate Authority found that in Ex. A1 the plan, there is no indication that the building has to be demolished and a new building has to be built in the site, but that only the roof has to be replaced by a terrace and that therefore the petition would not lie under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. But the evidence of P.W 1 the landlord, shows that a bathroom and a lavatory have to be constructed in the portion now in occupation of the tenant and that the entire portion has to be divided into two equal parts for the occupation of the two sons of the landlord. There is no evidence also in this case whether the building is required for immediate purpose of demolition. Further, there is no evidence as to whether the petition schedule property which bears Door No. 4, is alone so old as to require immediate demolition even though in the counter the tenant has expressly stated that the allegation that the building is old, is not true. From the plan alone submitted in this case, the Appellate Authority cannot come to the conclusion that the petition under Section 14(1)(b) will not lie”.
After remand, the landlady filed two documents, Exs. A8 and A9 to show the age of the building. Pending appeal the landlady and tenant died and the respondents and petitioners are their respective Legal Representatives. The Appellate Authority in this order dated 23.3.1992 confirmed the order of the Rent Controller, ordering eviction.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant submitted that the petition under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act cannot be maintained as the landlady wants only replacement of the damaged roofing and the Appellate Authority has not applied his mind with respect to para 5 of the remand order of this Court. He further submitted that the Court has misconstrued Ex. A3 and applied the substance of the document against his case. The learned counsel for the respondents/landlady has submitted that it is not correct to state that the landlady is going to replace only the roofing but as deposed by P.W 1, after demolition, the landlady is going to construct a pucca building. Ex. A1 plan will clearly prove the same. Exs. A8 and A9 sale deeds will clearly prove the age of the building and the tenant has not examined any witness to discharge his hurden regarding the condition of the building. In support of his argument, the learned counsel for the respondent/landlady cited number of decisions
3. The only question which has to be decided in this case is whether the petition under Section 14(1)(b) of Act 18 of 1980 is maintainable with reference to the facts of this case and whether the requirement by the landlady of the premises for demolition is bonafide.
4. In the petition, the landlady has clearly stated that she wants to put up additional construction by demolishing the premises in full. In support of her case. Ex. A1 and Ex. A2 have been produced which show not only the replacement of roofing but also some additional construction after demolition of the premises in question. P.W 1 has also deposed to that effect. On the contrary, the tenant did not let in any evidence to prove his case. Not even in the counter the tenant has stated that the petition is not maintainable, by alleging that the landlady is going to replace only the roofing and not going to reconstruct the building. So, in view of this fact, the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners. viz., K. Krishnan v. Munuswamy 1978 (2) M.L.J 510 =91 L.W 454 and T. Thiruppathi v. Maimoon Bibi 1982 (1) M.L.J 154 =95 L.W 35 will not support their contention. In the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, it is held that for a change of roof, petition cannot be maintained under Section 14(1)(b) and it should be under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act. As discussed earlier, herein this case, after demolition, the landlady is going to not only replace the roofing but also to construct structure in the demolished portion, so I find that the petition under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act is maintainable.
5. Regarding the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that there is no bona fide intention on the part of the landlady regarding the demolition and reconstruction of the building as the building is in good condition and it does not require immediate demolition: To maintain the petition under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act, the landlady should satisfy three conditions, namely (1) bona fide intention of the landlady, far from the sole object being only to get rid of the tenants; (2) the age and condition of the building; and (3) the financial position of the landlady to demolish and erect a new building. It is well settled that the building need not be in a dilapidated condition or in a dangerous state of affairs for ordering a petition under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. In this case, the landlady has proved that she is having sufficient money to construct the building and she has filed necessary plan to show that she is going to construct the building in the demolished portion so as to enable the sons to divide the properties. To deny this pleading and evidence, the petitioners did not let in any evidence regarding the condition of the building or to prove that the intention of the landlady to demolish and reconstruct the premises in question is a mala fide one and only for the purpose of evicting him. The very same issue came up for consideration before this. Court and this Court in the decision reported in 1996 (1) C.T.C 330=1996-2-L.W. 720(Central Hameedia Stores v. Valliammal Atrajammal) held that.
“though the burden is on the landlady to prove the condition of the building when the tenants also got into the box to give evidence, they should have let in evidence contra that the condition of the building is such that it does not require demolition. In the absence of any contra evidence, there is nothing wrong in accepting the evidence of the landlady. Both the authorities below had categorically found that the requirement of the landlady under Section 14(1)(b) is bona fide”.
6. The landlady has filed documents, Exs. A8 and A9 to prove the age of the building. The existing condition of the building far from being totally irrelevant is a factor in considering the bona fide requirement under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. While dealing with similar matter, this Court, in the decision reported in 1983 (II) M. L.J 8=96 L.W 114 (K.J. Sivalingam v. S. Guruswamy held as follows:—
“While the age and condition of the buildings are relevant factors to be taken into account, it is not possible to insist that the condition of the building must be such that there is an imminent threat of the same crumbling down in the near future and only in such a contingency, the landlord could resort to the process under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. There is no warrant for applying such stringent tests to discountenance the plea of the landlord for requiring the building for demolition and reconstruction of a better structure either to get a better return or to accommodate himself comfortably”.
Bona fides have to be assessed with reference to the facts and circumstances of each particular case. In this case, the landlady has given an undertaking that she will demolish the building and commence the construction of the building within a particular period. If she fails to do so, the tenant can seek restitution under the Act.
7. Looked at from any point of view the landlady has proved her bona fide intention to demolish the building for reconstruction. It cannot be said that after remand the Appellate Authority has decided the case only on the basis of the plan. The oral and other documentary evidence had been taken into consideration to assess the intention of the landlady. The authorities below have applied their mind regarding the condition of the building and other relevant factors and have correctly come to the conclusion that the building requires demolition and reconstruction and the intention of the landlady is bona fide. I do not find any illegality, impropriety or irregularity in the orders passed by the authorities below and as such the revision petition is dismissed. No costs.
8. After delivering the order, counsel for the petitioners-tenants requested time to vacate the premises. Though the counsel for the respondents resisted, ultimately agreed for the grant of three months time. Time is granted to vacate the premises, on condition that the tenants should file an affidavit of undertaking within two weeks from today, that the petitioners will vacate the premises within the period of three months from today, failing which the order of eviction already passed will come into force immediately.
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