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Lakshmi Ammal (Died) And 6 Others v. J. Victor And 3 Others

Madras High Court
Oct 18, 1997
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Judgment Summary — Appeal from Decree for Specific Performance

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued for specific performance of an agreement to sell a house (suit property) and obtained a decree in the trial court (recorded on the file of the IV / 4th Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras). Defendants 1 to 7 (the deceased vendor's wife, children) were unsuccessful at trial and appealed. The 8th defendant is the legal representative of the mortgagee and had separate mortgage recovery proceedings.

Key factual points as recited in the opinion (reported verbatim where dates or details vary in the source):

  • The sale agreement is repeatedly referenced in the opinion; some paragraphs refer to an agreement dated 21.7.73 while other paragraphs refer to an agreement dated 21.7.1975 or 21.7.75. The opinion records both forms of the date as they appear in the source text.
  • Under the written agreement, Narayanaswami Pillai (vendor) was to convey the property free from encumbrances and discharge subsisting mortgages; the agreed sale price was Rs. 37,000/-.
  • The plaintiff paid advances and subsequent sums amounting in aggregate to Rs. 17,851/- (including an advance of Rs. 1,100/- and a payment or payments totalling approximately Rs. 13,000–13,500/- intended to discharge mortgage obligations).
  • Narayanaswami Pillai allegedly did not redeem the mortgages, took a hostile attitude, and later died on 9.11.77. After his death, defendants 1–7 did not execute the sale deed; the plaintiff claims possession was delivered in part performance.
  • The trial court (4th Additional Judge, City Civil Court) found that the agreement was not legally cancelled by the vendor, that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform, and decreed specific performance in the plaintiff's favour. Defendants 1–7 appealed that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit based on Ex.A‑1 (the written agreement) is maintainable when the plaintiff's signature does not appear on the document, in light of Section 15(a) of the Specific Relief Act.
  2. Whether the agreement dated 21.7.1975 (as referred to in parts of the record) was cancelled by Narayanaswami Pillai.
  3. Whether the plaintiff had agreed to, and in fact did, discharge the mortgages dated 20.12.62 and 18.7.64 (i.e., whether the plaintiff performed or was ready and able to perform his obligation to discharge mortgages).
  4. If the plaintiff did not discharge the mortgages, what is the effect of such non-discharge on the plaintiff's right to specific performance?
  5. Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing and had the means to perform his part of the contract, and whether he was in possession of the property in part performance.
  6. Whether the omission in the trial court's written judgment to reproduce the framed issues vitiates the trial court's decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants 1–7) Arguments

  • Ex.A‑1 (dated 21.7.75/1975 in several paragraphs) is not valid because the plaintiff did not sign it; under Section 15(a) of the Specific Relief Act only a party to the agreement can enforce it.
  • If the agreement were unilateral, Narayanaswami Pillai had the right to cancel and in fact validly cancelled it.
  • There is no evidence that the plaintiff was continuously ready and willing to perform his obligations under the contract.
  • No specific finding was made regarding discharge of the mortgage in terms of Ex.A‑1; the plaintiff did not discharge the mortgage as required.
  • The plaintiff failed to prove possession and there was delay in filing the suit; plaintiff allegedly made forcible entry after the vendor's death.
  • The trial court failed to frame issues (or failed to record them in the judgment), making the trial judge's discussion and decree unsustainable.

Respondent's (Plaintiff / First Respondent) Arguments

  • The objection under Section 15(a) was not raised in the written statement at trial nor in the grounds of appeal; it is therefore a belated objection and cannot be entertained at the appellate stage.
  • Prior pleadings (notably the plaint in O.S. No. 4457 of 1978, marked Ex.A‑35) made by the appellants themselves admit execution of Ex.A‑1; given that admission and absence of denial in the present written statement, the suit is maintainable even if the plaintiff's signature is absent on Ex.A‑1.
  • The plaintiff has proved readiness and means to perform (including payments made towards the sale consideration and evidence of business assets and turnover), and has proved possession in part performance.
  • The trial court's decree was founded on acceptable oral and documentary evidence and therefore ought to be upheld; the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kandamath Cine Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. John Philipose (AIR 1990 Kerala 198) The opinion cites this authority as part of the group of decisions supporting the proposition that a pure question of law may be raised at a late stage, including on appeal. The court acknowledged the general principle that questions of law can be raised at any stage but proceeded to decide the maintainability objection on factual and pleadings grounds (admissions in Ex.A‑35 and absence of denial).
Vasantkumar Radhakisan Vora v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay (AIR 1991 S.C. 14) Cited among authorities for the proposition that questions of law can be taken at appellate stage. The court accepted the legal proposition but found the particular objection (absence of plaintiff's signature) was not fatal because the other contracting party had signed and the appellants had earlier admitted the agreement.
K.P.M. Basheer v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1992 Supreme Court 1353) Cited in support of the principle that questions of law can be raised at any stage. Used by the court to frame the procedural posture on whether the maintainability objection could be entertained; the court then resolved the matter on the facts and admissions in pleadings.
Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumar Sharma (AIR 1996 Supreme Court 869) Cited among cases reiterating that pure questions of law are entertainable at the appellate stage. The court noted the principle but concluded that the absence of the plaintiff's signature on Ex.A‑1 did not make the suit non‑maintainable given the other party's signature and prior admissions in pleadings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in discrete stages, each tied to materials in the record:

  1. Maintainability under Section 15(a): The court acknowledged the appellants' contention that Ex.A‑1 lacks the plaintiff's signature and that Section 15(a) normally permits enforcement by the party to be charged. The court also accepted the general legal position (supported by cited authorities) that pure questions of law can be raised on appeal. However, the court examined the pleadings and evidence: the plaint in O.S. No. 4457 of 1978 (Ex.A‑35) contained averments by the appellants (there plaintiffs in that suit) admitting that the plaintiff and Narayanaswami Pillai had entered into the agreement dated 21.7.1975. In the present suit the written statement did not deny the execution of the agreement; it pleaded cancellation. In that factual matrix the court held that the vendor's signature on Ex.A‑1 (even in the absence of the plaintiff's signature) sufficed for enforcement: the court quoted an authority (a treatise by Sir Edward Fry) that a signature by the party to be charged is sufficient. On that basis the court rejected the maintainability challenge.
  2. Performance, readiness and discharge of mortgage: The court examined documentary receipts (Ex.A‑2 and its reverse Ex.A‑22) and oral evidence and accepted that the plaintiff had paid sums aggregating Rs. 17,851/-, including amounts which corresponded to the Rs. 13,000 agreed to be paid for discharge of mortgages. The court reasoned that the timing and amounts of these payments, not disputed in the written statement, support the inference that the plaintiff had performed his part by providing funds intended to discharge mortgages. The court further noted that the vendor did not take steps to execute the sale deed nor to call on the plaintiff to pay any balance; this conduct supported the conclusion that breach lay with the vendor.
  3. Means to perform: The court reviewed oral evidence (P.W.1) describing the plaintiff's business (owner of J.V. Press), its turnover and assets (printing contracts, capacity to raise bank overdraft, prior property purchase and pledging of jewels). The court found P.W.1's evidence credible and sufficient to demonstrate that the plaintiff had the means to complete the purchase and therefore was not incapacitated from performing.
  4. Possession and part performance: The court considered testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.2 and the plaint averments (including Ex.A‑35 and paragraph references) that possession had been delivered in part performance: specifically the vendor allegedly evicted tenants, kept house under lock until registration, and handed the key to plaintiff or his agent. The court found the oral testimony and the prior plaint averments supportive of the claim of part performance and accepted that the plaintiff was in possession in part performance.
  5. Framing of issues: The appellants argued the trial judge failed to frame issues. The court inspected the record and found that four issues were in fact framed on 2‑2‑80 (the opinion reproduces these four issues). The court treated the omission to reproduce the issues in the body of the judgment as a clerical or drafting lapse but not a fatal irregularity. Accordingly that objection failed.
  6. Conclusion from the cumulative analysis: Having found the agreement was not legally cancelled, that the plaintiff had paid substantial part of the consideration (including sums directed to mortgage discharge), that he had means and possession in part performance, and that the trial court had framed issues, the appellate court agreed with the trial court's decree for specific performance.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The appeal is dismissed with costs; the trial court's decree for specific performance is affirmed.

Direct consequences and directions stated in the opinion:

  • The appellants/defendants 1 to 7 are directed to execute the registered sale deed within two months from the date of the judgment.
  • If the defendants fail to execute the sale deed within two months, the plaintiff is permitted to get the sale deed executed through the Court.
  • The opinion records that the plaintiff had deposited the balance of sale consideration and that the 8th respondent (legal representative of the mortgagee) was permitted to withdraw a sum as per his decree; this factual position informed the court's directions.

The opinion does not state any broader doctrine or declare that a new precedent has been laid down; the decision rests on the court's application of existing principles to the facts (pleadings, admissions, payments, proof of possession and means).

End of summary.

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JUDGMENT

Defendants 1 to 7 in O.S No. 7368 of 1978 on the file of IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras are the appellants in the above appeal. The first respondent herein filed the said suit for specific performance.

2. The case of the plaintiff is briefly stated hereunder.

The plaintiff and one Narayanaswami Pillai entered into an agreement of sale dated 21.7.73 under which Narayanaswami Pillai agreed to sell the suit property for a sale consideration of Rs. 37,000/- free from all encumbrances. According to the terms of the agreement, Narayanaswami Pillai should discharge a subsisting mortgage in respect of this property, pay the arrears of taxes, obtain an encumbrance certificate and convey the property free from all encumbrances. Subsequently on 11.10.75 Narayanaswami Pillai received a sum of Rs. 13,500/- representing that he woud discharge the two mortgages in respect of the property and another in respect of another property of Narayanaswami Pillai due to the same mortgagee. Including the advance of Rs. 1,100/- paid on the date of the agreement and the subsequent payments made by the plaintiff, Narayanaswami Pillai had received a total sum of Rs. 17,851 towards the sale consideration. However, Narayanaswami Pillai did not redeem the mortgages. He took a hostile attitude. But possession of the property was delivered in part performance of the agreement of sale. Before completing the execution of the sale deed Narayanaswami Pillai died on 9.11.77 The first defendant/first appellant is the wife and defendants 2 and 3.appellants 2 and 3 are the sons and defendants 4 to 7.appellants 4 to 7 are the daughters of Narayanaswami Pillai. 8th defendant/2nd respondent is the legal representative of the mortgagee. The plaintiff issued a notice even during the life time of Narayanaswami Pillai asking him to execute the sale deed. But Narayanaswami Pillai sent a reply refusing to execute the sale deed and rescinding the contract. After the death of Narayanaswami Pillai the plaintiff issued a notice to the defendants 1 to 7 calling upon them to execute the sale deed. The said demand made by the notice dated 2.6.78 was not complied with by the defendants 1 to 7. The plaintiff has been ever ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and as such he has come forward with the above suit for specific performance directing the defendants 1 to 7 to execute a registered sale deed after discharge of the subsisting mortgage.

3. Defendants 1 to 7 filed a written statement and contended that Narayanaswami Pillai had himself sent a reply notice dated 9.8.77 terminating the contract. The defendants admit the receipt of the total sum of Rs. 17,851/-. The plaintiff had agreed to discharge a mortgage from and out of the balance of sale price within a period of six months, but he did not discharge the mortgage. So it is the plaintiff who committed breach of the contract. After the death of Narayanaswamy Pillai, the plaintiff had made forcible entry into the property. The possession of the property was not given to the plaintiff in part performance of the agreement to sale. The defendants 1 to 3 had filed O.S No. 4457 of 1978 in the City Civil Court for permanent injunction. The present suit has been filed only after the other suit was filed by defendants 1 to 3. The 8th defendant filed a written statement and contended that there are two mortgages subsisting over this properly, the one for Rs. 3,000/- and the other for Rs. 4,000/-. The 8th defendant has filed O.S No. 8366 of 77 for recovery of a sum of Rs. 14,465/- due on the mortgages.

4. The plaintiff himself was examined as P.W.4 and one Ratnam was examined as P.W.2 apart from marking Exs. A-1 to A-35 in order to prove his case. On the other hand, third defendant was examined as D.W.I and Exs. B-1 to B-9 were marked on the side of the defendants. In the light of the above pleadings and oral and documentary evidence, after framing necessary issues the learned 4th Additional Judge, City Civil Court, after holding that the agreement dated 21.7.75 was not legally cancelled by Narayanaswami Pillai, the plaintiff did not agree to discharge the mortgage over the property, the plaintiff had always been ready and willing to perform his part of contract and the breach was committed only by Narayanaswami Pillai, decreed the suit for specific performance in favour of the plaintiff.

5. Aggrieved against the decree for specific performance, the unsuccessful defendants 1 to 7 filed the above appeal.

6. I have heard Mr. T. Thirumaran, learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. R. Rathinadurai, learned counsel for first respondent and Mr. V. Subramaniam, learned counsel for 2nd respondent.

7. Mr. T. Thirumaran, learned counsel for the appellants raised the following contentions: —

(1) Ex.A-1 dated 21.7.75 is not a valid agreement, since the plaintiff has not signed the same. As per Section 15(a) of the Specific Relief Act parties to the agreement alone can enforce the agreement, and since the plaintiff is not a party to the said agreement, the suit filed on the basis of Ex.A-1 cannot be maintained.

(2) Even if the agreement is unilateral since Narayanaswamy Pillai has right to cancel the said agreement, he has rightly cancelled it.

(3) There is no evidence to show that the plaintiff was all along ready and willing in order to perform his part.

(4) There is no specific finding regarding the discharge of the mortgage in terms of Ex.A-1.

(5) The plaintiff has also failed to prove regarding possession as well as delay in filing the suit.

(6) Inasmuch as the trial Court has failed to frame issues, the entire discussion and ultimate decree in favour of the plaintiff are liable to be set aside.

8. On the other hand, Mr. Rathinadurai, learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff submitted that (1) the plea that the suit based on Ex.A-1 is not maintainable as per Section 15(a) of the Specific Relief Act has not been rainsed in the written statement, nor any issue was framed. He also contended that even in the memorandum of appeal, no ground is taken as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants. Hence, such belated objection cannot be entertained at this stage.

(2) In view of specific averment admitting the execution of Ex. A-1 in O.S No. 4457 of 78 and in the absence of any denial in the written statement in the present suit, even in the absence of signature of the plaintiff in Ex.A-1, the suit as framed on the basis of Ex.A-1 is maintainable.

(3) The plaintiff has established regarding his readiness, means in order to perform his part.

(4) The plaintiff has established that he is in possession of the suit property and the same has been established by evidence.

(5) Inasmuch as the Court below has granted decree on the basis of the acceptable, oral and documentary evidence, produced by the plaintiff, absolutely there is no merit in the appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. I have carefully considered the rival submissions.

9. At the outset I shall consider the objection regarding the maintainability of the suit as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants. As requested, I have perused Ex.A-1 dated 21.7.75 agreement entered into between the plaintiff and Narayanaswamy Pillai. It is true in the said agreement only Narayanaswamy Pillai has signed. The plaintiff's signature is not found in Ex.A1 As per Section 15(a) of the Specific Relief Act, the party to the contract alone is entitled to file a suit. Relying on this provision, Mr. T. Thirumaran, learned Counsel for the appellants, vehemently contended that the suit filed by the plaintiff on the basis of Ex.A-1 cannot be maintained. In this regard, he also brought to my notice the relevant averment in the plaint. It is mentioned in para 10 of the plaint that “the cause of action for the suit arose at Madras and on 21.7.75 where and when the agreement of sale was executed and subsequently on all the dates of demand to execute the sale deed and non compliance thereof,…..”. There is no dispute that the suit has been laid only on the basis of ExA-1 dated 21.7.75 I have already observed that the plaintiff has not signed in ExA-1. At this stage, he also submitted that though the said objection has not been raised in the written statement or during the pendency of the suit as well as in the memorandum of grounds of appeal, in view of the fact that the said question being pure question of law, it can be raised at any stage including at the time of argument. In support of his contention, he has relied on the following decisions:

(1) Kandamath Cine Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. John Philipose (AIR 1990 Kerala 198)

(2) Vasantkumar Radhakisan Vora v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay (AIR 1991 S.C 14)

(3) K.P.M Basheer v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1992 Supreme Court 1353)

(4) Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumar Sharma (AIR 1996 Supreme Court 869)

As requested by the learned counsel for the appellants, I have carefully gone through the above decisions.

Absolutely there is no dispute that if it is a question of law, the same can be raised even at the appellate stage. Since there is no dispute with regard to the above legal position, there is no need to refer the relevant passages from the above referred decisions. However, the learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that even prior to the present suit, namely, O.S No. 7368 of 1978, the defendants 1 to 3 had filed O.S No. 4457 of 1978 before the City Civil Court against the plaintiff herein for permanent injunction. The plaint in the said suit has been marked as Ex.A-35 in the present suit. In the said suit, defendants 1 to 3 herein/plaintiffs in that suit made the following averment in para 3 of the plaint:

“The plaintiffs (in O.S No. 4457/1978) respectfully state that the defendant and late Narayanaswamy Pillai entered into agreement of sale dated 21.7.1975 in respect of house No. 4, New Street, Nungambakkam, Madras….”

Again in para 7 i.e, cause of action it is mentioned as follows: —

“The cause of action arose at Madras when the defendant entered into an agreement with the deceased Narayanaswamy Pillai and when the defendant broke open the lock and subsequently within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court.”

The above averments made by defendants 1 to 3.appellants 1 to 3 herein clearly show that the plaintiff herein and one Narayanaswamy Pillai had entered into an agreement on 21.7.1975 (Bx.A-1). Further, even in the present plaint in para 4 it is specifically pleaded that by an agreement of sale dated 21.7.1975, the said Narayanaswamy Pillai contracted to sell the above said property to the plaintiff forr a price of Rs. 37,000/- free of all encumbrances.” For this specific averment in the written statement in para 4 it is merely stated that

“the agreement of sale dated 21.7.1975 was cancelled, as clearly stated in the reply notice of late Narayanaswamy Pillai dated 9.8.1977”

It is not the case of the defendants that the said Narayanaswamy Pillai has not executed any agreement. In view of the above factual position particularly in the light of the specific averment in the plaint in O.S No. 4457 of 1978 which is exhibited as A-35 and in the absence of any denial in the written statement filed in the present suit, I am unable to accept the contention that the present suit filed on the basis of Ex.A-1 is not maintainable. Inasmuch as the other party to the agreement, namely, Narayanaswamy Pillai who has agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiff for a price of Rs 37,000/- has signed it is sufficient to enforce the same by way of filing suit for specific performance. In this regard the following statement found at page 248 in the Book, namely “A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts” by The Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Fry G.C.B, (sometime one of the Lords Justice of Appeal) is relevant which is extracted hereunder:

“515. The statute requiring that the agreement, or the Memorandum or note thereof, shall be signed by the party to be charged therewith, or his agent, and not requiring that it shall be signed by both parties to the contract, it has been held, both in Courts of Equity and also in Common Law Courts, that a signature by the party against whom the contract is sought to be enforced is sufficient.”

The above observation of the learned Author squarely supports the contention of the respondents herein. In such circumstance, I do not find any infirmity in the present suit filed by the plaintiff on the basis of Ex.A-1.

9(a) Now coming to the merits of the case, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that at any point of time, the plaintiff was ready and willing, he had no means to perform his part and has also not discharged the mortgage. The above said argument has been vehemently opposed by the learned counsel for the respondents. As per the agreement Ex.A.1, an advance of Rs. 1001/- had been paid. Admittedly no peeriod during which the sale deed has to be completed is mentioned in Ex.A-1. On the other hand, it is mentioned that Narayanaswamy Pillai should receive the sum of Rs. 13,000/- from the plaintiff on or before 25.8.75 and discharge the mortgages over the suit property. Ex.A-2 receipt shows that only on 11.10.75 a sum of Rs. 13,500/- was received by Narayanaswamy Pillai. The said receipt is attested by first defendant. Even though the said receipt does not mention that the money was being received for the purpose of discharge of mortgages in view of the fact that as per the agreement, a sum of Rs. 13,000/- was agreed to be paid by the plaintiff and the actual amount paid under this receipt is a sum of Rs. 13,500/-. The fact that the amount paid is of the order of Rs. 13,000/- will only go to show that the amount was actually received for discharge of the mortgages as agreed in the agreement. Apart from this, it is seen from the reverse of the receipt Ex.A-2 which is marked as Ex.A-22 dated 25.10.75 that Narayanaswamy Pillai had received another sum of Rs. 2000/- on 25.10.1975 and also received another sum of Rs. 1000/- on 23.10.75, Rs. 100/- on 15.11.75 and Rs. 250/- on 25.11.75 The said payments are not disputed in the written statement. In such circumstances, it is rightly contended that the plaintiff had paid a total sum of Rs. 17,851/- and the balance payable under the agreement was only about Rs. 19,149/-. No doubt, only after 11/2 years under Ex.A-10 the plaintiff through his counsel sent a notice to Narayanaswamy calling upon him to execute a sale deed for which the said Narayanaswamy sent a reply under Ex.A-11. Hence it is clear that the plaintiff had already provided with nearly 50 percent of the sale consideration within four months after the execution of the agreement. The plaintiff had paid the above said amount which includes a sum of Rs. 13,000/- agreed to be received by Narayanaswamy Pillai for the Specific Performance of disharge of the mortgages. So, it is clear that the plaintiff had performed his part of contract under Ex.A-1 by paying the amounts. The evidence before the Court also makes the position clear that the said Narayanaswamy did not take any initiative for executing the sale deed or calling upon the plaintiff to take the sale deed by paying the consideration. The above circumstances will go to show that the plaintiff had been always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. As already stated, he had paid nearly 50 per cent of the consideration.

9(b) Now I shall consider the question regarding means of the plaintiff. A perusal of the oral evidence of P.W.I clearly shows that he is the owner of printing press in the name and style of J.V Press and its value is Rs. 85,000/-. According to him, he is doing the printing works for the Tamil Nadu Text Book Society, Sports Company, and various undertakings both Central and State. The total turnover is Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 11/2 lakhs. The following evidence of P.W.I is very relevant in this regard and the same is extracted hereunder:

As rightly observed by the Court below, the cumulative effect of all the above facts mentioned by the plaintiff will only go to prove that besides advancing 50 per cent of the sale price of the suit property, the plaintiff had been engaging himself in doing lucrative business in that he could raise over draft from the State Bank of India. He has chosen to purchase property in the name of his wife for Rs. 25,000/- and he was in a position to pledge 28 sovereigns of jewels for the purpose of putting up the construction. On the other hand, D.W.I has merely stated that he is not aware of the income of the plaintiff and his investment in the business. D.W.1 in his cross-examination has stated thus: —.

In such circumstance I am satisfied that the plaintiff had sufficient means to take the sale deed.

10. Coming to the possession of the property it is stated that Narayanaswamy Pillai evicted the tenants of the property and kept the house under lock and key so that he could deliver vacant possession of the property at the time of the registration of the sale deed. It is the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 that in order to complete the transaction, they have gone to the house of Narayanaswamy Pillai to press him to execute the sale deed. According to them, this happened in the first week of October, 1977. Both P.W.1 and P.W.2 deposed that Narayanaswamy Pillai told them that he would not defraud the plaintiff having received so much amount out of the sale consideration, that he was sick and had been undergoing treatment and he would execute the sale deed after discharge from the hospital and if they had any doubt about the bonafide of Narayanaswamy Pillai, he was prepared to deliver possession of the property and in so saying he handed over the key of the house also. In this regard, the relevant evidence of P.W.1 is extracted hereunder. In Chief examination he has deposed thus:

Likewise, P.W.2 who is the attestor of Ex.A-1 has also deposed thus: —

Even in the cross-examination, he has deposed as follows: —

Even in the plaint in para 6 it is specifically pleaded

“…..In such circumstances in part performance of the said contract of sale dated 21.7.1975 possession of the Schedule mentioned property was also delivered to the plaintiff. But before a sale deed could be executed the said Narayanaswamy Pillai died on 9.11.1977

It is also stated in para 7 of the plaint thus:

“….While matters stood so the defendants interfered with the possession of the plaintiff and eventually the plaintiff gave a complain to the police. Thereafter the defendants 1 to 3 filed a suit in O.S No. 4457 of 1978 on the file of this Honourable Court seeking the relief of injunction alleging falsely that the plaintiff has broken open the lock of the schedule mentioned property after the death of Narayanaswamy Pillai. They also filed an application for ad-interim injunction and no order of injunction was granted. The suit is pending.”

For this there is no specific denial or details furnished in the written statement except the mere denial in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the statement. In the light of the averments made in the plaint and written statement mentioned above, the various averments in Ex.A-35 plaint copy in O.S No. 4457 of 1978 coupled with the oral evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2 clearly support the case of the plaintiff with regard to the delivery of possession of the property. AH the above discussions clearly show that the plaintiff has established his case with regard to readiness and willingness, means to perform his part as well as possession of the property in part performance of the agreement to sale in view of the fact that he had already parted with 50 per cent of the sale consideration. I am satisfied with the conclusion arrived at by the Court below in this regard.

11. Finally an argument was made by the learned counsel for the appellants that the Court below committed an error in not framing issues, hence the entire discussion and conclusion of the learned Judge cannot be sustained. No doubt, in the judgment, there is a omission to mention the issues framed by the learned Judge. Even though in para 4 he has stated that “On the above pleadings the following issues were framed”, the necessary issues had not been mentioned after para 4 as stated by the learned Judge. In view of the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants, I have perused the records of the Court below and it is seen that on 2-2-80 the learned Judge has framed the following four issues:

(1) Was the agreement dated 21.7.1975 entered into between the plaintiff and Narayanaswamy Pillai for sale to the Plaintiff of the suit property cancelled?

(2) Has the plaintiff agreed to discharge the mortgages dated 20.12.62 and 18.7.64 in favour of M/s. S.V Iyer and Mangalam?

(3) If so, what is the effect of such non-discharge?

(4) To what relief?

After framing the above mentioned issues, the learned Judge directed the parties to file document within two weeks and posted the suit for trial on 15.4.1980 Even though there is an omission in the body of the judgment, in view of the fact that the learned Judge has framed necessary issues on 2.2.80 as referred above, I am unable to accept the last argument of the learned counsel for the appellants. It is true that the learned Judge could have verified while pronouncing the order and had taken sufficient care at the time of pronouncement of judgment, this mistake could have been avoided. I have already observed with regard to the fact that the plaintiff has established his case on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence.

12. Under these circumstances, I do not find any merit in any one of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants and I am in agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the Court below. Accordingly, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs. During the course of hearing, it is brought to my notice that as per the decree, the plaintiff had deposited the balance of sale consideration and 8th respondent herein was also permitted to withdraw the said amount as per the decree obtained by him. In such a circumstance, the appellants/defendants 1 to 7 are directed to execute the sale deed within a period of two months from to-day, failing which it is open to the plaintiff to get the same executed through Court.

RR/VCS