1. Petitioner seeks issuance of writ of certiorari calling for the records relating to the proceedings of the 2nd respondent in Roc. No. 106307/94.J2, dated 26.7.1995 and the proceedings of the 1st respondent in L1/317335/95, dated 13.9.1995, confirming the proceedings of the 2nd respondent mentioned above, and to quash the same.

2. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition it is stated that the petitioner is the successful bidder of IMFL retail shop NO. 9/95-96, Dindigul, in terms of Tamil Nadu Liquor (Retail Vending) Rules, 1989 (for short ‘Rules’), in the auction held on 9.5.1995, as his bid amount was Rs. 3,33,500 being highest. The auction was confirmed in favour of the petitioner and he applied under Rule 13 of the Rules in Form VI to the 3rd respondent for the grant of licence with the prescribed fee. The 3rd respondent, the licensing authority also granted licence in Form VII after being satisfied that the petitioner has complied with all the statutory requirements for the grant of licence. It is said that he has been granted licence on 31.5.1995 and ever since 1.6.1995, he is carrying on retail vending in liquor in the said shop.

3. The reason for filing this writ petition is that at the instance of respondents 5 and 6, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner by the 2nd respondent herein, calling upon the petitioner to explain why the licence granted to him should not be cancelled. The reason for issuing the show cause notice was that the petitioner has not secured the lease from the owner of the property and the petitioner has resorted to a wrong procedure and that too filing fabricated documents. The petitioner gave an explanation denying the allegation and contended that he has obtained a valid lease from one Vijayalakshmi and that he had been in possession for more than six years without objection from any source and that he has been paying rent regularly to the lessor, and even for its period i.e, from 1.6.1995 he has obtained a consent letter from the lessor/Vijayalakshmi, and therefore, there is no reason for canceling the licence. Documents have also been filed before the 2nd respondent, the licensing authority to explain the case. But the licensing authority did not believe the case of the petitioner, mainly for the reason that Vijayalakshmi, who is alleged to have given the consent letter has denied having given such consent and also explained that she is not a tenant during that period, when she was alleged to have given the consent. Since Vijayalakshmi denied having given consent and the petitioner has also not obtained consent from respondents 5 and 6, the licensing authority held that his possession is not lawful and consequently directed the cancellation of the licence already granted.

4. The matter was taken up in appeal before the 1st respondent, who also confirmed the said finding and dismissed the appeal. Against that order the petitioner himself filed W.P No. 12775 of 1995 to quash the proceedings. This Court declined to entertain the writ petition, since the statutory revisional remedy is available. The order of this Court is dated 15.9.1995 After the dismissal of the said writ petition by this Court, the petitioner filed a revision on 15.9.1995, before the 4th respondent and also moved an application for stay. The 4th respondent, did not pass any order and at the same time he was being threatened to close the business. At the time when the revision was filed before the 4th respondent counsel for the petitioner was requested to meet the Secretary on 18.9.1995, who in turn directed to contact the Additional Secretary (Prohibition and Excise). The Additional Secretary expressed his inability to pass any orders on the stay application, since the file will have to be circulated to the Chief Minister, who was in charge of the portfolio of Prohibition and Excise. The petitioner and his counsel approached the Chief Minister through the Special Officer. Though the petitioner has already filed the statutory revision, since he was unable to get any interim order, he filed the present writ petition, challenging the order of the 1st respondent dated 13.9.1995 In the various grounds the petitioner has stated that the respondents have acted illegally in cancelling the licence validly obtained by him. It is also contended that even though he has obtained a valid consent from the landlord, his explanation has not been accepted and even if the said consent is not valid, as he is statutory tenant, he is entitled to the benefit of the Rent Control Act, and therefore, the finding that without the consent of the owner his possession cannot be recognised is invalid.

5. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner also relies on the decision of this Court in W.P No. 1 1283 of 1991, dated 13.8.1991, for the said purpose, to conclude that he being a tenant under the Rent Control Act his possession also should be recognised as lawful. So, even if there is no consent from the previous landlord, since his initial possession was that of a tenant, unless there is an order of eviction, he has all the rights as a contractual tenant. It is further said that he has also moved the Civil Court, against these respondents and obtained an order of injunction restraining them from interfering with his possession. His lessor Vijayalakshmi has now colluded with respondents 5 and 6, and she is now disputing the genuineness of the consent also. For the above reasons, he seeks the interference of this Court and to quash the proceedings of respondents 1 and 2.

6. On behalf of respondents 1 to 4, a counter affidavit has been filed. Respondents 5 and 6 have also filed another counter affidavit. In the counter affidavit filed by respondents 1 to 4, it is said that respondents 5 and 6 presented a petition to the Collector under Rule 31 of the Rules, requesting the cancellation of the licence issued to the petitioner, on the ground that the licensee has not secured proper lease deed from the landlord. A show cause notice has been issued to the petitioner asking him to explain as to why the licence should not be cancelled. In his reply, the petitioner submitted that he has informed of the transfer of land from his lessor Vijayalakshmi to respondents 5 and 6 by sale, and he would obtain a lease deed from the purchasers. It is also agreed by the petitioner that the 5th respondent has agreed to execute a lease deed in his favour and he would submit the same to the authorities. But the 5th respondent did not execute a lease deed as agreed. According to Rule 13(1) of the Rules, production of lease agreement from the rightful owner of the premises is a pre-requisite and mandatory for granting a licence. Even though the petitioner has produced a consent letter, purported to have been executed by Vijayalakshmi, the execution of the same was denied by her and she also stated that she has not executed any such deed in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner also did not make any attempt to prove the genuineness of the document. On the date when the renewal was granted, there was not valid lease. It is further said that even though civil suits are pending, the same are not relevant for being considered for grant of licence under the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act. The contention that the petitioner is a statutory tenant in actual possession cannot be taken into consideration without proper documentary evidence. It is said that he has not obtained any lease deed from the rightful owner of the land to continue his possession of the licence by misrepresenting the facts and on production of fake records. He has violated the rules and for the said reason the licensee is liable to be proceeded with by the competent authorities. It is further said that the petitioner was even asked to select a new place to shift his shop for the grant of licence. The petitioner did not make any attempt to shift his shop to any other place and when he failed to obey the instructions, the licence is liable to be cancelled. It is also said that the revision filed by the petitioner is also rejected.

7. In the counter affidavit filed by respondents 5 and 6, they have stated that the present writ petition is not maintainable and is an abuse of process of Court. It is also stated that the respondents 5 and 6 are the joint owners of the entire property measuring 18,000sq.ft. and the shop portion, and the same was purchased from the Church of South India Trust Association, as per sale deed dated 24.2.1995, and ever since the date of sale deed they are in possession of the same. It is said that the licence granted in favour of the petitioner to run a wine shop in the premises was without their consent and knowledge. Under Rule 7(2) (c) of the Rules, no person shall be permitted to participate in the auction, unless he furnishes a due and valid certificate regarding ownership or lease for not less than one year for the shop where he intends to sell liquor. The petitioner is admittedly not the owner of the premises and the respondents 5 and 6 who are the owners have not given their consent. The contention of the petitioner that he is a bona fide tenant of the place and that he has obtained a lease deed for the period from 1.6.1995 to 31.5.1998 is also not correct. It is further stated that Vijayalakshmi is not a tenant of the premises and she has also given a declaration before the 2nd respondent to the effect that she is neither a tenant nor she executed a lease deed in favour of the petitioner. Since the claim of the petitioner is based on a document, which is not valid, he is not entitled to any relief as sought for.

8. Learned counsel for the respondents took a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the writ petition. According to him, this writ petition is an abuse of process of Court. The 2nd respondent cancelled the licence, against which an appeal has been taken up and by the impugned order dated 13.9.1995, the appeal was dismissed. The petitioner challenging the same filed a writ petition as W.P No. 12775 of 1995 to quash the proceedings. This Court refused to entertain the said writ petition, since the statutory revision is maintainable. That order has become final. After the said order, the petitioner filed a revision before the government. But the government did not pass any order of stay. He, therefore, again filed the writ petition challenging the orders of the respondents 1 and 2, which were the subject matter of the earlier writ petition and which was refused to be entertained by this Court earlier. It is submitted that the order dismissing the Writ Petition No. 12775 of 1995 is dated 15.9.1995, and the present writ petition has been filed on 20.9.1995, i.e, within a period of five days, and that too, to quash the very same orders of respondents 1 and 2. The dismissal of the earlier writ petition, according to the counsel for respondents, bars the entertaining of this writ petition and really it is an abuse of process of Court.

9. As against the said contention, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that since urgent orders are required and the order of the 1st respondent was being implemented for closure of the shop and even after the best efforts of the petitioner he could not obtain any order of stay from the revisional authority, he was compelled to file this writ petition. It is further contended that after the writ petition was filed the revision before the Government was dismissed, holding that the second revision is not maintainable. If that be so, the challenge could be made only against the order of the 1st respondent. The Court can take note of what has happened subsequently. The direction of this Court that the petitioner must exhaust the statutory remedy by filing a revision was refused to be entertained by the Government, and therefore, he is left with no other remedy than to challenge the order of the 1st respondent once again.

10. After having heard the counsel on both sides, I feel that the writ petition itself is not maintainable, and the same is to be dismissed as barred. The District Collector who is the licensing authority passed an order dated 26.7.1995, on the basis of the explanation submitted by the petitioner. Immediately after the said order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the 1st respondent and moved for a stay. Stay was granted by the appellate authority. Later the appeal was dismissed as per order dated 13.9.1995 As per Rule 32 of the Rules, a revision lies to the Government if the same is filed within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order. The relevant Rule reads thus:-

“32 (1) A revision lies to the Commissioner against the order of the Collector passed on appeal within thirty days from the date of the receipt of the order.

(2) A revision against the order of the Commissioner on appeal lies to the Government within thirty days from the date of receipt of the order.”

The Government might have rejected the revision as not maintainable as it took it as a second revision. But the petitioner should have challenged that order and should have sought the help of this Court directing the 4th respondent-Government to entertain the revision, since the order of the 1st respondent was in appeal against the order passed by the Collector. The 1st respondent was not exercising its revisional power is clear from the proceedings in this case.

11. Even before getting an order in the said revision, the petitioner filed this writ petition, that too within five days after the disposal of the earlier writ petition. It is admitted by the petitioner that earlier writ petition was dismissed and this Court refused to entertain the same. Without waiting for the result of the revision, coming to this Court, again re-agitating the same issues is nothing but an abuse of process of Court.

12. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even now he is entitled to challenge the order of the 1st respondent since the Government has refused to entertain the revision. That is entirely a different matter. This argument is not an answer for the maintainability of the writ petition. Counsel submitted that when the Government has rejected his revision as not maintainable, naturally he can only challenge the order of the 1st respondent. I do not think that the said submission of the learned senior counsel is correct. Refusing to entertain a revision as not maintainable is also an order in revision, which ought to have been challenged. According to me this writ petition is liable to be dismissed for that reason alone.

13. In a similar case reported in State of U.P and another v. Labh Chand, 1993 (2) S.C.C 495 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that if a writ petition is dismissed in limine on the ground that the petitioner should avail other alternative remedy, the second writ petition challenging the same order is not maintainable, and the earlier dismissal should not be by-passed. In paragraph 20 of the judgment at page 506 of the reports, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held thus:-

“When a judge of single-Judge Bench of a High Court is required to entertain a second writ petition of a person in a matter, he cannot, as a matter of course, entertain such petition, if an earlier writ petition of the same person on the same matter had been dismissed already by another single-Judge Bench or a Division Bench of the same High Court, even if such dismissal was on the ground of laches or on the ground of non-availing of alternate remedy. Second writ petition cannot be so entertained not because the learned Single Judge has no jurisdiction to entertain the same, but because entertaining of such a second writ petition redundant and nugatory, although not reviewed in exercise of the recognised power. Besides, if a learned Single Judge could entertain a second writ petition of a person respecting a matter on which his first writ petition was dismissed in limine by another learned Single Judge or a Division Bench of the same Court, it would encourage an unsuccessful writ petitioner to go on filing writ petition after writ petition in the same matter in the same High Court, and have it brought up for consideration before one Judge after another. Such a thing, if allowed to happen, it could result in giving full scope and encouragement to an unscrupulous litigant to abuse the process of the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution in that any order of any Bench of such Court refusing to entertain a writ petition could be ignored by him with impunity and relief sought in the same matter by filing a fresh writ petition. This would only lead to introduction of disorder, confusion and chaos relating to exercise of writ jurisdiction by Judges of the High Court for, there could be no finality for an order of the Court refusing to entertain a writ petition. It is why, the rule of judicial practice and procedure that a second writ petition shall not be entertained by the High Court on the subject matter respecting which the first writ petition of the same person was dismissed by the same Court even if the order of such dismissal was in limine, be it on the ground of non-exhaustion of alternate remedy, has come to be accepted and followed as salutary rule in exercise of writ jurisdiction of Courts.” (Italics supplied)

14. On the preliminary ground itself the writ petition could be dismissed. But both the senior counsel argued the matter in detail. It is improper on my part if I do not consider the case on merits. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that even before the present renewal he had been a tenant of Vijayalakshmi from the year 1989 onwards, that tenancy is not disputed by anyone and even if there is no renewal from Vijayalakshmi, he being a tenant under Rent Control Act, he is entitled to all the benefits of the contractual tenant. The authorities should not have insisted for a fresh lease agreement.

15. As against the said contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner it is urged that the property and the building originally belonged to the Church of South India Trust Association, and even Vijayalakshmi was the person claiming right under the said Trust Association. The said Trust Association sold the property to respondents 5 and 6, and even Vijayalakshmi informed this fact to the petitioner. The petitioner also attempted to get a fresh lease from the 5th respondent and failed. It was thereafter a consent alleged to have been given in the nature of lease deed executed by the said Vijayalakshmi, was produced before the licensing authority. Immediately thereafter, respondents 5 and 6 informed the licensing authority that the licence has been granted to a person who is not entitled to continue in possession, and therefore, it has to be cancelled. A show cause notice was issued and an explanation was given by the petitioner stating that Vijayalakshmi did in fact has executed a lease deed, and therefore, he is entitled to renewal of licence. Vijayalakshmi herself informed the authorities and declared before the licensing authority that she is neither a tenant of the building nor she has executed any lease in favour of the petitioner. The petitioner did not attempt to prove the transaction between himself and Vijayalakshmi. The licensing authority found that the document produced by the petitioner is a fraudulent one and created for the purpose of getting licence. The said finding is also confirmed by the Appellate Authority. Having produced a fraudulent document and on that basis a benefit is sought to be obtained by the petitioner, learned senior counsel for Respondents 5 and 6 submitted that the power under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, which is a discretionary power should not be exercised in favour of a person who comes to Court with a fraudulent document. After entering a finding that it is a fraudulent document, the petitioner cannot turn down and contend that in spite of the said document proved as fraudulent, he is entitled to be in possession under Rent Control Act. It is further contended that even under the Rent Control Act, the petitioner cannot contend as a person in lawful possession.

16. All along the case of the petitioner before the licensing authority and Appellate Authority is that he has obtained the lease from Vijayalakshmi. But the execution of the same was denied by her. She also declared that she has no right as tenant of the building. It is not disputed that the entire property originally belonged to the Church of South India Trust Association. If the property belonged to Trust Association, the right of Vijayalakshmi, can only be under it. It is under Vijayalakshmi, the petitioner claimed possession. If Vijayalakshmi ceases to have any right, naturally the petitioner who claims under her also loses that right. In this case, Vijayalakshmi has declared before the licensing authority that she is not a tenant nor she has executed any lease deed in favour of the petitioner. What is the consequence of that statement. When she says that she is no longer a tenant, it means, whatever right she has, is given to respondents 5 and 6. She effaces herself claiming any right over the property. It is from her the petitioner claims to have obtained the right. When she has no right over the property, she also cannot execute any fresh lease in favour of anyone.

17. The argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners is that the petitioner is all along the tenant under Vijayalakshmi and she is now colluding with respondents 5 and 6. I do not think that the said argument is also going to advance the case of the petitioner in any way. When Vijayalakshmi declared that she is no longer a tenant, it means she surrenders whatever her right to respondents 5 and 6. So, without the consent of respondents 5 and 6, the petitioner cannot claim any right to continue to be in possession. That is why when Vijayalakshmi informed the petitioner that he must have direct dealings with respondents 5 and 6 only, the petitioner agreed to produce the lease deed obtained from 5th respondent before the licensing authority. Having agreed to produce the lease deed from 5th respondent and later producing a lease deed from Vijayalakshmi itself shows that the petitioner would not have obtained any document from Vijayalakshmi.

18. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner relied on various decisions to contend that tenant under the Rent Control Act is equated with the contractual tenant, and therefore, his possession is protected. I can understand his argument and would require a consideration on merits, if Vijayalakshmi continues to be a tenant of the building. Counsel relied on a decision reported in Gain Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and others, (1985) 2 SCC 683 wherein Their Lordships have considered the distinction between contractual tenant and statutory tenant. In that Judgment in paragraph 2, Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) after extracting the definition of ‘tenant’ under Delhi Rent Control Act, held thus:-

“Such a person would not be a tenant under the ordinary law but he is recognised as a ‘tenant’ by the Rent Control legislation and is therefore described as a statutory tenant as contra distinguished from contractual tenant. The statutory tenant is, by virtue of inclusion in the definition of ‘tenant’, placed on the same footing as contractual tenant so far as Rent Control legislation is concerned.”

In paragraph 24 of the judgment, another learned Judge held thus:-

“Keeping in view the main object of Rent Control Legislation, the position of a tenant whose contractual tenancy has been determined has to be understood in the light of the provisions of the Rent Acts. Though provisions of all the Rent Control Acts are not uniform, the common feature of all the Rent Control Legislation is that a contractual tenant on the termination of the contractual tenancy is by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Acts not liable to be evicted as a matter of course under the ordinary law of the land and he is entitled to remain in possession even after determination of the contractual tenancy and no order or decree for eviction will be passed against a tenant unless any ground which entitles the landlord to get an order or decree for possession specified in the Act is established. In other words, the common feature of every Rent Control Act is that it affords protection to every tenant against eviction despite termination of tenancy except on grounds recognised by the Act and no order or decree for eviction shall be passed against the tenant unless any such ground is established to the satisfaction of the Court.”

In paragraph 35 of the judgment, it is further said thus:

“These decisions correctly lay down that the termination of the contractual tenancy by the landlord does not bring about a change in the status of the tenant who continues to remain in possession after the termination of the tenancy by virtue of the provisions of the Rent Act. A proper interpretation of the definition of tenant in the light of the provisions made in the Rent Acts makes it clear that the tenant continues to enjoy an estate or interest in the tenanted premises despite the termination of the contractual tenancy.”

19. The above decision was followed by the Supreme Court in the subsequent decisions also. I need not want to extract the observations, except to refer the case laws. They are (i) Bhavarlal Labhchand Shah v. Kanaiyalal Nathalal Intawala, A.I.R 1986 S.C 600 (ii) Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guran, A.I.R 1987 S.C 117 and (iii) Narain and others v. Om Prakash Gupta, A.I.R 1987 S.C 1602. In Balluram Alias Bal Sarup v. Mandir Tuhiram Harnan Dass, 1995 (3) S.C.C 706 and in Visnnu Narayan Gadskari (Dead) By Lrs. v. Paralal Baladev Uza and others, 1995 Supp. (4) S.C.C 428 the same principle was reiterated. I do not think that the above decisions will have any application to the facts of this case. In all these cases, the question that came up for consideration was that in spite of termination of tenancy either by efflux of time or under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the tenant who continues to be in possession is not liable to be evicted, except under the Rent Control Act. He has got all the rights as a contractual tenant. It does not go beyond that. In this case, the scope is entirely different. If the petitioner claims that he is a tenant and has got all the rights of the tenant, naturally there must be a landlord also. If Vijayalakshmi is considered to be the landlord of the petitioner, and if she effaces herself from that right by declaring that she is no longer a tenant, and the respondents 5 and 6 get back benefit, unless the petitioner could get a direct relationship with respondents 5 and 6, he cannot be considered as a person in lawful possession, getting the benefit of a contractual tenant.

20. It may further be stated that the petitioner has failed to prove the right of Vijayalakshmi. One thing that is not disputed is that respondents 5 and 6 have obtained the ownership from the Trust Association. If that be so, whatever the right Vijayalakshmi has is only subordinate to the right of respondents 5 and 6. Any right created by Vijayalakshmi has also come to an end when the right of Vijayalakshmi to continue the building also comes to an end. Even if Vijayalakshmi is entitled to the benefit of Rent Control Act, the law does not prohibit the tenant from surrendering her rights. Respondents 5 and 6 are not claiming any right under Vijayalakshmi. In surrendering the right by Vijayalakshmi in favour of respondents 5 and 6, no question of public policy is involved. In the decision reported in Anandam Nadar v. Ramachandra Menon, 1976 K.L.T 448 (FB) this question was considered and held that the Rent Control Act does not prohibit the surrender of rights by a tenant to the landlord. Even though it is not on the same facts, the decisions reported in Carona Shoe Co. Ltd. and another v. K.C Bhaskaran Nair, A.I.R 1989 S.C 1110 also will have some relevance. In paragraph 15 of the Judgment, it was held by the Supreme Court thus:-

“The definition of ‘tenant’, it was observed, included contractual tenant as well as tenant remaining in possession of the building after determination of the contractual tenancy, i.e statutory tenant, and both contractual tenant and statutory tenant could, therefore, apply. It was, therefore, submitted in this case that on the analogy of the contractual tenant, the appellants were entitled to the protection of the Act. We are unable to agree. It is not a question of a contractual tenancy coming to an end. The limited estate created in favour of the mortgagee having disappeared, all rights emanating from that limited estate disappear and the superior right of the mortgagor, comes not in place of the mortgagee but as a result of an independent title, and as such the mortgagor cannot be bound by any act created or any relationship contracted between the mortgagee and the tenant, unless it is permitted by the mortgage deed.”

In this case, the possession of Vijayalakshmi may not be as a mortgagee. Once she surrenders her right or declares herself not as tenant, respondents 5 and 6 are exercising their right as owners, having the superior right. It is really an extinguishment of the right of Vijayalakshmi.

21. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner further submitted that for the purpose of Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, the only question that has to be considered is ‘lawful possession.’ In this case, the petitioner cannot be said as in wrongful possession. If he is originally a tenant, merely because the title changes, he cannot be termed as a person in unlawful possession. I think that the said submission also cannot be accepted for a moment. Rule 13 of the Tamil Nadu Liquor (Retail Vending) Rules, 1989, deals with ‘Grant of licence’. The said Rule was amended as per G.O.Ms No. 999, Home, Prohibition and Excise (XV) Dept., dated 27.11.1990 After the amendment, sub-rule (1) of Rule 13 of the Rules reads thus:-

“(1) Within seven days of receipt of the order of confirmation of the sale of the privilege in Form V, the auction purchaser shall make an application in Form VI to the licensing authority for the grant of the licence together with the application fee specified in sub-rule (3) a certificate in Form III from the Excise Officer or an officer or an officer not below the rank of a Deputy Tahsildar duly authorised by the Collector regarding suitability and also ownership or lease of the building for not less than a year of the shop from where he intends to sell liquor, and a xerox copy of the document showing that the auction purchaser himself is the owner of the building or a xerox copy of the lease agreement executed with the landlord of the building wherein the proposed shop is to be located.”

Column (9) in Form VI also insists either ownership or lease for a minimum period of one year. Even in the case of renewal, Column (8) in Form VIII also contemplates lawful possession. The word that is used is “further period of one year.” We have to rely on the word ‘further’, which is referred to in column (9) in Form VI. That means the possession must be as a lessee.

22. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner also brought to my notice the decisions reported in R.V Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P and others, 1995 (5) S.C.C 698 which was a case under the Andhra Pradesh Cinema (Regulation) Rules. The question that came up for consideration in that case was what is meant by ‘lawful possession’ under that Act. Their Lordships followed an earlier decision of that Court, which came under the Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, reported in M.C Chockaligam and others v. V. Manickavasagam and others, (1974) 1 SCC 48 wherein, their Lordship at para 15 of the judgment, held thus:-

“Turning to Rule 13, even in the first part if the applicant for the licence is the owner of the property he has to produce before the licensing authority the necessary records not only relating to his ownership but also regarding his possession. It is implicit, that the owner having a title to the property, if he can satisfy the licensing authority with regard to his possession also, will indeed be in ‘lawful’ possession, although the word ‘lawful’ is not used in the first part. It is in that context that the word ‘possession’ is even not necessary to be qualified by ‘lawful’ in the first part of Rule 13. If, however, the applicant for the licence is not the owner, there is no question of his showing title to the property and the only requirement of the law is to produce to the satisfaction of the authority documentary evidence with regard to his lawful possession of the property. The word ‘lawful’, therefore, naturally assumes significance in the second part while it was not even necessary in the first part. The fact that after expiry of the lease the tenant will be able to continue in possession of the property within the meaning of Rule 13. Lawful possession cannot be established without the concomitant existence of a lawful relationship between the landlord and the tenant. This relationship cannot be established against the consent of the landlord unless, however, in view of a special law, his consent becomes irrelevant. Lawful possession is not litigious possession and must have some foundation in a legal right to possess the property which cannot be equated with a temporary right to enforce recovery of the property in case a person is wrongfully or forcibly dispossessed from it. This Court in Lalu Yeshwant Singh's case, had not to consider whether juridical possession in that case was also lawful possession. We are clearly of opinion that juridical possession. We are clearly of opinion that juridical possession is possession protected by law against wrongful dispossession but cannot per se always be equated with lawful possession.” (Italics Supplied)

The above passage was extracted in the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In Chockalingam's case, (1974) 1 SCC 48. Their Lordships declared that the relationship cannot be established against the consent of the landlord unless, however, in view of a special law, his consent becomes irrelevant. I have already considered and held that without the consent of respondents 5 and 6, they cannot be declared as landlords of the petitioner and if there is no landlord the petitioner cannot be treated as a tenant. The Rent Control Act also may not have any application in such cases.

23. Learned counsel for the petitioner also brought to my notice certain civil litigations pending before the Civil Court and his possession should be protected. I do not think that on the basis of interim orders or the Judgment of Civil Court, the petitioner is entitled to succeed. Juridical possession is a possession protected by law against wrongful dispossession. As was held in Chockalingam's case, (1974) 1 SCC 48 and the decision R.V Bhupal Prasad v. State of A.P, (1995) 5 SCC 698 relied on by the counsel for the petitioner, the same cannot be equated with the lawful possession. In this case, lawful possession alone will not be sufficient. Possession must be either as a owner or as a tenant, which the petitioner has miserably failed to prove. The order of injunction only prevents respondents 5, 6 and others from disturbing his possession. It cannot declare that the petitioner is a tenant under Respondents 5 and 6.

24. I do not find any merit in the writ petition. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed. The connected W.M.Ps, are closed.