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M/S. Beach Estates, ... v. M/S. Likhami Holding...
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Civil Revision Petition (O.S. No. 252 of 1995)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiffs filed O.S. No. 252 of 1995 in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu seeking a permanent injunction restraining the defendant and his agents from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession of the suit property. The plaintiffs alleged they purchased a total area (6 acres 95 cents) under six sale deeds, received delivery of possession from their vendors, enclosed the property with fencing and compound walls, painted a name on the wall ("BEACH STATE SAND AVENUE") and kept a watchman residing on the property. They alleged the defendant attempted to interfere with possession on 23.10.1995, which prompted their application for temporary injunction (I.A. No. 350 of 1995).
The defendant denied the plaintiffs' claims of title and possession, contending that the plaintiffs had not properly described the suit property, had sold and delivered possession of portions to others, and that the defendant (or his wife) was in possession of certain portions (with patta and revenue records in the wife's name). The defendant described enclosing the land, erecting gates, putting up a name board ("LIKHAMI HOLDINGS"), and appointing a watchman. The defendant alleged that the plaintiffs demolished the name board on 13.11.1995 and denied plaintiffs' entitlement to injunction.
The trial Court (Additional Subordinate Judge) on 24.11.1995 granted temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendant appealed to the Principal District Judge, Chengalpattu by C.M.A. No. 55 of 1995. In that appeal both parties sought to place additional documents before the appellate Court under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC (defendant filed I.A. Nos. 120 and 146 of 1996 for 33 documents; plaintiffs filed I.A. No. 143 of 1996 for 25 documents). The Principal District Judge allowed those I.As, relied on the additional documents and on 1.7.1996 reversed the trial Court order, dismissing the injunction application. The plaintiffs then filed the present civil revision petition challenging the order of the Principal District Judge.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in a miscellaneous appeal challenging a trial Court's discretionary order granting or refusing an injunction, the appellate Court may receive additional documents under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC and act on them to reverse the trial Court's exercise of discretion.
- What is the proper scope of appellate interference in miscellaneous appeals against discretionary orders granting or refusing injunctions — specifically, whether the appellate Court may disturb such discretionary orders absent a finding that the trial Court's discretion was perverse, arbitrary, or capricious.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners / Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The learned senior counsel for the petitioners contended that the Principal District Judge erred in interfering with the discretionary order dated 24.11.1995 granting injunction; appellate interference in such discretionary orders is limited.
- It was submitted that the appellate Court could interfere only if the trial Court's exercise of discretion in granting or refusing injunction was perverse, capricious, or arbitrary, and that the trial Court's order was not of that character.
- The petitioners' counsel also relied on documents and material on record to support the contention that the order of 1.7.1996 was unsustainable (as reversing the trial Court's discretion without proper basis).
Respondent / Defendant's Arguments
- The defendant's counsel justified the District Judge's order reversing the injunction, asserting that the petitioners had suppressed material facts (having sold major portions and delivered possession to others) and therefore lacked subsisting rights to claim injunction.
- It was argued that the petitioners had wrongly asserted absolute ownership and possession, and that such non-disclosure alone warranted dismissal of the plaintiffs' application for injunction.
- The respondent relied on averments and affidavits of the petitioners and on various documents placed before the trial and first appellate Courts to contend that the petitioners failed to make out a prima facie case and that the balance of convenience did not favour them.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the nature and limits of appellate interference in miscellaneous appeals challenging trial Court discretion in granting or refusing injunctions. The court reiterated the settled principle that an appellate Court may reverse such discretionary orders only upon finding that the trial Court's exercise of discretion was perverse, arbitrary, or capricious — not merely because another view is possible on the material before the trial Court.
The court focused on the procedural fact that the Principal District Judge had permitted both parties to place additional documents before the appellate Court under Order 41, Rule 27 CPC and then relied upon those documents when reversing the trial Court's grant of temporary injunction. The court found this approach improper for the following reasons (as stated in the opinion):
- If the additional documents had been produced before the trial Court, the trial Court could have exercised its discretion having regard to those documents as well; therefore, it was not open to the appellate Court to receive such documents in the miscellaneous appeal and then decide that the trial Court's order was wrong on the basis of those documents.
- The appellate Court's role in such an appeal is to scrutinise whether the trial Court's discretion, as exercised on the material then placed before it (and the circumstances as they existed when the order was made), was capricious, perverse, or arbitrary. Receiving and acting on additional material at the appellate stage to substitute the appellate Court's discretion for that of the trial Court in ordinary cases is not permissible.
- If the appellate Court nevertheless considered the additional documents to be material to the exercise of discretion, the correct course (according to the court) was to remit the matter to the trial Court along with those documents after setting aside the impugned order, so that the trial Court could re-exercise its discretion in the first instance having regard to the combined material.
On this basis the court concluded that the Principal District Judge was not right in receiving the additional documents in the miscellaneous appeal and acting on them to set aside the trial Court's discretionary order. The court further observed that remittal would allow the trial Court to consider the additional documents in conjunction with the material originally before it and preserve the aggrieved party's right of appeal against any fresh discretionary order.
Considering the nature of the suit property (vacant lands with only compound walls and fences, and no substantial structures), the court also found it appropriate to direct maintenance of the status quo on the property pending re-consideration by the trial Court.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The civil revision petition is allowed; both the order dated 1.7.1996 of the Principal District Judge, Chengalpattu (in C.M.A. No. 55 of 1995) and the order dated 24.11.1995 of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu (in I.A. No. 350 of 1995 in O.S. No. 252 of 1995) are set aside.
Direct consequences and directions given by the court (as stated in the opinion):
- The matter is remitted to the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu to dispose of I.A. No. 350 of 1995 in O.S. No. 252 of 1995 afresh on merits and in accordance with law, taking into consideration the additional documents filed by both parties before the Principal District Judge (the opinion specifies taking into consideration the additional documents filed before 30.6.1997).
- The Principal District Judge, Chengalpattu is directed to send the additional documents filed before him to the Court of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu.
- The parties are directed to maintain the status quo existing on the suit property until the disposal of the I.A., subject to orders to be passed in that I.A.
Broader implication stated by the court (as appeared in the opinion): the appellate Court should not receive and act upon additional documents in a miscellaneous appeal challenging the discretionary order of the trial Court in granting or refusing injunctions; if such additional documents are material, the appellate Court should remit the matter to the trial Court so that the trial Court may re-exercise its discretion in the light of the entire material.
This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what is contained in that opinion.
1. This Civil Revision Petition is filed by the plaintiffs in O.S No. 252 of 1995 in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Chengalpattu, aggrieved by the order dated 1.7.1996 passed by the learned Principle District Judge, Chengalpattu in C.M.A No. 55 of 1996 reversing the order dated 24.11.1995 passed by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu in I.A No. 350 of 1995 in O.S No. 252 of 1995 and dismissing the application filed by the plaintiffs i.e, I.A No. 350 of 1995 for grant of injunction.
2. The parties in this order will be referred to as they were arrayed in the suit itself.
3. Briefly stated the facts leading to the filing to this civil revision petition are the following:-
The plaintiffs have filed the suit O.S No. 252 of 1995 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu for grant of a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his men, servants, agents and representatives, from interfering with the plaintiffs possession of the suit property, stating that they purchased the suit property measuring an extent of 6 acres 95 cents under six sale deeds. In the plant the suit land is described as A-B-C-D-E-F-G. Their vendors delivered possession of the suit property and that the plaintiffs have been in possession and enjoyment of the same. After purchase of the property they have enclosed the entire area with fence on the north and south, and with a compound wall on the east and west, with a wicket gate. They have also painted on the wall “BEACH STATE SAND AVENUE”. They have kept a watchman over the property who is residing in the suit property itself. The defendant having no interest in the suit property tried to interfere with the possession on 23.10.1995 which was prevented by the plaintiff. They apprehend that the defendant may repeat his attempts. Hence an application was filed in the suit for temporary injunction.
4. The defendant denied that the plaintiffs purchased the property under six sale deeds. He also denied the allegations that the vendors of the plaintiffs delivered possession, and that the plaintiffs are in possession of the same. The defendant states that the allegation that after purchase the plaintiffs have enclosed the area with barbed wires and that they have put up a watchman quarters and the watchman is residing in the property are not true. The plaintiffs have no title to the suit property. Their vendors were not in possession of the suit property. The power of attorney of the plaintiffs is the plaintiffs’ own brother. The defendant has purchased 4 acres and 60cents in Survey No. 168/3E-1A and 1A1A with specific boundary under sale deed dated 20.11.1986 and took possession of the same. The plaintiffs have not properly described the suit property.
5. The defendant further stated that his wife viz., Chandrika purchased an extent of 96 cents in Survey No. 168/3E1A from one Damodaran and 86 cents in the same survey No. from one Rajendran, and she is in possession and enjoyment of the property of those extents. The devendant has enclosed the property by putting up a compound wall and has put up a small gate on the east and a big gate on the west, having put up wire fence with stone pillars on the south and north. He has also proposed to put up a guest house and garden in the suit property. He has also appointed a watchman to look after the property. He has put up the name board ‘LIKHAMI HOLDINGS’. The patta and revenue records stand in the name of the wife of the defendant. After obtaining the injunction order, in order to take forceful possession on 13.11.1995, at the instigation of the plaintiffs, the name board was demolished. The defendant is in lawful possession of the suit property.
6. The trial Court on 24.11.1995 had allowed the petition granting temporary injunction. As already stated above, against the said order, C.M.A No. 55 of 1995 was filed in the Court of the Principal District Judge, Chengalpattu. In the said appeal, before the learned District Judge, the defendant filed I.A No. 120 of 1996 and I.A No. 146 of 1996 to receive additional documents under Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C The plaintiffs also filed I.A No. 143 of 1996 for receiving additional documents.
7. The learned District Judge, after hearing both the parties, considering the material on record including the additional documents produced by allowing the above-mentioned I.As filed by both the parties to receive additional documents, allowed the C.M.A No. 55 of 1995 by the order under appeal on 1.7.1996, in the result, dismissing the injunction application filed by the plaintiffs. Hence the plaintiffs are before this Court in the C.R.P as stated above challenging the order of the learned Principal District Judge.
8. Shri M. Venkatachalapathy, learned senior counsel for the petitioners contended that the learned District Judge manifestly erred in interfering with the discretionary order dated 24.11.1995 passed by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge granting injunction in I.A No. 350 of 1995 in O.S No. 252 of 1995; it is well settled in law that the scope of miscellaneous appeals filed against the discretionary orders passed by the trial Courts either granting or refusing injunction is limited; the appellate Court could interfere in such discretionary orders only on showing that the discretion exercised by the trial Court in the matter of granting or refusing injunction was either perverse or capricious or arbitrary; the order dated 24.11.1995 passed by the Subordinate Judge granting injunction was not such an order where the exercise of discretion by the trial Court could be said to be either arbitrary, perverse or capncious. The learned counsel also referred to various documents and the material on record in support of his submission to contend that the order under revision dated 1.7.1996 passed by the learned Principal District Judge is unsustainable.
9. Shri R. Thiagarajan, Learned counsel for the respondent- -defendant argued justifying the order passed by the learned District Judge reversing the order passed by the trial Court and dismissing the application made by the petitioners — plaintiffs for grant of injunction. He submitted that the petitioners were guilty of suppressing material facts; they, having sold major portion of the suit property, and having delivered possession to others, did not have any subsisting right and interest to claim injunction over the suit property; they have not disclosed above the sale of property and delivery of possession to others; they have wrongly asserted that they are the absolute owners in possession of the property; this ground alone was sufficient to dismiss the application filed by the petitioners for grant of injunction.
10. In support of his submission the learned counsel pointed out to the averments made in the plaintiff as well as in the affidavit filed by the petitioners in the applications. He also referred to various documents placed on record before the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court to contend that the petitioners were not at all entitled for grant of injunction order. The petitioners failed to establish prima-facie case and that the balance of convenience was in their favour. Thus the learned counsel for the respondent — defendant prayed for dismissal of the revision petition.
11. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.
12. No doubt, both the learned counsel made submissions in support of their respective contentions and they have also cited certain decisions touching the principles governing the grant or refusal of injunction and as to the scope of appeals against the discretionary orders passed by the trial Courts in the matter of granting or refusing injunctions. It may not be necessary to refer to the decisions as the principle in regard to the aforementioned aspects are well settled.
13. It cannot be disputed that in the appeal C.M.A No. 55 of 1995 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Chengalpattu, the discretionary order dated 24.11.1995 passed by the trial Court i.e, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu in I.A No. 350 of 1995 in O.S No. 252 of 1995 was called in question. The learned district Judge in the appeal had to essentially examine the validity, correctness and the property of the said order, of course having regard to the scope of such an appeal. In other words the order made in I.A No. 350 of 1995 in the discretion of the trial Court granting injunction could be reversed only on finding that the discretion exercised by the trial Court on the material placed before it was either perverse, arbitrary or capricious.
14. Before the learned District Judge, the respondent — defendant filed I.A No. 120 of 1996 and I.A No. 146 of 1996 to received 33 documents as additional documents in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal 55 of 1995 under Order 41, Rule 27 of C.P.C Similarly the petitioners also filed I.A No. 143 of 1996 to receive 25 documents as additional documents. The learned District Judge allowed all the said three I.As
15. As can be seen from the order under revision, the learned District Judge has relied upon the additional documents produced by the parties, and considering some of the documents as material documents, came to the conclusion that the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in granting injunction in favour of the petitioners. I specifically asked the learned counsel for the parties, whether additional documents could be received by the appellate Court in a miscellaneous appeal challenging the order granting or refusing injunction, and whether it was permissible for the appellate Court to find fault with the discretion exercised by the trial Court in the matter of granting or refusing injunction on the basis of the material that the placed before the trial Court at that stage. The learned counsel submitted that the learned Principal District Judges has received additional documents produced by both the parties and passed the order under appeal.
16. In a miscellaneous appeal, the appellate Court could reverse the discretionary order of the tnal Court in granting or refusing an injunction order only when the appellate Court would find that the discretion exercised by the trial Court was either capricious, perverse or arbitrary, and not even on the ground that two views are possible on the material placed before the trial Court. If additional documents which were produced before the learned District Judge had been produced before the trial Court, the position would have been different. The trial Court could have exercised its discretion having regard to such documents also. When such documents were not placed before the tnal Court, the appellate Court receiving additional documents and then stating that the order passed by the trial Court granting injunction in favour of the petitioners was wrong, cannot be sustained.
17. The learned District Judge was called upon to scrutinise and decide whether the discretion exercised by the trial Court was capricious, perverse or arbitrary, in the given circumstances prevailing on the date of passing the order by the trial Court having regard to the material that was placed before it including the situation existing on the date of filing the suit. In my view, it is not open to the appellate Court to receive additional documents in such miscellaneous appeals challenging the order of the trial court granting or refusing the order of injunction for the simple reason that if those documents were produced before the trial Court, the trial Court could have exercised its discretion keeping in view those documents also. The aggrieved party could always take up such matters in appeal.
18. At any rate, if the appellate Court were to consider that the documents sought to be produced were material having a bearing in the exercise of discretion in the matter of granting or refusing injunction, it could remit the matter to the trial Court along with the additional documents after setting aside the order impugned in the appeal so that the trial Court could, in the first place, exercise its discretion having regard the additional documents also what could be the combined effect of the materials already placed before the trial Court and the additional documents is a matter that could be examined by the trial Court. This apart the aggrieved party will have a right of appeal challenging the order of discretion passed by the trial Court.
19. Under these circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that the learned District Judge was not right in receiving the additional documents in the miscellaneous appeal challenging the discretionary order of granting injunction in favour of the petitioners, and acting on such additional documents to set aside the discretionary order passed by the trial Court. In any view of the matter the learned District Judge ought to have remitted the matter to the trial Court along with the additional documents produced after setting aside the order passed by the trial Court and directing it to dispose of the application filed for grant of temporary injunction by the petitioners/plaintiffs afresh.
20. The suit properties are vacant lands purporting to use them as beach resorts. Even according to both the parties, only compound walls are built on the east and west, and fenced with barbed wires on the north and south, and no material structures are put up. Under the circumstances, in my opinion, it is appropriate to direct the parties to maintain statusquo, and remit the case to the trial Court i.e, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu, directing it to dispose of the I.A No. 350 of 1995 in O.S No. 252 of 1995 afresh on merits and in accordance with law taking into consideration the additional documents filed by both the parties before the learned Principal District Judge.
21. In the result for the reasons aforementioned, this civil revision petition is allowed; both the orders dated 1.7.1996 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Chengalpattu in C.M.A No. 55 of 1995 and the order dated 24.11.1995 passed by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu in I.A No. 350 of 1995 in O.S No. 252 of 1995 are set aside; the matter is remitted to the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu to dispose of I.A No. 350 of 1995 in O.S No. 252 of 1995 afresh on merits and in accordance with law taking into consideration the additional documents filed by both parties before 30.6.1997 The learned Principal District Judge, Chengalpattu is directed to send the additional documents filed before him to the Court of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu. The parties are directed to maintain Status-quo existing on the suit property till the disposal of the I.A and subject to the orders to be passed, in the said I.A No. 350 of 1995.
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