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M. Karuppanna Gounder v. C. Visuvasam, And 4 Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Revision in R.C.O.P No. 5 of 1987)
Factual and Procedural Background
This Revision was filed by the tenant against concurrent orders in R.C.O.P No. 5 of 1987 on the file of the Rent Controller (Principal District Munsif), Karur. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority directed the petitioner (tenant) to vacate the demised premises on the ground that he had committed acts of waste which materially impaired the value and utility of the building.
The eviction petition was instituted by the original landlady, Michael Animal, who alleged unauthorized alterations, change of user and acts of waste materially impairing the building. The tenant denied the allegations in his written statement, asserting that he had not committed such acts and that certain structures pre-existed his tenancy. During trial a Commissioner prepared a Report and Supplemental Report with a plan showing alleged changes. The landlady’s agent was examined as P.W.1; the tenant gave evidence as R.W.1. The Rent Controller found for the landlady and ordered eviction; an appeal by the tenant failed. The landlady died during the pendency of the appeal and her legal representatives were impleaded as respondents. The tenant filed this Revision under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act challenging the concurrent orders.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the tenant committed or caused to be committed acts of waste that have "materially impaired the value or utility" of the building so as to justify eviction under the relevant statutory provision (Section 10(2)(iii) of the Act as applied in the case).
- Whether the landlord discharged the burden of proof to show that the alleged unauthorized acts caused damage that materially impaired the value or utility of the property.
- Whether the concurrent findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority are sustainable, or are illegal, improper, irregular or perverse such that this Court should interfere under Section 25 of the Act.
- Relatedly, what is the proper legal test and meaning of the phrase "materially impaired" (i.e., whether minor or temporary alterations can attract the eviction ground).
Arguments of the Parties
Revision Petitioner / Tenant (Appellant)
- Denied having committed acts of waste or changed the user of the building.
- Asserted that parts of the alleged additions (the north-eastern corner room) were pre-existing — described as a "bunk" or part of prior hotel use — and thus not newly constructed by him.
- Explained that asbestos roofing and other minor works (roof for bathroom/latrine, providing a door) were repairs or necessary measures for enjoyment/privacy/business safety and did not materially impair the value or utility of the building.
- Contended that movable items (two water tubs) are not structural alterations that can ground eviction.
Landlady / Respondents
- Alleged that the tenant made unauthorized alterations, constructed a new room on the north-eastern corner (used for a ghee business), provided new roofing to the bathroom and latrine, and made other changes that materially impaired the value and utility of the building.
- Relied on the Commissioner’s plan and report and the evidence of the landlady’s agent (P.W.1) to support the claim of alterations and resultant impairment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Om Pal v. Anand Swamp, (1988) 4 SCC 545 = JT 1988 (4) SC 46 | Not every construction/alteration amounts to material impairment; the impairment must be substantial and significant; burden of proof lies on the landlord; temporary constructions removable without damage may not impair materially. | The Court relied on this authority to emphasize that mere alteration is insufficient; landlord must prove material impairment. The opinion used the case to show that temporary or removable fixtures do not necessarily attract eviction. |
| Pratap Narain v. District Judge, (1995 Supp. (3) SCC 459 | Even where structural changes are made without consent, eviction follows only if those changes resulted in diminishing the value of the building. | The Court cited it to underline that proof of unauthorized structural change alone is not enough; the landlord must prove resulting diminution in value. |
| Gurbachan Singh v. Shivalak Rubber Industries, (1996) 2 SCC 626 | Definition and scope of "impair materially" and "value"; impairment must be substantial and judged from the landlord's point of view; nature of construction is a relevant consideration. | The Court applied this principle to hold that the authorities below did not examine whether the alleged acts caused substantial diminution of quality/value measured against the antecedent state, and failed to assess the landlord's perspective. |
| Viswanathan v. Parichu, 1985 K.L.T 551 | Tenant’s right to act as a person of ordinary prudence; minor or temporary repairs (e.g., replacing tiles, patching a window) are permissible and do not amount to material alteration. | The Court used this High Court decision to support the view that routine repairs or security-related reasonable measures do not justify eviction for material alteration. |
| Shanmugam v. Rao Saheb, 1988 (1) K.L.T 80 | Emphasizes "materially and permanently" — damage must be of reasonably substantial magnitude and may require sizable expenses to rectify; minor or temporary alterations insufficient. | The Court relied on the decision to stress that the legislature did not intend eviction for minor or temporary impairment; authorities below failed to show such substantial impairment here. |
| Man Mohan Das v. Vishun Das, AIR 1987 S.C. 643 (cited in Shanmugam) | When assessing "materially" diminished value or utility, facts and circumstances matter; minor destruction or marginal reduction is insufficient. | Referenced (via Shanmugam) to underline that material impairment depends on facts and was not shown by the landlord in the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by noting the limited scope of interference under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act — intervention is warranted only if findings are illegal, improper, irregular or perverse, including findings reached without considering statutory provisions or without any evidence.
The Court identified the statutory provision invoked by the authorities below (Section 10(2)(iii) of the Act) which makes eviction available where a tenant has committed acts of waste likely to "impair materially the value or utility of the building." The Court emphasized that the burden of proof on this point rests squarely on the landlord.
On the facts, the Court reviewed the evidence presented: the Commissioner’s plan and reports, oral evidence of the landlady's agent (P.W.1), and the tenant’s evidence (R.W.1). The tenant testified that parts of the alleged alterations pre-dated his tenancy (the building had been used as a hotel and the northeastern addition was a pre-existing bunk) and that certain works (asbestos roofing, bathroom door, etc.) were repairs or necessary for privacy and business use; two water tubs were movable items.
The Court found critical gaps in the landlord's case: the landlady did not testify; P.W.1 (the landlady’s agent) failed to describe the prior condition of the building or explain how the alleged acts affected the building’s utility or value; the Commissioner’s Report did not assess how utility was affected; no expert evidence was produced; and the eviction petition itself lacked particulars of the alleged alterations. Given this absence of proof about the antecedent condition and the effect of the alleged works, the Court held that the landlord had not discharged the burden to prove material impairment.
The Court then examined the legal meaning of "materially impaired" through authorities. Drawing on Om Pal and Gurbachan Singh, the Court reiterated that not every addition or alteration warrants eviction — the impairment must be of a substantial and significant nature, assessed with reference to the antecedent state of the building and from the landlord’s perspective. The Court observed that the authorities below focused on the absence of consent but did not enquire whether the alleged acts materially diminished the building’s quality, strength, value or utility.
The Court also considered the tenant's right of enjoyment under the lease and referenced Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, holding that a tenant may, as a person of ordinary prudence, effect repairs or protective measures necessary for enjoyment, provided they do not materially affect the landlord's rights. The Court found that the acts relied upon by the landlord (asbestos roof over a portion, a roof for bathroom/latrine, a door, movable tubs) fell within the tenant's right of enjoyment or were minor and did not amount to material impairment.
Concluding, the Court held that the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority had ordered eviction in the absence of necessary evidence showing material impairment and that their conclusions were therefore perverse and unsustainable. Interference under Section 25 was justified.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court set aside the concurrent findings and order of eviction. In the result, the tenant is not liable to be evicted, the Rent Control Eviction Petition is dismissed, and the Revision Petitioner (tenant) is entitled to costs in the Revision.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the eviction order made by the Rent Controller and upheld by the Appellate Authority was quashed and the tenant retains possession.
- The Court emphasized the landlord's burden to prove material impairment of value or utility and applied established principles from higher and allied authorities to require substantial evidence of impairment measured against the antecedent condition.
- The opinion did not purport to lay down a new legal principle; instead, it applied existing authorities to the facts and found the authorities below had acted without required proof. No broader or novel precedent was announced beyond applying settled tests for "material impairment" and the scope of judicial interference under Section 25 of the Act.
Disposition: Revision allowed; Rent Control Eviction Petition dismissed; tenant awarded costs.
This Revision is by the tenant in R.C.O.P No. 5 of 1987 on the file of Rent Controller (Principal District Munsif), Karur. Both the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority have, directed the petitioner to vacate the demised premises on the ground that he has committed acts of waste, which have materially impaired the value and utility of the building.
2. In the Eviction Petition, in para 10, the original landlady Michael Animal has said that the tenant, petitioner herein, has made some alterations without permission and put the building into a different user and also committed acts of waste which have materially impaired the value and utility of the building and, therefore, the tenant is liable to be evicted on that ground.
3. The said allegation is answered in Paragraph 4 of the counter wherein the tenant has said that he has not made use of the building for any other purpose, nor has he committed any acts of waste. He has also said that he has not done any act which is likely to impair materially the value and utility of the building. The allegation that he has committed acts of waste is also denied.
4. During trial, the Rent Controller, on the application of the respondent herein, deputed a Commissioner to file a Report. The Commissioner has filed a Report and also a Supplemental Report. He has also given a plan of the building and the socalled changes that were alleged to have been effected by the tenant. By way of oral evidence, the agent of the landlady was examined as P.W.1 As against the oral evidence of P.W.1, petitioner (tenant) examined himself as R.W.1 and denied having committed any act of waste and also the alterations which were alleged to have materially impaired the value and utility of the building.
5. On the above evidence, the Rent Controller held that the tenant is liable to be evicted on the ground that the construction put up by him was without the consent of the landlady, and because of the construction, the landlady is put to difficulties. Against that order, an appeal was preferred by the tenant, which also met with failure. It is the concurrent orders of the Authorities below that are challenged in this Revision.
6. During the pendency of the Appeal, the landlady died, and her legal representatives were impleaded. Those legal representatives are the respondents herein.
7. Under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, the jurisdiction of this Court is limited, and it is entitled to interfere only if the finding is illegal, improper or irregular. But, at the same time, if a finding is entered without taking into consideration the statutory provisions and to arrive at a finding for which there is no evidence at all, it cannot be doubted that such findings are perverse. If, on the basis of the available evidence, no reasonable man could arrive at such a finding, this Court, in exercising the power under Section 25 of the Rent Control Act, is entitled to interfere with such finding.
8. With the above introduction regarding the power of this Court under Section 25 of the Act, let us consider how far the Authorities below were justified in ordering eviction.
9. Section 10 (2) (iii) of the Act says that the tenant is liable to be evicted if he has committed or caused to be committed such acts of waste as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building. (Emphasis) The burden of proof is on the landlord to show that the unauthorised act of the tenant has caused damage to the building and such damage has materially impaired the value or utility.
10. The property from which the tenant is sought to be evicted is described in the Schedule thus: —
“Karur, R.D, West Karur Sub R.D, Karur Taluk, Karur Municipal Town, 1st Ward, 7th Division, Brahmatheertham Road (Lakshmipuram) within the following four boundaries: — On the south of the house of Chinnasamy Iyer; On the west of north south road; On the north of the house of Arokkiasamy Mudaliar, and On the east of Municipal lane. Within these four boundaries, East-West 89 on the northern side and 87′ on the southern side, north south 17 ‘with east facing terraced house, front yard, backyard, doors, door frames, almirahs, windows, electric connection, tap connection, pathway and other easementary rights with right of taking drinking water from the northern property. For this old Door No. 13 and new Door No. 28 and 28-A old T.S Nos. 1200 and 1201 new T.S No. 3115.”
East west length of the building is 89 ft. on the northern side and 87 ft. on the southern side. The building is facing on the east. It faces the road. According to the plan prepared by the Commissioner, it has got seven rooms. Portions of the same are terraced and the remaining portion has asbestos roof. The middle portion is a tiled portion. The finding of the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority is that it is an old building. On the north eastern extremity and outside the 87 ft a room has been constructed having a width of 10.8 ft. × 8 ft. That room is having an asbestos roof. It is said that the revision petitioner is making use of the room for the purpose of ghee business. It is a new construction. The said room, of course, touches the north eastern corner of the building. On the south western corner, there is a bathroom and latrine where the new roof has been provided. Immediately east of the bathroom and latrine, there are two water-tubs which are movable. They are kept in open air. These are the additions to the building as seen from the Report. The tenant, while he was examined as R.W.1, has said in chief examination that long before he took the building on rent, the schedule building was used as a hotel and the alleged new construction on the north-eastern corner was really a bunk. He further went on and said thus: —
The Rent Controller, accepting the evidence of the tenant, held that he above acts are acts of waste. The Appellate Authority, without further discussing the matter, accepted the conclusion. I have already said that the burden of proof is on the landlady to prove that the alleged alterations have materially impaird the value and utility of the building. The landlady did not enter the box. Her Secretary or Clerk was examined as P.W.1 This is all what he has stated in chief-examination: —
He has not stated even one sentence about the previous condition of the building and how far the acts of the tenant have affected the utility of the building. In cross-examination also, he does not say anything about the previous condition of the building. What are the changes that were effected by the tenant, and how far those changes affected the utility, have not been stated. The Report of the Commissioner also does not say anything how far the utility of the building is affected. No expert evidence is available. In the eviction petition, no details of alterations have been given. The alleged construction is on the eastern corner in the front portion of the building. If that is a new construction, nothing prevented the landlady from alleging about the same, because it could be seen even from the road. When there is absence of pleading, the case of the tenant that it was originally a bunk which was in existence long before he came to occupy the building and when the thatched roof became old, he provided the same with asbestos roofing, and it is not a new construction could have been accepted. The other act alleged is that the tenant has provided roof to the bathroom and latrine and a new door with tin sheets has been provided in the toilet. It is also explained by the tenant that the roof got damaged, and there was no door for the bathroom and he had to provide the same. The two water tubs kept outside the building are movables. When the landlord has not said anything about the original position of the building, and when the tenant says that such constructions were in existence even before he came to occupy the building, the Rent Controller should have accepted the evidence. In fact, there is no counter evidence adduced by the landlord. Unless the landlord proves the original condition of the building, he cannot get an order of eviction on the simple allegation that the tenant has put up additional constructions.
11. Assuming that the tenant has put up the construction on the north eastern corner, the further question that arises for consideration is, whether the value and utility have been materially affected. A mere reduction in the value and utility is not sufficient. The value and utility of the building must have been materially impaired. To decide whether the value has been affected materially, the Court has to consider and form an opinion in the light of the views of the landlady and not of the tenant. But, even in spite of the same, there must be evidence available from the landlady.
12. In a decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1988) 4 SCC 545 = JT 1988 (4) SC 46 (Om Pal v. Anand Swamp), their Lordships said that ‘it is not every construction or alteration that would result in material impairment to the value or the utility of the building’. Their Lordships were considering a similar provision under the E.P Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, and held thus: —
“It is not every construction or alteration that would result in material impairment to the value or the utility of the building. In order to attract Section 13 (2) (iii) the construction must not only be one affecting or diminshing the value or utility of the building but such impairment must be of a material nature i.e, of a substantial and significant nature. When a construction is alleged to materially impair the value or utility of a building, the construction should be of such a nature as to substantially diminish the value of the building either from the commercial and monetary point of view or from the utilitarian aspect of the building. The burden of proof of such material impairment is on the landlord. In the present case the appellant-tenant examined an expert, a retired engineer, to prove that the parchhati was only a temporary wooden fixture which would be easily removed at any time without any damage being caused to the walls of the building. Having regard to the nature of the temporary construction put up by the appellant and the evidence of the expert witness examined by him which remains uncontroverted by any expert's evidence on the respondent's side, it must be held that there was no material impairment to attract Section 13 (2) (iii). There was no basis for contrary findings rendered by the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate authority and the High Court erred in accepting those findings without applying the correct principles of law underlying Section 13 (2). (iii).”
In paragraph 6 of the judgment, their Lordships considered and accepted the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner as to what is meant by ‘material impairment’ and ‘impairment’. The argument was that the words “materially impaired” have a distinct connotation and as such any and every alteration made in a building will not necessarily constitute material impairment to the building. The meaning of the word ‘impair’ as given in the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Iyer was accepted. The meaning given in that Lexicon reads thus: —
“Impair. To diminish in quality value, excellence or strength of a thing.
The word ‘impair’ means to make worse; to weaken; to enfeeble. To make or become worse or less; to lessen, reduce or diminish the quantity or quality.”
13. In (1995 Supp. (3) SCC 459(Pratap Narain v. District Judge), in paragraph 4 of the judgment, while considering a corresponding provision under the U.P Urban Buildings. Regulation of (Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, held thus: —
“…A perusal of clause (c) of sub-Section(2) of Section 20 of Act 13 of 1972 would indicate that a suit for eviction is maintainable only if the tenant is found to have made my structural changes without the consent of the landlord and that such changes resulted in diminishing the value of the building. Therefore, even if it is held that the structural changes were made by the appellant without the consent of the landlord, the suit could not be decreed unless it was further found that the changes resulted in diminishing the value of the building……….”
14. The decision in (1996) 2 SCC 626 Gurbachan Singh v. Shivalak Rubber Industries is also in relation to a case under East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949. Their Lordships have considered in that decision the meaning of the words, ‘impair’, ‘impair materially’ and ‘value’. It was held in that case that it is the version of the landlord that we have to take into consideration. Their Lordships further went on and said that to consider whether the tenant is liable to be evicted on that ground, the nature of construction made by him is a relevant consideration. It was held thus: —
“Section 13 (2) (iii) of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act contemplated that a tenant is liable to eviction who has committed such acts as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building or rented land. The meaning of the expression “to impair materially” in common parlance would mean to diminish in quality, strength or value substantially in other words, to make a thing or substance worse and deteriorate. The word ‘impair’ cannot be said to have a fixed meaning. It is a relative term affording different meaning in different contexts and situation. Here in the context the term “impair materially” has been used to mean, considerable decrease in quality which may be measured with reference to the antecedent state of things as it existed earlier in point of time as compared to a later stage after the alleged change is made or effected suggesting impairment. Further, the use of the word ‘value’ means intrinsic worth of a thing. In other words utility of an object for satisfying, directly or indirectly, the needs or desires of a person. Thus, the ground for eviction of a tenant would be available to a landlord against the tenant under Section 13(2) (iii) of the Act if it is established that the tenant has committed such acts as are likely to diminish the quality, strength or value of the building or rented land to such an extent that the intrinsic worth or fitness of the building or the rented land has considerably affected its use for some desirable practical purpose. The decrease or deterioration, in other words the impairment of the worth and usefulness or the value and utility of the building or rented land has to be judged and determined from the point of view of the landlord and not of the tenant or any one else.”
On going by these decisions, it is clear that if the landlord wanted to get eviction of the tenant, he has to prove that the act has considerably decreased the quality which has to be measured with reference to the antecedent state of things as it existed early in point of time as compared to later stage after the alleged change was made or effected substantial impairment. The act complained of must also be such that it is likely to diminish the quality, strength and value of the building. In such a case, the intrinsic worth or fitness of the building is affected. I do not think, the Authorities below have taken into consideration any of these legal implications before passing the order of eviction. Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority has only considered that the tenant has committed certain acts without the consent of the landlady. In my opinion, that by itself will not give the Rent Controller jurisdiction to order eviction.
15. A lease contemplates right of enjoyment. If the tenant has no right of enjoyment, it cannot be considered as a lease. Enjoyment contemplates certain rights on the part of the tenant. In this case, the building is used both for residential and non-residential purposes. Originally the building was being used as a hotel. As a tenant, he is entitled to have privacy. When there was no door for the bathroom and toilet, they cannot be made use of. They are amenities to the building. Naturally, the tenant can insist that he is entitled to privacy. If the landlord is not providing the tenant with those amenities, the tenant makes arrangement for himself and fixes a door where there was already a door. By this, it cannot be said that the tenant has violated the terms of tenancy. If it is a business place, the tenant is entitled to have necessary protection. A roof which has already fallen down in the north eastern portion and the tenant, for the purpose of his business, has provided asbestos roof. These matters go along with the term of enjoyment for which the building has been let. Under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, a tenant is entitled to enjoy the property, of course, without materially affecting the landlord's right. He can make use of the property leased as a man of ordinary prudence.
16. In 1985 K.L.T 551 Viswanathan v. Parichu, a tenant, for the purpose of his business, fixed collapsable shutters in the place of ordinary shutters. The question was, whether that would amount to material alteration. The Kerala High Court rejected the contention and held thus: —
“A user of the leased property as a person of ordinary prudcance is a right of the tenant. The possession of the property itself vests with the tenant. He could, in relation to the leased premises, exercise such acts as a person of ordinary prudence, provided, however, that no material alteration is affected in the building by such acts. This is implicit in the proviso to S. 17 (1) of the Rent Control Act itself. To replace a broken tile, or to fill up the void in the place of missing one, or to patch up a damaged window or a door could all be acts which the tenant would be fully entitled to carry out. Material alterations are important alterations, such as those which materially or substantially change the front or the structure of the premises. The background in which the tenant was forced to reinforce the security for his shop room in which costly articles had been stored cannot be forgotten in this context. He had not altered the form or structure of the shop room. The specific averment in his objection and written statement is that collapsable shutters can be removed without any difficulty and without causing any damage to the building. Only minimal alterations such as digging two pits on either side of comparatively small dimensions are undertaken. The pits will be filled up when the collapsable shutters are affixed. The extent of the alterations can be gauged from the statement of the Commissioner that the expenses for the restoration of the room’ to its earlier condition would come to a measne sum of Rs. 50/-. It follows that the acts complained of would not constitute a material or structural alteration of the building.”
17. In 1988 (1) K.L.T 80. Shanmugam v. Rao Saheb, J., as he then was, in paragraph 6 of the judgment held thus: —
“To attract Clause (ii) of sub-s. (4) of S. 11 the Act proof of mere reduction or even destruction of utility or value would not be sufficient. The words “materially and permanently” have much importance in the context because the legislature was not inclined to allow a tenant to be dislodged from the building on proof of even destruction of utility or value of the building. Almost a similar expression is used in S. 108, Clause (e) of the Transfer of Property Act that when the property leased is destroyed or “substantially and permanently” rendered unfit, due to the wrongful act of the tenant, the lease becomes void. Courts have held that the damage caused must be so great as to involve reasonably sizable expenses to rectify the damage. While dealing with the expression “materially altered/the accommodation or is likely to substantially diminish its value” in S. 3 of the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 the Supreme Court observed in Man Mohan Das v. Vishun Das (AIR 1987 S.C 643) that it would depend upon facts and circumstances in each case. The expression “materially and permanently” in Clause (ii) of sub-rule (4) of the Act would certainly indicate that a landlord cannot get an order of eviction on that ground by mere proof of minor destruction, or alteration, even if it results in marginal reduction of value or utility. As the expression was used conjunctively the legislature has indicated that even material alteration of a temporary nature would not help the landlord in getting an order of eviction. The destruction or reduction of utility or value of the building must be of a reasonably substantial magnitude.”
18. The Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority has ordered eviction when there is lack of evidence in this regard totally. There is no finding that the acts of the tenant have materially affected the value and utility of the building. From the Plan, drawn by the Commissioner, under no stretch of imagination, can it be said that the acts of the tenant have materially impaired the value and utility of the building in any way. When the decisions of the Authorities below were based on no evidence, the decision can only be treated as perverse, and this Court will be justified in interfering under Section 25 of the Rent Control Act.
19. In the result, setting aside the concurrent findings of the Authorities below, I hold that the tenant is not liable be evicted.
20. There is another ground for eviction put forward by the landlords, namely, wilful default in payment of rent. But this did not find favour with the Rent Controller as well as Appellate Authority. Consequently, by allowing this Revision Petition, I dismiss the Rent Control Eviction Petition. Revision petitioner is entitled to his costs in this Revision.
RR/VCS.
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