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J. Kuppuswami Mudali And Others v. Mahalingam
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction or, alternatively, for recovery of possession of a suit property. The core factual assertions in the plaint were:
- Govinda Mudali was the original/absolute owner of the suit property.
- Govinda Mudali executed a registered settlement deed (Ex.A-1) dated 14.5.1970 settling the property in favour of Pappammal (the vendor of the plaintiff), and she accepted the settlement.
- The plaintiff purchased the property from Pappammal by a registered sale deed (Ex.A-5) dated 2.4.1979 for Rs. 3,000.
- The plaintiff alleged that title was perfected by adverse possession through the vendor's possession and enjoyment; defendants allegedly attempted trespass/interference.
The defendants disputed the plaintiff's case, asserting that the settlement Ex.A-1 was not acted upon, possession never passed to Pappammal, and that Govinda Mudali subsequently cancelled the settlement and bequeathed the property to the defendants' temple by a registered Will (Ex.B-1 dated 7.4.1975). They claimed continuous possession on behalf of the temple.
At trial the plaintiff gave evidence as P.W.1 with four additional plaintiff witnesses (P.Ws.2–5) and exhibits Ex.A-1 to Ex.A-8 were marked. The defence led D.W.1 and two other defence witnesses (D.Ws.2–3) and marked Ex.B-1 to Ex.B-8. The District Munsif, Tiruttani, after framing issues and examining evidence, dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs.
The plaintiff appealed to the Sub-Court, Kancheepuram (A.S. No. 22 of 1982). The learned Appellate Judge reappraised evidence, disagreed with the trial court, allowed the appeal and granted the decree in the plaintiff's favour. The defendants then filed the present second appeal before this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether there is an omission to construe and misconstruction of the material evidence on record by the lower appellate court when it chose to reverse the judgment and decree of the first Court?
- Whether there has been a proper construction by the lower appellate Court on Ex.A-1 on the question as to whether it is a Will subject to revocation?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (Defendants)
- Ex.A-1 (the registered settlement deed) is not a valid gift but amounts to a will (or at least a transfer not acted upon) and therefore can be revoked.
- Possession had not passed to the settlee (Pappammal), so Ex.A-1 was never acted upon; consequently it could be cancelled. The defendants rely on recitals within Ex.A-1 to support this submission.
- Counsel for the appellants relied on authorities (including Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Tvl. Inca Cables (Pte) Ltd and Navaneet Lal v. Gokul) for the proposition that a document must be construed as a whole to determine its character, arguing that a holistic reading shows Ex.A-1 was not an irrevocable, effective settlement.
Respondent's Arguments (Plaintiff)
- The respondent relied upon Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act and a body of judicial decisions to contend that a registered instrument of gift or settlement need not be accompanied by delivery of physical possession for it to take effect.
- Counsel for the respondent argued that the lower appellate court properly construed Ex.A-1, and that the deed was acted upon and accepted by the settlee; therefore the appellate decree in favour of the plaintiff should be sustained and the second appeal dismissed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Tvl. Inca Cables (Pte) Ltd, 1982 (1) M.L.J. 137 (Full Bench) | The document as a whole must be construed to determine its character; nomenclature alone is not decisive. | Used to support the approach that Ex.A-1 must be read in its entirety to determine whether it effected a settlement or was merely a revocable instrument; the court applied this principle in construing Ex.A-1 in favour of the plaintiff. |
| Navaneet Lal v. Gokul, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 794 (1976 (2) S.C.R. 924) | Supreme Court guidance on how a document is to be construed — find intention, meaning and surrounding circumstances. | Applied to interpret Ex.A-1's language and context to conclude that the settler did not reserve a right to cancel and that the settlee had accepted the transfer. |
| Lallu Singh v. Gur Narain, A.I.R. 1992 All. 467 (Full Bench) | Interpreting Section 123, holding that delivery of possession is not necessary for a registered instrument of gift to take effect. | Relied upon to support the conclusion that physical delivery of possession was not required for Ex.A-1 to be effective; reinforced the appellate court's construction. |
| Gouranga Sahu v. Maguni Dei, A.I.R. 1991 Ori. 151 | Similar view that delivery of possession is not necessary where a registered instrument of gift is properly executed and attested. | Cited as supportive authority for the proposition that registration and acceptance suffice to give effect to Ex.A-1. |
| Balmakund v. Bhagwan Das, 1894 Allahabad Series 185 | Delivery of the deed of gift to the donee is sufficient to pass title without actual physical possession being taken. | Invoked to substantiate that the transfer by Ex.A-1 could operate without immediate physical transfer of possession. |
| Man Bhari v. Navindh (reference in text: "Man Bhari v. Navindh followed") | (As cited) Followed the principle that delivery of the deed may suffice to pass title. | Referenced as a supporting precedent consistent with the proposition that physical possession is not essential once the instrument is accepted. |
| Bhagwan Prasad v. Hari Singh, A.I.R. 1925 Nag. 199 | Observes that Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act abrogated the older Hindu law requirement (if any) of delivery of possession to complete a gift of immovable property when the instrument is registered. | Used to reinforce that registration under Section 123 obviates the necessity of delivery of possession for Ex.A-1 to be effective. |
| Samrathi Devi v. Paraswaran Pandey, AIR 1975 Pat. 140 | Handing over the deed by the donor to the donee is sufficient evidence of the donee's acceptance; acceptance of the instrument proves acceptance of the gift. | Applied to conclude that acceptance of Ex.A-1 by the settlee (Pappammal) amounted to acting upon the document. |
| Tila Bewa v. Mana Bewa, A.I.R. 1962 Ori. 130 | Gift cannot be revoked for mere failure of the donee to maintain the donor. | Cited to support the principle of irrevocability of certain transfers once the instrument has taken effect. |
| Venkatasubbiah v. Subbamma, A.I.R. 1956 A.P. 195 | Aligns with the view that gift once effected is not revocable for neglect to maintain the donor. | Relied upon as additional authority supporting the non-revocability of a properly effected gift/settlement. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by summarising the factual contest: plaintiff claimed a registered settlement (Ex.A-1) was executed in favour of Pappammal and later a sale to the plaintiff occurred; defendants claimed the settlement was not acted upon, was cancelled (Ex.B-8) and the property was bequeathed to the temple by Will (Ex.B-1).
The Court addressed the framed substantial questions of law and closely examined Ex.A-1 in light of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act and established authorities on document construction. The legal analysis proceeded along these lines:
- The Court accepted the established proposition that a document must be construed as a whole (citing Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Tvl. Inca Cables and Navaneet Lal v. Gokul) to determine its true character rather than relying on its nomenclature alone.
- Applying that holistic approach to Ex.A-1, the Court found that the settlee's power of transfer had been postponed but that the settler (Govinda Mudali) had not expressly reserved a right to cancel the settlement in the deed.
- The Court relied on authorities interpreting Section 123 to hold that delivery of physical possession is not necessary for a registered instrument of gift/settlement properly executed and accepted to take effect. The Court cited precedents (including Lallu Singh, Gouranga Sahu, Balmakund v. Bhagwan Das and Bhagwan Prasad v. Hari Singh) to support that principle.
- Acceptance of the document by the settlee was treated as sufficient evidence that the settlement had been acted upon (citing Samrathi Devi). On that basis, the Court concluded Ex.A-1 had been acted upon despite the absence of immediate physical possession transfer.
- Because Ex.A-1 did not contain a reservation enabling the settler to cancel at will, the purported cancellation under Ex.B-8 could not be sustained.
- Consequently, the Court found no error in the lower appellate court's reversal of the trial court's finding and its decree in favour of the plaintiff.
The Court expressly stated that the appellate court's findings were based on acceptable evidence and in consonance with the law laid down by various courts.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The second appeal is DISMISSED, thereby upholding the decree of the lower appellate court in favour of the plaintiff.
Direct implications and immediate consequences:
- The appellate decree in A.S. No. 22 of 1982 (which had allowed the plaintiff's appeal and granted the decree sought) is confirmed.
- The court held that settlement deed Ex.A-1 was acted upon and that cancellation recorded as Ex.B-8 could not be sustained.
- Accordingly, the defendants' claim based on the Will (Ex.B-1) and the asserted cancellation of Ex.A-1 was rejected for the purposes of this appeal.
- In the circumstances of the case, the Court ordered that there be no order as to costs.
Broader implications: The opinion grounds its decision on established statutory interpretation of Section 123 and multiple precedents; it affirms that a registered settlement/gift properly executed and accepted can be effective without immediate physical delivery of possession. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond applying existing authorities.
1. The defendants is O.S No. 472 of 1979 on the file of District Munsif s Court, Tiruttani are the appellants in the above second appeal. The respondent, Plaintiff filed the said suit for declaration and for permanent injunction or in the alternative recovery of possession of the plaintiff's property.
2. The case of the plaintiff as found in the plaint are briefly narrated hereunder: One Govinda Mudali was the absolute owner of the suit property. He settled the suit property in favour of one Papammal, the vendor of the plaintiff under the registered settlement deed dated 14.5.1970, and she has also accepted the same. The plaintiff purchased the suit property from the said Pappammal under a registered sale deed 2.4.1979 for Rs. 3,000. Since the vendor of the plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property, sold the same to the plaintiff, they have perfected their title to the suit property by adverse possession also. The defendants have no right, title or interest in the suit property, attempted to trespass in the suit property and interfered in his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same, which necessitated the plaintiff to file present suit.
3. The allegations in the written statement are briefly as follows:- The plaintiff and his vendor are not the owners of the suit property, and they were never in possession of the same. The settlement deed dated 14.5.1970 was not acted upon and the vendor of the plaintiff or the plaintiff have not perfected their title by adverse possession. One Govinda Mudali was the owner of the suit property and he was in possession of the same. He has executed a settlement deed in favour of one Pappammal by stipulating a condition but the settlement deed was not acted upon. Hence Govinda Mudali cancelled the registered settlement deed in favour of Pappammal and with his absolute right he has bequeathed the suit property in favour of the defendants temple as per the registered Will dated 7.4.1975 Till the death of Govinda Mudali he was enjoying the property and after his death, the defendants are in continuous possession of the suit property on behalf of the temple. They have perfected their title by adverse possession also. With these averments they prayed for dismissal of the suit.
4. The plaintiff himself was examined as P.W 1 and four more witnesses were examined as P.Ws 2 to 5 apart from marking Ex.A-1 to A-8 on the plaintiff's side. The 3rd defendant was examined as D.W 1 and two more witnesses were examined as D.Ws 2 and 3. Ex.B- 1 to B-8 were also marked on the side of the defendants.
5. The learned District Munsif, Tirutani after framing necessary issues and on the basis of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not proved his case consequently dismissed the suit with costs.
6. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the suit, the unsuccessful plaintiff filed an appeal in A.S No. 22 of 1982 before the Sub-Court, Kancheepuram. The learned Appellate Judge after framing the necessary points for consideration and after reappraising the whole evidence, disagreed with the findings of the trial court, allowed the appeal and granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff as prayed for.
7. Against the decree of the lower appellate Court, the defendants have filed the present appeal before this court. While entertaining the appeal this Court has framed the following substantial questions of law for consideration: -
1. Whether there is an omission to construe and misconstruction of the material evidence on record by the lower appellate court when it chore to reverse the judgment and decree of the first Court?
2. Whether there has been a proper construction by the lower appellate Court on Ex.A-1 on the question as to whether it is a Will subject to revocation?
8. Mr. J. Venugopal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in the light of the substantial questions of law framed contended that in view of the recital in Ex.A-1, the decree of the lower appellate court is erroneous and prays for interference in this appeal. He also submitted that Ex.A-1 is not a valid gift and it is only a will and at any rate Ex.A-1 has not acted upon. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the lower appellate court has misconstrued the recital in Ex.A-1. On the other hand, Mr. S.T Balaji, learned counsel appearing for the respondent after pointing out Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act as well as some decisions contended that the lower appellate court has correctly construed Ex.A-1 and rightly granted decree in favour of the plaintiff, hence prays for dismissal of the second appeal. I have carefully considered the rival submissions.
9. Admittedly, one Govinda Mudali is the original owner of the suit property. It is the case of the plaintiff that the said Govinda Mudali settled the suit property in favour of P.W 4 under registered settlement deed Ex.A-1 dated 14.5.1970, and he has purchased the same from P.W 4 under registered sale deed Ex.A-5 dated 2.4.1979 However, it is the case of the defendants being the trustees of the Grama Devathai Temple, they became the owner of the suit property under the Will executed by Govinda Mudali, i.e, Ex.B-1 dated 7.4.1975 The defendants resist the claim of the plaintiff on the ground that settlement deed Ex.A-1 in favour of Pappammal has not been acted upon and the possession of the suit property was not transferred to the said Pappammal. It is also contended by the defendants that P.W 4 failed to act according to the terms and conditions of Ex.A-1, hence it was cancelled by the said Govinda Mudali as per Ex.B-8, bequeathed the suit property in favour of the temple under Ex.B-1 and the defendants are also in possession of the suit property on behalf of the temple.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant after referring the recitals in Ex.A-1 and in the light of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act contended that even though the first ingredient to the said Section has been complied with, however, the second aspect, namely, the possession in the said property has not been passed on the settlee, i.e, P.W 4 and therefore submitted that Ex.A-1 was never acted upon. He very much relies upon the following passages in Ex.A-1 which reads as follows:-
With these sentences in Ex.A-1, the learned counsel points out that possession was never parted with the settlee, hence Ex.A-1 at no point of time acted upon. He also relied on Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. Tvl. Inca Cables (Pte) Ltd, 1982 (1) M.L.J 137 (F.B) to the effect that a document as a whole has to be construed to determine the character of the document. As propounded in the said decision there is no dispute that reading the concerned document as a whole that determines the character of the document and not the nomenclature given to the document. There is no dispute that the proposition of law stated in the said Full Bench decision has to be followed. He also stated another decision, namely, Navaneet Lal v. Gokul, A.I.R 1976 S.C 794: 1976 (2) S.C.R 924. In the said decision the Supreme Court has formulated how a document has to be construed. Here also absolutely there is no problem in applying the said decision in order to find out the nature of the document, namely, Ex.A-1. In the light of the above-said two decisions, we have to find out intention, meaning and surrounding circumstances of the parties in Ex.A-1.
11. In order to hold that it is a valid settlement we have to find out whether the settlee has accepted the said document. It is also a settled law that in settlement once the settlee accepts the transfer it is presumed that the said document has been acted upon irrespective of the fact whether the settlee has obtained possession immediately or not. A reading of the entire document Ex.A-1 as pointed out by the two decisions referred to earlier leads to an irresistible conclusion that the power of transfer by the settles (Pappammal) alone has been postponed. As a matter of fact the said Govinda Mudali has not written anything in the said document. Hence the contrary conclusion reached by the trial court cannot be sustained. On the other hand the lower appellate court correctly construed Ex.A-1. When there is no provision or reservation in the settlement deed by the settler, namely, Govinda Mudali it is presumed that he has no right to cancel the said settlement deed at a later date. If that is so the cancellation of Ex.A-1 under Ex.B-8 cannot be sustained.
12. The following decisions cited by the learned counsel for the respondent amply support the above view of mine. In Lallu Singh v. Gur Narain, A.I.R 1992 All. 467, the Full bench of the Allahabad High Court while interpreting Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act has held that “delivery of possession is not necessary, Section 123, does away with the necessity of delivery of possession even if it was required by the strict Hindu Law, in the case of a registered instrument of gift properly executed and attested” A similar view has been arrived at in a decision reported in Gouranga Sahu v. Maguni Dei, A.I.R 1991 Ori. 151. In Balmakund v. Bhagwan Das, 1894 Allahabad Series 185, the Division Bench has observed as follows:-
“The delivery to the donee of immovable property of the deed of gift is sufficient to pass the title to such property to the donee without actual physical possession such property being taken by the donee. Man Bhari v. Navindh followed”.
In Bhagwan Prasad v. Hari Singh, A.I.R 1925 Nag. 199 it is observed as follows:-
“Assuming that delivery of possession was essential under the Hindu Law to complete a gift of immovable property, that law had been abrogated by Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act in cases where the instrument of gift has been registered.”
In Samrathi Devi v. Paraswaran Pandey, AIR 1975 Pat. 140, it is observed as follows:
“The fact of the deed being handed over by the donor to the donee was sufficient evidence of his having accepted the gift, and the acceptance of the said document was a relevant fact to prove the acceptance of the gift by him.”
In Tila Bewa v. Mana Bewa, A.I.R 1962 Ori. 130 it is observed that gift cannot be revoked for failure of donee to maintain donor. A similar view has been taken i.e, gift cannot be revoked for neglect to maintain donor in Venkatasubbiah v. Subbamma, A.I.R 1956 A.P 195
13. In the light of the above mentioned cotena of decisions and after considering the decisions and after considering the recital in Ex.A-1, I am of the view that the said document has been acted upon and there is no need or warrant to cancel the said document in Ex.B-8, hence I am in entire agreement with the findings of the lower appellate court.
14. Under these circumstances, I did not find any good reason to interfere with the findings of the lower appellate court which are based on acceptable evidence as well as in consonance with the law laid down by various courts. Consequently, the second appeal fails and same is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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