Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

N. Krishnaswamy Reddiar And Ors. v. Manickavasagam

Madras High Court
Nov 25, 1994
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Legal Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit O.S. No. 22 of 1982 was filed by Krishnasamy Reddiar together with his brother Ramaswamy Reddiar against the respondent Manickavasagam in the Court of District Munsif of Musiri. An ex parte decree was obtained on 1.12.1986; Ramaswamy Reddiar had died on 4.6.1985 prior to the decree. Decree-holder Krishnasamy Reddiar sought execution in E.P. No. 236 of 1988. In E.A. No. 943 of 1988 an application under Order 21, Rule 16 and Section 151, C.P.C. was filed to implead the present review petitioners 2 and 3 (wife and daughter), as the legal representatives (L.Rs.) of deceased Ramaswamy Reddiar; that application was allowed by the District Munsif on 17.11.1993.

The respondent challenged the impleading order before the High Court in C.R.P. No. 148 of 1994. By order dated 17.2.1994 a learned Single Judge allowed the C.R.P., set aside the District Munsif's order in E.A. No. 943 of 1988 and dismissed the application for impleading petitioners 2 and 3, on the sole ground that Ramaswamy Reddiar was not alive at the time the decree was passed and therefore impleading his legal representatives subsequently was not according to law.

The present proceeding is a review application by decree-holder Krishnasamy Reddiar and the legal representatives of Ramaswamy Reddiar seeking review of the learned Single Judge's order dated 17.2.1994.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a decree passed in favour of a deceased person is a nullity or, alternatively, only an irregularity that is executable by the deceased's legal representatives.
  2. Whether the legal representatives of a deceased decree-holder can be impleaded at the execution stage under Order 21, Rule 16 (read with relevant provisions) and thereby execute a decree passed without the court having knowledge of the death.
  3. Whether the learned Single Judge erred by setting aside the impleading order on the sole ground that the plaintiff-decree-holder was dead at the time of the decree.
  4. Whether the grounds invoked in the review application satisfy the limited scope of Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. (i.e., review for mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, discovery of new evidence, or any other sufficient reason analogous to the specified grounds).

Arguments of the Parties

Review Applicants' Arguments

  • A decree passed in favour of a dead person is not a nullity but at most an irregularity; such a decree can be executed by the legal representatives of the deceased if the death was not brought to the court's notice when the decree was passed.
  • There was a co-plaintiff (Krishnasamy Reddiar) alive, so even in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff the decree is valid.
  • The learned Single Judge's order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record for setting aside the impleading order solely because the deceased plaintiff was not alive at the time of decree.
  • Order 21, Rule 16 read with Section 146 (and related provisions) enable legal representatives of the deceased to come on record and apply for execution, so the Executing Court was right to allow impleading of L.Rs.
  • Discretionary revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C. should not have been exercised to cause hardship or injustice to the decree-holders entitled to recover possession.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The scope of review is restricted by Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C.; review may be allowed only on the limited grounds specified (discovery of new evidence, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason analogous to those grounds).
  • Reliance was placed on authorities (M.M.B. Catholicos v. N.P. Athanasius; Raja Shatrubjit v. Mohamed Azmat Azim Khan) to stress the limited scope of review and the correct application of legal provisions; the respondent contended that those authorities did not assist the review applicants' position in the present context.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Azeez v. Dhanabagiammal, A.I.R. 1983 Mad. 5 The executing Court cannot refuse execution of a decree on the ground that the decree was passed in favour of a dead person; such a decree (passed in ignorance of the plaintiff's death) is a mere irregularity and not a matter of jurisdiction. The Court respectfully agreed with this view and applied it to hold that a decree passed in favour of a dead person is not a nullity and is executable; accordingly, setting aside the impleading order solely because the plaintiff was dead was an error apparent on the face of the record.
M.M.B. Catholicos v. N.P. Athanasius Reiterates the principles of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. concerning the limited scope of review. The Court observed that this citation merely reiterates Order 47, Rule 1 principles and is not of particular assistance beyond that reiteration.
Raja Shatrubjit v. Mohamed Azmat Azim Khan Where the law applied by a court was not the law applicable, failure to apply the correct legal provision is an error on the face of the record. The Court noted that this authority establishes that applying incorrect law is an error apparent on the record, but the decision did not advance the respondent's position in the present matter.
Chinnichi alias Parikkal v. Srinivasan Chettiar, (1970) 1 M.L.J. 234 Revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C. is intended to secure justice; the High Court may refuse to interfere in revision to avoid causing hardship or injustice even if an order is without jurisdiction. The Court cited this authority to support the proposition that revisional discretion should not be exercised where interference would result in hardship or injustice; used to argue that Section 115 should not have been invoked to deny relief to decree-holders here.
Kuba v. Vaithiyanathan, 1988 T.N.L.J. 1 Discretion under Section 115, C.P.C. should not be exercised where the order of the subordinate court renders justice to the parties on the facts of the case. Cited to support the proposition that the High Court should not have exercised its discretionary revisional jurisdiction in a manner that caused hardship to persons entitled to relief.
Balambika v. Elizabeth, 1990 T.N.L.J. 116 A single Judge refused to exercise discretion under Section 115 where setting aside the subordinate court's order would cause hardship or injustice to the respondent. Applied by the Court to support the conclusion that exercising revisional or discretionary jurisdiction to deny relief here produced injustice to decree-holders.
Murari Rao v. Balavath Dikshit, A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 98 The term "error" in Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. can include an error of law apparent on the face of the record, not only errors of fact. The Court relied on this to hold that an error of law apparent on record (such as overlooking a leading authority) can justify review; used to support that the Single Judge's view was an error apparent on the face of the record.
Natesa Naicker v. Sambanda Chettiar, A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 918 When a legal position is clearly established by authority and a Judge has palpably gone wrong by overlooking that authority, such oversight may be a ground for review as an error apparent on the face of the record. Cited as supporting authority that errors of law apparent from omission to consider binding authority are reviewable; used in reasoning that the Single Judge's decision was reviewable for such an error.
Valliammal v. Authorised Officer Mistake or error within Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. is not confined to mistakes of fact; an error of law apparent on the face of the record is reviewable. Relied upon to reinforce that the error identified in the Single Judge's order (a legal error apparent on the face of the record) warranted correction in review.
Sigappi Achi v. Palaniappa Awarding interest in a decree at a rate higher than permitted by Section 34 is an error apparent on the face of the record and hence correctable in review. Cited to illustrate that errors of law apparent on the face of the record are correctable by review; applied by analogy to the present error identified in the Single Judge's order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the matter in two principal strands: (A) the legal character of a decree passed in favour of a dead person, and (B) whether the learned Single Judge's order was open to review under Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C.

A. On the first strand, the Court agreed with the view expressed in Abdul Azeez v. Dhanabagiammal that a decree passed in favour of a dead person, where the court proceeded in ignorance of the death, is a mere irregularity and not a nullity. The Court reasoned that such a decree cannot be treated as void ab initio merely because the plaintiff was not alive when the decree was passed; at most it is an erroneous decree that must be set aside by the proper corrective proceedings (appeal, revision, or review). The Court noted that Order 21, Rule 16 read with Section 146 (and related provisions) enables legal representatives of a deceased decree-holder to come on record and apply for execution of the decree "in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree-holder."

B. On the second strand, the Court examined the scope of review jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. It observed that the rule allows review on limited grounds including "mistake or error apparent on the face of the record." The Court surveyed authorities (Murari Rao; Natesa Naicker; Valliammal; Sigappi Achi) establishing that "error" in Order 47, Rule 1 may include errors of law that are clearly apparent on the record. The Court also considered decisions on the exercise of discretionary revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. (Chinnichi alias Parikkal; Kuba; Balambika) to underline that revisional or discretionary powers should not be exercised in a manner that causes injustice or hardship to parties entitled to relief.

Synthesizing these points, the Court concluded that the learned Single Judge erred in setting aside the executing Court's order solely on the ground that Ramaswamy Reddiar was not alive at the time of the decree. That view was an error of law apparent on the face of the record and therefore correctable in review. The Court therefore allowed the review and restored the executing Court's order permitting impleading of the deceased's legal representatives.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Review Application allowed; the order of this Court dated 17.2.1994 is set aside; C.R.P. No. 148 of 1994 is dismissed; and the order of the executing Court in E.A. No. 943 of 1988 is restored.

Direct consequences for the parties: The decree-holders' position is restored: the executing Court's order permitting impleading of Ramaswamy Reddiar's legal representatives stands, and the legal representatives may proceed in execution of the decree as permitted under the applicable provisions referenced by the Court. The respondent's challenge in C.R.P. No. 148 of 1994 is dismissed. The Court ordered no costs.

Broader implications: The Court applied existing authorities to reaffirm that a decree passed in favour of a person who had died prior to the decree (and where the fact of death was not before the court) is not ipso facto a nullity but is, as a general proposition, an irregularity; such errors, when apparent on the face of the record, fall within the scope of review under Order 47, Rule 1 C.P.C. The opinion applies established principles and does not state that it is creating a new legal precedent beyond the application of those principles to the facts before it.

Show all summary ...

ORDER Thangamani, J.

1. The first review petitioner Krishnasamy Reddiar along with his brother deceased Ramaswamy Reddiar filed O.S. No. 22 of 1982 against the present respondent Manickavasagam in the Court of District Munsif of Musiri and obtained a decree ex parte on 1.12.1986, Ramaswamy Reddiar died on 4.6.1985 prior to the decree. In E.P. No. 236 of 1988 the first review petitioner sought to execute the decree. Subsequently he filed E.A. No. 943 of 1988 under Order 21, Rule 16 and Section 151, C.P.C. for impleading present review petitioners 2 and 3 who are wife and daughter of Ramaswamy Reddiar L.Rs. of the said Ramaswamy Reddiar in the abovesaid E.P. On 17.11.1993 Learned District Munsif allowed the application. The respondent herein challenged the same before this Court in C.R.P. No. 148 of 1994. Learned single Judge in his order dated 17.2.1994 allowed the C.R.P. and set aside the order in E.A. No. 943 of 1988 and dismissed that application for impleading the present petitioners 2 and 3 as L.Rs. of deceased Ramaswamy Reddiar. The order in E.A. No. 943 of 1988 was set aside on the sole ground that admittedly at the time of passing of the decree Ramaswamy Reddiar was not alive. The order of the court below is not according to law in impleading his legal representatives subsequently.

2. In this application decree-holder Krishnasamy Reddiar and the legal representatives of Ramaswamy Reddiar seek review of the order of learned single Judge dated 17.2.1994. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that while a decree passed against a dead person is ab initio void, a decree passed in favour of a dead person is not a nullity. Such a decree can utmost be an irregularity only. A decree awarded without the knowledge of the death of the plaintiff can be executed by his legal representatives. Besides, in this case there is another plaintiff Krishnasamy Reddiar and even in the absence of legal representative of deceased Ramaswamy Reddiar a decree is a valid one. So, the impugned order of learned Single Judge suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record.

3. In support of his claim learned Counsel for the review applicants relied on Abdul Azeez v. Dhanabagiammal A.I.R. 1983 Mad. 5, wherein a single Judge of this Court has held that it is not open to the executing Court to refuse execution of the decree on the ground that the decree has been passed in favour of a dead person. As the decree passed in ignorance of the death of the plaintiff is a mere irregularity, it cannot have the effect of making the decree as one without jurisdiction. Learned Counsel for the respondent has not brought any authority to my notice which has taken a contrary view. I respectfully agree with the abovesaid view of the learned single Judge and hold that a decree passed in favour of a dead person is not a nullity and the fact of death, being not brought to the notice of the court when it passed the decree is only an irregularity: and it cannot have the effect of making the decree void ab initio and the decree is executable. Where the Court proceeded with the case in ignorance of the fact of death of a person and passed a decree, that decree cannot be treated as a mere nullity. It may, no doubt, be a wrong decree, but it will have to be setaside by taking appropriate proceedings like appeal, revision or review. Generally speaking a decree passed in favour of a dead person is not a nullity, though a decree passed against a dead person can be construed as a nullity. Even if there is abatement of the suit, that would not make the decree passed in the suit as one without jurisdiction and the executing Court is not entitled to refuse to execute the decree on the ground that the plaintiff was not alive on the date when the decree was passed in his favour. Order 21, Rule 16 read with Section 146, C.P.C. enable the legal representatives of deceased decree-holder Ramasamy Reddiar to come on record and apply for execution of the decree and the decree may be executed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as if the application were made by such decree-holder. So allowing C.R.P. No. 148 of 1994 on the sole ground that Ramaswamy Reddiar was not alive on the date of decree is an error of law on the face of the record.

4. Thiru S. Srinivasan, learned Counsel for the respondent vehemently argued than the scope of an application for review is much more restricted that that of an appeal. Under Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified grounds, viz., (i) discovery of new and important matter of evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any other sufficient reason. And the expression "any other sufficient reason" means "a reason sufficient on grounds atleast analogous to those specified in the rule." In support of his contention he based reliance on M.M.B. Catholicos v. N.P. Athanasius and Raja Shatrubjit v. Mohamed Azmat Azim Khan . The first citation reiterates the principles stated in Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. and it is not of any particular assistance to him. In the next case the Supreme Court found that the law that was applied by the High Court was not the law which was applicable. Held: The court is to apply the legal provision as it always stood. Failure to do so would be an error on the face of the record. So this decision also cannot help him.

5. Whereas it is the claim of learned Counsel for the review petitioners that learned single Judge ought to have interfered in revision by invoking Section 115, C.P.C. in this case. In Chinnichi alias Parikkal v. Srinivasan Chettiar (1970)1 M.L.J. 234, Ismail, J. (as he then was), has laid down that the revisional jurisdiction of the court is intended to secure and subserve the ends of justice and not to deny or defeat it. If interference in a particular case will result in hardship or injustice to a party, the High Court will be justified in refusing to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, even if the impugned order is found to be one without jurisdiction. In Kuba v. Vaithiyanathan, 1988 T.N.L.J. 1, a Division Bench of this Court has taken the view that the discretionary jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C. should not be exercised where order of subordinate court renders justice to the parties on the facts of the case. In Balambika v. Elizabeth, 1990 T.N.LJ. 116, another single Judge of this Court was not inclined to exercise his discretion under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in view of hardship or injustice which would be caused to the respondent, if the order of the court below is set aside. In the present case O.S. No. 22 of 1982 was instituted by deceased Ramaswamy Reddiar and his brother Krishnasamy Reddiar for recovery of possession and mesne profits. The suit was decreed on 1.12.1986. During execution when the legal representatives of deceased Ramaswamy Reddiar tried to come on record, it was resisted by the defendant. After enquiry the trial Court ordered impleading of the said L.Rs. In C.R.P. No. 148 of 1994 by setting aside the impugned order. Injustice has been caused to the decree-holders who are entitled to recover possession. And in view of the ratio laid down in the three decisions referred to above the discretionary jurisdiction under Section 115 should not have been exercised since it has caused hardship and injustice to the persons rightly entitled to recover possession of the property. So looked at from any angle the order dated 17.2.1994 of learned Judge suffers from error apparent on the face of the record.

6. As early as Murari Rao v. Balavath Dikshit A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 98, a Division Bench of this Court has held that the word 'error' occurring in Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. need not necessarily be limited to errors of fact, but there are cases in which an error of law can also come within the meaning of the rule, e.g. where the error of law is such that it is clearly apparent on a perusal of the record. The Bench repelled the contention of the appellant therein that the word 'error' must necessarily be limited to errors of fact. The Bench recognised the power of the court in an appropriate case to review its order because it has overlooked a leading authority on a clear matter of law. Following this decision Wadsworth J. had held in Natesa Naicker v. Sambanda Chettiar A.I.R. 1941 Mad. 918, that when there is a legal position clearly established by a well known authority and by some unfortunate oversight the Judge has gone palpably wrong by the omission of those concerned to draw his attention to the authority, it may in a proper case be a ground coming within the category of an error apparent on the face of the record.

7. In Valliammal v. Authorised Officer , Ramasami, J. took the view that a mistake or error within the meaning of the provision in Order 47, Rule 1 of the C.PC. is not confined to mistake or error of facts. Even on a mistake or error of law, if apparent on the face of the record, the order is liable to be reviewed.

8. In Sigappi Achi v. Palaniappa , Kailasam and Ganesan, JJ. (Kailasam, J. as he then was), has held that awarding of interest in a decree at the rate higher than allowed by Section 34 of the Code is an error apparent on the face of record and non-raising that point in appeal will not make the trial court decree on that point final. Since error is apparent on its face, the same can be corrected, in review. There could be no doubt that in the impugned order dated 17.2.1994 the view taken by learned Judge that because Ramaswamy Reddiar was not alive at the time of passing of decree, the decree was a nullity and his legal representatives could not have been impleaded at the execution state is an error of law apparent on the face of the record and hence it has to be corrected.

9. In the result, the Review Application is allowed and the order of this Court dated 17 2.1994 is set aside. And C.R.P. No. 148 of 1994 is dismissed and the order of the executing Court in E.A. No. 943 of 1988 is restored. No costs.